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Educating Christians for Political Involvement: 
An Examination of Augustinian, Liberation and Confessing Clluucb 
Approaches 
Thesis submitted for the degree ofDoctor ofPhilosophy, 2003 
Nigel William Oakley 
This thesis examines the role of the churches in educating their congregations 
for political involvement. It does this by examining three aspects of the 
political thought of three theologians, Augustine, Gustavo Gutierrez and 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The first aspect is eschatology, on the grounds that 
thought on the eschaton influences thought on how to react to the present. The 
second is ecclesiology, with particular reference to how the theologian expects 
the church to relate to the civil society in which the church is located. The 
third is the 'prepolitical' education, or the education of the ordinary Christian 
for political involvement, in that civil society. The thesis concludes by stating 
that there is no formula, or curriculum, for prepolitical education, but there is a 
'summary grammar' expressed in the form of three inter-related tensions on 
which all prepolitical education must rest if it is to be a properly Christian 
prepolitical education. The first tension concerns the 'now' and the 'not yet' 
nature ofthe coming of God's kingdom; the second relates to the idea that that 
the church should be in the world but not of it; and the third is based on how 
the church relates to the world in a prophetic and an embodied manner. 
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While political theology is making strides towards acceptability in the 
academy, and it is becoming more acceptable for politicians to state publicly 
that they have a Christian (or other) faith; there are still many people, 
including Christians, who wish to keep the fields of faith and of politics totally 
separate. 1 On the one hand, 'the electorate now looks with almost 
unprecedented expectancy to the churches and to theology to make 
constructive and significant contributions to public debate', 2 but on the other, 
there are still those who are prepared to argue3 that a twenty-first century 
Archbishop of Canterbury ought to stick to religion and keep out of politics.4 
Given that there is still a debate over whether the church ought to be involved 
politically, in this thesis I have chosen to examine the parameters within which 
ordinary Christians - that is those who occupy the pews, rather than those in 
leadership- should be educated for political involvement. 
11.1 'JI'llne 'JI'RneoHogftcanD JP>mnmme~errn Jfo!l" JP>olhitftcmR lEI!iluncm~ftorrn 
I make this choice for three reasons. Firstly, in order to counter the arguments 
of those who would keep politics and faith separate, ordinary Christians 
should be aware that their faith, and the attitudes that follow from that faith, 
ought to impinge on their political thoughts, views and actions. Secondly, 
1 This includes members of the General Synod of the Church of England. On issues such as 
trade union power, 'Synod members were operating principally in terms of secular political 
values.' However on issues such as abortion, 'they seemed to be guided by principles of 
mainly theological governance' (Kenneth N. Medhurst and George H. Moyser, Church and 
Politics in a Secular Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 265). Grace Davie also notes 'the 
phrase ('privatised religion'] gives an accurate impression ofthe current state ofaffuirs, for it 
is true that religion has very largely become a matter of personal or private choice. So long as 
the expression of your views does not offend anyone else, you can believe whatever you like' 
(Religion in Britain since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 76).1t is, of course, when religious 
people speak politically that offence is taken - by those who disagree politically - and 
objections follow. 
2 Duncan B. Forrester, Truthful Action: Explorations in Practical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark, 2000), 118. 
3 In the letters pages of The Times, and elsewhere. 
4 This separatist view is not confined to non-Christians. Medhurst and Moyser note that within 
the Anglican Church, there are those who 'argue that Christianity is largely a personal matter 
having no direct implications' (Church and Politics, 356). 
1 
because magisterial pronouncements from church leaders are bound to have 
more weight if there is active support for those pronouncements from the 
'grass roots' ofthe churches, rather than the, at best, passive support which is 
all too common at present, then the grass roots needed to be educated to 
understand the reasoning behind such pronouncements. Thirdly, because I 
believe that the more the Christian community can influence the larger society 
in which we all live, the better society may be as a result. At the very least, 
Christians can point to how society can, and ought, to improve, so that life 
may be better, more just, for all. 
Rather than look at educational practice I wish to examine the theological 
underpinnings from which any such practice should emerge. This is because 
educational practice will change with circumstances, time, and the means by 
which people are able to participate in the political processes of their society. I 
have therefore set out to establish some parameters by which a Christian 
political involvement in any society may be measured. The approach I use in 
examining the theological bases for Christian political involvement is to look 
at the thought of three different theologians whose work has influenced 
thinking on political involvement for Christians. 
1.2 The Three Theologians 
I have chosen Augustine of Hippo as the first theologian because of his 
continuing influence on Western Christian political thought. Due to his 
profound influence throughout the ages, and the differing ways in which his 
thought has been interpreted, I will look not only at some of Augustine's 
writings, but I will also look briefly at the work of some of his twentieth 
century interpreters in this field. One of these interpreters is Peter Bathory, 
whose thesis on prepolitical education in Augustine's thought has, until now, 
remained unexamined. While I fundamentally disagree with Bathory's 
2 
analysis, his thesis has pointed a way forward for considering how Christians 
may be educated 'prepolitically.' 5 
As an antithesis to Augustine, I have chosen the liberation theologian Gustavo 
Gutierrez as my second theologian. I will also examine the work of Paulo 
Freire: the pedagogue on whom Gutierrez based his work on Base Ecclesial 
Communities. As I shall show, both Gutierrez and Freire have mellowed 
somewhat in later years: the former due to a greater emphasis on the spiritual 
aspects of liberation, and the latter's stance has softened mainly due to the 
practical experience ofbeing involved as a political leader in education. 
Finally, as my third theologian, I have chosen Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Although 
he has many contributions in his own right, Bonhoeffer can be viewed as 
having a mediating position between the first two schools of theology, as he 
has an Augustinian inheritance (mediated through his Lutheranism), and he 
has, by their own admission, influenced liberation theologians. This influence 
is somewhat surprising as Bonhoeffer himself remained, as I shall show, 
authoritarian in outlook both culturally and politically. 
1.3 Eschatology, Ecclesiology and Prepolitical Education 
These three theologians are from different times, places and cultures. In order 
to compare their political thought, I will examine three specific areas of that 
thought. I will look first at eschatology. This is because, as has become widely 
accepted during the twentieth century starting from the work of Albert 
Schweitzer on the kingdom of God, a theologian's approach to eschatology 
cannot but affect their approach to the present.6 If God is seen, for example, as 
5 I have borrowed the term 'prepolitical' from Peter Bathory (see Political Theory as Public 
Confession (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1981), and chapter 3 below). I use the term 
'prepolitical education' to mean that education which prepares people to be politically 
involved. This is as opposed to political education, which is education for specific views and 
actions, and which can easily become political indoctrination. 
6 
'From first to last ... Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward 
moving, and therefore also revolutionising and transforming the present' (Jiirgen Moltmann, 
Theology of Hope (London: SCM Press, 1967), 16). For the contribution ofSchweitzer (and 
Johannes Weiss) see ibid., 37-9. 
3 
a God who will judge and therein condemn the world and who calls his people 
out of that world, then it is unlikely that Christians will be encouraged to 
engage with the world for its betterment; conversely if God is seen as the One 
who will bring the world to perfection, then Christians will be encouraged to 
spend their entire energy in improving the lot of humanity. None of my 
theological conversation partners offers such a form of eschatology, at either 
extreme; though Augustine is more negative about the world than Gutierrez. It 
is unsurprising, therefore, that the latter is more positive about political 
involvement and action than the former. 
The second area I look at relates to ecclesiology - to how the three theologians 
related the church to the society in which that church was located. Are church 
members, and the church of which they are a part, merely aliens in an 
unfriendly environment, and to keep their heads down as they await the 
promises of heaven? Or is the church the voice that condemns the injustices of 
society, and thereby requiring its members to take the lead in overcoming 
those rruustices? Or are church members to work invisibly within society, 
seeking somehow to do what they can when they can, but, for the most part, 
going along with society as it is? Circumstances alter cases, but neither 
Augustine, Gutierrez, nor Bonhoeffer ever advocated non-involvement in 
society: the questions revolve around how and in what way were people to be 
involved in society. However, as I shall show, for both Augustine and 
Bonhoeffer, the emphasis was on how church leaders were to be involved in 
civil society, rather than ordinary people. The ordinary Christian's role was 
relegated largely to obedience, unless civil society's strictures ran contrary to 
the commands of God. 
Given this attitude to the role of the ordinary Christian, the education of the 
ordinary Christian for political involvement, or prepolitical education, 7 
becomes the third area of examination. Clearly, the liberation approach stands 
apart from the other two theologians who place a greater presumption in 
favour of political authority. However, it cannot be said that Liberation 
7 See note 5 above. 
4 
Theology advocates disobedience for the sake of it. Though Liberation 
Theology is clearly more sympathetic to revolution and to the 'counter-
violence' of the masses against the oppression of the state, it is interesting to 
note that both Gutierrez and Freire tone down their revolutionary language in 
later works. None of the theological approaches is entirely free of hierarchy 
and thereby of authority,8 but all of them do have something to say about the 
education of the ordinary Christian for political involvement; depending of 
course on what is meant by 'political involvement'. 
1.4 Pollitican Hmrvolvement in Civlill Society 
Where politics is seen as a debate over what is the most efficient way of 
implementing a course of action, there may be a wish to leave the discussion 
to the experts, but debate in politics does not just come about because people 
have differing views over what is the most effective means of governing 
society, it also occurs because people's interests differ, so what is seen as 
efficient or effective will differ. More importantly for this thesis, people's 
values differ. This means that their ideas of what is right, not just what is 
efficient or effective, will differ.9 It is at this level of values that silence by any 
part of the community allows others with differing values to impose their 
views on the whole of society unopposed. It also means that those who do 
seek change will assume that silent churches, and silent church people, support 
the status quo. This is a broad definition of what political involvement entails; 
indeed Gustavo Gutierrez also refers to a broad and a narrow definition of 
politics. For Gutierrez, the construction of a society 'in which people can live 
in solidarity' is political and 'encompasses and severely conditions all human 
activity.' He continues: ' [ o ]nly within this broad meaning of the political 
sphere can we situate the more precise notion of"politics," as an orientation to 
8 Gutierrez and Freire work from a hierarchy of pedagogue, 'organic intellectual' and the 
masses. However, as I note, this is an organisational, rather than a status, hierarchy. 
9 
'A modern democratic society is characterised not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incomprehensible yet 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines' (John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993), xvi). 
5 
power.' 10 Gutierrez is clearly reacting against the idea that "politics" should be 
a clearly defined free time activity. 11 Indeed he is prepared to regard the 
struggles against the marginalization of unimportant people as political 
struggles, even if some would regard such small gestures as 'having little 
political effectiveness.' 12 Following Gutierrez, 'politics' and 'political 
involvement' in this thesis will have a broad definition encompassing the 
values by which Christians live. A command as basic to the Christian faith as 
'loving your neighbour' will then have a political dimension, but the practical 
outworking of that love will, of course, depend on time and circumstance: 
however, none of the theologians studied in this thesis assumed that loving 
one's neighbours meant that they should be left alone in their troubles. Being a 
Christian means being involved in civil society, and that, in turn, means being 
politically involved in that civil society. 
This is, of course, a messy business. We cannot necessarily tell what is the 
right course of action to take in a particular circumstance. All we can do, like 
Bonhoeffer, though hopefully not in such extreme circumstances, is take the 
free responsibility that we have under Christ and offer that to him and trust 
that our actions are indeed righteous ones. Politics, certainly in its narrow 
sense of a will to power, cannot be defined as a natural part of humanity's role 
on earth in the pre-Fall sense of 'natural';13 but trying to keep the church pure 
will in the end divorce it from the real lives that its people (and any others 
whom it is trying to reach) live. In this sense, the church would return to what 
Bonhoeffer calls the 'monastic' misunderstanding of what God's call on our 
lives means, and tries to find somewhere 'which is not the world', where this 
monastic call can be lived out 'more fitly.' 14 
10 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation (London: SCM Press, revised edition 1988), 
30. See 4.4.3 below for further discussion. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., XXX. 
13 Here I follow Augustine (see 2.4.3.4 below). 
14 See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Touchstone, 1995), 252; and see 6.5 below for 
further discussion. 
6 
Another difficulty is what is meant by 'civil society'? 'There are many 
definitions of the term "civil society" ... ' 15 amongst social scientists and 
others. Interestingly, the same social scientists generally understand 'that local 
religious congregations including churches are a part of civil society.' 16 When 
I refer to the relation between church and civil society, I shall assume that the 
church qua church is distinct from civil society. This does not mean that I 
assume that a church could have no contact with civil society: indeed each 
member of the church is, simply by living, working and acting in the 
community, of necessity a member of civil society. Also, as I have pointed out 
above, none of the theologians studied in this thesis would accept non-
involvement in civil society. Even Augustine, who makes much of the 
different 'ends' of members of the earthly and heavenly cities -members of 
the heavenly city are destined for heaven, and those of the earthly city are 
destined for damnation - requires his readers to use the peace of the earthly 
city, to pray for this 'peace of Babylon', even though they may be mere 
pilgrims in a strange land on their way to their home in the celestial city. 
Christians then are to be involved in civil society, even if they are aware that 
there is always something better than that civil society. Civil society, for this 
thesis, is defined as the communities in which we live, and in which we seek 
to live at peace with one another. Civil society, being composed of imperfect 
human beings, will always be imperfect itself, and will contain injustices that 
need to be challenged. 
15 Michael Walzer, 'Introduction' in Michael Walzer (ed.) Toward a Global Civil Society 
(Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1995), I. For a discussion on the different ways in which 
civil society has been defined, see John Keane, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 
32-64. Cf. Margaret Harris, 'Civil Society and the Role of UK Churches: An Exploration', 
Studies in Christian Ethics 15, 2 (2002), 47. 
16 Harris, 'Civil Society and the Role ofUK Churches', 48. Waltzer's list of the networks that 
must be rebuilt by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe includes churches 
('The Concept of Civil Society' in Walzer (ed.) Toward a Global Civil Society, 7). For Keane, 
civil society requires 'the principle of freedom of religious worship . . . [and] the freedom not 
to be religious' (Civil Society, 108)- in a chapter about nationalism, Keane appears to argue 
that one's religious identity, like one's national identity, should be 'only one identity among 
others' (ibid., I 07). 
7 
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How then are ordinary church members to be educated to cope with living in 
this imperfect world? If we follow Augustine and, to a lesser extent, 
Bonhoeffer we could conclude that we should leave 'politics' to church 
leaders. They will do what they can when they can. However, my contention is 
that if church members are silent on issues - such as the war against Iraq -
when their leaders speak out, then church leaders will inevitably be speaking 
in a vacuum, and can find that their comments are at best reported, and at 
worst ignored. Church members need to know, at the very least, the basis on 
which their leaders are speaking out, and to know why those leaders are saying 
what they are saying. 17 This leads me to the thesis, outlined above, that there 
needs not only to be a prepolitical education within the congregation, but an 
examination of the theological foundation for that education. 
The theological foundation of a prepolitical education for the congregation is 
expressed in the form of a summary grammar. This grammar in turn rests on 
three inter-related tensions, within which any church must remain if it is to 
educate its congregation prepolitically. The first tension is eschatological in 
that it relates to the 'now' and the 'not yet' nature of the coming of God's 
kingdom; the second follows from the idea that the church is in the world, but 
not of it; and the third tension is based on how the church relates to that world 
in a prophetic and an embodied manner. However, before I expand on these 
tensions, I will look at each of the three theologians in more detail, beginning 
with Augustine. 
17 This is not to say that political involvement is entirely a matter of speaking, but that at 
present it seems that a lot of political 'action' from Anglican bishops consists in reports and 
submission to various parts of government. It is always to be hoped, and expected, that any 
church leader's actions, whether they could be construed as political or not, do not belie their 
words. 
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JF~OM lL 'A1f.JG1f.JS'JI'l!Nl!SMJE POILJ!'JI'l!Q1f.JJE 'fO JPOILll'fllCAJL 
A.lU G lU§TliNliA.NJISMl§: 
A. ClRillTllCA.IL A.CC01UN1I' (())JF IruECEN'f IruEJFILECTllON ON 
A.lUGlU§'fliNE9§ lPOILll'fllCAJL TlHfOlUGJHI'f 
In spite of his overwhelming influence down the centuries, Augustine left 
behind no treatise devoted to political thought. 1 His thought has to be culled 
from various books, letters and sermons, and has inevitably borne different 
interpretations. Augustine was famously used as an authority on both sides of 
the eleventh-century Investiture Controversy, and even twentieth-century 
exploration of his political thought has resulted in Augustine's concerns being 
filtered through the fears and aspirations of the interpreter's time. 
In this chapter, I will give an overview of Augustine's political thought and 
how that thought has been interpreted. The debate centres on how far 
Augustine felt that the church could interfere in matters of the civil society, or 
whether he felt that Christians should merely obey the strictures of Romans 13 
in all circumstances; this debate therefore affects how far the congregation 
should be educated for political involvement.2 It also affects what I shall ca113 
the "summary grammar" of the church's role in the world, and the questions of 
how far the paradox of the world being both destined for destruction and loved 
by God means that Christians should engage with that world. 4 
1 
'[R]econstructing Augustine's political ... thought is like putting together the fragments of a 
pot retrieved from an archaeological site' (R W. Dyson, The Pilgrim City: Social and Political 
Ideas in the Writings of St Augustine of Hippo (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell Press, 
2001), xi). 
2 This is the specific topic of chapter 3. 
3 Following Nicholas Lash, see chapter 7 below. 
4 The prophetic/embodied aspect of the summary grammar is less of a concern from an 
Augustinian perspective. 
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After I have examined Augustine's principal 'political' idea5 of the two cities, 
I shall look at other, less theoretical, aspects ofhis political involvement. This 
second part will also look at some of Augustine's letters and sermons given in 
response to events as they happened. I shall also briefly consider what has 
been, and what now should be, understood by 'political Augustinianism'. I 
shall then discuss some twentieth century views on Augustine's political 
thought. In the light of all this, I shall re-examine Augustinian political 
thought under three topics. These topics are :firstly the eschatological question 
- that is, in the light of the final destination of the two cities, whether the 
pilgrim members of the city of God should cooperate with members of the 
earthly city; secondly, the ecclesiological question, how the church should 
relate to society; and, thirdly, the educational question, how far does 
Augustine believe that Christians require educating so that they can participate 
in their society.6 
Augustine lived in the fourth and fifth centuries, from 354 to 430,7 just as 
Catholic Christianity became the only recognised religion in the Roman 
Empire. 8 In early adulthood, he rejected the Catholic Christianity of his 
mother, and, for a while, embraced Manichaeanism. Though he remained part 
of the sect for nine years, he was spiritually unsatisfied and started to look for 
a more adequate system of belief. It was through the sermons of Ambrose, 
bishop of Milan, that Augustine returned to the faith of his childhood. He was 
baptised in 387. His return to Catholic Christianity occasioned a crisis of 
employment. He felt compelled to give up his job as public rhetor at the 
5 
'Augustine's purposes ... first and last, are religious' (ibid.). Even the two cities are not, 
therefore, presented as a political idea - however much political use has been made of that 
idea. Johannes van Oort gives an impressive list of scholars (including Neville Figgis) who 
correctly regard De Civitate Dei as an apologetic work 'contra paganos'. See van Oort, 
Jerusalem and Baby/on: A Study into Augustine's City of God and the Sources of His 
Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 163-7. 
6 As already noted, this topic will be covered in more depth in chapter 3. 
7 Among the best biographies of Augustine are Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1967) and Gerald Bonner, St Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies 
(Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1986). 
8 Emperor Constantine issued the Edict of Milan, which tolerated Christianity, in 313; the 
general edict against paganism (which therefore made Christianity the only form of religion 
tolerated in the Empire) was issued in 391 by Emperor Theodosius. 
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Imperial Court in Milan, and he feh he could no longer teach rhetoric: with his 
conversion his promising career in Imperial service was over, and he sought a 
life in retirement. 
A year later he returned to Thagaste, in North Africa, the place of his birth, to 
continue his 'retirement'9, but made the mistake in 391 of going on a visit to 
Hippo, not knowing that the bishop there was looking for a priest to assist him 
Augustine was recognised, and, in the manner of the time, was seized and 
forcibly ordained. On Bishop Valerius' death, Augustine became bishop of 
Hippo in his place, a title and job he was to fulfil until his death thirty-five 
years later. 
Even while he was a priest, Augustine was, against the practice of the time, 
encouraged to preach, and to play his part in church affairs. The church in 
North Africa was beset by the Donatist controversy- a split in the church that 
dated back to the time of the anti-Christian persecutions. Augustine was to 
spend much of his life debating with, and writing against this sect, as well as 
the Manichees and, later on, the Pelagians. 
Augustine lived in troubled and violent times: he was the target of a 
Circumcellion assassination attempt. 10 Across the Mediterranean, the Empire 
was under threat. In 410, Rome itself was sacked. Although the physical 
damage was comparatively minor, the damage to the Roman psyche was 
colossal. Augustine felt compelled to write an extended rebuttal to those 
pagans who derided Christianity on the one hand for taking people away from 
the old gods who had protected Rome for centuries, and on the other, for 
having a God who was clearly too weak to protect the centre of the Empire. 
The barbarian hordes were a constant threat to peace and Augustine himself 
9 It was a very active 'retirement': Augustine had started on the great output of books and 
treatises that would continue for the rest of his life. The classical idea of otium is better 
understood as a retreat from the world for study and/or prayer, rather than our idea of 
retirement. 
10 Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 330. The Circumcellions were an extreme, and violent, part of 
the Donatist church. This incident is also recorded in Possidus's account of Augustine's life, 
see 'The Lire of St. Augustine written by Bishop Possidus' in F.R. Hoare (ed. and trans.), The 
Western Fathers (London: Sheed and Ward, 1954), 206-7. 
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was to die with the Vandals at the city gates. Augustine knew that the Roman 
peace was fragile, and that disaster could easily be around the next corner. He 
therefore sought, and encouraged others to seek, the peace of eternal life, 
which was better than any peace that the world could give. 
2.3 The Two Citie§ 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Inevitably, a section with the title 'The Two Cities' will concentrate on 
Augustine's major work, De Civitate Dei [The City of God]. This book is not 
the first or only reference to the two cities, but it is his major work on the 
theme of the earthly and heavenly cities. 11 These two cities would only be 
separated at the parousia; until that time members of the two cities would 
intermingle in the saeculum, 12 both seeking (for different reasons) the peace of 
Babylon. 
2.3.2 Pilgrimage and Peace 
Augustine regarded the Christian as a pilgrim member of the city of God, a 
wanderer within the saeculum. Only at the end of time, when Christ returns in 
judgment, would the members of the two cities be separated and receive their 
reward on the basis of whether they have been guided by love of God or love 
of self. Both the earthly and the heavenly city, according to Augustine, have 
existed, and will continue to exist, throughout time. This 'twofold division of 
the universe into the "City of God" and the "City of Earth" originated in the 
prideful revolt of the (now fallen) angels in heaven.' 13 In De Civitate Dei, 
Augustine makes it clear that he does not regard members of the city of God 
as being 'at home' in the earthly city. 
Now Cain . . . belonged to the City of man; the second son, Abel, 
belonged to the City of God . . . When those two cities began to run 
11 This theme can be seen in Augustine's thought from the 390s onwards. For a discussion of 
the development of this idea in Augustine, see van Oort, Jerusalem and Baby/on, 87: 'The 
City of God is ... a grand vision [in which Augustine] brought together what he had written 
earlier ... '. 
12 For further discussion on 'saeculum' see 2.4.3.3 below. 
13 Rex Martin, 'The Two Cities in Augustine's Political Philosophy', Journal of the History of 
Ideas 33 (1972), 195. 
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through their course of birth and death, the first to be born was a 
citizen of this world, and the second was a pilgrim in this world, 
belonging to the City of God. The latter was predestined by grace and 
chosen by grace; by grace he was a pilgrim below, and by grace he was 
a citizen above ... 14 
From this, it seems that the earth is the territory of the earthly city, through 
which the pilgrims are to pass on their way to eternal glory. However, the 
situation is not as simple or as clear-cut as it might first appear; members of 
both cities 'make use of good things, or are afllicted with the evils, of this 
temporal state' and will continue to do so until 'they are separated by the final 
judgment'. 15 In other words, members of both cities must live side by side in 
the same world, and make use of the same peace, 16 until that world ends. 
For Augustine, humanity is naturally social. 17 However, it does not follow that 
he believes that humanity is naturally political. 18 So, although the two cities 
live side by side in this world, and make use of the good (and suffer the evil) it 
offers, the question arises as to how this cohabitation is to be achieved and 
carried on. 
2.3.3 A Common Good? 
One of the major difficulties for the pilgrim members ofthe city of God is that 
'the order of their love' is so radically different from the members of the 
earthly city (who will always be in the majority). 19 As far as Augustine is 
concerned, either one's love is orientated towards God, or it is orientated 
towards sel£ However, if people are to live peaceably together, there has to be 
some sort of agreement over what is to be the basis of their society- what is to 
be 'the common good.' But, in terms of the two cities, the question arises of 
how is there to be any 'political agreement among men who are theoretically 
14 R W. Dyson (ed. and trans.), The City of God against the Pagans (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), XV. I. All quotations from De Civitate Dei (hereafter referred to as 
DCD), unless otherwise indicated, will be from this translation. 
IS DCD, XVIII. 54. 
16 DCD, XIX. 26. 
17 See DCD, XII. 22-3, XIX. 12. 
18 For a discussion on this point, see Dyson, The Pilgrim City, 48f. 
19 See, for example, DCD, XVI.21 and XXI.l2. 
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opposed to one another'i0 Unless there is some basic agreement amongst 
people, political cooperation will be 'superficial at best'.21 Fundamentally, 
George Lavere contends, Augustine believes that there can be no common 
good between the two cities, just as there is - and never has been - a truly just 
state which based 'its conception of justice upon a sincere allegiance to 
God'.22 
However, in De Civitate Dei XIX. 24, Augustine accepts that all societies 
have cohered somehow. There is, he claims two chapters later, an intermediate 
concept of peace - one which members of both cities can use - and it is in this 
intermediate concept of peace, 'the peace of Babylon', that an intermediate 
common good can be placed. In other words, even though at the deepest level, 
'[t]he two cities cannot agree on a single purpose' ,23 Christians are told by 
Augustine to make use of the 'peace of Babylon', and they are to pray for 'the 
temporal peace which is for the time being shared by the good and the wicked 
alike. '24 Although there can never be a societas perfecta on this earth, 25 there 
is an intermediate peace which all can strive to maintain. It is at this level of 
striving that Augustine expects his judge to sit, 26 and the Christian king is 
expected to rule, even while those judges and kings are all too aware of the 
lack of true peace and justice in the world they have authority. 
Given the above, the question anses whether (following Robert Markus) 
'Augustinian theology should at least undermine Christian opposition to an 
open, pluralist, secular society. ' 27 This is, to say the very least, debatable. 
Augustine asserted that any society that did not submit to God was, in the final 
20 Jacques Maritain, quoted in George Lavere, 'The Problem of the Common Good in Saint 
Augustine's Civitas Terrena', Augustinian Studies 14 (1983), 2. 
21 Lavere, ibid. 
22 Ibid., 5. Augustine makes this clear in DCD, XIX. 21. 
23 Ibid, 7. 
24 DCD, XIX. 26. Interestingly, and against most commentators, Oliver O'Donovan argues 
that Augustine does not allow for any sort of 'justice ofBabylon' to go with its peace (Oiiver 
O'Donovan, 'Augustine's City of God XIX and Western Political Thought', in Dorothy F. 
Donnelly (ed.), The City of God: A Collection ofCritical Essays (New York: Peter Lang, 
1995), 1421). Ifthis is so, why should Augustine expect a judge to sit (DCD, XIX. 6)? 
25 Against Augustine's medieval interpreters- see below. 
26 DCD, XIX. 6. 
27 RA. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology ofSt Augustine (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 173. 
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analysis, unjust and therefore would be damned. Gerald Bonner, in his review 
ofMarkus's work, puts it this way: 
Augustine never forgets the warped element in the nature of fallen man 
which continually threatens to transform the theologically neutral 
terrena respublica into a visible manifestation of the Civitas terrena, 
and his tendency to identify the two while refusing to abide by that 
identification ... is psychologically justified for, as Markus says: "The 
sphere of politics belongs irrevocably to the realm infected with sin."28 
Everything in Augustine's career would suggest that he considered a 
state governed by Christians to be a "better" political entity than a 
pagan state; and the general tendencies in open, pluralist, secular 
societies hardly suggest that the abandonment of religious norms has 
been a particular blessing for human society.29 
This lack of blessing upon 4the abandonment of religious norms' gives 
Christians another reason to be involved in civil society on the grounds that if 
they are not involved, others, with different perspectives will be. For example, 
in Epistula 220 to Boniface, Augustine reminds him that he, Boniface, did not 
give up public life because of the benefit he was able to give to the churches 
whilst in his public role. 30 Augustine is quite happy for this involvement to be 
for the betterment of the churches, as the churches point the way to the City of 
God, and therefore to humanity's true 'end'. However, as we have seen, even 
in their cooperation with those who have such a distinct 'end' from them, the 
pilgrim members of the city of God do not lose their eschatological 
perspective. Humanity remains divided on the most fundamental issue, and 
this division will remain until the civitas terrena is destroyed at the parousia. 
This awareness of the final separation31 does not, in Augustine's eyes, excuse 
a lack of involvement in the world, for all its problems; as I have noted, 
Augustine agrees with the philosophers that 'the life of the wise man is a 
social one'. 32 To sum up, those Christians who have the gifts and the calling, 
28 Ibid. 
29 Gerald Bonner, 'Quid lmperatori cum Ecc/esia? St. Augustine on History and Society', 
Augustinian Studies 2 (1971), 246-7. 
30 Letter 220, 3, in E.M. Atkins and RJ. Dodaro (eds. and trans.), Augustine: Political 
Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). All references to Augustine's 
sermons and letters will be from this collection, unless otherwise indicated. Contra Atkins and 
Dodaro, hereafter I shall follow normal practice by referring to 'Epistula' and 'Sermo'. 
31 Which also extends into this life: against Markus, O'Donovan contends that 'true Christians 
were never true Romans ... '. The temporal peace, 'not an institution, but simply a condition of 
order', is the only thing 'common to both communities' ('Western Political Thought', 141). 
32 DCD, XIX. 5. 
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must fulfil their role in the saeculum, and seek cooperation in and with 
members of the earthly city for the sake of the peace of Babylon - even if their 
constant prayer is 'From my necessities deliver Thou me. ' 33 
2.3.4 Babylonian Peace, Yes; Societas Pt!Yfecta, No 
As far as Augustine is concerned, the peace of Babylon was all that could be 
expected from the political authorities, not least because one person cannot see 
into another's heart. 34 Augustine is also aware that, if a society exists by being 
'bound together by a common agreement as to the objects oftheir love', then 
it follows that 'the better the objects of this agreement, the better the people 
••. '.
35 However, true peace, a peace that did not depend on coercion, was only 
to be found in the City of God.36 For this reason Herbert Deane correctly 
insists that '[i]t is perfectly clear, however, that the conditions sine qua non for 
the existence of such a [Christian, truly just] state can never be realised on this 
earth. ' 37 Therefore those commentators who thought that Augustine regarded a 
truly just, Christian state as 'feasible or necessary'38 were wrong. However, 
this does not mean that Augustine views the beliefs of those in authority with 
indifference. In Epistula 138 (quoted by Deane), we are told that 'an army 
composed of the sort of soldiers that the teaching of Christ would require' 
along with others, both in authority and under it 'would contribute greatly to 
the security of the commonwealth'.39 This situation may be 'contrary-to-fact' 
and conditiona140 - in so far as there is no commonwealth so composed - but 
Augustine is clear that such a society would be better than any other. He 
makes a similar point in De Civitate Dei: 
If kings of the earth and all nations, princes and all the judges of the 
earth ... people of every age and each sex ... if all these together were 
to hear and embrace the Christian precepts of justice and moral virtue, 
33 DCD, XIX. 6. 
34 Even with the aid of torture, a judge cannot be certain he has arrived at the truth. See DCD, 
XIX.6. 
35 DCD, XIX. 24. 
36 Even Christians cannot obtain true peace in its entirety in this life. See DCD, XIX. 27. 
37 Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1963), 137. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ep. 138. 15. Cf., Deane, Political and Social Ideas, 138. 
40 See Deane, 138. 
16 
then would the commonwealth adorn its lands with happiness in this 
present life and ascend to the summit of life eternal, there to reign in 
utmost blessedness. 41 
Augustine is clearly aware of the present state of humanity and the 
commonwealth, but a Christianized society, as an improvement on any other 
society, 'must at least be left open as a possibility'42 however remote that 
possibility might appear to Augustine, or to us. 
The obvious Christianized society is, of course, the church. However, as I 
have noted above, the church in Augustine's time had plenty of members 
whose attitude and behaviour left much to be desired. Neville Figgis, in his 
discussion of the church, tells us that: 
By the mere use of the terms civitas and regnum ... Augustine 
prepared the way for the later development of the doctrine that the 
Church is a societas perfecta, and must have the powers necessary to 
any self-sufficient community.43 
Figgis is careful to state that the societas perfecta doctrine is a development 
from Augustine's thought, and not part of his thought. Although there are 
points of contact between the City of God and the institutional church, 44 the 
identity between the two is metaphorical and representational, rather than 
actua1.45 Augustine's Church was, as he well knew, imperfect. If Augustine is 
seen as opening the way for a societas perfecta doctrine, then Augustine's 
followers were simply being careless with his language and meaning, and 
thereby misinterpreting him. 46 
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that Augustine held out no hope for a perfect 
society in this world. Indeed in his discussion of Augustine's ideas on sacred 
and secular history, Markus points out that 
41 DCD, H. 19. 
42 Martin, 'The Two Cities in Augustine's Political Philosophy', 20 I. 
43 J. Neville Figgis, The Political Aspects of Augustine's City of God, (London: Longmans/ 
Green, 1921), 71. 
44 For example, Augustine sees himself as 'defending the City of God - that is His Church' 
against the calumnies of the philosophers (DCD, XIII. 16). See also ibid., XVII. 4, XVIII. 29, 
where similar identification appears to be made, and cf. Martin, 199. Van Oort (Jerusalem and 
Baby/on, 128) makes the excellent comment that 'concerning the civitas Dei he [Augustine] 
hardly ever states that it has reprobate people in its midst; but concerning the ecclesia, he does 
so on several occasions.' 
45 Cf. Martin, 198-202. 
46 For further exploration ofthis topic, see the discussion on 'political Augustinianism' below. 
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Even at a time when Augustine is prepared to envisage a period in 
which Christ will rule with his saints before the final consummation of 
history, he repudiates naive millenaristic speculation ... [A]t the end of 
the fourth century, Augustine was moving ever further from the 
conceptions which lay behind them. After c.400, even the residual 
echoes of milleniaristic ideas ... disappear. Some famous chapters of 
his De Civitate Dei contain a frontal attack on chiliasm.47 
In other words, by the time De Civitate Dei came to be written any idea that a 
form of perfectionism could be found on earth had completely disappeared 
from Augustine's mind. Deane is equally gloomy: Augustine's words 'give no 
support to the hope that the world will gradually be brought to belief in Christ 
and that earthly society can be transformed, step by step, into the kingdom of 
God.'48 
Against this pessimism, Jean Bethke Elshtain takes a more balanced approach. 
For her, Augustine sees that '(s]ociallife on all levels is full of ills and yet to 
be cherished. ' 49 However good Augustine is 'in cataloguing the miseries 
attendant upon the human life ... [t]here are countervailing influences ... '.50 
Although it is true that, for Augustine, perfection is impossible, for '(e]ven in 
our good works we are dislocated creatures, tom by discord, but striving to 
attain some measure of concordia', it is also true that 'love abides'51 for as 
she notes, Augustine says that 'a man should harm no one, and, second, that he 
should do good to all, so far as he can. ' 52 
Augustine, even while he was aware ofhow imperfect the world is (and how it 
will never be perfect), never abandoned the hope that guides us towards the 
peace and love of God. 'And the more we try to emulate God's love, the 
stronger will be our hope; the more decent our lives with and among one 
another. ' 53 Society, it seems on this reading, appears open to progress. But 
Epistle 44,54 which Elshtain quotes to support her assertion, merely points to 
47 Markus, Saecu/um, 20. 
48 Deane, Political and Social Ideas, 38. 
49 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Augustine and the Limits of Politics (Notre Dame, In d.: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1995), 27-8. 
50 Ibid., 37-8. 
51 Ibid., 89. 
52 DCD, XIX. 14; cf. Elshtain, The Limits of Politics, 96. 
53 Elshtain, 89. Also see Ep. 138. 15, quoted above. 
54 See Philip Schaff(ed.), The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Volume 1: The Confessions 
and Letters of St. Augustine (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994 (reprint)), 285-90. 
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Christian behaviour in love (as opposed to relying on money) and has no 
theory of progression in society as such. Augustine does not regard historical 
progression or improvement as inevitable. Indeed, he finds historical 
development 'inherently ambiguous', what may appear to be progress may 
turn out to be a disaster and vice versa. 55 The best we can say is that society 
can be 'Christianized' -in that society may be composed of Christian soldiers, 
judges, kings and so on - and that Augustine saw that this sort of 
'Christianized' society would be better than other societies.56 This does not 
mean that Augustine saw the (earthly) possibility of a societas perfecta. As far 
as Augustine is concerned, God may be achieving his purposes by 'allowing 
evil to wax great. ,s? However, whether the times were good or bad, Augustine 
expects some form of Christian involvement in society. 58 The motivation for 
such action, and for what end, is what I explore in the next sections. 
When any examination is undertaken of Augustine's political involvement, we 
see that it is Augustine himself,59 or his fellow bishops,60 or Christian Imperial 
o:fficials61 who are urged to take some form of action in the saeculum. This 
tendency can be seen in both Augustine's more theoretical (even if polemic) 
writing,62 as well as when he is dealing with practical, up to the moment, 
issues in his letters and sermons. This action depended upon the authority 
which had been given to various bodies by Rome: Augustine himself 'was a 
much sought-after arbitrator' in his own Episcopal court.63 Conversely, the 
ordinary people are encouraged not to act- and certainly not to take part in a 
55 O'Donovan, 'Western Political Thought', 146. 
56 See Ep. 138. 15. For further discussion on whether Augustine thought historical 
development was possible, see 2.3.6 below. 
S? O'Donovan, 'Western Political Thought', 146. 
58 For example, the reluctant judge will take his seat, because 'the claims of society, which he 
thinks it wicked to abandon, constrain him ... ' (DCD, XIX. 6, emphasis added). 
59 
'But you all know that it's your needs that force me to go there, even though I don't want to. 
I have to wait my chance ... '. Sermo 302. 17. 
60 See for example Ep. 1 0* to Alypius. 
61 See for example Ep. 220 to Boniface. 
62 Such as 'The Mirror to Princes' in DCD, V. 24. 
63 The court's authority derived from apostolic instruction to believers (I Cor 6.1-6) and 'the 
Roman legal device of recepti arbitri' (Bonner, Life and Controversies, 123). 
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lynching. In Sermo 302, Augustine rages against his congregation for their 
part in the death of an unpopular Roman official: 
'But', you might say, 'think ofthe things that crook did .. .'. He has his 
own judges, his own authorities. There is an established government: 
all that there are are established by God [Rom 13.1]. Why are you so 
violent? What authority have you been given? But, of course, this isn't 
public punishment, it's simply terrorism in the open.64 
In the same sermon, the only people encouraged to act, as they were the ones 
with the legal authority, are the heads of households who should have 
prevented their families (and anyone else under their authority) from taking 
part in the disturbance.65 It is clear that Augustine does not approve or 
advocate mob violence of any description. Robert Dodaro puts it this way: 
Augustine makes it clear in this sermon that what he most fears in 
political dissidence is its capacity to corrupt the desires of Christians to 
live justly into a form of envy aimed at possessing and exercising the 
same corrupting power which those in public office possess. If 
Christians truly wish to create a more just society, they should first 
renounce the desire to become like their enemies by renouncing the use 
of violence. Christ and the martyrs testify that the only efficacious way 
to reform political society is to oppose injustice through nonviolence. 66 
At first, we may wish to question this non-violent approach as it sits strangely 
with Augustine's advocacy of the just war and coercion. However much he 
saw war as a necessary evil, he still expected wars to happen, and he expected 
Christians to take part in such wars, (even when ordered into battle by 'an 
infidel Emperor').67 But there is a difference in Augustine's mind between the 
'ordinary' Christian, and, for example, a Christian Emperor.68 Although 
Augustine did not see these Christian leaders as 'parts of a government 
machinery', but as 'members of the Church' ,69 these leaders were obliged to 
act in ways that Augustine would clearly object to if he met similar action in 
64 Sermo 302.13. Emphasis original. 
65 Sermo 302.1 1. Heads of households were seen as a mediating authority between household 
and state (see DCD, XIX. 16). 
66 Robert Dodaro, 'Between the Two Cities: Augustine's Political Activism' (unpublished 
paper delivered to Conference 2000: the Power and the Glory. The Legacy of Constantine at 
the Dawn of the Third Millennium, University ofExeter, 7-10 August, 2000), 3-4. 
67 See £narrationes in Psalmos, CXXIV. 7, quoted in Deane, 149. 
68 Even when Augustine had ceased to expect there to be a Christian Empire, he still talked of 
Christian Emperors. See Markus, Saeculum, 146ff. 
69 lbid, 148. 
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ordinary members of his congregation. 70 Therefore, to defend Dodaro, it is the 
motive with which a Christian goes to war that exercises Augustine. Even if 
the action may be similar, the Christian ruler would only engage in just wars. 71 
In other words, the libido dominandi that motivates so many rulers, should not 
exist in the heart of the Christian ruler - just as it should not exist in the heart 
of the ordinary Christian - as it is 'founded upon the direct opposite of 
neighbourly and Christian motives.' 72 
Augustine is not totally averse to political action by his congregation - when 
they release slaves from a slave ship docked in port, there is no condemnation 
similar to Sermo 302. In his letter to Alypius, Augustine notes that his 
congregation, being 'aware of our practice of performing acts of mercy in such 
cases', released one hundred and twenty people either from the docked ship or 
'from the place where they had been hidden before being put on board.'73 
Augustine pleads with Alypius to do what he can so that the illegally enslaved 
people can and do remain free, and Augustine's congregation is no longer 
harassed by the slave traders demanding the return of their 'goods'. 
Augustine's lack of condemnation here shows that quietism in all 
circumstances is not the end of the story. 
So, from this, it must be concluded that for the ordinary Christian, direct 
political action is not an option unless it is within the realms of legitimate 
authority,74 and is done with the correct motive: that is, action is undertaken 
for others (like those on the slave ship) rather than themselves. 
70 To look no further than Sermo 302, the heads of households are emphatically not seen as 
having authority to call their households out against that 'bad man' - in fact, as discussed 
above, the reverse is the case. 
71 That is, 'if they resort to punishment only when it is necessary to the government and 
defence of the commonwealth, and never to gratifY their own enmity ... '. DCD, V. 24. 
72 Figgis, Political Aspects, 52. 
73 Ep. 10*. 7. 
74 Ep. 10* makes clear that Augustine wishes to use the appropriate laws to keep the 'slaves' 
free. He is not interested in a clandestine 'free the slaves' movement. 
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2.3.6 The .IIm![n"Gvablle Earthly City 
However, even if mob rule should not be part of the Christian's political 
armoury, before we accept Herbert Deane's thesis of Augustine as political 
quietise5 in its entirety, we need to examine a further argument from Peter 
Burnell. Bumell presents us with three convictions he has derived from 
Augustine's writings. The first two are not contentious: we are told 'that 
injustice is unavoidably part of civil life', and, secondly, that 'human beings 
.. . still have civil duties.' 76 It is his third conviction that we need to examine. 
This conviction is 'that despite the effects of original sin, civilisation is 
susceptible of moral improvement.' 77 
Burnell argues that Augustine, in his early writings, 'had, by means of a clear, 
hypothetical example [in De Libero Arbitrio ], defended the propriety of using 
revolution to correct civil injustice.'78 There is, therefore, a theoretical 
Augustinian possibility of a legitimate uprising to displace a government that 
failed to live up to its responsibility to govern according to the common good 
of its people. I quote the section of De Libero Arbitrio to which Burnell refers: 
Augustine: But suppose that the same people . . . come to prefer 
private interest to the public good. Votes are bought and sold. 
Corrupted by those who covet honors, they hand over power to wicked 
and profligate men. In such a case would it not be right for a good and 
powerful man (if one could be found) to take from this people the 
power of conferring honors and to limit it to the discretion of a few 
good people, or even to one?79 
Whether or not this passage should be read as an argument against democracy, 
it certainly does not read as a blueprint for overthrow of a government. Burnell 
has clearly ignored the genre of this writing: this is part of a debate that 
investigates many hypotheses. This situation is clearly hypothetical, and it 
cannot be described as representing Augustine's thought. Also, given 
Augustine's later strictures on what people were to accept from their leaders 
75 See 2.4.3.2 below. 
76 Peter Burnell, 'The Problem of Service to Unjust Regimes in Augustine's City of God', in 
Dorothy F. Donnelly, The City of God: A Collection of Critical Essays, 39. 
77 lbid, 40. 
78 lbid, 41 (with a reference to De Libero Arbitrio [On the Free Choice of the Will]). 
79 Thomas Williams (trans.), Augustine: On Free Choice of the Will, (lndianapolis: Hackett, 
1993), l. 6. 
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(even if they were tyrants), it is difficult to imagine at what point this 'good 
man' should act. 
Augustine does not, however, advocate obedience to the civil authority in all 
circumstances. The one over-riding exception is when God commands 
something that conflicts with the law of the land: 'But when God commands 
something contrary to the customs or laws of a people ... it has to be done. ' 80 
God, as the supreme authority, is to be obeyed over any king. Herbert Deane, 
who makes much of political obedience, accepts this. 81 The question is over 
how far 'religious' obedience to God entered the 'political' realm, and how far 
any resistance (if any resistance is allowable) should go. Deane says that: 
we have no right to resist the state's commands or to rebel against the 
constituted authority. Our only recourse is to follow the example of the 
holy martyrs, that is, to refuse to obey the ruler's sacrilegious 
commands and to accept quietly, without resistance, even joyously, 
whatever punishment he may impose upon us for our failure to obey.82 
Nor, as Augustine pointed out in Sermo 302 (quoted above) are we to resist 
and rebel when authority imposes unjust penalties on us, 83 but as Peter Bumell 
correctly points out: 
Intended audience is the important factor here. When haranguing his 
flock Augustine is prepared to assume the existence of settled and 
constant government. Hence he talks in extremes: official executions 
(publica supplicia), as opposed to open banditry (aperta latroncinia 
[sic]). 84 
In his more considered writings, such as De Civitate Dei, Bumell contends, 
Augustine cannot make such assumptions. 85 Against Deane - who tells us, for 
example, that, according to Augustine, a usurper must be opposed 'even if he 
8
° Confessiones, III. viii (15). Text from Saint Augustine: Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991 ). All quotations from Confessiones (hereafter referred 
to as Conf), unless otherwise indicated, will be from this translation. 
81 
'Since obedience to rulers is clearly in the public interest, all the laws promulgated by the 
ruler must be obeyed by all citizens, with the sole exception of laws or commands that run 
contrary to God's ordinances' (Deane, 147). 
82 Ibid, 149 (emphasis original). And see Sermo 326. 2: the martyrs know that the Emperor 
can threaten death, but God threatens hell. Punishment is not resisted, but the idolatrous 
command is equally not obeyed. (Quoted in Dyson, The Pilgrim City, 1 02-3). 
83 Though interestingly, Augustine leaves open the recourse to law against the unjust official. 
Active rebellion is the problem, especially while there is means of redress. 
84 Bum ell, 'Unjust Regimes', in Donnelly, 42. 
85 Augustine's thoughts in DCD, V. 17, where he claims that it makes no difference 'under 
what rule a man lives ... ' will be discussed below. 
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seems to be a better and wiser man than the present king'86 - Burnell contends 
that Augustine still sees (in about 415) civil revolution as 'a permissible kind 
of action in itself. ' 87 What Augustine was attacking, in De Civitate Dei III.l5, 
according to this argument, is the Roman expulsion of Tarquinius 'without 
seeking or ascertaining his judgment in the matter'. 88 He does not say that the 
Romans should have merely remained obedient to their king. For Burnell, this 
means that Augustine tacitly supports insurrection - in spite of Augustine's 
faithful record in the following chapter of De Civitate Dei of the disasters that 
followed Tarquinius's expulsion. 
That Augustine was recording history in these chapters seems to have 
bypassed Burnell. Even if it is conceded that Augustine's history is both 
polemical and selective, if he was in favour of this particular insurrection, it 
was surely in his power to make his approval clear in his text. Admittedly, 
Augustine does not specifically say that the Romans were wrong in their 
action, but I cannot accept that this passage in De Civitate Dei- as 'a matter 
of practical congruency'89 -points to a strong argument that Augustine was in 
favour of insurrection. He may not necessarily be as quietist as Deane paints 
him, but, as we shall see, finding circumstances in which Augustine favours 
rebellion is a very difficult exercise. 
In his discussion of Spartacus (in De Civitate Dei IV, 5), Burnell views 
Augustine as saying that 'merely having got hold of some imperial power ... 
is not a sign of virtue. ' 90 This is true enough. However, after telling us that, 
although Augustine clearly takes St. Paul seriously in his injunction to 
obedience to those in authority, and (while they lasted) 'Spartacus and his 
gladiators were ... the powers that be' ,91 Burnell continues: 
Augustine still thought it perfectly proper to do what one could to 
oppose ... Spartacus's gladiators ... That this is so and the principle 
that makes it so are clear from Augustine's assertion a few chapters 
86 Deane, 145. Of course, if the usurper is successful, he must be obeyed, but this does not 
make his rebellion 'right or meritorious' (ibid.). 
87 Burnell, 'Unjust Regimes', 43. 
88 DCD, 111.15. 
89 Burnell, 'Unjust Regimes', 43. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 44. 
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later [De Civitate Dei, IV. 15] that imperial interference by Rome ... 
are justified as occasional moral necessities. One should not desire 
such things for themselves, but they are justified when they prevent a 
greater evil, the unjust, lording it over the just.92 
Taken as a whole, this later chapter of De Civitate Dei reads ironically. The 
Romans, it seems, should have worshipped 'Foreign Iniquity' as a goddess, as 
she clearly did so much to help the Romans justify the increase of their 
Empire. (And of course, as other parts of De Civitate Dei make clear, 
Augustine is not convinced of the final justice of the Roman cause, and 
questions whether the results of Roman peace are worth the cost.)93 Augustine 
does contend that 'the wise man, they say, will wage just wars',94 so there are 
judgments to be made by leaders and a just war can be waged as a 'necessary 
evil', but Augustine does not say here (or elsewhere) that ordinary people 
should determine whom they should obey, and against whom they should 
rebel. 
There is the further point to consider. Namely whether Augustine really 
thought that Spartacus and his gladiators ever constituted more than a 
rebellion, albeit a successful one for a time. This, I suggest, is open to doubt. 
After all, Augustine says '[J1ustice removed, then, what are kingdoms but great 
bands of robbers?'95 - and the gladiators are hardly described as just when 
they 'eJ1joyed whatever pleasures they wished, and did what their lust 
suggested. ' 96 Augustine grants the Roman Empire some sort of justice (even if 
it comes nowhere near the justice of the Heavenly City), but the gladiators are 
not even granted that: it seems they must remain a 'great band of robbers' to 
be treated, justifiably, as such. 
In book XIX of De Civitate Dei (written ten years after the chapters discussed 
above), Augustine reconsiders the ideas of just war and civil unrest. A just war 
(as noted in XIX, 7) is primarily justified by the enemy's injustice. We are 
simply left with the contention that a just war therefore 'changes a society in 
92 Ibid. 
93 See, for example, DCD, XIX. 21, XIX. 7. 
94 DCD, XIX. 7. 
95 Ibid, IV. 4 (emphasis added). 
96 Ibid, IV. 5. 
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the direction of justice [and] has an obvious revolutionary dimension. ' 97 Even 
when Augustine does accept that Rome's Empire was acquired justly, he is all 
too aware of the cost: 
It is true that the Imperial City has imposed on subject nations not only 
her yoke but also her language, as a bond of peace and society ... But 
how many great wars, what slaughter of men, what outpourings of 
human blood have been necessary to bring this about!98 
Augustine, it seems, is more equivocal than Burnell. Even when society has 
paid the price of a just war, there is no guarantee that people will be moved 
very far (if at all) towards justice. 
Civil unrest in book XIX is apparently covered by the story (in chapter 12) of 
Cacus. The comparison made is the one between the monster's savage acts, 
and 'legitimate revolution'. The latter, according to Burnell, 'makes no sense 
unless there can · be a necessity that leads a downtrodden and desperate 
citizenry into sedition and legitimately causes a revolution.'99 However, 
Burnell forgets that, in the context of the chapter, there is nothing to suggest 
that Cacus's actions are legitimate; only that they demonstrate the universal 
and instinctive desire for peace which all societies share. If we extend 
Burnell's analogy we can see that praise is only due to the Herculean figure 
who totally destroys the seditious society - so both rebels and the rebelled 
against are no more! Thus we see that Burnell's analogy does not stand up to 
scrutiny for all that Augustine says that: 
He who has learnt to prefer right from wrong and the rightly ordered 
from the perverse, sees that, in comparison with the peace of the just, 
the peace of the unjust is not worthy to be called peace at all. Even that 
which is perverse, however, must of necessity be in, or derived from, 
or associated with, and to that extent at peace with, some part of the 
order of things amongst which it has its being or of which it consists. 100 
From this we can see that Augustine recognises different types and orders of 
justice, but we cannot say that Augustine is interested in encouraging 
'legitimate revolution'. 
97 Bumell, 'Unjust Regimes', 45. 
98 DCD, XIX. 7. 
99 Burnell, 'Unjust Regimes', 46. 
100 DCD, XIX. 12. 
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Bumell has, however, ignored one aspect of Augustine's view of obedience to 
the civil authorities. In De Civitate Dei, V.17, Augustine refers to the fact that 
it makes no difference under whose authority a man lives, as he will soon die, 
'provided only that those who rule him do not compel him to do what is 
impious and wicked'. 101 In XIX, 17, Augustine makes a similar point, though 
with one vital omission. In this chapter, we see the Heavenly City preserving 
and following 'the customs, laws, and institutions by which earthly peace is 
achieved or maintained', 'provided only that they do not impede the religion 
by which we are taught that the one supreme and true God is to be 
worshipped.' 102 There is no mention here of the wickedness or injustice that 
was also prohibited earlier in the book. As Augustine did not have the mindset 
characteristic of modernity that makes a distinction between 'religion' and 
'politics', or between 'worship' and 'doing justice', I do not believe this is 
significant. God has, to put it broadly, forbidden injustice among his people. 103 
Therefore his people cannot (or should not) be commanded to commit 
injustice as obeying such a command would surely 'impede the religion by 
which ... the one supreme and true God is to be worshipped.' 
The above can be viewed as reopening the door to civil disobedience that 
might have been firmly shut on dismissal of BurneD's unfortunate account of 
Cacus. However, the door can only be considered to be open a crack as there 
is still no practical point at which Augustine allows his congregation to engage 
in any actual civil disobedience. In this light, and to the extent that there is a 
difference between the peace of the just and that of the unjust, I can only agree 
with Robert Dodaro's conclusion that: 
legitimately-established civil officials ought to be obeyed unless they 
command one to violate God's law. Augustine has the Christian 
martyrs in mind when he formulates this principle, and while it allows 
in theory for the possibility of a non-violent, conscientious civil 
disobedience outside of martyrdom, it is not easy to imagine cases in 
which he would have thought its application justifiable. In no case 
101 DCD, V.17, emphasis added. 
102 DCD, XIX. 17, emphasis added. 
103 See, for example, Micah 6.8. However, we should note that Augustine would, and did, 
point to Romans 13 where obedience to the political authorities is advocated. 
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could it be extended as a principle to justify armed insurrection or 
violence against persons, property or public institutions. 104 
Augustine does recognise that some civil societies are better than others. We 
may therefore surmise that it is possible to judge between societies. However, 
given Augustine's elitist thought, it must be up to leaders to make the choices. 
It is to the role of leadership that I now turn. 
Given the very limited idea that Augustine has of the freedom to disobey civil 
authority, it may be surprising to read that Augustine does not obey all that 
Imperial authority throws at him. He is prepared to assert his point of view 
(whether individually, or as a member of a Church council). To quote Dodaro 
again: 
Reading Augustine's correspondence leaves one with the clear 
impression of an African church capable, against almost all the odds, 
of undertaking an extremely limited level of coordinated political 
activity. 105 
In forwarding this 'extremely limited level of coordinated political activity', it 
helped that the Catholic Church was the established religion, and that the 
(African) church in council was therefore able 'to apply delicate, diplomatic 
pressure to the imperial court in order to redress social and political injustices 
occurring within Roman Africa.' 106 This is not to say that the Imperial court 
immediately acceded to the requests emanating from the African bishops, but 
that the bishops were able, over the years: 
to use the council as a format for addressing the imperial 
administration with a united voice, one which was respectful without 
being timid, and for seeking reforms which would contribute to the 
formation of a more just society while asserting at the same time the 
legitimate role of the Church in fostering justice. 107 
104 Dodaro, 'Between the Two Cities', 3, emphasis added. 
105 Dodaro, 'Augustine's Political Activism', 11, emphasis added. 
106 Ibid., 12. 
107 Ibid. This suggests that church leaders were involved in political life not just to maintain 
such order that existed in civil society, but also to promote greater justice in society. For 
further discussion on this point see 2.4.3.3 below. 
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Society was, as Burnell has argued, 'susceptible of moral improvement' 
(though not as easily as Burnell implies), and there was a role for Christians to 
play in that improvement. That role would depend on a person's place in 
society. Ordinary people were not, as seen in Sermo 302, to partake in rough 
justice, but apply for the legal redress that was available. Bishops had a more 
active role as supplicants. As people with authority they were able to suggest 
what could be done to those with power. 108 And Christians with imperial 
power are to use that power to further the aims of the church. 109 They must 
'serve God as kings': 
for no man as a private individual could command that idols should be 
taken from the earth. But that when we take into consideration the 
social condition of the human race, we find that kings, in the very fact 
that they are kings, have a service which they can render to our Lord in 
a manner which is impossible for any who have not the power of 
kings.llo 
Thus it was the leaders - whether of Church or civil society - who had the 
authority and the power to affect any (small) improvement in the justice of 
society. 
From the above we can see that Augustine was a child of his time. Barbarian 
hordes threatened the Empire, and the struggle was to maintain such peace and 
security that existed. Essentially, and as far as ordinary people were 
concerned, their role was to obey the commands that authority laid down. 
Those who had authority in civil society were to use that authority to further to 
work of the church. Church leaders had the right of supplication, 111 but could 
not order civil authority to act according to the church's wishes. This is a far 
cry from what came to be called 'political Augustinianism'. 
108 See below for the difference between 'authority' and 'power'. 
109 See Ep. 220 to Boniface: what prevented him from abandoning his career (and what 
Augustine and Alypius, a fellow bishop, pointed out) was 'the degree to which your activities 
were benefiting the churches of Christ'. 
11
° Figgis, Political Aspects, 51. 
111 See the correspondence between Augustine and Macedonius: Epp. 152-5. 
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2.4 Augustine !from the Middll.e Ages to the Twentieth Century 
2.4.1 Introduction 
This section will look at how Augustine has been interpreted in the Middle 
Ages and how four twentieth century interpreters have seen him. I will 
contend that Augustine was unjustly served by his medieval interpreters, and 
that, in the twentieth century, although his interpreters have been kinder to him 
in the sense of being truer to his own thought, Augustine has been seen in the 
light of the contemporary history of the interpreter. I will finish the section 
with an overview based on my reading of Augustine and the authors under 
consideration. 
2.4.2 The Medieval Background to Augustinian Interpretation 
This sub-section will be a brief overview of a large and contentious subject. 
After an examination of the conflict between the Papacy and the Holy Roman 
Empire, I shall examine Arquilliere's thesis on political Augustinianism, 
which, however political, is clearly not Augustinian. 
How far Walter Ullmann was correct to regard the early Middle Ages as a 
battle-ground between a Germanic ascending theory of government and a 
Latin, descending theory of government, is debatable, 112 but what is certain is 
that the Middle Ages was a theocratic society with a theocratic style of 
government. 113 The Investiture Controversy114 was not - as might be assumed 
from a modern perspective- a battle between 'Church' and 'State' or between 
'sacred' and 'secular', but was about how God devolved his powers, to whom, 
and how these powers were split between the Pope and Holy Roman Emperor. 
112 See Waiter Ullmann, Medieval Political Thought, (Harmondsworth, Middx.: Peregrine 
Books, 1975), 12-13. For objections to Ullmann, see J.H. Burns, The Cambridge History of 
Medieval Political Thought c. 350-c.1450 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
127: 'There is no trace of a popular assembly, of any other constitutional curb on the exercise 
ofthe [Vandal] king's will .. .'. 
113 By 'theocratic', I mean a society that accepts the sovereignty, and therefore the ultimate 
authority, ofGod. 
114 Between Pope Gregory VII (1 073-1 085) and the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (I 056-
1105). 
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And we find that 'Augustine is used as an authority on both sides.' 115 I shall 
examine the Papal side of the case first, and then look at the Imperialist 
position. 
On the Papal side, the argument followed from the Augustinian thought that 
civil government only existed because ofthe Fall. 116 
Coercive authority was necessary, he [Augustine] conceded, but on his 
theory the prince who wielded it was little more than a highly 
respected hangman, a divinely appointed executioner of criminals. 
According to Augustine true justice was to be found only in the church 
[sic] -and it seemed but a small step to many medieval propagandists 
to argue that the ministers of the church were accordingly qualified to 
direct all the activities of secular rulers. 117 
Given the medieval identification of the City of God and the Church - an 
identification that Augustine himself did not make - the medieval papalists 
argued that Papal authority should be predominant in all spheres of life. 
However, we must note that this argument was not expressed as taking over 
'secular' society: but as a concept by which any authority that existed in the 
political or civil sphere was deemed to have derived from, or was secondary 
to, authority in the spiritual sphere. Pope Gregory the Great, for example, 
applies the words of Pope Gelasius' doctrine of two powers- or two swords-
to his own situation, and with the spiritual power being weightier than the 
temporal; it is the Popes who will have to answer for kings at the Day of 
Judgement. Therefore: 
11 est clair que, sans sortir de son role spiritueL Gregoire-le-Grand 
inclut dans I' institution royale, une fonction religieuse ... On peut dire 
qu'en introduisant la morale chretienne dans la politique, en inculquant 
aux rois le devoir de proteger la discipline de l'Eglise, il ouvrait un 
champ illimite aux interventions du Saint-Siege.118 
The Holy See, in defence of what it perceived as its own interests, became 
more and more willing to 'interfere' in temporal affairs. This culminated in the 
Investiture Controversy - Gregory VU's attempts to excommunicate and 
depose Henry IV. The interference by the Church in what we would now call 
115 Figgis, 87. 
116 Robert Markus also persuasively argues this. See Saeculum, I 97-210. 
117 Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300 (Englewood CliffS, NJ, 1980), 
165. Tierney also appears, erroneously, to conflate 'church' and 'City of God'. 
118 H.-X. Arquilliere, L 'Augustinisme Politique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1934), 40-l. 
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'affairs of state' would not have been perceived like that at the time. Figgis 
points out that, several centuries before Henry IV, Charlemagne would have 
seen himself as the head of a Civitas Dei, not of a Civitas terrena: 'the realm 
of 'imperial Charlemagne' was a Christian Empire, the City of God on 
earth.' 119 John Milbank: goes so far to say that 'a ruler like Charlemagne comes 
to see himself, without incongruity, as a kind of bishop with a sword .. .' yo 
V an Oort accurately states the problem: 
Stripped of its eschatological content, the City of God became a 
theological and political programme. Whereas Augustine saw Church 
and State as transitional phases in the divine plan of salvation ... 121 
Therefore, with the eschatological emphasis forgotten, the belief that the Holy 
Roman Empire was a Christian commonwealth was one that was universally 
shared in the later Middle Ages. The question was whether the Emperor held 
his sceptre by the grace of God immediately or via the authority of the Pope as 
Vicar of Christ. 
Figgis tells us that, on the Imperialist side of the dispute, 
[Otto of Freisingen] uses the 'render to Caesar' to support the rights of 
the crown, and quotes the pertinent passage of S. Augustine addressed 
to the Donatists in which he laid down that property can be rightly 
possessed only by human law at the bidding of kings, who are of 
divine appointment ... 122 
However, once the identification of the City of God with the Church had been 
made, and the doctrine of the 'two swords' had been accepted, 123 then the 
weight of the argument would have been on the papalist side. Whatever the 
truth of the argument, Augustine's works were clearly used both to support 
and to reject the idea that the Pope held both the spiritual and the temporal 
swords, and merely loaned the temporal sword to the Holy Roman Emperor. 
119 Figgis, Political Aspects, 84. 
120 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 419. This does not 
mean Charlemagne welcomed papal interference in his Empire - even if the Pope had 
crowned him Holy Roman Emperor. 
121 Van Oort, Jerusalem and Baby/on, 92. 
122 Figgis, 92. 
123 For an excellent summary ofthis doctrine, see Deane, 172. 
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H.-X. Arquilliere, writing in 1934, regarded the medieval political thinkers 
who turned to Augustine's works for their inspiration as not making the 
careful distinction he, Arquilliere, thought necessary between the natural and 
the supernatural, between faith and reason. However, in spite of its reliance on 
Augustine's writings, whether medieval society can be described as one that 
owed much to 'political Augustinianism' - and whether 'political 
Augustinianism' owes much to Augustine - is open to debate. Certainly 
Arquilliere's assertion that the natural order of the State is older than that of 
the Church124 is open to contention on two grounds. Firstly, given the very 
modern way that Arquilliere uses 'Church' and 'State', it must be pointed out 
that modern ideas of 'State' (and particularly a nation state) are very much 
younger than the Church- the nation states of Western Europe grew up under 
the tutelage of the Church. However, if we are to translate Arquilliere's 
'l'Etat' by 'political authority', then we can say that 'States' did exist before 
the institutional Church, 125 but these 'States' were only granted existence (as 
far as Augustine was concerned) as a post-Fall dispensation; there was no 
right for them to exist. 126 
My second objection to Arquilliere's contention is that, by natural order of the 
state, Arquilliere appears to mean a secular - as in a non-theocratic -
organisation. For Augustine, and any king (pagan or otherwise), power came 
from God, or the gods. A 'state' separated from the religious basis of society 
would have been unthinkable before the modern era. The right of a state to 
exist 'anterieurement a l'Eglise et independamment de l'Eglise', 127 which 
Arquilliere happily asserts, is not one which pre-modern society would 
recognise: it would have been more a case of which God the 'state' should 
follow, not whether the State should look to (a) God or not as it so chose. 128 
124 See Arquilliere, L 'Augustinisme Politique, 23. 
125 We must note, however, that the City of God has always existed according to Augustine, 
including before the Fall. This eternal existence can be ascribed to the church when (and only 
when) the church is seen as the metaphorical representation of the City of God. 
126 On Augustine and the 'right' of states, even a 'just' state, to exist, see DCD, XXII. 6 (cf. 
ibid., Ill. 20). Also see the discussion in Rowan Williams, 'Politics and the Soul: A Reading 
ofthe City ofGod', Mil/town Studies 19/20 (1987), especially 65-6. 
127 Arquilliere, L 'Augustinlsme Politique, 37. 
128 Tierney tells us that 'a theocratic ordering of society is a very common pattern of human 
government' (Crisis of Church and State, 1). 
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Anyone who tried to follow a different religion would be looked on with 
suspicion at best, or face more active persecution - as the Christians of the 
first to third centuries found to their cost. 
For Arquilliere, the essence of political Augustinianism is the tendency 'a 
absorber I 'ordre nature/ dans I 'ordre surnature/.' 129 If this meant the 
absorption of the temporal into the remit of the spiritual (as represented by the 
Holy See), then this would be a good account of medieval Papal policy 
(political Gregorianism perhaps?). However, as we have just seen, 
Arquilliere's ideas of what the natural order is do not correspond with what 
pre-modem society would have understood; and nor is this a fair 
representation (as Arquilliere admits) of Augustine. As Milbank points out, 
Augustine does call on the secular powers to assist in the suppression of 
Donatism, but this is against the more general flow of his 'ontology' .130 
'Augustine certainly understands that salvation means the recession of 
dominium .. .' 131 Augustine, it seems, is not entirely consistent: but the 
Augustine of the Middle Ages - for whom the Church is the City of God, and 
for whom the Church could and should direct all aspects of temporal life - is 
not the Augustine we, or his twentieth century interpreters, recognise. 
All this suggests that Augustine's writings had a profound influence on the 
Middle Ages, but that Augustine was misunderstood by his interpreters; in 
particular Arquilliere's "political Augustinianism" is not worthy of the name. 
129 Arquilliere, L 'Augustinisme Politique, 38, emphasis original. 
130 See 3.7.4 below. 
131 Milbank, Social Theory, 421, emphasis original. That is, the increase of peace to the 
exclusion of all violence. This comes from Augustine's idea that everything aims at peace 
(even Cacus- see discussion above). 
34 
In this sub-section, I shall give a brief overview of four books offering an 
interpretation of Augustine's political thought. These books have been chosen 
because their authors are widely recognised to be prominent figures in the 
study of Augustine's political thought. 
J. Neville Figgis, whose work was published in 1921, wrote in a world 
convulsed by the First World War, just as Augustine's had been by the sack of 
Rome in A.D. 410. Augustine's position after 410 was 'one somewhat 
resembling that of a modem Christian faced with the charge that Christianity 
is bankrupt because it did not prevent the [First World] war' .133 Augustine's 
answer, written over several years, is The City of God. This book makes it 
clear that, for Augustine 'the whole course of created existence is seen ... as a 
conflict between two societies' (31). This 'conflict' would only be resolved 
eschatologically. 
Figgis shows us an Augustine who grew up in a Roman Empire which had, it 
seemed, lasted forever - a child of late antiquity who has to integrate his 
Christianity into his Classical learning without denying that Christianity (7). 
Although '[t]he goal of the Civitas Dei is the pax reterna, and the visio dei' 
(41), Augustine 'does not promise a new earthly security under the regis of the 
Church' (42). Augustine, it seems, 'did not set out to compose a philosophy of 
history' (36), but he was certainly 'historically minded' (34) and, for him, the 
Church was 'an important part of the world historical process' (35). 
132 John von Heyking's book Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World (Columbia: 
University of Missouri Press, 2001) is the first major work to appear in the twenty-first 
century, but as it follows Markus' line of saeculum as tertium quid, it will not be given any 
major treatment here. Von Heyking also argues for an Augustinian view of politics as 'right-
by-nature'. This is flawed: while love of God is reflected through love of neighbour, it is not 
necessarily reflected through love of city- indeed Augustine constantly relativises 'love of 
city', the heavenly city's pilgrims are to use what the city provides, and not enjoy it for its 
own sake (see ibid, 176 for von Heyking's position). Von Heyking also tries to make love of 
glory a political virtue, when it was the Romans chief vice (see DCD, V. 13; cf. review by 
Oliver O'Donovan in Studies in Christian Ethics 15 (2002), 134). His book therefore should 
be treated with caution if one is looking for Augustine's political thoughts. 
133 Figgis, Political Aspects, 6. Page numbers in brackets in the text ofthis sub-section refer to 
this work. 
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Just as the Church cannot be identified with the City of God, the State and the 
earthly city are not identical (although there would be considerable overlap 
between the earthly city and 'all actual States' (65)). Figgis tells us that 
Augustine regarded '[a]ll governments as the will of God" (65). This does not 
mean that Augustine thought any civil state could be truly just, but that 'some 
form of State is needful to the worst tyrant and that the State is a natural and 
therefore a Divine necessity' (58) - as such, it must be obeyed. 134 'Augustine 
did not deny the goods of human life, but sought to raise them to a higher 
power' ( 67). 
Figgis devotes two chapters to tracing Augustine's influence through the 
Middle Ages and on through the Renaissance and Reformation. Given the 
Church's place in 'the world historical process' (35), Figgis argues that 
Augustine 'did much to strengthen the Church as an imperial force' and if the 
'actual expression extra ecclesiam nulla sa/us is not his ... the principle he 
definitely states' (72). 
It seems that Augustine's (neo-)Platonism gave him the 'nostalgia for the 
infinite' (7) which governed the division between the world affirming and 
world denying sides to his character and leaves us with the dichotomy that 
world adoration is not enough and world flight is impossible. He concludes 
that: 
just as the individual is driven to the larger life of the community ... so 
human society and all human culture is possible only by the ultimate 
recognition of the eternal goal. Otherwise there will come the 
decadence, such as overcame Greece and Rome and the Renaissance. 
That is the lesson of the "De Civitate Dei" (117). 
Herbert Deane, reflecting the Cold War era in which he was writing, presents 
us with an Augustine whose 'theological beliefs and his experience and 
observations of men's actions in an age of disorder enforced upon him an 
134 Hobbes develops this thought in Leviathan. 
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attitude of pessimistic realism ... '. 135 This attitude applies both to the State -
Augustine's words 'give no support to the hope that the world will gradually 
be brought to belief in Christ and that earthly society can be transformed, step 
by step, into the kingdom of God' (38)- and to the Church: it is 'absolutely 
impossible to identify the City of God ... with the visible Christian Church in 
this world' (24). 
Deane's presentation of Augustine as promoting both a 'political and social 
quietism' (151) has been noted above. For Deane, the state exists solely 'to 
maintain earthly peace' and does so 'through the use of coercion and the fear 
of punishment' (221). So the 'State' would not appear to have any role to play 
in church life. But Augustine gives it one when he appeals for 'secular' power 
to coerce and punish reluctant Donatists, as well as other heretics and 
schismatics (174). Deane therefore argues that Augustine's appeal to secular 
authorities, given his more general quietist attitude, is 'a contradiction of the 
most fundamental kind' (220). For a man who saw 'the inherent limitations 
and inadequacies of the political process .. .' (219) as clearly as Augustine did, 
his appeal to that process in an attempt to coerce belief merely shows Deane 
'the grim conclusions to which even a very wise man can be led by zeal for the 
promotion of orthodoxy' (220). This is in spite of Augustine's own 
explanation of his change of mind (that this coercion brought people into the 
city of God), 136 and Deane's own note (189) that punishment can be an 
inducement a change of mind. 
In conclusion, Deane regards Augustine as a philosopher who exhibited 'both 
the power and limitations of the great vision' (238). That vision saw mankind 
'completely vitiated by sin' (239) and had 'no room for the idea that every 
man is a particular, complex mixture of good and evil impulses, of love and 
hate, or of egotism and ahruism' (240). Deane does not seek to apply 
Augustine's words to his day, but only tells us that, given 'our era of war, 
135 Deane, Political and Social Ideas, 241. Page numbers in brackets in the text of this sub-
section refer to this work. 
136 See Epp. 185. 7, 100. 1-2, 88. 6-8. Also see DCD, XVIII. 50: the kings who persecuted the 
church 'might begin to persecute the false gods, for whose sake the worshippers of the true 
God had hitherto been persecuted.' 
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terror, and sharp anxiety about men's future ... we cannot afford to ignore 
Augustine's sharply etched, dark portrait of the human condition' (243). 
2.4.3.3 R..A. Markus: Augustine in Favour of (Limited and Secular) 
Involvement 
Writing in the ever more 'secular' (i.e. non-theocratic) era ofthe 1960s, R.A. 
Markus is concerned to show how Augustine thought Christians should live in 
the saeculum, 'the world of men and of time', 137 a world that would never be 
perfect, but one in which they should participate. Just as Markus's world is 
liberal and pluralist, so he seeks to show that Augustine would be at home in 
such a society. 
In Markus's opinion '[t]he most significant aspects of Augustine's reflection 
often turn out to be his changes of mind .. .' (viii). One change of mind is the 
move away from any Eusebian apologetic. It is later in his life that Augustine 
develops his thought from the idea of the Christian having to 'stick it out' in 
the saeculum. He is: 
much too sensitive to the claims of the earthly state on the members of 
the heavenly city to let it go at that. Concern for the temporal order, in 
its very temporality, had become part of a Christian's duty to God' 
(100). 
Therefore the 'societies, groups and institutions' which make up the saecu/um 
are legitimate areas for Christian concern as part of their 'intermediate 
principles' in which they can agree with their fellows, even if their ultimate 
destiny is radically different (101). This is certainly no argument for political 
revolution, but appears to be pointing in a less quietist direction than Deane. It 
also opens the question of whether Christians can be involved in civil society 
just for the maintenance of 'the peace of Babylon' in that society, or whether 
they are to be involved to promote greater justice and order. For Markus, 
'concern for the saeculum is the temporal dimension of his [the Christian's] 
concern for the eternal city' (102), but '[i]n the last resort man's destiny is not 
within his control' (103). From this eschatological perspective, therefore, it 
137 Markus, Saeculum, viii. Page nwnbers in brackets in the text of this sub-section refer to 
this work. 
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cannot be said that the promotion of greater justice is indicative of human 
salvation - Augustine is no advocate of a 'politics of perfection' - but 
involvement, including involvement to promote greater justice, is part of what 
love of neighbour is about. 
As I have noted above, Augustine only expects such involvement from church 
and civil leaders. Markus' implication that any Christian could or should be so 
involved is clearly a development from Augustine. He is also wrong to assume 
that Augustine would recognise a saeculum as a temporal indistinct reality 
where 'both poles of the dichotomy' of the stark division of the two cities was 
somehow, if temporarily resolved- even if it was only resolved long enough 
for members of both cities to promote its welfare. Oliver O'Donovan is surely 
correct when he points out that there 'never emerges a tertium quid between 
the two cities, a neutral space on which they meet as equal partners.' 138 
Members of the two cities make use of the peace of Babylon for their own 
distinct ends. 139 
However, Markus still feels there is a difficulty with Augustine's continuing 
'implicit but effective rhetorical identification of the existing with an ideal 
order' (146), which is due to Augustine's continuing 'to speak of Christian 
rulers and officials owing specific service to God in their public, official 
capacity' (147). There can be no Christian Empire, but there can be a Christian 
Emperor, who is a servant of the church. 140 This line of thought, as Markus 
points out, easily leads to the 'political Augustinianism' defined by Arquilliere 
even though 'it was scarcely in line with the grain of Augustine's own thought 
... '(152). 
In spite of his reservations, Markus talks of a 'politically radical' 
Augustinianism ( 168) at the same time warning that it is all too easy to slip 
'from eschatological hope ... into revolutionary strategy .. .' (170). However, 
because 'the man whose hope is eschatological has no programme, no 
138 O'Donovan, 'Western Political Thought', 141. 
139 See DCD, XIX, 26. 
140 Though both Augustine and Markus are clear that they refer to the Emperor as an 
individual Christian; there is nothing specifically Christian about the office of Emperor. 
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ideology, and no strategy' (171 ), the only possible action by a Christian is 
piecemeal opposition to policies without being tied to 'any final political 
vision'. The 'eschatological objective' cannot 'be anticipated in the present 
world of politics' (171 ). If this is so, then why should anyone be involved in 
promoting justice and peace, given that these ideals cannot be anticipated this 
side of the eschaton? 
Mark.us thinks that Augustine's "'secularisation" of the realm of politics' 
implies 'a pluralistic, religiously neutral civil community' (173). This is not to 
be seen as Christian detachment - even if '[i]n the saeculum we must be 
content with the provisional ... ' (173) - as the believer is drawn into 
'participation in political life and into full membership of his society without 
[it] tethering him to any ideology .. .' (173). However, as I have noted, there is 
no tertium quid in Augustine's thought, nor is there any reason to assume that 
Augustine would accept a 'secular' society as better than a Christian one. 
Mark.us is right to point to a less politically quietist Augustine than Deane, but 
he goes beyond Augustine in assuming that any Christian, rather than just 
leaders, could be involved in political life. 
2.4.3.4 John Milbank: Augustine as Advocate for 'Ontological Peace' 
As befitting his post-modern (or, as he would prefer, 'post-secular') times, 
John Milbank's densely written work141 has one very simple purpose - to 
undermine the whole modern culture of 'secular reason' .142 He seeks in many 
ways to go forward by returning to old nostrums. Before reaching the chapter 
under consideration, he writes eleven previous chapters that are 'but preludes 
to an assertion' that theology is a social science and, indeed, 'the queen of 
sciences' for Christians in 'this temporary world' (380). He uses Augustine -
especially The City of God - to put forward his case that a Christian counter-
141 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory. Page numbers in brackets in the text of this 
sub-section refur to this work. 
142 For all the 'onslaught ... against secular reason' (432), a kind of 'Hegelian' metanarrative 
is allowed - however, it has to be 'based on faith, not reason.' (387). This is the nub of his 
disagreement with Markus - for a discussion of this disagreement, see Michael J. Hollerich, 
'John Milbank, Augustine, and the "Secular'", Augustinian Studies 30 ( 1999), 311-26, 
especially 318. 
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history, counter-ethic, counter-ontology and a final return to counter-history as 
'ecclesial self-critique' (3 81) provides 'the only alternative to a nihilistic 
outlook' to which all other forms of history must succumb, due to their 
inability to assume anything other than 'a necessary dialectical passage 
through conflict' (389). 
Milbank' s case is 'that one needs to emphasize more strongly the irruptive 
character of Christianity, and therefore its difference from both modernity and 
antiquity' (399). This difference can be seen in the locus of the paideia. 
Because the 'Christian ethical identity' came in the context of 'a new kind of 
community, the ecclesia' (399), the basis of paideia was not therefore the city, 
but the Christian household- a place where all could 'receive an education in 
true virtue' (403). We thus have a paideia based on the ecclesia and the 
Christian household that leads to greater involvement with the polis, while 
recognising that the po/is is never going to be translated into the city of God. 
On re-reading The City of God, Milbank informs us that we will 'realize that 
political theology can take its critique, both of secular society and of the 
Church, directly out of the developing Biblical tradition, without recourse to 
any external supplementation' (389). Certainly as far as Augustine goes, this 
critique shows that the 
contrast between ontological antagonism and ontological peace is 
grounded in the contrasting historical narratives of the two cities. The 
Civitas terrena is marked by sin, which [includes]... an enjoyment of 
arbitrary, and therefore violent power over others - the libido 
dominandi (390). 
However, Milbank goes on to show that Augustine was not as consistent as he 
might be when he introduced a defence of coercion in his battles with the 
Donatists: 'his account of a legitimate, non-sinful, 'pedagogic' coercion 
violates this ontology' (419) - an ontology that was revolutionary precisely 
because it denied 'any ontological purchase to dominium or power for its own 
sake .. .' (419). 
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Milbank recognises that, for Augustine, the Fall introduced coercion into the 
world. This fallenness leads to the tragedy of the Church's involvement with 
the dominium. Milbank also accepts that Augustine believed that humanity 
was naturally social, but politics was - in the pre-Fall sense of the term -
unnatural. However, Milbank adds that 'Augustine allows us to see many 
forms of 'the social' beyond the political, and also implies that the political is 
necessarily imperfectly social' (402, emphasis original). But it takes Aquinas 
to begin the separation of the secular from the spiritual: 
[ Aquinas] has . . . moved not very far down the road which allows a 
sphere of secular autonomy; nevertheless, he has moved a little, and he 
has moved too far. By beginning to see social, economic and 
administrative life as essentially natural, and part of the political sphere 
separate from the Church, Aquinas opens the way to regarding the 
Church as an organization specializing in what goes on inside man's 
souls ... Once the political is seen as a permanent natural sphere, 
pursuing positive finite ends, then, inevitably, firm lines of division 
arise between what is 'secular' and what is 'spiritual'. ( 407) 
Milbank argues for the removal - or at least a blurring - of this division, as 
'the absolute Christian vision of ontological peace now provides the only 
alternative to a nihilistic outlook' ( 432). From the time of Augustine, who 
compromised his radical peace ontology in his disputes with the Donatists, 
through Aquinas, to secular reason, the Church's salvation ('the peace of the 
altera civitas' (432)) has often been absent. The only alternative is a return to 
'the absolute Christian vision of ontological peace' 143 - a refined 'political 
Augustinianism' without any compromise with 'the negative distortion of 
dominium ... ' ( 417). 
Milbank's thesis of 'ontological peace' is an interesting one, but which falls 
down when it comes to practicalities. Even if all punishment should be 'the 
self-punishment inherent in sin' (421), Milbank does not say how he proposes 
to raise a person's conscience, or install self-discipline, without an external 
discipline being imposed first (even Pinocchio needed his Jiminy Cricket). 
What Milbank needs to note is Augustine's 'nostalgia for the infinite' .144 That 
sacred and secular should not be treated as separate is quite correct, but merely 
143 Though how this is possible, given the Fall, Milbank does not say. 
144 Figgis, 7. 
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arguing for ontological peace does not address the world as lived in by us, or 
by Augustine. 
2.4.4 Augillstme's PoRitican Thought: A SWimmary and Overview 
I have shown that Augustine's political thought has meant different things to 
different people. However, medieval ~political Augustinianism' cannot any 
longer be viewed as being anything other than a misinterpretation of 
Augustine's thought. Throughout the twentieth century, there has clearly been 
a progression in how Augustine's political thought has been interpreted. In the 
aftermath of the First World War, when nineteenth century liberal optimism in 
human progress had been (almost literally) shot to pieces, we have Neville 
Figgis presenting Augustine as a divided soul looking to the peace of heaven 
while, at the same time, being very aware of the sin and violence here on 
earth. With the Cold War crises in the 1960s, Herbert Deane brings us an 
Augustine who advocates political and social quietism as chaos could be just 
around the comer. 145 Later, as society become more secular, so does 
Augustine - at least according to R.A. Markus. A pluralist, non-theocratic 
society should, therefore, be acceptable to the 1970s Christian. But not, 
according to John Milbank, the 1990s Christian. In a world of post-modem 
uncertainty, secular reason is not a valid system to build political authority. 
Political Augustinianisrn, despite its problems with Augustine's attitude to 
coercion, is now presented as having more to do with seeking an ontological 
peace: a peace that can be more easily accomplished by small communities 
'where the lines between Church and world, spiritual and secular are blurred 
' 146 
Augustine, as we have seen, expected Christian governors, magistrates or 
judges to do what they could to advance the cause of the church- but this was 
as Christians, not as officials. They could, and should, use their office and 
official capacity to help the church, but Augustine did not presume that all 
officials of whatever religious persuasion must help the church- nor (as the 
145 It is perhaps significant the Berlin Wall was built in 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis 
occurred in 1962- Deane's work was published in 1963. 
146 Milbank, 408. 
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medievalists might have been able to assume, at least nominally) did he 
assume all officials were Catholic Christians. 
Herbert Deane, however, goes too far the other way. Augustine was never so 
quietist and pessimistic that he refused all questioning of civil authority: mob 
rule was definitely out, but this does not mean that he felt people could not be 
defended by the Church against unjust action by civil authorities. 
'Church' and 'State' were not totally separate categories for Augustine- or for 
anyone at that time: society was theocratic. People might have different roles 
within that society, but Augustine lived in a world where an Emperor (even an 
unbaptised Emperor) could preside at a church council, 147 and bishops had 
become part of the civil authority - hearing lawsuits and deciding cases. 148 
This being so, Augustine's 'political thought' must be seen (contra 
Arquilliere) against this background. 
In summary, Augustine's thought must be seen as a pastoral balancing act -
exhortations to obedience, for example, are countered by Augustine's own 
willingness to 'interfere'. His pessimism over the idea that civil society will 
ever become the City of God is countered by his requirement that Christians 
with appropriate talents and callings should serve in that society. 149 There is, 
as Figgis and others warn us, no 'system' as such, but from Augustine's work, 
in spite of his awareness of hwnanity's inherent sinfulness, we will see that 
there are (albeit highly limited) ways of improving society. 
2.5 The Christian and Political Activity 
2.5.1 Introduction 
Given the above overview of how Augustine's political thought has been 
interpreted over time, and how far this thought is from Arquilliere's ideas of 
147 As Constantine did at Nicaea. Further Augustine notes that the Donatists were first to 
afspeal to the Emperor over their theological dispute with the Catholics, see Ep. 88, 1. 
1 8 Though Augustine is not altogether happy with the time he had to spend in this role- see 
De opere monachorum 29:37 (quoted in Oyson, The Pilgrim City, 192-3). 
149 DCD, XlX.6. 
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I 'Augustinisme po/itique, I will now re-examine Augustine's political thought 
in the light of the three themes relevant to my thesis. Firstly, because of its 
importance in Augustine's thought, I shall examine the eschatological 
question. In other words, even though the city of God will be finally separated 
from the earthly city at the second coming of Christ - and the worldly city will 
then be destroyed - I shall argue that Augustine believed that at least some 
Christians should be politically involved in the world. This leads on to the 
second question concerning ecclesiology and how the church should relate 
with civil society. As Augustine thinks hierarchically, ordinary folk are to 
content themselves with what their masters tell them to do, but, as I shall 
show, Christian leaders can be more assertive in what we would now call civil 
matters. Given this, I shall then examine the third question. This looks at the 
education and training Augustine thought most appropriate for those who 
exercise political leadership. This third question will be looked at in more 
detail in the next chapter in conversation with Peter Bathory's book, Political 
Theory as Public Confession. 
2.5.2.n .bD~rodunctioliD 
Even in his defining of the two cities, and how they came about, Augustine is 
thinking eschatologically. It is equally clear that members of the city of God 
are not 'at home' in the earthly city. 
It is written, then, that Cain founded a city, whereas Abel, a pilgrim, 
did not find one. For the City of Saints is on high, although it produces 
citizens here below, in whose persons it is a pilgrim until the time of its 
kingdom shall come. Then it will call together all those citizens as they 
rise again in their bodies; and then they will be given the promised 
kingdom, where they will reign with their Prince, the king eternal, 
world without end. 150 
How, therefore, are we to understand the role of the pilgrim in what we must 
assume to be a hostile environment? 
ISO DCD, XV. I. 
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Eugene TeSelle, in his book Living in Two Cities: Augustinian Trajectories in 
Political Thought, devotes a whole chapter to the nature of the pilgrim. 151 I 
have already noted the pilgrim nature of Christian's journey through this life, 
but this does not mean that Christians should despair of 'attempts to transform 
the world', or be people who react against the "occupied territories" language 
ofliberationists. As TeSelle says, 
Both moves are Augustinian only as a first step, a clarification of one's 
primary values and commitments. When they become the last word 
they are un-Augustinian in their indifference to relative judgments 
about better or worse in the temporal sphere. Augustine ... was not 
prepared to abandon the world ... in the same manner. 152 
Even as they are pilgrims, Augustine expects that Christians who are truly 
'fathers of their families' create a household that 'ought to be the beginning, or 
a little part, of the city;' and therefore 'domestic peace has reference to civic 
peace' .153 However, the difference between true fathers and earthly fathers can 
be seen in the next chapter of The City of God. 
But a household of men who do not live by faith strives to find an 
earthly peace in the goods and advantages which belong to this 
temporal life. By contrast, a household of men who live by faith looks 
forward to the blessings which are promised as eternal in the life to 
come; and such men make use of earthly and temporal things like 
pilgrims: they are not captivated by them, nor are they deflected by 
them from their progress towards God. 154 
Though the world has to be travelled through, it is not, therefore, 
abandoned. 155 It is clear that Augustine viewed Christians as pilgrims through 
the earthly city, with their sights set on the eschatological city of God. In the 
end, for Augustine, all political life is relativised: the Christian was to make 
use of the peace of Babylon, and to pray for that peace even while knowing 
that this earthly peace was not, and never would be, perfect peace. For 
151 
'The Sojourner: Neither a Citizen nor an Alien' in Eugene TeSelle, Living in Two Cities: 
Augustinian Trajectories in Political Thought (New York: University ofScranton Press, 1998) 
45-71. 
152 lbid, 61. 
153 DCD, XIX. 16. 
154 DCD, XIX. I 7. 
m As can be clearly seen in DCD, XIX. 16 quoted above. 
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Augustine, the peace of Babylon is something that the Christian can make use 
of: but for different ends than members of the earthly city for whom this peace 
is the only peace they know. However Augustine also saw that the Christian 
had a responsibility to love their neighbour and was therefore required to be 
involved in civil society. 156 While not setting out to transform society, the 
pilgrim had a different ethos of life, which could affect society - hopefully for 
the better. 
For Augustine, true justice will only occur in the City of God, but Christians, 
as pilgrims on their way to their homeland, are to offer their talents to be used 
in the earthly city in order to secure and maintain the peace of Babylon. In 
other words, even if the eschaton is the first word - that in the end very little 
matters in terms of what civil customs and laws we follow, 157 or under what 
authority we live- it does not mean it is the only word Christians offer to the 
world. For Augustine, political involvement is a necessary part of life. 
Therefore, I shall consider how the church should relate to civil society. 
2.5.3 The Church and Civil Society 
2.5.3.1 Introduction 
The balance between looking to the infinite and living in this world is, of 
course, difficult to achieve. And as we look at Augustine's writings, at times 
one aspect is emphasised, then the other. On the one hand, he clearly tells his 
congregation not to get involved, 158 not to be disobedient (not even to 
tyrants) 159 - after all we are all going to die sometime anyway. 160 All of this 
points to a very quietist approach to life. And yet, we also see Augustine 
vigorously defending himself when taken to task by Macedonius, who 
156 Though with the correct motives- see 2.3.5 above. 
157 Provided that 'there is nothing indecent or immoderate about it' (DCD, XIX. 19). 
158 See Sermo 302. 
159 DCD, ll. 19. 'Christ's servants, therefore ... are commanded to endure this earthly 
commonwealth, however depraved and wholly vile it may be, if they must.' 
160 DCD, V. 17. 'As fur as this mortal life is concerned, which is spent and finished in a few 
days, what difference does it make under what rule a man lives who is soon to die, provided 
only that those who rule him do not compel him to do what is impious and wicked?' 
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suggests that religion should be kept out of politics (or, in this case, the justice 
system). 161 
As I noted in 2.3.5 above, in Epistula I 0* Augustine notes that his 
congregants were 'aware of our practice of performing acts of mercy in such 
cases', 
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and so took direct action in freeing over one hundred slaves. While 
he expects to solve the problems thus created by due legal process, Augustine 
does not condemn their actions. Therefore we must accept that quietism in all 
circumstances is not the end of the story. 
Sermo 302 tells a very different story: lynching, rioting and other sorts of 
violent behaviour are emphatically not condoned. 'Rough justice' is not the 
sort of behaviour Augustine expects from his congregation. If the official has 
broken the law, the remedy is through the law. On the whole, political action 
is to be left to those who are in a position to take that action: whether that 
person is a leader in the church or in civil society. 
Augustine tells his congregation that he would rather not go to see imperial 
officials on their behalf, where 
I have to wait my chance, stand outside the door, queue while they go 
in ... have my name announced - then sometimes I only just get 
admitted! I have to put up with the humiliation, make my request, 
sometimes succeed, sometimes leave disappointed. 163 
It seems that being a bishop is no guarantee of success when pleading with 
imperial bureaucracy. This is in spite of Augustine's role as a civil judge in 
minor disputes, and Augustine's influence on several important imperial 
officials. Augustine himself, when not haranguing his flock (though how much 
of his complaint in Sermo 302 is invective or polemic?) defends the right of 
the church to argue in supplication for the guilty. 'In short, the Lord himself 
161 Epp. 152-5. 
162 Ep. 10*. 7. 
163 Sermo 302. 17. 
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interceded with the men to save the adulteress from stoning, and by doing so 
he advocated the duty of intercession to us.' 164 Augustine may be aware that 
his efforts will not necessarily succeed, but this does not mean that he wishes 
to abandon the right to argue his case. 
How the church related to civil society precluded, as far as practical politics 
was concerned, any form of civil disobedience - even if such action can be 
seen as theoretically possible from Augustine's writings. 165 On the whole, the 
people who were to advocate improvements in the justice of society were 
church leaders: Christian leaders in the 'saeculum' were to support the church. 
So a person's relationship with society would depend on their position in that 
society. That position in society partly depended on the system of patronage (a 
system Augustine used to advance his own career as a rhetor prior to his 
conversion), but whether the individual was granted any career advance 
depended on the level of education that person had received. It is to our third 
theme of education that we now turn. 
2.5.4 Education and Training in Augustine's Congregation 
2.5.4.1 Introduction 
If political action can be taken, we must look to see where that action should 
originate, and how people should be educated to take any action. Even in 
Epistula 1 0* Augustine is left with a series of problems following 
congregational action, so what sort of education, or, more broadly, paideia, 166 
did Augustine have in mind for those who were called to be politically 
involved? 
164 Ep., 153. ll. 
165 See 2.3.6 above. 
166 For the breadth ofthe meaning ofpaideia, see Eugene Kevane, 'Paideia and Anti-Paideia: 
the Prooemium of St. Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana', Augustinian Studies I (1970), 
153-80, especially 156-7. 
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2.5.4.2 Leading Ug into ABl Truth 
For all practical purposes, Augustine expects his congregation to be obedient 
to those in power. While this does not mean we can dismiss the idea of 
Augustine teaching the congregation on how they should approach political 
matters - even in Sermo 302, as I have noted, he tells the congregation that 
their remedy is through the laws of the state167 - Augustine does not set out a 
political program, nor does he give a political paideia. This is because the 
subject of paideia for Augustine is not politics, but truth. This is summed up 
by Philip Cary: 
In the classical philosophic view of education represented by 
Augustine, liberal education (the learning appropriate to a free person 
rather than a slave) forms human character by strengthening it with the 
virtues necessary for the pursuit of truth, which is the pursuit of 
happiness. Thus any pedagogy not based on the students' innate love 
of truth is not liberal education but training for servants ... 168 
For Augustine the best education is a paideia based on Christian truth, taught 
by Christian leaders. 169 
Emest Fortin, in his discussion on Augustine's theory of conscience (and 
making use of De utilitate credendi), points up Augustine's elitist thinking, 
and thus the dependence on leaders. The truths relating to the existence of God 
and his involvement in the lives ofhis creatures 
are inaccessible to the multitude of uneducated men. If they are to be 
accepted at all by them, it can only be on the authority of a few wise 
and learned men. 170 
Foolish people (in contrast to 'the wise') 171 who are unable to see the truth 
require someone in or with authority to lead them into that truth. 172 Of course, 
167 See Sermo 302. 13. 
168 Philip Cary, 'Study as Love: Augustinian Vision and Catholic Education' in Kim 
Paffenroth and Kevin L. Hughes (eds.), Augustine and Liberal Education (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000), 62. 
169 How 'political' this education would be will be discussed in chapter 3 below. 
170 Emest L. Fortin, 'The Political Implications of St. Augustine's Theory of Conscience', 
Augustinian Studies 1 (1970), 150, emphasis added. 
171 For Augustine's definitions of'wise' and 'fools' see below. 
172 See C.L. Cornish, 'On the Profit of Believing' [De Utilitate Credendi] in Philip Schaff 
(ed.), The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, vol. III: St. Augustine, (Edinburgh: 
T &T Clark, 1993 (reprint)), 34. 
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from Augustine's perspective, since God is the source of all wisdom, the wise 
person must be an adherent of the Catholic Church. 173 The big question is of 
course, how to recognise wisdom. This is where the Church comes in as 'the 
specific authority instituted by God to lead men to the truth.' 174 But there is a 
need, as far as Augustine is concerned, for leadership. To reiterate: in Sermo 
302, the only people enjoined to action are Augustine himself, and heads of 
households, who should have prevented their families and servants from 
joining the lynch mob. 
So, wise leadership is the key to authority in the church and in civil society. 
We must note, however, the distinction Augustine draws between 'authority' 
and 'power'. 
In Augustine's usage authority (auctoritas) belongs to teachers, not to 
kings. Political rulers are not said to have authority, but rather power or 
sovereignty (potesfas or imperium). 115 
Therefore we can see that just because a person has power - and must, 
therefore, be obeyed (subject to the strictures discussed above) - it does not 
mean they necessarily have the authority to direct people to the truth. For this, 
a wise man is required. 
The wise man here is not someone clever or skilled, but rather one who 
has a "clear and strongly established knowledge of God and man" (De 
utilitate credendi 12.27 ... ), and lives and conducts his life in a way 
that answers to that knowledge ... From this, no one with moderate 
intelligence can miss the point that it is more ''useful and helpful to 
obey the precepts of the wise" than for the fool to live by his own 
whims (De uti/it ate credendi 12.27 ... ). 176 
For Augustine, then, the wise man is the person to follow and will lead us to 
God. Also for Augustine, it is the Church that guides us all to the truth - and 
no political authority (however good in secular terms) that ignores the truth of 
173 Anything useful from Classical liberal education, was taken over by the church as a 
'spoiling of the Egyptians' (see Saint Augustine, On Christian Teaching [De Doctrina 
Christiana], trans. R.P.H. Green (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 11. 144-52. 
References to this work follow Green, and future references to this text will be cited as DDC). 
174 Fortin, 'Augustine's Theory of Conscience', 151. 
175 Philip Cary, 'Study as Love', 56. 
176 Felix B. Asiedu, 'The Limits of Augustine's Personal Authority: The Hermeneutics of 
Trust in De utili late credendi', in Kim Paffenroth and Kevin L. Hughes ( eds. ), Augustine and 
Liberal Education, 136-7. 
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God is truly just. 177 From this Rowan Williams tells us that 'Augustine 
assumes that a person nurtured in the Church and in the ordered caritas it 
inculcates is uniquely qualified to take responsibility for wielding political 
power.' 178 Whether Augustine would accept that any Christian was so 
qualified is open to doubt. What we do know179 is that Augustine is happy to 
refer to the idea of Christian leaders in civil society long after he has 
abandoned any idea of a 'Christian Empire.' 
This is not to say a Christian leader would have an easy time as he tried to 
balance the conflicting interests of the earthly and the heavenly cities. Not 
only does a Christian leader have 'the alanning task of discerning the point at 
which what he is defending has ceased to be defensible ... ', 180 but also there is 
the tension of knowing, more generally, that '[a] wise leader, political or 
otherwise, must be sensitive to the double necessity that Augustine points to in 
[De Civitate Dei, XIX. 6]' .181 This 'double necessity' is that 'on the one hand, 
ignorance is unavoidable, and, on the other, judgement is also unavoidable 
because human society compels it.' 182 This inevitably leads to tensions, and to 
the realisation that the only certainty is that mistakes will be made. Hence 
Augustine's praise of Theodosius, whose penitence (very much against the 
norm for Roman Emperors) over the massacre of the Thessalonians is 
commended in De Civitate Dei, V. 26. 
2.5.41.3 Cmndunsi~DIID. 
I have shown in this section, that Augustine's elitist thinking meant that he 
expected there to be leaders both in the church and in civil society. The leaders 
in the church should guide the rest towards the Christian truths. 183 Also 
Christian leaders in civil society would face an almost impossible task in their 
177 DCD, XIX. 21. 
178 Williams, 'Politics and the Soul', 68. 
179 For example from Augustine's insistence to Bonifuce (Ep. 220) and to Christian judges 
(DCD, XIX. 6) that they should continue in public office. 
180 Williams, 'Politics and the Soul', 66. 
181 Mark J. Doorley, 'Limit and Possibility: An Augustinian Counsel to Authority', in 
Paffenroth and Hughes (eds.), Augustine and Liberal Education, (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Co., 2000), 151. 
182 DCD, XIX. 6. 
183 Augustine himself spent considerable time educating others, some of whom went on to be 
bishops themselves; conversely, the masses remained uneducated (see 3.2 below). 
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uncomfortable role. In the light of his hierarchical thinking, it is unsurprising 
that Augustine did not advocate political action on the part of his 
congregation. However, in spite of the difficulties facing leaders, the only 
education Augustine offered was the informal Christian education of the 
Church184 which had no directly political content. 
In this chapter, I have shown that Augustine was not entirely the political 
quietist that he has been portrayed, but neither would he have advocated 
'political Augustinianism'. He involved himself with the civil society around 
him, and although the scope for action was limited, he nevertheless saw taking 
that action as part of his responsibility as a Christian. Others with public roles 
were also expected to take action in the service of the church, but the general 
mass of the population were expected to follow the instructions of those 
placed over them, and civil disobedience was never part of what Augustine 
saw as legitimate political action. I shall now move on to examine Peter 
Bathory's book, to see ifthere is scope in Augustine for a prepoliticalpaideia. 
184 As noted above, Classical education was pillaged for the truths that Christianity could 
accept. 
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Chapter 3 
PREPOLITICAL EDUCATION IN AUGUSTINE'S THOUGHT 
3.1 Introduction 
As intimated in the last chapter, Augustine is interested in educating his 
congregation into the truth of the Christian gospel. His concern is not 
'political'. I have suggested that his reactions to congregational action in the 
public realm vary according to the motives of his congregation: taking part in 
the lynching of a hated tax official can only be selfish, 1 whereas the releasing 
of illegally held slaves indicates a willingness to act on behalf of others.2 
Motivation, and holding the correct authority, is clearly Augustine's concern 
when he addresses, or thinks about, Christian leadership. Christian emperors 
are judged happy 'if they rule justly', not for other reasons that Augustine 
describes as mere 'gifts and consolations of this wretched life ... ' .3 
Given Augustine's eschatological perspective and elitist mode of thought, the 
question explored in this chapter is what sort of education would Augustine 
think appropriate for his congregation. Before I explore Peter Bathory's thesis 
of a prepolitical paideia, I will look more generally at Augustine's approach to 
education. The main difficulty in looking for a political education, or an 
education for political action, is that Augustine did not have the mindset of a 
modem man in divorcing his faith from political life. On the contrary, '[a]ll 
societies of antiquity, culminating in the Roman Empire, assumed an intrinsic 
relationship of religion to the political order' .4 Therefore an education that 
looked for 'truth' in terms of religious faith would be bound to share the same 
assumptions about the relationship of faith and political order. It is only in this 
way, as I shall show, that Augustine can be said to have an education for 
political involvement. In other words, any political education is implicit in his 
1 Sermo 302. 
2 See Ep. 10*. 
3 DCD, V. 24. These include ruling 'for a longer time', subduing their enemies and avoiding 
revolt against their rule (ibid.). Such 'consolations' are relativised by Augustine, who points 
out that 'every man should be a Christian only for the sake of eternal life' (ibid., V. 25). 
4 Rosemary Radford Ruether, 'Augustine and Christian Political Theology', Interpretation 29 
(1975), 253. This 'intrinsic relationship' extended well beyond Antiquity (see 2.4.2 above). 
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Christian education, and not explicit. That there is a political side to his 
education is evidenced by his comment towards the end of Confessions, where 
he states that 
our soul yields works of mercy 'according to its kind (Gen. 1: 12), 
loving our neighbour in the relief of physical necessities ... This means 
such kindness as rescuing a person suffering injustice from the hand of 
the powerful and providing the shelter of protection by the mighty 
force of just judgement. 5 
What we would call political action, action in the public sphere, is motivated 
by the Christian command to love our neighbour. The question remains as to 
how Augustine thought he could teach his congregation and others how they 
could show 'such kindness'. 
3.2 Augustine's Teacher Training 
As well as its being riven by the Donatist schism, Augustine was well aware 
that the African church suffered from a lack of education amongst its priests. 
In order to overcome this lack, after his ordination as presbyter, 
Augustine organised a monastic community within the precincts of the 
church. The function of this community was primarily educative, to 
train a more educated priesthood ... 6 
Once Augustine had become bishop ofHippo, 
he set up ... three similar communities, one consisting of priests and 
minor clerics and two consisting of laymen ... The purpose of these 
communities was not to separate their members from the affairs of the 
world but to prepare them for more intelligent participation in its life. 
They were in fact designed to become competent Christian teachers ... 
Possidus mentions the names of several of its members, who later 
became bishops of African sees. 7 
Bishop Possidus was himself one of those men. In his 'Life of St. Augustine', 
he tells us that, 
As divine truth made headway, those who had been serving God in the 
monastery with the holy Augustine, and under his rule, began to be 
ordained as clergy for the Church at Hippo . . . [T]en men . . . were 
supplied by the most blessed Augustine to various Churches ... These 
5 Conf XIII. xvii (21). 
6 George Howie, Educational Theory and Practice in St. Augustine (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1969), 23. 
7 Ibid, 24. 
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[men] in their turn ... founded fresh monasteries as the Churches of the 
Lord multiplied; and then . . . they supplied brethren to yet other 
Churches for promotion to the priesthood. 8 
The difficulty, for anyone looking for a general Augustinian education, is that 
these monasteries became mines for the elite priesthood, rather than centres of 
general education for the populace: 'neither he [Augustine] nor the African 
church as a whole succeeded in educating the indigenous masses. ' 9 In other 
words, 
The African church produced an incomparable elite, but no Christian 
people. The barbarians and the schism gave it no time to do so. 10 
While van der Meer points out that this lack of education for the masses is a 
criticism more of Augustine's time than of the man himself, 11 he does point 
out that 'the materially poor constituted the overwhelming majority' 12 of 
Augustine's congregation. This overwhelming majority were also uneducated, 
even though those 'who could come anywhere near affording it sent his 
children to a grammaticus, as the principal would be called in those rather 
curious private schools where the poets were read, explained and learned by 
heart.' 13 In the culture of the time, it was more important to be able to quote 
the poets exactly by heart, than to earn one's living by following some craft, 
even ifthat craft was architecture. 14 'Yet ifwe take the population as a whole, 
the truly lettered only formed a small caste in the towns and a tiny fraction in 
the villas and on the land ... '. 15 
Then there was slavery, the foundation of the whole culture of 
Antiquity, on which no man as yet dared lay a finger. Like St. Paul and 
all the Fathers of the Church, St. Augustine was more concerned to 
ennoble the existing relation between master and slave than to 
reconstruct the social order ... 16 
8 F.R. Hoare (ed. and trans.), The Western Fathers (London: Sheed and Ward, 1954), 205-6. 
9 F. van der Meer, Augustine the Bishop, trans. Brian Battershaw and G.R. Lamb (London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1961), 568. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 135. 
13 Ibid., 133. 
14 Ibid., 134. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 135. 
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There is, therefore, no evidence of a call to liberate the slaves. The fact that 
slaves often wanted for nothing while the poor-but-free could be seen begging 
for bread, meant that the 'more serious social problem for Augustine was 
• ' 17 massive poverty . . . . 
While Augustine's church in Hippo provided sanctuary to slaves and others in 
times of need, and while he preached to a congregation of mainly poor people, 
it is, we are told, 'the towns and the upper classes' that are Augustine's 
'immediate preoccupation'. 18 His own writings on education are aimed at 
those who are already educated. Indeed in De Doctrina Christiana, he tells his 
readers to look elsewhere for teaching in the study of rhetoric, 19 though he 
expects the rhetorical styles to be understood and used by those readers when 
they come to put his words into practice.20 It is however, interesting that 
Augustine assumes a high level of intelligence on the part of his reader,21 and 
he clearly assumes that the best 'performances' are from those who 'can argue 
or speak wisely, if not eloquently. ' 22 Therefore, though Augustine is not 
theoretically averse to someone who is not eloquent in expounding the 
scriptures, it is clear that he prefers the speaker to be both wise and eloquent. 23 
This dichotomy is evidence of what Carol Harrison refers to as Augustine's 
tension 'between his past, but still enduring, educational and intellectual 
formation, and his present identity as a Christian bishop. ' 24 Perhaps the best 
way to describe the tension is to suggest that Augustine thinks that Christian 
17 Robert Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies, Just Wars and the Politics of Persuasion: Reading 
Augustine's City of God in a "Postmodern" World', Augustinian Studies 25 (1994), 113. 
18 
van der Meer, Augustine, 568. 
19 DDC, IV. 3. 
20 
'The general function of eloquence, in any of these three styles [of rhetoric], is to speak in a 
manner fitted to persuade . . . and if he fails to persuade he has not achieved the aim of 
eloquence (ibid., 143). 
21 Ibid., 7. 
22 Ibid., 17. 
23 Ibid., 22. Augustine, against pagan criticism, also states that the Scriptures are naturally 
eloquent (ibid., 25). 
24 Carol Harrison, Augustine: Christian Truth and Fractured Humanity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 69, cf Figgis Political Aspects, 44. Interestingly, 'grammar seems 
exempt from Augustine's criticisms' (Catherine M. Chin, 'Christians and the Roman 
Classroom: Memory, Grammar, and Rhetoric in Confessions X', Augustinian Studies 33 
(2002), 162); Augustine wishes to place grammar within Christian, and not pagan learning 
(ibid., 163). This looks like an example of'spoiling the Egyptians' (see 2.5.4.2 above). 
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truth ought to be able to stand by itself without human embellishment, but he 
knows that human beings are perfectly capable of following an eloquent 
speaker - whether or not that speaker propounds the truth,25 and the same 
attitudes will prevail when it comes to reading the written word. Augustine 
himself, as a young man before his conversion, regarded the scriptures as 
'unworthy in comparison with the dignity of Cicero. ' 26 The fact that he has 
clearly changed his position on Catholic Christianity may have influenced his 
wish to find and defend eloquence - even grand eloquence - in the Scriptures, 
without, of course, making Biblical writers or expounders dependent on 
classical rhetorical style. 27 
In De Doctrina Christiana, Augustine changes Cicero's priorities of eloquence 
from saying that the 'teaching and delight were subordinate to the ultimate 
goal of persuasion', 28 to the idea that teaching, or instruction, 'is a matter of 
necessity. ' 29 Delight, for Augustine, is part of (Christian) eloquence, merely 
because 'the disdainful kind of person ... is not satisfied by the truth presented 
anyhow ... ',30 and persuasion, or moving people cannot occur, unless they 
have been taught. 31 However, if the use of rhetoric is what will allow them to 
learn, to perceive delight, and be moved to action, then so be it. Given that 
Augustine's 'overriding emphasis [is] on teaching the truth', 32 it is 
unsurprising that he would wish to make use, and recommend others to make 
use, of a skill that had served him so well in both his civil and his pastoral 
careers - even if he has to considerably adapt classical rhetoric before it can be 
deemed suitable for Christian use. 
25 
'But the speaker who is awash with the kind of eloquence that is not wise is particularly 
dangerous because audiences actually enjoy listening to such a person on matters of no value 
to them, and reckon that somebody who is heard to speak eloquently must also be speaking 
the truth.' DDC, IV. 17. 
26 Confessions, m, V (9). 
27 See Harrison, Augustine, 70-1. 
28 Ibid., 73. 
29 DDC, IV. 76. 
30 Ibid., 78. 
31 
'People may either do or not do what they know must be done; but who could say that they 
must do something which they do not know they must do?' (Ibid., 76). 
32 Ibid., 73 
58 
In sum, we can conclude that, although Augustine does not require everyone 
to be eloquent in propounding the scriptures, he is fully aware of his culture 
and his time. That culture meant that, all too often, the eloquent rather than the 
wise would win any argument. Augustine's own education was elitist and this 
elitist thought can still be seen in works such as De Doctrina Christiana. 
Elitism at that time would have extended to reading itself. We must note that 
for centuries, the Bible, as with other literature, was usually read aloud. 33 
Hence we can appreciate Augustine's surprise at Ambrose's silent reading, 
even in public. 34 In a culture where it could not be assumed that everyone 
could read, any educational programme could be seen to be elitist. However 
Augustine, as a Catholic bishop, had pastoral responsibility for many poor 
people (and slaves), so what programme could he envision for them? It is to 
this topic that I now turn. 
3.3 Educating the Poor 
Augustine is clearly a pastor, and an educator. His many sermons and letters 
address issues of the moment. He frequently tells his congregation what he 
expects of them- and in no uncertain terms.35 This 'education' can only be 
described as informal. A more theoretical treatment of educating the poor is 
the De Catechizandis Rudibus,36 written in response to a request from 
Deogratias, a deacon of the church in Carthage. This short treatise, as might be 
expected from its title, is about education for Christian baptism. It is therefore 
not, by any stretch of the imagination, an education for involvement in public 
life. It is, however, instructive as it shows Augustine's methods for training 
ordinary people. 
The instructions Augustine gives (and even the examples he uses) in this work 
show a didactic method: the teacher teaches and the pupil listens. Questions 
33 See Joseph T. Lienhard, 'Reading the Bible and Learning to Read: The Influence of 
Education on St. Augustine's Exegesis', Augustinian Studies 27 (1996), 10-1 L 
34 See Confessions, VI. iii (3). 
35 See for example, Senna 302, discussed in chapter 2 above. 
36 Augustine, Catechising of the Uninstructed [De Catechizandis Rudibus], trans. S.P.F. 
Salmond, http://ccel.org/fathers2/NPNF 1-03/npnfl-03-25 .htm (11109/02). This work was 
written 'about the year 400 AD.' (ibid., 'Introductory Notice') and is divided into both 
chapters and paragraphs. As the latter are consecutive throughout the work, I shall just refer to 
the work by paragraph number. 
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are seen as opportunities for the instructor to expand or expound Christian 
history or doctrine. 37 This stands in marked contrast to De Magistro, another 
early work by Augustine,38 which uses an interlocutory method. The teacher 
asks questions in order to lead his pupil in dialogue towards the truth: there 
may be direction on the part ofthe teacher, but the amount of input on the part 
of the pupil is considerable. A similar interlocutory method can be seen in 
Contra Academicos.39 It can be argued that these latter two early works 
purport to be reports of actual conversations between educated people, 
whereas De Catechizandis Rudibus is meant as a manual for Deogratias to use 
in his instruction of candidates for Christian baptism, including the 
uneducated. 
For Augustine, Christian truth was based on knowledge of events in the Bible 
Therefore a certain amount of instruction would be required - especially for 
the unlearned poor (which, as noted above, made up a large part of Christian 
congregations).40 Augustine recommends a shorter catechism41 for those who 
have had a (classical) liberal education and have 'already acquired a 
considerable knowledge of our Scriptures and literature ... ' .42 He also notes the 
special treatment to be given to those 'who come from the commonest schools 
ofthe grammarians and professional speakers' who are neither uneducated nor 
of the 'very learned classes'. 
Therefore, we can see that Augustine is clearly aware that there are different 
classes of hearer,43 and he wishes to address them all. However, Augustine's 
approach to the uninstructed seems radically different from the way he seeks 
to educate the already classically educated Christians who were his 
37 The only major questioning is done by the teacher of the catechumen to check that the latter 
is genuinely seeking baptism (and with the correct motives). De Catechizandis Rudibus, 9. 
38 Augustine, The Teacher [De Magistro], ed. and trans. Peter King (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1995), 94-146. This work was originally written in 389 A.D. 
39 Augustine, Against the Academicians [Contra Academicos], ed. and trans. Peter King 
(lndianapolis: Hackett, 1995), 1-93. This work was originally written in 386 A.D. (This 
interlocutory method is also followed in De libero arbitrio.) 
40 See De Catechizandis Rudibus, 24-50. 
41 Ibid., 52-5. 
42 Ibid., 12. 
43 This is further discussed in ibid., 23. 
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companions in the educative monasteries he set up.44 A set of instructions in 
the form of an address does not engage the hearer in the way that a participant 
in debate and discussion is engaged in learning and understanding what is 
under discussion. 45 It is therefore unsurprising that van der Meer insists 
(however much Augustine was a man of his time in matters educational) 
Augustine and his fellow bishops failed to produce a Christian people.46 His 
wish to educate 'everyman'47 was clearly limited to the truths ofthe Christian 
gospel. Even his book De Doctrina Christiana, although it is ostensibly 
directed at 'those whom we desire to be educated for the good of the 
church' ,48 is elitist. R.P .H. Green notes that De Doctrina Christiana 'is surely 
not for all preachers, for he assumes that the communicators have considerable 
knowledge already, or the means to gain it, and much of his advice would be 
beyond the comprehension of most preachers of his time. ' 49 'Everyman' for 
Augustine, it appears is very much an 'educated everyman.' 
3.4 Prepolitics for the Congregation 
Against van der Meer and others, Peter Bathory produces a thesis that puts a 
different, and radical, light on Augustine. Bathory's thesis, in Political Theory 
as Public Confession, that Augustine aimed at a universal 'prepolitical' 
education for his congregation has considerable appeal on a first reading. 50 
However, for all that Bathory can be seen as a counter-weight to those such as 
Herbert Deane who take the line that Augustine advocated total, and passive, 
44 See Howie, 23-4, and the discussion above. 
45 This topic is further discussed in chapter 5 on Paulo Freire, who distinguishes between 
'banking' and 'liberative' education. The former merely seeks to transfer information from 
one mind to another; the latter seeks to engage the pupils in their own educative process. 
46 See above and van der Meer, 568. 
47 Bathory derives the term 'everyman' from Robert J. O'Connell, St. Augustine's 
Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul (Massachusetts: Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 
1969), 186. However, O'Connell is making the point that Augustine believes that all humanity 
is a part of one - fallen - society (hence our equality before God), and that man shares a 
'mysterious unity with his fellow-men.' (Ibid., 187). 
48 DDC, IV, 8- not all of whom should necessarily devote their time to learning the rules of 
eloquence (see ibid.). 
49 R.P.H. Green, 'Introduction' to Saint Augustine, On Christian Teaching, viii. 
50 
'Augustine of Hippo's political thought was - and is - immensely influential. He saw 
"political theory as public confession" - the presentation of a Christian perspective on the 
political process and on historical development which was in a real sense the proclamation of 
the gospel' (Duncan B. Forrester (quoting Bathory's phrase), Christian Justice and Public 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 11 ). 
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obedience to the political authorities, I will argue that Bathory's book is not 
immune from criticism. 
Bathory's Political Theory as Public Confession introduces an account of the 
'everyman' of Augustine's North African congregation. According to Bathory, 
this everyman needed to be educated away from Roman 'antipolitics',51 into a 
proper appraisal of his own limitations and limited sphere of action- so that 
he would be in a better position to take that action. Bathory, chiefly through 
examination of Augustine's Confessiones and De Civitate Dei, expounds an 
idea of a church-led, or bishop-led, pre-political education, which is needed to 
drive the revival of civic virtue. He does this by pointing up the educational 
parallels between the two books. That is, the educational stages undergone by 
the individual in Confessiones are similar to the stages communities go 
through in De Civitate Dei. And, just as Augustine - after the process of the 
Confessiones - becomes aware of the lack of true education and leadership in 
his upbringing, so people more generally need to be educated to be similarly 
aware regarding political leadership in civil society. 
After an examination of why Bathory's work could appeal to those seeking to 
broaden the base of Christian political involvement, I shall present an account 
of his work. Then I shall argue that Bathory is open to criticism in five specific 
areas. Firstly, he fails to take account of the eschatological nature of 
Augustine's teaching. Secondly, he seems unaware of the hierarchical nature 
of Augustine's thinking - which leads to questions, discussed above, about 
how far Augustine would go in educating the ordinary congregant. Thirdly, he 
fails to explore the implications for political life of Augustine's approach to 
lying. Fourthly, he also fails to mention coercion. There is no discussion, 
therefore, of pastoral coercion, or the coercion of the political authorities who 
'do not bear the sword in vain', a sword that would presumably still be used 
by the new, Christian, leaders. This omission, in a discussion of Augustine's 
views on political involvement, is a significant oversight. Fifthly, Bathory's 
51 Bathory calls Roman politics a 'bastardization' of Classical politics (Political Theory, 11), 
and Roman society as one in which people 'were too ready to follow any plausible leader ... ' 
(ibid., 121). 
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idea of Augustine as a 'political therapist' must be questioned in the light of 
Augustine's overwhelming religious concern for the well being of his 
. 52 
congregation. 
Then I will briefly re-examine Deane's quietist approach, before returning to 
Bathory, to see what we can learn from his thesis on Augustine's political 
thought. My conclusion will be that, although (contra Deane) Augustine can 
hardly be described as passive in front of political authority, neither can he be 
described as a pre-political educator searching for a universal paideia -
however attractive the idea may appear. The Christian in power may be, from 
an Augustinian perspective, the best possible option in a fallen world, but this 
does not mean (as Bathory seems to think) that Augustine thought everyone 
should be educated 'prepolitically' so that they could recognise those who 
might be the best to have political authority over them. That Augustine 
expected the actions of all Christians in authority in civil society to be based 
on a Christian paideia is easier to argue, though the difference is one of 
motivation, not necessarily of action. 
3.5 Augustine as Proto-Liberation Theologian? 
Bathory's work can been seen as an opening up of Augustine's political 
thought for ordinary humanity. The ordinary person of Augustine's 
congregation, 'everyman', is educable, and can be trained to recognise which 
leader is best to lead his society back towards a true public virtue. This, of 
course, is not what is usually emphasised in Augustine's writings, but, given 
that the aim of my thesis is to examine how 'ordinary' Christians should be 
involved in civil society and how they should be educated for that 
involvement, Bathory's thesis (if he is correct) makes very congenial reading. 
For, according to Bathory, ordinary congregants can be involved in political 
debate. They should also be aware of public life around them and of the 
contribution they can make. And the education that the church provides, given 
52 Bathory regards Augustine as a 'political therapist' in the sense of giving his congregation 
the wherewithal to understand (and presumably, given Bathory's thesis, the wherewithal to 
influence and take part in) public life as lived in North Africa in the fifth century. The 'this 
worldly' approach entailed contrasts with the religious and eschatological note in Augustine's 
teaching that other commentators emphasise. 
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that it impinges on the congregants' everyday life in civil society, implies that 
the church has to be politically involved. There is, therefore, more to 
Augustinian politics than obeying whoever happens to be in charge. True 
leaders can, it seems, be identified and encouraged. And, of course, the 
political values and opinions of ordinary people count. 
The value of ordinary people (politically or otherwise) is a central theme of 
liberation theology:53 the poor need to be released from their oppression in this 
world if the church's call to (total) liberation in the next world is to be 
understood. In order to do this, the church must move away from being seen as 
part of the political establishment. Indeed, Bathory tells us that Augustine saw 
'no intrinsic good in extent of empire' and that 
No tinkering with imperial institutions would provide an adequate 
solution . . . thus Augustine began to question any form of alliance 
between the church and the empire (92).54 
Whether this means that there is to be a 'political therapy' that involves radical 
criticism of the current political order, and works towards a new political order 
in civil society, is doubtful. It is true that Augustine, especially after 410, 
rejected the Eusebian version of a Christian Roman Empire; but any argument 
about an Augustinian concept of a total separation of the church and the 
empire must take account of his own position, once he became a bishop, as 'a 
member ofthe new governing class', and as a 'city judge' (1). He may have 
complained that the arbitration of disputes took him away from other tasks, 
but there is no evidence that Augustine thought that this task ought to be 
outside the remit of a Christian leader. 55 
The idea that Augustine favoured a 'more limited order' in the saeculum56 
based on love (92) is more plausible. As I noted in chapter 2, Augustine 
53 Bathory does not make the link, but there are similarities between his approach to 
Augustinian prepolitical education and the approach of the Base Ecclesial Communities 
(BECs) set up under the influence of Liberation Theology (see chapters 4 and 5 for further 
discussion on BECs). 
54 Throughout the rest of this chapter, unattributed page numbers refer to Bathory's work. 
55 On the contrary, see Epp. 152-5. 
56 Bathory follows Markus and accepts the idea of the saeculum as a tertium quid. As I have 
explained above in chapter 2, I do not accept that Augustine thought in terms of any neutral 
ground between the two cities. 
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certainly thought that '[t]he more perfect the love that held a society together, 
the more ordered was that society' (92); but the question remains whether he 
therefore thought that his congregation must be taught how to live out its faith 
in a social and political environment, as distinct from living it out in 
obedience to the civil authority. Bathory moves away from the 'passive 
obedience' model of Augustinian political thought and gives us an Augustine 
who wants to educate ordinary mortals so they are aware of their oppression 
(created by the lack of leadership in civil society) and who points them 
towards taking part in the community politically. How far Augustine can be 
moved towards a liberation theological approach to politics remains to be 
seen, but I shall now examine Bathory's thesis against what I have already 
discussed ofhis work (and its interpretation) above. 
3.6 Political Theory as Public Confession: Bathory's Thesis 
3.6.1 Introduction: The Unity of Confessiones and De Civitate Dei 
Bathory presents us with an Augustine who is concerned 'to educate Roman 
North Africans so they would be better able to confront the temptations and 
injustices of Roman politics and society than he and his friends had been in 
their youth and young adulthood' (xi). As a result ofthis education, Augustine 
hopes that his congregation is able to recognise and follow the best leaders 
within civil society. The education Augustine propounds is vital - an 
individual's 'early training or lack thereof could ... have a grave impact on 
future social and political questions' (18).57 Augustine clearly felt that his own 
education was lacking, and - in spite of the praise Augustine heaps on his 
mother in book IX of Confessiones - equally clearly, Monica is seen 'as a 
significant hindrance' to her son's educational development (46).58 
57 
'Behaviour does not change when one leaves behind domestic guardians and 
schoolmasters.' Conf I. xix (30). One can only assume that Bathory means 'impact' in its 
broadest sense: Augustine is concerned that people are brought up to regard their private good 
over any public good or duty - so many would, therefore, not be involved in public life 
(presumably to its detriment). See discussion below on private and public. 
58 Augustine's ambiguous relationship with his mother is discussed in Robert J. O'Connell, St. 
Augustine's Confessions, 106-13. 
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The key to Bathory's interpretation of Augustine, and his intimate tying 
together of Confessiones and De Civitate Dei, is in Augustine's Platonic 
thought that "'the happiness of a city and the happiness of an individual 
human being" are the same' (19, quoting DCD, I. 15). Although Augustine 
knows that 'individual remedies to problems caused by social and political 
disorders were destined to be partial at best' (1 02), 
He hopes that diagnoses on the individual level will make larger social 
and political diagnoses more fruitful. He is certain that the treatment of 
those larger social and political diseases must begin with the individual 
(19). 
Thus, what Augustine does for the individual, m terms of analysing the 
problems caused and remedies needed after a deficient education, in 
Confessiones, he does for society more generally in De Civitate Dei. 59 For 
Bathory Confessiones show that, for the individual (and in spite of the 
continuing conflict between knowing and willing), Augustine 'emphasised 
that ethical action ... is both possible and important in the face of life's 
incompleteness' (36). For Bathory, De Civitate Dei similarly finds Augustine 
looking for people 'that confront the difficulties of life actively - appreciating 
their limits but also affirming that which they can accomplish' (125). 
However, De Civitate Dei, XIX. 14 which Bathory uses to back up his 
statements merely points out that there is no final good in this life (true peace 
only occurs in the heavenly city), 'affirming that which they can accomplish' 
may only mean survival - but not even that is guaranteed. 60 Later on in book 
XIX, Augustine notes that social life may be desirable (he is in agreement with 
the philosophers here), but that it is never going to be free from anxiety as one 
cannot see into anyone's heart.61 Also, even the judge finds that 'on the one 
hand, ignorance is unavoidable, and, on the other, judgment is also 
unavoidable because human society compels it. ' 62 Bathory makes much, 
therefore, of the affirmation of what can be accomplished without 
acknowledging that Augustine does not think that we can do more than 
restrain the chaos that threatens to engulf society. 
59 See DCD, X. 14. 
60 As noted above, Christians should only be Christians for the sake of eternal life, not for any 
benefits that may be accrued in this life (see DCD, V. 25). 
61 DCD, XIX, 5. 
62 DCD, XIX, 6. See 2.5.4.2 above. 
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Recognition of a person's limited sphere of action depends on a Christian 
education. For Bathory, in Confessiones, Augustine's task was to teach 
himself and his readers 'the law of the scriptures so the law of the flesh could 
more regularly be brought under control' (25).63 This law of the scriptures 
was, however, only useful if people loved God and each other. Augustine's 
aim was to present people with an alternative to the corrupt Roman culture 
that surrounded them. For Augustine, Christ's example - as 'the concrete 
manifestation of the return to the [Platonic] cave' (27) - would lead to his 
readers' greater self-understanding as individuals and members of society 
sharing 'a vision ofthe "truest common good"' (28). 
Augustine follows similar themes in De Civitate Dei, where he uses the Old 
Testament leaders 'to mediate between his account of the history of Rome 
[and its politics] and the mysteries of the Christian faith' (144). Thereby 
Bathory unites the individual therapy of Confessiones with the political 
therapy of De Civitate Dei, in which the politics of Rome compared and 
contrasted with the true politics of Christianity. 
In summary therefore, we can see that Bathory has clearly identified unifYing 
themes in Cof?fessiones and De Civitate Dei. That these unifYing themes exist 
is incontrovertible given that both works are by the same author and are 
apologies for Christianity. However, how much political and educative 
thought went into these themes is another question. Augustine, as I have 
noted, is concerned with Christian truth: political application must remam 
incidental. The political therapy of De Civitate Dei is more eschatological than 
63 Bathory says that Augustine 'even after his conversion [he saw]" ... in my members another 
law ... making me captive to the law of sin ... "',but the quotation comes from Conf VII. xxi 
(27), not (19), and is certainly not after his conversion. (For a discussion on the stages of 
Augustine's conversion, see O'Connell, St. Augustine's Confessions, 10 1-4). At Ostia, after 
his conversion, his attitude was one of"Forgetting the past and reaching forward to what lies 
ahead" (Conf. IX. x (23), cf. O'Connell, 118), sin, and its legacy in him, was to be forgotten. 
He may still wish to teach his congregation, but his teaching does not come from an 
'understanding' position. In his 'Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans', Augustine tells 
us, in his discussion of Romans 7:23, that though Paul's 'carnal desires still exist, by not 
consenting to sin he does not serve them ... ' (Paula Fredriksen Landes (text and trans.), 
Augustine on Romans, (Chico, Ca.: Scholars Press, 1982), 19). Augustine's interpretation 
seems to assume that there is rather less of struggle not to sin than the Pauline text would 
indicate. 
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Bathory gives credit for. It is designed to inform the Romans that their gods 
did not, would not, and could not protect the 'eternal city'; that a Christian 
'state' may be better polity than a late Roman one, but that even this would not 
guarantee against disaster in this life; rather it offers eternal peace and justice 
in the life to come. It is to the differences between Christian and Roman 
politics that I now turn. 
3.6.2 Roman Anti-Politics and Christian Politics 
According to Bathory, Augustine's problem with Roman society was that it 
was not political or public enough. Rhetors vied with each other for public 
acclaim, no matter what the cost was to others (up to and including their 
death).64 In other words, 'antipolitics' appears to mean that men are trained in 
a 'public' discourse which is not aimed at the greater public or common good, 
but at the greater private good of the rhetor. Politics is reduced to a politics of 
conquest, not cooperation. It seemed to Augustine that Roman society was one 
which 'fostered only passive cooperation' (106), and followed a deficient 
education which allowed and encouraged children to be 'cast into their society 
with a set of public examples and standards of excellence' which were 
disastrous (30). The unity of Roman society had only come through conquest, 
and 
A rule based on force, said Augustine, is inherently weak, because it 
eschews education and so has a weak base of support ... Consequently, 
fearful and insecure men were implicitly the good citizens of Roman 
political practice. The praxis of Roman politics was the antithesis of 
the classical political ideal. (124-5) 
This left the Roman not only unable "to be his own friend", but also 'unable to 
find friends among his fellows' (126) - a state of affairs which led to people 
being 'immobilized ... or driven to fanaticism' (126). 
In order to avoid either error, people needed to be educated and directed by a 
new authority, creating a mind that can judge situations and events around 
them. The new authority is based (as noted above) on the Scriptures. 
Augustine 'points the way and makes them [the Scriptures] available to 
64 Conf I. xviii (29); cf Bathory 104. 
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Everyman' ( 128). He also, in his writings, describes 'the most basic substance 
of the commonwealth, and he offers instruction in the reformation ofthat basic 
substance' (128). 
For Augustine this solution depends on the nature of anxiety. As long as 
humanity lives in civil society, people will feel anxious,65 but the nature of 
that anxiety will either direct people towards action or inaction. For Bathory, 
the Augustinian 'First Principles of Christian Education' (2) seek to 'teach 
men to be active forces in all aspects of their world' (2) while keeping them 
anxious about the new sort of life they should lead.66 This new life, which will 
turn Roman culture upside down, depended on the education that people 
received (39-40). However, not all counsel is nurturant, and there is a 
'fundamental ambivalence' in our relation with authority. So standards in 
public life must be high enough to avoid producing "corrosive anxieties" ( 41 ). 
The solution, for Augustine, is to recognise dependence on God, which leads 
to 'true anxiety'. This true anxiety helps people cope with their limits and 
allows them, through the process of self-criticism, to start liberating 
themselves 'from the superficial and privatizing standards of Roman society' 
(42). 
For all that "men are said to hate authority" (122, quoting Bertrand de 
Jouvenel), under Roman culture men passively accepted any plausible leader 
and were in thrall to opinion, which in turn was 'ruled by superstition and 
hollow custom' (123). For Bathory, Augustine's role was to point men to true 
anxiety and thereby move them toward a new activism. His theory and 
practice of leadership was first to capture his audience's attention and then to 
educate it, so people could 'distinguish and reject would-be statesmen and 
unworthy teachings' (121). 
65 
'For not only are we anxious lest they [our friends] be afflicted by famine, war, pestilence, 
or captivity ... also, there is the much more bitter fear that their friendship will be transformed 
into perfidy, malice, and wickedness.' DCD, XIX. 8. 
66 Bathory wants to differentiate between the fears of those who, surrounded by (real or 
imagined) enemies, live in constant tension oflosing everything including wealth or position-
see DCD, IV. 3 - and those who live in the same world, caring and anxious for others, but 
who know that, in the end, they and their friends will be with God - see DCD, XIX. 8. 
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The teaching method was a 'therapy of self-examination' (7); Augustine's life 
and experience was applied to his audience - if he knew himself better and 
was more aware of his own limitations, then others could be similarly 
knowledgeable and aware. Therefore, 'recognising their limitations but ready 
to act, men might . . . rediscover the potential that had atrophied in the late 
Roman world ... ' (9).67 By nature, Augustine had 'cautious, even pessimistic, 
expectations of human nature', but thought that 'men might act more easily 
and act more justly if they had more reasonable expectations about their 
potential' (9). However, what Bathory fails to note is that teaching people how 
to live in their society is not the same as teaching them how to be politically 
active, or aware. Augustine is quite happy to teach that people should obey 
civil authority,68 and that true peace, justice and happiness will only occur in 
the heavenly city.69 
Augustine's life mirrored such a move from 'negative to positive anxiety' 
(51). Ambrose, the bishop of Milan, had assisted Augustine in '[t]he 
successful unmasking of Roman institutions and Manichean doctrine ... ' but 
this 'demanded another sort of anxiety that would compel rather than inhibit a 
search for psychological and political wholeness' (53). In Milan, Augustine 
was finally 'set face to face with himself (54), and his "odyssey of the soul" 
through self-examination had concluded 'in relief and hope' (54). Augustine, 
and his reader, would still face temptations, they would never achieve 
complete liberation from early errors, and they would still be dependent on 
others, but, 
Freed from the enervating anxieties of Roman custom, Augustine and 
his reader are propelled by a new and creative anxiety to seek new 
principles of order and justice . . . Personal growth became more 
probable, as the boundaries of human action were more clearly defined 
(54).70 
67 However, as Bathory notes elsewhere (134-5), Augustine is not always so sanguine about 
early Roman society. 
68 Even when it is blatantly unjust, see Sermo 302. 
69 See for example, DCD, XIX. 10-I I. 
70 Interestingly, Bathory provides no references in Augustine's writings (or other, secondary 
literature) to back up such a sweeping statement. 
70 
Faced with the perfection of God, Augustine's readers were not to be 
negatively anxious, nor 'frozen in despairing inaction': rather, people's 
confrontation with their imperfection was to have 'psychological, political, as 
well as religious results' (60). Augustine is concerned with unity - unity 
within and between people, and the unity with (and of) God. Once human 
wills were united with God, they could then 'act for the good of all' (62). One 
is forced to wonder, however, what that action could be, given Augustine's 
pessimistic assessment that '[a]ny peace attainable in the saeculum is ... but a 
pale reflection of eternal peace ... ' (68). What this does not mean (though 
Bathory gives every indication of wishing it would) is that Augustine expected 
'everyman' to bring about that pale, political peace. 
Augustine's method, says Bathory, takes us - following a process which 
parallels Plato's- 'from the social to the personal and back to the social again' 
(88). He seeks to create a mutually interdependent community, where, "if one 
member suffers, all the members suffer ... "(88). 
At times, Augustine seems to be speaking of a universal Christian 
community, but at others it is clear that he hopes that the principles of 
Christian community will affect existing nations and human 
institutions. The love of which he speaks ... endorses and encompasses 
the classical Roman virtues ... (88-9). 
We must note with Deane that when Augustine speaks of this Christian 
community, he is speaking hypothetically. 71 How the principles of Christian 
community will affect existing nations, Augustine does not say, and such a 
sentiment has more to do with modem liberalism than early medieval attempts 
at imposing Catholic orthodoxy on the late Roman Empire. All Augustine says 
is that a Christian 'nation' would be better than any other polity in existence.72 
Also, Augustine himself never endorses the classical Roman virtues 
uncritically: the love of glory may have overcome all other vices, but was 
itself a vice. 73 
71 See Deane, 138 and 2.3.4 above. 
72 Ep. 138, and see DCD, 11. 19. 
73 DCD, V. 12-13. 
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3.6.3 A New Role for Education 
As has been seen above, how people are to be educated is a vital consideration 
for Bathory's Augustine. This education is 'prepolitical' in that it prepares 
people to be involved in public life - educating them differently from the 
Roman culture in which they had been brought up. In The Confessions, 
Augustine berates his teachers who loved oration above the moral content of 
their tales.74 The lack of moral training left a tension between the obvious need 
for obedience to authority (which Augustine believed in), and the wish to 
assert self-consciousness. 
In the examination of his own life, Augustine could see that, from infancy, 
children seek to overcome their dependency on others - therefore 
Education, Augustine stressed, is crucial to the situation. It could, 
however, develop in two very different directions. It could be an 
education that helped the child to understand the nature of his 
dependencies and weaknesses, or it could be a miseducation that might 
crush him (43). 
Augustine believed that Roman education was indeed 'miseducation', and its 
dependence on tricks of rhetoric led to a situation that 'Roman public words 
had lost any connection ... with Roman public virtue' (98). To correct this, a 
new respect for language was needed and 'Christian rhetoric ... would bridge 
the gap between private and public worlds, introducing into the world of 
politics an important role for religious instruction and Christian belief (99). 
What Bathory fails to note is that, opposed to his readership, most members of 
Augustine's congregation would not have had the benefit of this education. 
This means that application of this educative process to 'everyman' is suspect 
at least as Augustine himself did not treat everyone the same, but even laid 
down different catechisms for people depending on their education (and 
especially their education in rhetoric). 75 
74 Conf l. xviii (28). 
75 See 3.3 above. 
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In chapter five, 76 Bathory exammes Augustine's thoughts on a Christian 
approach to language and rhetoric. In De Magistro, teachers who 'were not 
interested in the truth of words' (103) are castigated, and a style of teaching 
which people were able 'to know one another, and to know that which they 
share with one another' (104) is commended. The argument progresses in De 
Doctrina Christiana. Here Augustine points to the seven steps he expects 
teachers to take their pupils towards spiritual health. The pupils should 
become aware of 'the possibility of public virtue and public action ... ' (1 06). 
Therefore, teachers should point to "those human institutions helpful to social 
intercourse in the necessary pursuits of life" (107, quoting De Doctrina 
Christiana, 11. 139) and, therefore, according to Bathory, 'the teacher's words 
should have both a proximate and an ultimate end' (1 07). However, it must be 
borne in mind that Augustine constantly and consistently emphasises the 
ultimate. Pagan learning should only be appropriated '[l]ike the treasures of 
the ancient Egyptians', 77 so students should 'not venture without due care into 
any branches of learning which are pursued outside the church of Christ'. 78 In 
the light of this, the possibilities of 'public virtue and public action' seem 
guarded and limited even before the later Augustine becomes 'less optimistic 
about the use ofhuman institutions' (116, note 42). 
In De Catechizandis Rudibus, 'it is possible for the teacher to communicate 
his own enthusiasm, and thus awaken interest in his audience, whether they 
are educated or uneducated, apathetic or alert' (108). As in Plato's Symposium, 
men were to be moved in more than their thoughts. 79 The listener must (unlike 
in Roman culture) be moved beyond the 'captivating story' to the truth and 
freedom beyond the words. The listener would be confronted and 'could not 
be passive'. 
Self-knowledge gave him [Augustine] insight into what moved people 
- the people of his own congregation - to thought and action. 
76 This is the only chapter that specifically pays attention to Augustine's works outside 
Con.fessiones and De Civitate Dei. 
77 DDC, 11. 144. 
78 DDC, 11, 139. See 2.5.4.2 above. 
79 See also DDC, IV. 74-80, where the Christian orator is urged to move his audience 'so as to 
conquer their minds' (Ibid., 79) and not just their emotions. 
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Knowledge of language and rhetoric gave him insight into how such 
action could be evoked ( 111 ). 80 
Augustine never felt he, or others, should withdraw from the world, but he 
educated his congregation 'to a recognition of their active responsibilities'- as 
well as a love of God. Bathory concludes that '[h]is goal thus became a 
political goal in terms of his own argument about the nature of politics, for it 
was the object of their love that gave substance and direction to the political 
order' (114). Therefore the education and upbringing of the congregation had 
a political aspect in that it inevitably related to, and impinged on, the public 
order. However, as I noted in chapter 2, the only 'political' example that 
Augustine gives his congregation is that of the martyrs: civil disobedience, 
while theoretically conceivable is, for all practical purposes, ruled out.81 
3.6.4 Public Leadership: Theory and Practice 
Public virtue, as Augustine reminds us in De Civitate Dei, and as Roman 
leaders had forgotten, is not 'a given', it needs to be "ushered in by 
instruction" (125, quoting DCD, XIX. 4). This leaves the Augustinian 
educator with a task not unlike the Old Testament prophet. 'The prophetic task 
... was to re-establish contact between ongoing social and political affairs and 
the founding principles that had given social substance to those affairs' ( 151 ). 
In other words, the prophet's task is to point to how things ought to be. 
However, unlike Rome (where any 'concern for public virtue belied a tradition 
that looked to the glory of the individual' (151)), the Old Testament prophet 
'could rely on a preexisting community and a corresponding social and 
political identity' (150). So God's people must bring in an alternative culture 
'that would awaken in all people the possibility of a new moral-political order' 
(153). This, according to Bathory, could only happen if God's people were 
given 'the instruction provided by a Christianpaideia' (153). 
Having described the Christian educator as a reincarnation of the Old 
Testament prophet, Bathory also sees the bishop's role as 'relevant to ordinary 
80 But see my comments at 3.3 above. 
81 See 2.3.6 above. 
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politics' because they were 'charged with initiating through their good works a 
new order of things' (161). Christian education, its paideia, began in the 
family and in the church.82 The family provided 'an example of just rule' and 
contributed to the order of the city. The Christian minister provided the 
instruction of that rule so that 'reciprocal relationships' could be established 
between the earthly and the heavenly cities (162). The Christian preacher 
therefore comes to play the role of intermediary (magister) between Christ and 
the 'Christian prince' (162). If genuine political reform was to occur, which 
had 'a clear recognition of the capabilities of political man' (163), then the 
church needed to provide 'a prepolitical education that might allow men to 
come to terms with the most basic principles of their social existence' (163). 
In that, through its leaders, it educated both the ordinary congregant and the 
'Christian prince', the church's role becomes 'political or prepolitical' as well. 
The church became, for Augustine, very much a part of the saeculum-
of "the world of men and of time." Leaders of the church ... had, 
therefore, the responsibility to act within it [the world] to further the 
end of public virtue, of a "rightly ordered love." Augustine had learned 
of the difficulties of such action. His own experiences had taught him 
that confession of sin and praise might lead to a new respect for public 
purpose. He sought, as one of the leaders of his church and so of the 
saeculum, to elicit that respect from others. His political action and his 
political thought were thus united in his own public posture- a posture 
of public confession (167-8). 
Quite apart from ignoring the fact that for Augustine there can be no 
'reciprocal relationships' between cities that shall be eternally separated, there 
is a clear tension here between Bathory's prophet and his magister. While the 
Church must point to how things ought to be - and Bathory is correct to point 
to the Church's prophetic role here, though, as ever, like the medievalists 
before him, he is very light on Augustine's eschatological approach- the idea 
that Augustine saw his practical work addressing members of the civil 
authority (whether they were Catholics or not) or his teaching of his 
congregation as a prepolitical role is not borne out by his writing. His 
congregation were to remember the martyrs, and the fact that they were 
pilgrims on their way to the heavenly city. The peace ofBabylon is to be used, 
but primarily as a guard against chaos: the love of neighbour may precipitate 
82 Milbank also notes this aspect of Christian paideia (see Social Theory, 399-403). 
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public action, 83 but this does not mean that Augustine believed that the justice 
of civil society would necessarily be improved as a result. Indeed, he was very 
clear that Christian action is no guarantee of a peaceful life on earth. 
3. 7 Political Theory as Public Confession: A Criticism 
3. 7.1 1Educ21tio111 1for 1I'hns WorBdl- mr 1tllle Next? 
Bathory takes the approach that Augustine's aim is education, and political (or 
prepolitical) education is a major part ofhis teaching for his congregation. The 
impression left is an activist bishop in front of what he hopes will be an 
activist congregation. What form that activity can take is left open, and leaves 
much to conjecture: Augustine's society is far from a liberal democracy, and 
we are, of course, centuries away from any sort of list of 'human rights' being 
drawn up. In other words, the populace did not elect political leaders, and, 
given that most of Augustine's congregation were poor, most people's 
opinions would not be considered worthy of consideration - so legitimate 
political activity would have been limited to say the least. 
On the other hand, in a society where, at least notionally, the Emperor's power 
was based on the support and acclamation of the people, it may be argued that 
demonstrations of public opinion had to be taken seriously, but these 
demonstrations could be problematic. Clearly Augustine is no advocate of his 
congregation taking the law into their own hands, 84 and, as I have noted, 
motivation is key for Augustine. 
Bathory leaves us with a policy of Augustinian self-examination that 'sought 
constantly to challenge his audience' (Ill), but there is no evidence from 
Bathory as to where Augustine's challenge could legitimately lead in terms of 
dealing with the current political order. We might suppose that we could be 
left with lobbying those in power (and there is plenty of evidence that 
Augustine did that)85 but in order to lobby, a person has to be influential 
enough to gain access to those with the power to alter the situation, and not 
83 Possibly like the incident covered in Ep. I 0*. 
84 Sermo 302. 
85 See Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 113. 
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even Augustine necessarily had the influence to command an audience with 
Imperial authorities.86 What we are given is an idea of prepolitical education, 
and some parallels between the self and society, between the education of the 
individual and the education of a people - and no evidence from Bathory as to 
how he sees that education leading to responsible action by ordinary members 
of the congregation. 
What Bathory omits to mention is the pilgrim nature ofthe congregation's life 
as members of the heavenly city, especially in relation to its eschatological 
end. This eschatological nature is clear to Emest Fortin, who points out that 
for Augustine, the solution to the inherent tension between the Christian and 
his political overlords, is not to politicise religion, but to move beyond the 
problem 'in the direction of a goal which was not only transpolitical but 
otherworldly. ' 87 If there is a prophetic role for the Augustinian preacher, it 
must surely primarily be to the pilgrim members of the city of God, those who 
could be recalled to the teaching of their founder. Any Christian leader in civil 
society, however devout, would have to bear in mind that most of the people 
for whom he bears responsibility are not pilgrim members of the city of God, 
and have to be treated as such. Also, because all are fallen, everyone will 
always need laws and the fear of punishment if any sort of earthly peace is to 
be maintained. 
3. 7.2 Individual and Society, Household and City 
A further difficulty for Bathory in his search for the Christian paideia is the 
hierarchical nature of Augustine's thinking. He assumes, without showing any 
evidence, that every member of Augustine's congregation was educable to a 
political end.88 Contrary to what we might expect, Bathory does not set up 
86 Harrison states that 'bishops seem to have had very little authority or influence when it 
came to episcopal interventions ... ' (Augustine, 125). 
87 Ernest L. Fortin, 'The Saint Augustine Lecture 1971: Political Idealism and Christianity in 
the Thought of St. Augustine', in http://www.librarv.villanova.edu/sennons/fortin.htm 
(ll/09/02), 35. 
88 The only 'end' that Augustine was interested in was the 'end' that led to the heavenly city. 
While Augustine may have believed that everyone was 'educable' in terms of being brought 
into membership of the heavenly city, I do not accept that Augustine thought everyone would 
benefit from a classical education - or even the Christian version of it (see 3.3 above). I 
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parallels between the family group and the city but 'the education of God's 
people and that of each individual ... ' (165-6). He continues: 'What is 
important was that at each step along the way the individual had a perspective 
from which to view his actions and chart his directions' (166). 
This emphasis on every individual - and the equality this seems to imply -
does not tally with what Rowan Williams tells us about Augustine's thinking. 
Subordination of some people to others is part of Augustine's ordo, and 'the 
authority of the Roman paterfamilias over family and slaves is accepted and 
defended as a model. ' 89 This, of course, involves coercion and not the liberal 
ideal of free exchange between equals that Bathory seems to assume in his 
writing. But, more importantly from our perspective, it shows Bathory reading 
contemporary ideals about the atomistic individual back into the fifth century. 
He tends, as seen above, to think of the individual, rather than the family unit, 
but as Eugene TeSelle tells us, 
Augustine's "peace tabulation" is broadly Aristotelian ... This social 
and political theory has a number of characteristic features ... 
[including] its assumption that the household . . . is the basis of the 
polis, so that habits of order and subordination developed in the 
household give training for the life of the city and ensure its stability 
90 
It appears therefore that not all individuals were equally important in 
Augustine's thought in terms of their position in society,91 and certainly not all 
would, or could, have equal influence in the public arena. 
I have already noted that 'Roman language reinforced the privatisation that 
dominated that culture ... ' (1 03). This happened in two ways: 
First of all, the diversity of languages within the empire often meant 
that two people - regardless of their good will - could not 
communicate with one another ... But second and more disastrously, 
communication between two Romans was endangered by the 
competitiveness of Roman rhetorical custom ... (103-4). 
therefore disagree with Bathory's statement that Augustine 'made clear through his 
Confessions ... that all men were educable ... ' (158)- as ever, Bathory does not tell us where 
in Confessiones Augustine makes such an inference. 
89 Williams, 'Politics and the Soul', 62-3. 
90 TeSelle, Two Cities, 113-14, emphasis added. 
91 He would, however, insist on their equality before God. 
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If such a thing was ever recognised, the Roman public-private split is a very 
different idea from the present-day view that there are areas of life where 
society has no right to interfere. The Augustinian individual was always an 
individual in society. There is no record of Augustine living alone.92 It seems 
he always needed people around him- even as bishop of Hippo, he lived in 
community. This is not to say that Augustine was unaware of the self as an 
individual - indeed The Confessions could not have been written otherwise -
but he is aware of himself as an individual in relation to others; in Corifessions 
those others include his family, his friends, and, primarily, God. 
In spite of Augustine's difficulties with his own family, he states that 'the 
ordered concord of domestic rule and obedience has reference to the ordered 
concord of civic rule and obedience. ' 93 Even if Bathory now moves away from 
the individual I society parallel to the more Augustinian household I city one, 
we are still left with a difficulty (and it is one that Bathory overlooks in his 
desire to see the church as 'a framework' which might 'initiate true public 
action' (167)). This difficulty is that, while Augustine regarded the family as 
part of the natural order (that is, without the Fall, there would still have been 
family life), the same cannot be said of Augustine's attitude to the civil and 
political society, which is only 'natural' in humanity's post-Fall experience.94 
However, Augustine insists that 'domestic peace has reference to civic 
peace' ,95 so there is a connection between the two, though 'the temptations of 
arbitrary power and excess grow greater the more power there is to be had. ' 96 
There is also the difference in a faithful household's relationship to the 
heavenly city, and the relationship between a non-Christian household and the 
earthly city.97 The faithful household seeks the perfect peace of the heavenly 
city even while it makes use of the earthly peace. The non-faithful household 
can only seek earthly peace. The latter household will establish 'an ordered 
92 
'He was by nature a gregarious person, for whom the eremitical life had little appeal .. .' 
(Bonner, Life and Controversies, 94). 
93 DCD, XIX, 16, cf. Bathory, 161. 
94 Cain built his city after the Fall, see DCD, XV. I. 
95 DCD, XIX. 16. 
96 Elshtain, Limits, 40. 
97 For what follows, see O'Donovan, 'Western Political Thought', 140-1, and DCD, XIX. 17. 
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concord of civil obedience and rule in order to secure a kind of co-operation of 
men's wills for the sake of attaining the things which belong to this mortal 
life. ' 98 The faithful household will make use of this peace or concord and 
'does not hesitate to obey the laws of the earthly city' (provided that they 
allow the true God to be worshipped);99 but whereas the non-Christian 
household only seeks earthly peace, the faithful household 'directs that earthly 
peace towards heavenly peace.' 
This peace the Heavenly City possesses in faith while on its 
pilgrimage, and by this faith it lives righteously, directing towards the 
attainment of that peace every good act which it performs either for 
God, or - since the city's life is inevitably a social one - for 
neighbour. 100 
Not forgetting that true peace (like true justice) only exists in the city of God, 
Augustine is clear that we should aim for peace in both the household and the 
city. That peace is a peace between friends based on trust and therefore 
truthfulness. 
3. 7.3 The Politics of (Not) Lying 
For Augustine, any form of lying breaks this trust upon which society is 
built. 101 Bathory does not discuss how this attitude to lying would work in 
civil society. 102 His only example is Augustine's discussion of Varro. For 
Augustine, Varro had analysed Roman life, pointed to its problems, but he was 
too scared of public opinion to tell the truth about Roman traditional 
religion. 103 If we look to Augustine's discussions of lying, we find that even 
Rahab would not have been excused for her lies about the presence of the 
Israelite spies in her house. 104 There is, from Augustine's perspective, no 
guarantee that honest action would have the intended consequences, so how 
much less would deception - however laudable the ends - justifY the means, 
98 DCD, XIX. 17. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 See Against Lying [Contra Mendacium] in Roy J. Deferrari (ed.) The Fathers of the 
Church: St. Augustine Treatises on Various Subjects (Washington D.C.: Catholic University 
of America Press, 1952), 4 (7). 
102 This omission also occurs in the twentieth-century writers examined in 2.4.3 above. 
103 DCD, VI.6. Cf. Bathory, 123. 
104 Contra Mendacium, 17 (34). See also Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 79-89. 
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especially given the uncertainty of the outcome. 105 After all, the Jericho 
authorities could have refused to believe Rahab and searched her house 
anyway. 106 Augustine's approach is much more rigorous that any politician, 
facing the 'realities' of fifth century - or present-day life - could 
countenance. 107 'In the end, he rejected absolutely any possible moral 
justification of compensative sin, and any attempt to justifY the discretionary 
lie even for the sake of national security.' 108 
To return to Rahab, Augustine allows that it would be correct for her to refuse 
to cooperate with the authorities (in other words, she did not need to point to 
the ceiling), but his idea of what she should say ('I know where they are, but I 
fear God and will not betray them') 109 is hardly likely to appease the Jericho 
authorities. So, while it may be 'one thing to utter a falsehood and another to 
pass the truth over in silence', 110 the conclusion must remain that 'all lies are 
. . . ll "I ' Ill mtrmstca y ev1 . . . . 
For Thomas Feehan, Augustine's attitude to lying is based on the 
'corresponding prima facie right, not to the truth, but a right not to be lied 
to'. 112 The arguments Augustine advances include that lying is speaking 
against the truth known in the mind; it intends to deceive the listener, 113 but 
also lying undermines trust in society. Once lying is permitted (for whatever 
motives), Augustine asks: 
Do you not see whither this evil tends? It tends not only to make us 
appear suspect to them and them to us, but it tends, and not without 
cause, to make every brother appear suspect to every other brother. 114 
105 Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 89. 
106 Ibid., 88. Thomas Feehan also discusses this case (among others) in 'Augustine's Own 
Examples of Lying', Augustinian Studies 22 (1991), 171 and 180. 
107 The same could be said for any trader or military strategist. 
108 Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 87. 
109 Contra Mendacium, 17 (34). 
110 Ern est L. Fortin, 'The Political Implications of St. Augustine's Theory of Conscience', 
Augustinian Studies I (1970), 145. 
111 Fortin, 'Political Implications', 145. 
112 Feehan, 'Augustine's Own Examples', 181. Feehan does not make the point, but for 
Augustine it is the grace of God that imparts the truth to a person's soul- we cannot presume 
on a 'right' to that truth. 
113 See Thomas Feehan, 'The Morality of Lying in St. Augustine', Augustinian Studies 21 
(1990), 71-2. 
114 Contra Mendacium, 4, (7). Cf Feehan, 'Morality', 74. 
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So that, anyone who decides that lying is helpful for their cause (or for any 
other reason) will find that '[w]ishing to be helpful by lying, he is held 
unreliable when he speaks the truth.' 115 
Bathory then, may point the way for society to be more truthful about its past 
and its present, but he does not examine the difficulty of creating the sort of 
'lie free' environment Augustine requires - nor does he indicate whether 
Augustine thought such a society was attainable this side of the parousia. 
Augustine expects a very high standard of truth telling - this high standard 
may come from (and be seen as an over-reaction to) his own experience as a 
rhetor. This career culminated in his self-disgust and misery at having to 
deliver a panegyric to and about the fifteen year old Emperor Valentinian 11 116 
(even the beggar he passed in the street seemed happier than Augustine as he 
made his way to court). 117 Every member of the court would know that this 
panegyric was a lie from start to finish - and yet Augustine was expected to 
deliver the panegyric, and woe betide him if he told the truth! If Augustine 
ever expected the standard of truth-telling to rise to the heights he advocated, 
he does not say, but Christians were expected to tell the truth at all times. His 
tracts De Mendacio and Contra Mendacium were written as theological and 
pastoral treatises, 118 and not therefore, as social and political ones, but, given 
how firmly Augustine believes that it is never appropriate to lie, his attitude 
would, we can expect, remain the same in all circumstances. This is perhaps 
an occasion where we can see that Augustine is so insistent on how things 
ought to be, that he makes no allowance for how things are. 119 Interestingly, he 
appears to think much more about how things are when he deals with 
coercion. 
115 Lying [De Mendacio] in Roy J. Deferrari (ed.) The Fathers ofthe Church: St. Augustine 
Treatises on Various Subjects (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 
1952), 8 (11). Cf. Feehan, 'Morality', 75. 
116 Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 81. 
117 See Conf VI, vi, 9. 
118 See Thomas Feehan, 'Augustine on Lying and Deception', Augustinian Studies 19 ( 1988), 
132. 
119 John M. Rist makes the point well: 'given the complexities of present global problems and 
the bizarre ways in which politicians often reach the leadership of their various parties and 
states ... it is hard not to see systematic lying and misinforming as a necessary feature of a 
democratic state. And we know how uncompromisingly- even impossibly- tough Augustine 
is on lying' ('Democracy and Religious Values: Augustine on Locke, Lying and 
Individualism', Augustinian Studies 29 (1998), 19). 
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3.7.41 Coeirdorrn 
As with lying, but this time against Deane, Markus, and Milbank, 120 Bathory 
makes no reference to coercion and its place within Augustine's thought. This 
omission is disconcerting, and relates to the under-consideration of the 
eschatological nature of Augustine's thought- Augustine tells us that only the 
city of God is free of coercion. 
For Deane, Augustine's change of mind over the coercion of the Donatists is 
'a contradiction of the most fundamental kind' .121 Markus shares the same 
concerns, but tries to solve the issue by pointing out that Augustine regarded 
this coercion as being enforced by leaders who happened to be the church's 
servant rather than asking the state (as such) to enforce the Emperor's pro-
Catholic edicts. 122 Whether an official should use his position- and the state's 
power- to force people into the Catholic Church is probably the question that 
Markus feels ought to have (but clearly had not) troubled Augustine. 123 For 
Milbank, more radically, '[t]he only fmally tolerable, and non-sinful 
punishment, for Christians, must be the self-punishment inherent in sin', 124 as 
in all punishment, or coercion, 'however mild and benignly motivated, there is 
still present a moment of 'pure' violence, externally and arbitrarily related to 
the end one has in mind ... '. 125 Milbank recognises, with Augustine, that the 
Fall introduced coercion (and hence the tragedy of the Church's involvement 
with the dominium), but he does not seem to realise how unAugustinian 
(rather than 'beyond Augustine') 126 his attitude is. In Confessiones, while 
Augustine admits that his own sexual adventures are touched with 'a bitter 
taste', 127 Augustine affirms that there is a beneficial side to Divine 
120 Von Heyking is more sanguine about Augustine's acceptance of violence, arguing that he 
always advocates more lenient punishments and saw Augustine as, on the one hand, protecting 
his congregation from the attacks of the Donatists, and on the other, educating and reforming 
those Donatists so that they became Catholics. (Augustine and Politics, 239-57.) 
121 Deane, 220. See 2.4.3.2 above. 
122 Markus, Saeculum, 148-53. 
123 Ibid., 151-2. 
124 Milbank, Social Theory, 421. 
125 Ibid., 420. 
126 Ibid., 422. 
127 Conf 11. ii ( 4). 
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punishment. 128 If God is prepared to punish, Augustine is therefore prepared to 
support punishment and coercion in both church and civil society. 
There are implicit references to coercion in Bathory's work: for example, he 
points to the fact that Augustine was punished as a child - but the inference is 
that Augustine deserved that punishment, even if it was hypocritical of his 
teachers to punish him for 'crimes' which those same adults committed on a 
regular basis (44). 
By contrast, it seems that Augustine relied on exhortation in order to modifY 
his congregants' behaviour. On one occasion when he wanted a celebration 
modified (if not cancelled) he found that his sermons failed to convince his 
entire congregation. 
On the verge of qmttmg for want of "more powerful means," 
Augustine tells Alypius that he was visited by those whom he thought 
intransigent and was moved to continue his preaching that finally met 
with success. The steadfastness of both preacher and congregant was 
thus shown to be of great importance (110-11). 
It seems that Christian rhetoric finally won the day (though one is left to 
wonder what 'more powerful means' Augustine would have liked to employ). 
In spite of this, it seems that Augustine's general attitude was, although he 
believed that '[t]he truth of a lesson may be clarified by the skill of its 
instructor,' that the truth that 'must dominate', and the vital aspect for both 
speaker and hearer, is motive ( 11 0). Given this, as Augustine did not believe 
that a person's will (and therefore, their motivation) could be coerced, we can 
perhaps see why coercion is lacking in Bathory's account. But how to get 
people into the position where they would become hearers? This is where 
coercion enters the picture: Bathory forgets that Augustine was happy 'to 
compel them to come in.' 129 
128 
'[Y]ou 'strike to heal', you bring death upon us so that we should not die apart from you 
(Deut. 32:39).' Ibid. 
129 See, for example, Ep. 93.5, quoted in Dyson, The Pilgrim City, 201. 
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Augustine came to this position after he had seen the result of enforced church 
attendance on Donatists. 130 Indeed, his initial opinion was that force should 
not be used, but, as he says in his letter to Vincentius, the Rogatist 131 bishop of 
Cartenna: 
my opinion at first was that no one should be coerced into the unity of 
Christ ... lest we should have those whom we knew to be true heretics 
becoming false Catholics. But this opinion of mine was overcome not 
by the words of those who opposed it, but by the examples to which 
they could point by way of demonstration ... 132 
Augustine then lists several examples of what has been said to him by former 
Donatists in thanks that they had been coerced into entering the Catholic 
Church. He continues: 
Could, I then, continue to oppose my colleagues, and, by speaking 
against their opinion, hinder such conquests of the Lord and prevent 
the sheep of Christ ... from being gathered into the fold of peace [i.e. 
the Catholic Church]? ... Certainly not. Let the kings of the earth serve 
Christ by making laws for Christ. 133 
Markus also tells how the later Augustine related the external coercion with 
internal, motivational change. 
The divine disciplina uses external pressure to bring about an internal 
moral development . . . Free choice and compulsion were not 
incompatible: 'It is not true that nothing is accomplished by external 
pressure. For not only is the wall of hardened habit breached by human 
terrors, but the mind's faith and understanding is at the same time 
strengthened by divine authority and reason.' 134 
In the same way, Bathory points out that Augustine 'saw freedom and 
authority as partners' (128). In order to be free, he continues, a person must be 
able 'to judge between alternatives' (128). But Bathory seems reluctant to 
allow coercion to enter the picture. 
In an attempt to recreate . . . public feeling, Augustine prodded, 
implored, and exhorted his parishioners to a recognition of their active 
responsibilities toward themselves and their brethren. The disciplina 
that he sought to create was one that could become the foundation of a 
new order with the congregation as the centre ofthat order (113). 
130 See Markus, Saecu/um, 141-142. 
131 The Rogatists were a small Donatist faction. 
132 From Ep. 93, 5-19, quoted in Dyson, The Pilgrim City, 203. 
133 !bid, 205. 
134 Markus, Saecu/um, 143, quoting Ep. 89.7. Cf Deane, 189. 
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However, as I have noted, Augustine's disciplina involved coercion. Also, this 
coercion would be needed if a person, in order to be free, had to be broken 
from 'the grip of past habit' -this was something which Augustine regarded 
as having 'entered deeply into a man's make-up' and not necessarily lost on 
conversion. 135 This points to a unity between the necessity for education (as in 
Bathory's thesis) and coercion. The importance of education from an early 
age, and hence Augustine's criticism of the lack of correct guidance from his 
mother, is clear from Bathory's thesis. However, coercion was never 
dismissed as part of the Augustinian pastoral strategy, 136 and could be used to 
get people to where they should be. Augustine would not think that all bad 
habits could be broken in this life, but he would want and expect as many as 
could be persuaded to attend church and be given the benefit of the education 
on offer, that they might be guided to a better life on their pilgrimage to the 
city of God. 
If such guidance was to be made through the imperial courts, then so be it. 
Augustine was however, always concerned that leniency should be applied, 
and he always wrote against capital punishment; in one case telling the 
proconsul of Africa (called, confusingly, Donatus), that ifthe latter were to put 
Donatists to death in his court, he would 'deter us [Catholics] from bringing 
any such case by our own efforts before your court.' 137 He still wished for the 
Donatists to be brought to trial, but then 'be persuaded and informed' rather 
than 'led through force alone' to 'bend their will to a better course.' This is 
because, even when he advocated coercion, Augustine still realised that 'when 
people are led through force alone and not through teaching even to abandon a 
great evil and embrace a great good, the efforts expended prove burdensome 
rather than profitable.' 138 
135 Markus, Saeculum, 144. 
136 In his Confessiones, Augustine pleads: 'If only someone could have imposed restraint on 
my disorder' (Conf II. ii (3)), and later says that 'You [God] 'fashion pain to be a lesson' (Ps. 
93:20 LXX)' (ibid., ll. ii (4)). On similar lines, in Ep. 104. 7, Augustine asks: 'If, as little 
boys, or even as bigger ones, we had been let off by our parents or teachers whenever we 
pleaded for pardon after committing some sin, would any of us have been bearable as an 
adult? Who would have learnt anything useful? These things are done out of care, not cruelty.' 
137 Ep. I 00. 2. 
138 lbid. 
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For Augustine, it is a matter of regret that our authority structures require 
'reinforcement by mechanisms of compulsion' 139 but this is due to our fallen 
state. However, he is also aware that there is no guarantee that punishment 
would work: 'I don't know whether more people are reformed than slip into 
worse ways through fear of impending punishment ... '. 140 Augustine is caught 
between the ideas that punishment could lead to a person's destruction, but 
that leaving that person unpunished could 'lead to someone else being 
destroyed' .141 Therefore, we can see that while Augustine is clear in his 
'unambiguous approval of the official use of force ... there are times when he 
makes no secret of his misgivings' .142 Williarns points out that the power of 
coercion that 'so readily converts itself into a tool for selfish interest, a means 
of exercising the libido dominandi, is a sign of how far fallen we are.' 143 
Coercion certainly has its downside. 
Cruelty, he [Augustine] agreed, had no place in official policy or 
religious conversion, but if authorities had been moved by mercy or 
pity, moved ex caritate, to rescue errant Christians from their errors, 
Augustine ... saw God's hand in the matter.' 144 
Augustine lived in a coercive, not to say violent, society, and his thoughts on 
the necessity of coercion spread further than the church. Indeed, Augustine 
expected Christian soldiers to fight and kill for their Emperor- not for him the 
pacifism of earlier Christian writers145 - so coercion was certainly part of 
Augustine's civil society, and, as Christians were to be in the earthly city (even 
if they were not to be of it), they and their leaders must know when and where 
to use coercion. Motive again is the key: 
[We need] to remember what St. Augustine taught: war and strife, 
however just the cause, stir up temptations to ravish and to devour, 
often in order to ensure peace. Just war is and must remain a 
cautionary tale of domestic and international order, a story of the 
requirements and purposeful uses of power and order, a lens through 
which to look at the heart of what constitutes peace ... In a world of 
139 Rowan Williams, 'Politics and the Soul', 63. Cf. Deane, 189. 
140 Ep. 95. 3. 
141 Ibid. 
142 John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 226. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Peter lver Kaufinan, 'Redeeming Politics: Augustine's Cities of God', in Donnelly, The 
City of God, 83. 
145 Although Augustine 'makes war much harder to justifY than many just-war thinkers do ... '. 
Elshtain, Limits, 111. 
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discontinuities and profound yearnings, of sometimes terrible 
necessities, a human being can yet strive to maintain or to create an 
order that approximates justice, to prevent the worst from happening, 
and to resist the seductive lure of imperial grandiosity. 146 
For Augustine, the person best equipped to create that order and resist imperial 
grandiosity, is the person who has been educated in the Christian paideia. 
Williams points to Augustine's eulogy ofthe (almost) ideal Christian emperor 
whose motive in all he does is love and not the lust for glory. 
Theodosius I is regarded ([De Civitate Dei] V, 26) as a ruler well on 
his way towards this ideal . . . [W]e should note what exactly it is that 
Augustine picks out as the marks of good government - law and 
coercion employed for the sake of the subject by one who is manifestly 
not in thrall to libido dominandi or vainglory, because he is capable of 
sharing power and accepting hurniliation. 147 
Broadly speaking, it seems that Augustine accepts that all leaders will use 
coercion in civil society, but the means and motives for the use of coercion 
will be different for Christians than for others. Coercion will be used to set 
people on the right path, not as mere punishment. Perhaps the only observable 
difference for those on the outside would be the fact that the Christian leader 
uses his power and authority to promote the Catholic Church. Finally, for 
ordinary people, we must note that 'the most effective guarantee of the quality 
of authority is not only that those who wield it should be sensitive and 
scrupulous men; but that they should be in the habit of wielding it.' 148 
Ordinary people are to be educated, it seems even according to Bathory, 
simply to deal with 'the events that controlled their lives' (127). Those who 
were able, and in a position to lead, should exercise their God-given authority. 
This is, of course, not a democratic ideal, and would not in itself appeal to 
liberation theologians, but the question is how does that concern manifest 
itself. Bathory thinks it involves 'political therapy.' 
146 Ibid. 
147 Williams, 'Politics and the Soul', 64-5. Von Heyking insists that both church and Emperor 
'would have benefited politically from Theodosius's repentance' as the Emperor needed a 
power base against overweening courtiers; this could now come from the people - mediated 
by the church. (Augustine and Politics, 213-14.) While this cynical view may hold an element 
of truth, it appears that Augustine's purpose in recording the incident is (as Williams notes) to 
point to the lack of libido dominandi in this particular Emperor. 
148 P.R.L. Brown, 'St. Augustine's Attitude to Religious Coercion', Journal of Roman Studies 
54 (1964), 115. 
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3.7.5 Augustine as Political Therapist? 
Bathory tries to make the case for the church's ability to make more than a 
minimal difference- Augustine, for him, is the 'civic or political therapist': 
He defines and seeks to influence those objects that a people share or 
love in common. He describes thereby the most basic substance of a 
commonwealth, and he offers instruction in the reformation of that 
basic substance.' (128). 
Most of this statement is perfectly acceptable: people either love themselves to 
the exclusion of God, or they love God to the exclusion of themselves; the 
commonwealth is thereby defined by that love. But the two commonwealths 
so defined are the city of God and the earthly city, and there is no reformation 
to offer. People are either going to hell, or to heaven. 149 For those going to hell 
there is only repentance - the earthly city is not, in and of itself, going to be 
'reformed': it will be destroyed in the fullness of time. If Christians are 
involved in the cities in which they live as pilgrims, it is because they love 
their fellows and wish to do the best they can for their neighbours: it is not 
primarily to seek a structural reformation of the city itself. In other words, 
Christians cannot turn their backs on their fellow human beings even while 
they do not 'allow their souls to be molded [sic] and determined by the taste 
and opinions of the regime under which they happen to live.' 150 The best that 
anyone can do for their fellows is to bring them into- or, to retain Augustine's 
pilgrim approach, to point them in the direction of- the city of God. 
The eschatological note of Augustine's work cannot be ignored. Christianity, 
certainly Augustinian Christianity, supplies the believer with 'standards of 
judgment that are ultimately independent of the regime and the pervasive 
influence of its principles.' 151 This will always create tension. The earthly city 
- because of the foundation of its love - will seek the ultimate in loyalty, 
dedication and even worship, from its citizens. It will not, therefore appreciate 
anyone who - however obedient to its laws - has in the final analysis, a 
different loyalty. This is why Peter Bumell is wrong to state that '[t]rying to 
guarantee a succession of saints in public office would . . . be . . . a form of 
149 DCD, XV. I. 
15° Fortin, 'Political Idealism and Christianity', 33. 
151 Ibid. 
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defending the state by divine grace.' 152 Williams points out that 'no state can 
rightly be defended as an absolute 'value' in itself', 153 which means that no 
'succession of saints' would, or should, defend the state against the values of 
the heavenly city. 
There is no evidence that Augustine ever supposed that any commonwealth 
would be perfect - 'the transition from oldness to newness is never 
completed.' 154 However, De Civitate Dei is 'a total attack upon the value 
system of Rome .. .' 155 (a sentiment with which Bathory would agree) which 
leads, according to Eugene TeSelle, to a new political theology: 
I. Neither pagan nor Christian religion ensures a state against the 
temporary and military vicissitudes common to states as such. 
2. As regards religion, the Roman empire can do nothing better than 
to be a Catholic Christian empire and thereby further among men 
the worship ofthe true God. 
3. The ultimate destiny of Catholic Christianity is not in the slightest 
degree tied to the fortunes ofthe Roman Empire. 156 
The political therapy that Augustine issues is much stronger medicine than 
Bathory realises, and takes account of the possible (or, eschatologically, 
definite) destruction of the state. In the end, although according to Augustine 
the state would do best with saints in office (and anywhere else in society), 157 
the earthly city will fall, so seeking to defend the state by divine grace will be 
counter productive for the Church as it looks to the parousia of Christ. 
3.8 The Quietist Approach 
Having looked at, and criticised, Bathory's idea of a universal Christian 
prepolitical paideia, we return to Deane's quietist view. Deane presents 
152 Peter J. Burnell, 'The Status of Politics in St. Augustine's City of God', History of Political 
Thought 13 (1992), 28. 
153 Williams, 'Politics and the Soul', 66. 
154 TeSelle, Living in Two Cities, 42. 
155 Ibid, 16. 
156 After Evans in ibid, 20. 
157 See Epp. 138.15, 91.3, DCD, Il. 19. Cf. Fortin, 'Political Idealism', 27. 
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Augustine as promoting both a 'political and social quietism': 158 'the true 
Christian must be prepared "to endure even the most wicked and most vicious 
commonwealth"' .159 Whatever the regime, Augustine allows 'no scope for any 
limitations of his [a ruler's] power by his subjects or for any disobedience or 
resistance to his commands' .160 Although Deane states that Christians have 'a 
positive duty to participate in the State's work ... if they had the talents that 
fitted them for these duties'; 161 these duties are merely for the maintenance of 
the peace of Babylon, and as a defence against anarchy; 'there is little room 
for the idea that power may be used to improve the lot of man on earth ... '. 162 
Deane appears to have little use for the idea that power is to be used for the 
benefit of the church and its programme to bring people into the city of God 
and thereby (if indirectly) improve their lot. 
This quietist doctrine, for all it takes due account of Augustine's priorities as a 
Christian, is unsatisfactory when examined in the light of Augustine's own 
willingness to intervene with the political authorities, for example, in 
mitigating capital punishment (though there appears to be no evidence that 
Augustine ever questioned the right of the authorities to commit someone to 
their death, he clearly argued against that sentence being carried out). 163 
There is also his clear change of mind about the use of political power to 
coerce the schismatic Donatists back into the Catholic Church - once he was 
prepared to advocate the use of force, he was clearly involved in the political 
process and did more than merely obey as he was quite prepared to remind the 
authorities of their duty to exercise that force against the Donatists. This was 
more than a religious quarrel as the Circumcellions - the 'shock troops' of 
Donatism - were clearly breaching the civil, as well as the religious, peace. 
But Augustine goes further than this in relating religious to civil disturbance. 
The Donatists, 
158 Deane, 151. 
159 Deane, 124. 
160 Deane, 143. 
161 Deane, 224. 
162 Deane, 151. 
163 See Ep. 100.2 quoted above at 3.7.4, and Banner, Life and Controversies, 267. 
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refused to obey the laws passed by emperors and circulated by their 
deputies, refused to accept that diligent public officials were God's 
ensigns and champions of the church. Could such refusals, Augustine 
wondered, amount to anything other than sedition?164 
Clearly, for Augustine religious and political quarrels influenced each other, 
so coercion in one implies coercion in the other. The same is true for action: 
Dodaro, as noted above, has pointed to Augustine's activism in doing his best 
to alleviate the plight of slaves and the poor who came to his church. 165 This 
action had implications outside the church - not least because Augustine 
would write letters on his congregants behalf to civil authorities. 166 A passive, 
quietist approach is not what Augustine is necessarily about - and certainly 
not when we look at his own record. 
3.9 Challenging the Consensus 
Peter Burnell states that there is a broad consensus - which includes Deane -
that Augustine regards humanity as intrinsically social, but not political (that 
is, politics only arrived after the Fall). 167 Against this consensus, Burnell 
argues that 'in principle for Augustine the civil state is the chief natural means 
of justice' even though 'in practice the goodness of civil society ... has been 
much diminished (though not annihilated) by the Fall ... ' 168 Given these 
conclusions, Burnell surprisingly also concludes that Christianity has 'little ... 
politically reformative power.' 169 This second conclusion is even more 
surpnsmg if Burnell is indeed arguing (as he appears to) that 'politics' and 
'civil life' are two ways of saying the same thing. 170 However, politics, is 
about trying to reconcile differing views about what should be done: differing 
views that are based not just on disagreements over what is most effective or 
efficient, but also about what is right. 171 
164 Kaufinan, 'Redeeming Politics', 84. 
165 Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 113. Gaylon L. Caldwell documents Augustine's concern for a 
poor tenant farmer, Faventius, who had sought sanctuary, but been abducted. Augustine writes 
several letters to relevant authorities in his concern for Faventius, not least because of the lack 
of concern for the "due process of law" ('Augustine's Critique of Human Justice', Journal of 
Church and State 2 ( 1960), 14-15). 
166 See Caldwell, 14-15. 
167 Burnell, 'The Status ofPolitics', 14. 
168 Ibid, 28-9. 
169 Ibid, 29. 
170 Ibid, 22. 
171 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, xvi, quoted at 1.4 above. 
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If we lived in a natural (pre-Fall) state then our interests and values would 
surely be the same - so no conflict, and therefore, no politics. If, to return to 
Bumell's argument, the civil state is the chief natural means of justice, then 
surely the whole point of Christianity would be to point back (or forward) to 
this natural state where people will, presumably live in political institutions, 
behind political boundaries in a completely non-coercive manner. 
Looked at in this way, the flaw in Bumell's argument is obvious: Christianity 
points to a city of God where people exist, as brothers and sisters, in a state 
without boundaries. All civil states have fought over their boundaries (or had 
them imposed from outside by other, more powerful states) so the ultimate 
justice of those boundaries must be open to question. 172 lfthese boundaries are 
open to question, then these civil states cannot be as natural as Bumell claims. 
We are, therefore, back where we started: with the consensus view that, for 
Augustine, humanity may be naturally social, but not naturally political. 173 
This at least means that a minimal influence (Bumell's last conclusion) seems 
reasonable. How minimal that influence would be under Bathory's thesis is 
open to question and would depend on how well the prepolitical education was 
disseminated amongst the congregation, and how many people were motivated 
by, and able to take action, because ofthat education. 
3.10 A Prepolitical Paideia? 
Bathory's work certainly has a 'rightness and corrective irnportance' 174 about 
it when it is taken against the passive obedience line advocated by Deane and 
others. The shortcomings of Political Theory as Public Confession have been 
noted above, but I now wish to point to those aspects of the work that deserve 
prmse. 
172 See Fortin, 'Political Idealism', 32. 
173 DCD, XIX. 5 begins with Augustine's agreement with the philosophers that 'the life of the 
wise man is a social one', and ends with the plight of a city full of law-suits and criminal 
trials: even when it is 'at peace' (see also DCD, XV.4, for more on strife in the earthly city). 
DCD, XV. 5 points out that Cain founded his city after the Fall, on the other hand, goodness is 
possessed 'more abundantly in proportion to the fullness with which he loves his partner in it.' 
174 Burnell, 'The Status of Politics', 24 n. 68. 
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3.10.1 Educatiol!B 
The education of the individual, or any group of people, and the influence of 
others over them (especially in their formative years), is vital for the 
'relationship between the developing individual and his human, social 
environment ... ' (93). Augustine was aware of this- as is shown by Bathory's 
treatment of the parallels between Confessiones and De Civitate Dei. Bathory 
is not the first to note that De Civitate Dei is an 'expansion of the 
Confessions', 175 but his tying together of the educational aspects relating the 
preparation of Augustine himself for public life with the preparation of the 
peoples of Rome, of the Old Testament, and of Christ, is worthy of attention. 
Education is, of necessity, prepolitical. This is because, whether for good or 
ill, our education - whether it is formal schooling, or the more informal 
influence of our home life - lays down our attitude towards involvement in 
public life. Whether we accept 'any plausible leader' who promises us more in 
the way of 'bread and circuses', or whether we look for leaders who offer less 
selfish and more public, inducements, depends more on our background and 
education (in the broadest sense) than on rational thought at the time the 
decision is required. 
Of course, if we assume that people come into church flawed (and, gtven 
Augustine's views on human nature, this is a safe assumption), then people 
need to be reformed, as Augustine himself needed to be after his conversion. 
Confessiones stand as witness to the fact that Augustine believed that personal 
change was possible, the theme of reform was expanded in De Civil ate Dei to 
emphasise that congregations of the Christian church could be reformed 
towards the true public service of neighbour-love, and it was the job of 
Christian leaders in the church to act as the intermediaries, the prophets, 
recalling the congregation to its founding principles. Michael Loriaux tells us 
that a 'Christian statesman takes it as his or her moral task to strive to 
contribute to the quality of the earthly or secular peace ... ' -just as Christians 
175 Figgis, quoted in Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 120 n. 24. Figgis published in 1921. 
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can 'intervene on the model of the Roman paterfamilias to assure the 
education (and correction) of people who are in his or her charge.' 176 
3.10.2 Motivation 
Why we wish to act in a particular way in society, Augustine argues, is as (if 
not more) important than what we wish to do. Even though it may often 
appear that Christians and non-Christians behave in the same way, their 
motivation is different, and this 'internal' difference is vital. In the end, the 
motivation will count, as, for example, coercion will be applied for different 
reasons - even if, to the one being coerced, it will feel just as painful. 
The coercive nature of life in civil society is the most difficult part of 
Augustine's thought to come to terms with. If Christians are to 'get involved 
in politics', how do they cope with the apparently arbitrary use of force? 
Augustine's only answer seems to be that Christians are involved unhappily. 
Augustine ends De Civitate Dei XIX. 6 with a description of a judge who may 
have to torture the innocent and act in ignorance against justice: 
we certainly have an instance ofwhat I call the wretchedness of man's 
condition . . . [though the judge] is not guilty . . . is he also happy? 
Surely, it would be more compassionate, and more worthy of the 
dignity of man, if he were to acknowledge that the necessity of acting 
in this way is a miserable one: if he hated his own part in it, and if, 
with the knowledge of godliness, he cried out to God, 'From my 
necessities deliver Thou me.' 177 
Christians are also in the invidious position of trying 'to live a Christian life 
and practise the Christian faith while at the same time struggling to maintain 
the shadowy peace of the saeculum.' 178 Christians 'are authorized to use their 
"love" to maintain social structures, though . . . not to change them' .179 
Augustine would regard membership of the pilgrim city of God as more 
important than any political initiative in civil society, but he would (however 
176 Michael Loriaux, 'The Realists and Saint Augustine: Scepticism, Psychology and Moral 
Action in International Relations Thought', International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992), 414. 
Cf. DCD, XIX. 14 (not XV, 22 as Loriaux states). 
177 DCD, XIX. 6. 
178 Rist, Ancient Thought Baptized, 230. 
179 Ibid. Rist uses the example of slavery, but as Dodaro points out that, although Augustine 
did not oppose the institution, 'he did complain to officials of abuses of the laws permitting 
slavery ... ' (Dodaro, 'Eloquent Lies', 113.) 
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secondarily, and following Bathory) still advocate the mmor improvements 
that he, or his fellow bishops, could persuade the authorities to make. 180 
3.10.3 Political Involvement 
In that it seeks to teach its congregations, the church is politically involved. 
However, we must note that Augustine would probably put more emphasis on 
church leaders being involved (as people who would, in his society, have 
authority to take some action), and less on 'ordinary' people. Ordinary people 
would, however, be educated to be- as we have seen- wary of the mob, and 
of leaders whose motivation would be open to question. Augustine would also 
be aware of how incremental any change would be. As I have noted above, he 
never advocated attacking or undermining any existing social structures. He 
was happy to support social justice, and would write to civil officials in 
defence of the poor when their legal rights were being flouted; but civil 
disobedience or revolution were not part ofhis strategy. 
Augustine's writing clearly does involve a radical critique of all classical 
politics. And even if he does have a pessimistic view of human nature and 
therefore of the amount of progress that can be expected in civil society, he 
does not, as Bathory points out, want his congregation frozen in inaction and 
(negative) anxiety. If Christians are called to love their neighbour as well as 
their God, then the attempt to improve their neighbour's political lot must 
(from Bathory's view of Augustine) not only be made by church leaders, but 
also the whole congregation must be educated to play its part as well. 
3.11 Conclusion 
Bathory's thesis leaves us with the question of how a prepolitically educated 
congregation would find new leaders if they realised that their present ones 
were not fit to carry out the task before them? In Augustine's time, the only 
'power' the ordinary congregant would have is the self-control not to be 
180 See Dodaro, 'Between the Two Cities 11-12. 
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caught up by the emotional fury of the mob, and the wisdom to recognise a 
good leader when one appeared. 181 However, Augustine would expect that 
those who had power and influence to use it wisely according to the dictates of 
Christ. 182 Augustine himself, as we have seen, used his influence to help the 
poor ofHippo. 
There is no suggestion that the ordinary congregant sitting under Augustine 
should, or could, seek power - even if they (and Augustine) could be sure that 
they would use that power correctly in the service of the Church and their 
neighbours. Whether this suggestion is not forthcoming from Augustine 
because he failed to consider the possibility for theological or practical reasons 
is a question that remains open. Theologically it could be argued that 
Augustine thought the seeking of political power so open to cupiditas, to the 
self-love upon which the earthly city is based, 183 as to risk a soul's 
salvation. 184 Practically it could be argued that Augustine did not live in our 
contemporary democracy where political power can legitimately be sought, so 
the problem of 'ordinary people' seeking political power just did not occur to 
him. Any answer to this debate would, of necessity, have to be both tentative 
and speculative. What we can conclude from the past two chapters is that 
Augustine never advocated turning our backs on society however it was 
construed or govemed. 185 Nor did he, as I have noted, advocate revolution. He 
sought to do what he could, within the law, to assist people, to increase social 
justice (if only incrementally), but any political education for his congregation 
came through his example to alleviate the plight of the poor, and through his 
teaching on the command to love our neighbour. 
181 Though this would only be by the grace of God. All leaders, including tyrants, were to be 
served. 
182 This does not mean that the church itself trains leaders in or for civil society. The church's 
education (in the broadest sense of that term) is about living as pilgrims in an evil and fallen 
world. Involvement in civil society is based on the love that is due to one's neighbour - and 
not about seeking power. 
183 See Rist, Ancient Thought Baptized, 222 and 224. 
184 
'Although "no man is prevented from devoting himself to the pursuit of truth (which) 
involves a praiseworthy kind of love," the same is not the case for the pursuit of office: high 
position in itself is "not a respectable object of ambition." Once "wise rule" is desired for the 
honor or power, even when exercised in a manner worthy of respect, it is an occasion and 
cause of sin' (William P. Haggerty, 'Augustine, the "Mixed Life," and Classical Political 
Philosophy', Augustinian Studies 23 (1992), 154). 
185 
'[T]he "compulsion of love" ... undertakes "righteous engagement in affairs"' (ibid.). 
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Chapter 4 
THE POWER OF THE OPPRESSED: 
GUST A VO GUTIERREZ AND A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Liberation theology takes a very different view to the 'powers that be' from 
Augustine, and seeks to 'conscientize' the poor, so that they become aware of 
their oppression and begin to seek ways to combat it. Again in contrast to 
Augustine, liberation theology emphasises the sinfulness of structures, not just 
of the individual. It is these structures - and those who use these structures to 
oppress the poor - that are to be opposed and overcome if the oppressed are to 
be liberated. 
Liberation theology has, therefore, been criticised for reducing salvation to the 
political. 1 Certainly in its base communities and in its conscientization of the 
poor, it can be said to be providing a pre-political (if not a directly political) 
education for the poor.2 It is the ordinary person who, according to this 
theology, needs to be made aware of his or her situation in order to be able to 
overcome it. It must also be said, as we shall see, that liberation theology does 
not view itself as a political theology in this reductionist fashion, but opposes 
'apolitical' theology on the ground that this view 'requires self-deceit and is 
itself a political position providing covert support for the status quo. ' 3 
1 Cf Cardinal Ratzinger of the Vatican's Sacred Congregation for the Defence ofthe Faith; 
whether his criticisms are accurate is doubtful (see below). 
2 Paulo Freire 'saw education as having a political end because it can help construct a new 
society that facilitates the realization of a new human being' (Scott Mainwaring, The 
Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916-1985 (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 
1986), 69-70). As we shall see, Gutierrez (and other liberation theologians) regard Freire's 
pedagogical work very highly. 
3 lan Linden, Liberation Theology: Coming of Age? (London: Catholic Institute for 
International Relations, 1997). Raymond Plant points out that 'if Christian theology has a 
theory of man or human nature, it is difficult to see how such a theory could be developed 
without having a view about the institutions, both social and political, within which the 
human personality is nurtured' ('The Anglican Church and the Secular State', in George 
Moyser (ed.), Church and Politics Today, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985), 319). Oliver 
O'Donovan states that '[t]heology must be political if it is to be evangelical. Rule out the 
political questions and you cut short the proclamation of God's saving power; you leave 
people enslaved at points where they ought to be set free from the power of sin ... ' ('Political 
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Liberation theology makes much of the idea of community - specifically of 
solidarity with the poor. As such, the Western idea of a privatised faith is 
(correctly in my view) attacked. 
In this chapter I have chosen to concentrate on the writings of Gustavo 
Gutierrez as he is the best-known liberation theologian,4 and because of the 
influence that Paulo Freire had on his work.5 As Gutierrez's seminal book, A 
Theology of Liberation, is still regarded as one of the best expressions ofwhat 
he calls a 'new way to do theology',6 I shall look at Gutierrez's liberation 
theology mainly, though not solely, through this work. 7 I will then look at some 
of the criticisms of Liberation Theology. Finally, I will examine Gutierrez's 
work in terms of the three topics we looked at previously when we examined 
Augustine's twentieth century interpreters: that is, Gutierrez's eschatology and 
how this affects his ideas of Christian involvement with the world. Secondly, 
the relation of the Christian individual with the civil society in which they find 
themselves. And, thirdly, how the church (in the light ofthe attitudes seen from 
the two other topics) should seek to educate that individual for political 
involvement. This last section, in particular, will enable us to examine more 
closely the debt that Gutierrez owes (and which he acknowledges) to the work 
ofPaulo Freire in educating the poor and oppressed. 
Theology, Tradition and Modernity', in Christopher Rowland (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Liberation Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 241 ). 
O'Donovan goes on to offer his own critique of liberation theology, principally its 
'acephalous idea of society' and its views (or lack thereof) of authority (see ibid., 245-7). 
4 Alfred T. Hennelly describes him as such in his 'General Introduction' to Liberation 
Theology: A Documentary History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990). He goes on to say 
'[t]he very title of the liberation movement is taken from his book, A Theology of Liberation 
... '(xxiii). 
5 Paulo Freire spent his life as an educator of the poor and oppressed - conscientizing them 
for political involvement. I shall look at his work in the next chapter; here I shall look at the 
theology that has been built (at least partly) on his work. The other liberation theologian 
influenced by Freire is Juan Luis Segundo, whose work will also be discussed briefly in 
section 4.6.3 below. 
6 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation (London: 
SCM Press, revised edition 1988), 12, emphasis original. 
7 It must be said that Gutierrez often repeats his points in later books. This is partly in 
response to criticism and partly for clarification. There is also, as we shall see, evidence of 
progression - in his later book On Job, Gutierrez is clearly less idealistic than he is in A 
Theology of Liberation: fighting against injustice may not lead to temporal victory (see 
below). A Theology of Liberation was reprinted in a revised edition in 1988. All references, 
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4.2 A Theology of Liberation 
Gustavo Gutierrez, a Peruvian priest and theologian, lives and works in a world 
where the majority of the poor and impoverished, those he terms 'the 
oppressed', are Christian. His theology is born out of praxis - what Christians 
do and practise in the world - and reflection on God's Word in his Latin 
American culture.8 Gutierrez is insistent that he deals first and foremost with 
his own culture and situation, though he notes with approval in his introduction 
to the revised edition that 'the liberation perspective' has been adopted across 
denominational, cultural and religious boundaries (xix). His original, and 
remaining, purpose is to seek a response to the plight of the oppressed which 
would compare with the biblical presentation of 'liberation - salvation - in 
Christ as the total gift, which ... gives ... liberation its deepest meaning and its 
complete and unforeseeable fulfilment' (xiv). I shall first examine Gutierrez's 
work, following the format he set up in A Theology of Liberation, but 
concentrating on the fourth part - the theological core9 - where Gutierrez puts 
forward his answer to the problems he raises earlier. 
4.2.1 Parts 1 to 3: Theology, Liberation and the Latin American Church 
In the opening chapter of A Theology of Liberation, 'Theology: A Critical 
Reflection' (3-12), Gutierrez looks at theology as wisdom, as rational 
knowledge and, differentiated from the afore-mentioned classical tasks, as 
'Critical Reflection on Praxis' (5ff.). This last aspect is seen as having its roots 
in the early church, and hopeful signs are seen in the Vatican II documents, but 
'the influence of Marxist thought' (8, emphasis original) is also mentioned. 
(Marx, Marxism, and, more generally, socialism is approvingly, though not 
uncritically, mentioned throughout this book.) 10 Gutierrez, in this chapter, 
wants to see the idea that theological premisses precede pastoral activity 
unless otherwise indicated, will be to this edition: further, unattributed page numbers in this 
chapter (given in brackets after each reference to the text) refer to the 1988 edition. 
8 This reflection while it is 'a second stage' is not to be seen as 'secondary' (xxxiii, emphasis 
original). 
9 Cf Alfred T. Hennelly, Liberation Theologies: The Global Pursuit of Justice (Mystic, 
Conn.: Twenty-Third Publications, 1995), 13. 
10 This aspect of Liberation Theology has, as we shall see, caused considerable disquiet in 
many establishment quarters. See 4.3.1 below. 
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overturned and replaced with the idea that it follows pastoral activity (9). From 
this, Gutierrez argues, Liberation Theology can be seen as 'part of the process 
through which the world is transformed' (12). 
In Gutierrez's liberation theology, the transformation of the world leans in a 
socialist direction. As far as Gutierrez is concerned, authentic development can 
only come 'if there is liberation from the dominion exercised by the great 
capitalist countries, and especially by ... the United States of America' (54). 
Socialism, on the other hand, 'represents the most fruitful and far-reaching 
approach [to liberation]' (55). This far-reaching approach extends to utilising a 
Marxist class analysis of the situation: indeed, 'only a class analysis will enable 
us to see what is really involved in the opposition between oppressed countries 
and dominant peoples' (54, emphasis added). 11 In this light, the theories of 
development are seen as too closely tied to capitalism and fail to address the 
real, deep-seated problems of the underdeveloped Latin American societies. 
Furthermore, the socialist revolution will be a "Latin American socialism that 
will promote the advent of the New Humanity." Gutierrez does point out that 
socialism will 'not deliver humanity from injustices caused by personal attitudes 
... ' but he does see it as providing 'a fundamental equality of opportunity' 
(66). And any government which is seen as moving in this, more just, direction 
should be given the backing of the church, with the consent and involvement of 
the poor themselves 'who must be the protagonists of their own liberation' 
(67). 
Of course, there is the possibility that 'the [Roman Catholic] Church will 
become linked to the future established order' (76) but, in response, Gutierrez 
points out that not exercising the Church's social influence on behalf of the 
oppressed 'is really to exercise it against them ... ' (76). The Church's overall 
task, as it faces the options and oppression before it, comes in four parts: a 
prophetic denunciation, a conscienticizing evangelisation (the Exodus theme 
11 Though Gutierrez's Marxism is not very fur reaching: see 4.3.1 below. 
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referred to here is taken up in chapter 9), a right attitude to poverty (discussed 
in chapter 13), and a need to look at the ecclesial structures (68-71). 
4.2.2 A Theology of Liberation Part 4: 'Perspectives' 
4.2.2.1 [ntmduction 
The next part of Gutierrez's A Theology of Liberation, 'Perspectives', looks at 
Christianity and the Church's mission in the light of 'the process of liberation' 
(79). This discussion takes up most of the remainder of the book- apart from a 
short conclusion - and is itself divided into two parts: 'Faith and the New 
Humanity', and 'The Christian Community and the New Society'. There are, 
however, consistent themes. These include: the idea that commitment to 
political action must be balanced with other aspects ofthe Christian life (81); 
the idea that the goal of liberation (and here Gutierrez looks to Vatican 11 for 
support) includes the creation of a new humanity (81); and the idea that 
Christians are to identify with the oppressed, not to struggle paternalistically on 
their behalf (82). This last idea, as we shall see, is easier to talk about than to 
do. Gutierrez's own writing can appear to carry a certain elitist tone (though 
nowhere near as elitist as Augustine) - this elitism is problematic when placed 
alongside the ideal of equality that he seeks to create among the liberated 
oppressed. 12 However, with regard to the Church's belief in the possibility of 
universal salvation (that is, a salvation open to all- not one in which all will be 
saved whatever they think or do), Gutierrez regards human existence as 
'nothing but a yes or a no to the Lord' (84), and one in which we must all seek 
liberation in this life, and not confine it to the next. 
12 See 4.6.3 below. 1t must also be noted that nowhere does Gutierrez, or other liberation 
theologians, seek to disassociate themselves from the hierarchical church structure to which 
they belong - hence the considerable effort in engagement with their critics in the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy - but this does mean that there is an implicit tension in seeking to raise 
the voice of the (lay) poor and put it on a par with well educated clerics used to a hierarchical 
structure. 
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~.2.2.2 New Hunmanndty, Oppression and §nn 
We must note, however, that Gutierrez regards the creation of a new humanity 
as the second level of liberation. 13 The first level is the 'economic, social and 
political liberation' ( 13 7), and the third is 'liberation from sin and entrance into 
communion with God and with all persons' (137). In discussing the three levels 
of liberation, 14 Gutierrez stresses the interdependence and interrelationship 
between them. Gutierrez does refer both to a 'liberation which leads to the 
creation of a new humanity in a new society of solidarity' (137) and to a 
'confidence in the future' (121). However, any suggestion that Gutierrez 
believes in a humanity that can improve itself without the intervention of grace 
-or that this self-improvement can occur before humanity's need to face its sin 
is dealt with- is strongly rejected by Curt Cadorette: 
Gutierrez sees a correlation between Jesus' message of God's 
approaching reign and the utopian hopes of people throughout history. 
He views them as related in the sense that both "postulate the unceasing 
search for a new kind of man in a qualitatively different society," but 
ultimately distinct to the extent that "there is close relationship but no 
identification." This is a key methodological point since Gutierrez 
refuses to absolutize any utopian vision or political action on its behalf. 
By stressing the distinction between our relative, sometimes flawed 
efforts on behalf of liberation and the absolute symbols of God's reign 
as preached by Jesus, Gutierrez avoids the pitfall of "idolatry toward 
unavoidably ambiguous human achievement" as well as the trap of 
Pelagianism. 15 
For Gutierrez then, even as he examines the Exodus as a political liberation, 
during which the Israelites needed 'to become aware of the roots of their 
oppression' (88), he is aware that the work of Christ follows on 'as a liberation 
13 At this level, 'liberation can be viewed in relation to a history of human beings who 
assume conscious responsibility for their own destiny, and create their own selves throughout 
history ... Although he does not mention it explicitly, it is clear that Gutierrez has in mind 
the process of conscientization developed by . . . Freire' (Hennelly, Liberation Theologies, 
17). 
14 For example see the chapter on 'Eschatology and Politics', (121-40). 
15 Curt Cadorette, From the Heart of the People: The Theology of Gustavo Gutierrez (Oak 
Park, IL: Meyer-Stone Books, 1988) 118, quoting A Theology of Liberation (First Edition), 
23 I , 171, 23 8. This book is an excellent examination of Gutierrez' s theology. It is a very 
sympathetic work - the few criticisms are offered somewhat apologetically and are carefully 
qualified. Cadorette has, like Gutierrez, experienced the brutal treatment meted out to Peru's 
poor (see xv-xvii). 
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from sin and from all its consequences ... ' (90). However, the struggle for the 
Kingdom of God cannot occur without a struggle for social justice (97). 
Gutierrez also deals with the 'personal and intrahistorical reality' of sin (85). 
Sin is not considered as an individual private or merely internal reality. It 'is 
regarded as a social, historical fact, the absence of fellowship and love in 
relationships among persons [and] ... with God ... and, therefore, an interior, 
personal fracture' (102-3). Sin therefore needs 'a radical liberation, which ... 
implies a political liberation' (103). This is not to say that building a more just 
society is the coming of the Kingdom, nor that it is all of salvation, but that 
building a more just society can be seen as contributing to the Kingdom and 
therefore, '[i]t is a salvi:fic work, although it is not all of salvation' (1 04 ). This 
is why 'all struggle against exploitation and alienation, in a history which is 
fundamentally one, is an attempt to vanquish selfishness, the negation of love' 
(103-104). 16 
4.2.2.3 Liberation, the Church and the Status Quo 
One reason that Gutierrez gives for having the three levels of liberation, with 
'economic, social and political liberation' as the first level, lies in his argument 
that hearts can, and often are changed after a new situation is forced upon, or 
created for, society. 'Peace, justice, love, and freedom are not private realities; 
they are not only internal attitudes.' (97). Indeed, contrary to certain Western 
privatisation and individualist tendencies, in a damning passage, Gutierrez tells 
us that: 
Those who reduce the work of salvation are indeed those who limit it to 
the strictly "religious" sphere . . . It is those who in order to protect 
salvation (or to protect their interests) lift salvation from the midst of 
history, where individuals and social classes struggle to liberate 
themselves from the slavery and oppression to which other individuals 
and social classes have subjected them. It is those who refuse to see 
that the salvation of Christ is a radical liberation from all misery, all 
despoliation, all alienation. It is those who by trying to "save" the work 
ofChrist will "lose" it. (104) 
16 Gutierrez cites Vatican 11 (Gaudiam et Spes) in support of this 'one history' approach (see 
99). 
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Gutierrez makes his position explicit in The Power of the Poor in History: 
... "What is the good of changing the structures without a change in the 
human heart?" This is only a half-truth, for changing social and cultural 
structures is a way of changing the human heart. There is a mutual 
dependency, and reciprocal demands, between the human heart and its 
social milieu, based on a radical unity. It is no more "mechanistic" to 
think that a structural change automatically makes for a new humanity, 
than to think that a "personal" change guarantees social 
transformations. Both assumptions are unreal and naive. 17 
Arthur McGovern writes in support of this thesis, pointing out that ' [ o ]ver the 
centuries not many wealthy landowners in Latin America have been 
"converted" to distributing their land.' While it is true that hearts need to be 
converted as well, conversion has not 'proved an efficacious means for 
changing structures.' McGovern continues: 
Moreover, changes of heart often follow, rather than precede, changes 
in structures. The issue of racism in the United States provides an 
example. Prior to the 1950s, laws in many states legitimized racial 
segregation. Only by changing these laws, by ''transforming sinful 
structures," could real progress toward justice be achieved. 18 
For someone who argues so strongly (and correctly) that poverty and 
oppression must be opposed if people are to attain freedom even to think, it is 
unsurprising that Gutierrez should say that social and structural change is 
necessary. However he also states (as we have noted) that it is not everything-
all three levels of liberation are required. 
As far as political involvement and its relation to faith is concerned, there is the 
further argument for the Church to consider: 
. . . can it honestly be said that the Church does not interfere in "the 
temporal sphere"? Is the Church fulfilling a purely religious role when 
by its silence or friendly relationships it lends legitimacy to a dictatorial 
and oppressive government? ... ' ( 40) 
Even Paul VI's encyclical, Populorum Progressio - a Vatican document 
usually quoted with favour by Gutierrez as it follows the liberationist themes 
17 Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History (London: SCM Press, 1983), 47. For 
a similar point, see Gustavo Gutierrez, 'Toward a Theology of Liberation', in Hennelly, 
Liberation Theology: A Documentary History, 70. 
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and the idea of the preferential option for the poor - is criticised as 'ultimately 
it addresses itself to the great ones of this world urging them to carry out the 
necessary changes' (23). Gutierrez expects change to come from below, rather 
than from above - particularly as those at the top will often see the required 
changes as detrimental to their interests. 
That the privileged and powerful will resent popular19 demands for change is 
perhaps inevitable, but Gutierrez argues however that the demanded changes 
are not detrimental to their real interests. The oppressor also needs to be set 
free from their own oppression: the actions of the bishops against certain 
'Christians who deliberately ignore the demands of the gospel concerning 
respect for life ... ' are to be seen in the context of 'the love that the bishops 
have for brothers and sisters who have strayed from the right path' (160). 
Therefore, it is clear that 'Gutierrez insists that class struggle, as a struggle for 
justice and human dignity, is totally consonant with Christian love. '20 
The universality of Christian love is only an abstraction unless it 
becomes concrete history, process, conflict; it is arrived at only through 
particularity. To love all men does not mean avoiding confrontations ... 
Universal love is that which in solidarity with the oppressed seeks also 
to liberate the oppressors from their own power ... But this cannot be 
achieved except by resolutely opting for the oppressed, that is, by 
combating the oppressive class. It must be a real and effective combat, 
not hate. This is the challenge, as new as the Gospel: to love our 
enemies. 21 
The above quotation does not appear in the second edition of A Theology of 
Liberation, but even in the new (and somewhat toned down version), Gutierrez 
still insists that: 
The universality of Christian love is . . . not incompatible with a 
preferential option for the poorest and most oppressed . . . There are 
oppositions and social conflicts . . . but they do not exclude respect for 
persons, for as human beings they are loved by God and are constantly 
called to conversion (160). 
18 Arthur F. McGovern, Liberation Theology and Its Critics: Toward an Assessment 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989), 225. 
19 I am following Gutierrez in using 'popular' to mean 'of the people.' 
2
° Cadorette, From the Heart of the People, 109. 
21 A Theology of Liberation, First Edition, 275-6. 
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Gutierrez does not, therefore, see liberation as the rise of the proletariat and the 
overthrow ofthe bourgeoisie. Nor does he see a simple linear progression from 
one level of liberation to the next. He expects, and has experience of, the 
struggle involved in liberation. However, his stress on the inter-relation of the 
levels of liberation is to show that one cannot (like some of the development 
and Marxist-type theories) have political action separated from faith, or- more 
to the point for Western humanism - faith separated off from all other aspects 
of life, including from political action. On the other hand, Gutierrez denies a 
simple connection between these two: he does not support the idea that one 
should 'seek from faith norms and criteria for particular political options' 
(138). 
Gutierrez is keen, however, to see a new 'Utopia'. This is not a return to some 
lost paradise, but is something that can be achieved (135). It links faith and 
political action 'through the effort to create a new type of person in a different 
society' (138). Not only is Gutierrez's utopia intended to be 'the arena of the 
permanent creation of a new humanity ... ' but also this creation 'is the place of 
encounter between political liberation and the communion of all persons with 
God' (139). 
The emphasis on socialism and utopia has led to criticism, not least because 
Gutierrez and the other liberation theologians look to the ideals of utopia and 
socialism without saying much about how those ideals translate 'into realistic 
"approximations"'. 22 This criticism tends to come from those whose experience 
of capitalism is more favourable than the Latin American experience of 
'foreign domination, exploitation of workers, human needs subordinate to the 
drive for profits, and concentration of power and wealth' / 3 and so does not 
reflect the true Latin American experience - nor the fact that Liberation 
22 McGovern, Liberation Theology and Its Critics, 182. 
23 Ibid., 180. 
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theologians emphatically do not wish to see a socialist state created in Latin 
America after the Soviet model. 24 
Although he 'does not consider an option for socialism essential to liberation 
theology' / 5 Gutierrez considers that the spirituality of liberation does have 
implications for the Church. 26 It is to become an "institution of social 
criticism"27 (a critique which must extend to itself- its own internal structures 
must be liberating). The Church must also be aware that its identification with 
the oppressed will lead to opposition from the powerful. In the re-written 
section on 'Faith and Social Conflict' (156-61), Gutierrez argues, with support 
from Marx and papal encyclicals, that although 'none of us can accept with 
unconcern ... a situation in which human beings live in confrontation with one 
another' (157), social, class-based, conflict is a fact. Therefore the church must 
take sides, or it risks supporting the (oppressive) status quo (159). However, 
this does not mean that Gutierrez is 
identifying the preferential option for the poor with any ideology or 
specific political program. Even if they represent legitimate options for 
the Christian laity, they do not at all satisfy fully the demands of the 
gospel. ( 160) 
On the other hand, '[a]ny claim to non-involvement in politics ... is nothing but 
a subterfuge to keep things as they are' (151). So the question must be 'in what 
direction and for what purpose is it [the Church] going to use its influence ... ?' 
(152) 'For ifwe are concerned that peace indeed supposes the establishment of 
24 
'Liberation theologians do tend, however, to give existing socialisms much higher marks 
than most North Americans would give' (ibid, 182). McGovem, seeking a more balanced 
approach, states that we 'can certainly learn from socialist models, but also from more 
positive aspects of capitalism ... ' (ibid., 183). 
25 Ibid., 180-1. 
26 [ will discuss the socialist, and, more specifically, the Marxist tenor of liberation theology 
below. For a liberationist approach to the socialism verses capitalism debate, see Juan Luis 
Segundo, 'Capitalism Verses Socialism: Crux Theologica', in Rosino Gibellini, Frontiers of 
Theology in Latin America (London: SCM Press, 1980), 240-59. Unsurprisingly, socialism is 
preferred, and robustly defended: 'The European advocates of political theology demand that 
we Latin Americans present them with a proposal for a socialist society that is guaranteed in 
advance to avoid the defects evident in existing brands of socialism. Why do they not demand 
the same thing of Jesus? Why do they not demand that Jesus, before telling someone that his 
faith has saved him and curing him, provide some guarantee that the cure will definitely not 
be followed by worse illnesses?' (ibid., 255). 
27 A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 128 (emphasis original to Gutierrez, quoting 
J.B. Metz). 
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justice, we cannot remain passive or indifferent when the most basic human 
rights are at risk' (159). 
In support of his position, Gutierrez looks at Jesus and his political world. 
While accepting that Jesus was not defined by political militancy, he states that 
it is as a political militant that Jesus was tried (133). Jesus encountered political 
opposition with his radical challenge to the groups in power (132). Therefore, 
his call to personal conversion cannot be separated from 'its social, vital, and 
concrete context' (134). Gutierrez states that, although Jesus' announcement 
of the Kingdom 'must not be confused with the establishment of a just society, 
this does not mean that it [the Kingdom] is indifferent to this society' (134-5). 
4.2.2.4 The Poor of the Beatitudes 
A just society must seek to alleviate poverty, but in Christian circles, poverty is 
an ambiguous term. It is seen as both good for the spirit and 'a scandalous 
condition' (165). Gutierrez's solution is to distinguish between material and 
spiritual poverty.28 The former deserves prophetic denunciation; the latter is to 
be viewed as a route to God and a counter to pride (165-73). As an example of 
this, Gutierrez points to the attitude of the believers in Acts 4 - who shared 
what they had so that 'there were no poor' (173) - this is a spiritual poverty 
that will lead to 'authentic solidarity with the poor' (173). 
Gutierrez is, of course, aware that there are two versions of the beatitudes, and 
is considerably exercised by the Matthean beatitude in favour of 'the poor in 
spirit' (164, emphasis added). He returns to the discussion in The Truth Shall 
Make You Free. The question is whether, as some think, Matthew has 
'"spiritualized" Luke's version'. This, according to Gutierrez, has to be doubted 
because 
28 This approach can also be seen in Jorge Pixley and Clodovis Boff, The Bible, the Church 
and the Poor (Tunbridge Wells: Bums and Oates, 1989), 139-56. Pixley and Boff, however, 
differentiate usefully between spiritual poverty (the inner attitude) and evangelical poverty 
(which this inner attitude produces). Gutierrez, as he does not have this third category, tends 
to merge evangelical poverty with spiritual poverty. 
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no one can deny that the Gospel of Matthew is notably insistent on the 
need for concrete and "material" actions toward others and especially 
toward the poor (see Mt. 25 :31-46). This emphasis does not seem to be 
compatible with a supposed Matthean "spiritualism."29 
Gutierrez equates spiritual poverty with spiritual childhood, and therefore, as 
' [ s ]piritual childhood is the attitude of those who know themselves to be sons 
and daughters of God ... ', spiritual poverty is synonymous with discipleship.30 
In the perspective just explained (poor in spirit = disciples), it makes 
sense to say that Christians should choose a poor lifestyle. The reason is 
not that being poor is an ideal to be striven for but that to be a disciple 
today includes being in solidarity with the real poor, those who lack the 
necessities for living in the way that their dignity as human beings and 
children of God calls for. As Medellin reminds us, poverty according to 
the Bible is an evil, a situation not desired by the God oflife. 31 
There follows a discussion of the 'theme of justice in the Matthean 
Beatitudes' .32 Justice is seen both as a gift of God and the task of humanity. 
Therefore '[t]he practice of justice is required of the disciples of Christ' .33 This 
'finds expression in life-giving actions in behalf of the neighbor and especially 
the most defenceless: the poor' .34 These actions are to 'be seen by others in 
order that the latter may receive the message ofthe Beatitudes'.35 The disciples 
are blessed 'because by means of concrete actions they give life and thus 
proclaim the kingdom'. 36 
Gutierrez concludes by telling us that 
The Beatitudes in Luke put the emphasis on the gratuitousness of the 
love of God, who has a predilection for the poor. The Beatitudes in 
Matthew fill out the picture by specifYing the ethical requirements that 
flow from this loving initiative of God. The two approaches are 
complementary. Matthew does not "spiritualise" the Beatitudes ... he 
"disciple-izes" them. The Matthean approach is especially demanding 
37 
29 Gustavo Gutierrez, The Truth Shall Make You Free: Confrontations (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1990), 160. 
30 Ibid., 161. 
31 Ibid., emphasis original. 
32 Ibid., 162. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 163. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 164. 
37 Ibid. 
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In The Power of the Poor in History, Gutierrez returns to this theme telling us 
that there is a danger of spiritualizing the Beatitudes "too soon". 
But if, instead, we take the gospel statements at face value, 
unflinchingly and courageously, then what we have is God's love for the 
poor first and foremost simply because they are poor, simply because 
they are literally and materially poor. Now we have no easy God at all. 
Now we are faced with the mystery of God's revelation, and the gift of 
his Kingdom of love and justice. 38 
For Gutierrez therefore, a spirituality of liberation leads away from any 
received orthodoxy which separates religion from the rest of life to a 
'conversion to the neighbor' (118, emphasis original) and in them, to God. This 
is an active - and activist - faith, but one which requires the Christian 'to find 
the way to real prayer' (119). Gutierrez admits this way to prayer can be 
difficult, but none the less expects the attempt. 
4.2.3 Conclusion 
In this brief overview of Gutierrez's new way of doing theology, we have seen 
how he works to ground his theology in the teachings of the Roman Catholic 
Church (especially Vatican 11) and in the Bible. The Church must abandon its 
alliance with the establishment and seek solidarity with the poor- at whatever 
cost to itself Although Marxist analysis is utilised, and a socialist approach 
generally favoured, no specific political program is endorsed. The key to it all is 
that the poor and oppressed must be made aware of, in order to be freed from, 
their oppression. This is a laudable aim, but Gutierrez, and his colleagues, have 
faced considerable criticism, not least from the Vatican. 
4.3 Criticisms of Liberation Theology 
Gutierrez's work makes fascinating reading. He is clearly reacting against a 
Church which he sees as allying itself to the governing authorities (and thereby 
with the oppressors) and, as such, fails to stand up for the majority of its 
people.39 For all his criticism however, Gutierrez is keen to keep the Church on 
38 The Power of the Poor in History, 95. 
39 In Latin America, about 80 percent of the population live in poverty (Pixley and Boff, The 
Bible, the Church and the Poor, I). 
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his side - his continual references to Vatican 11 and other church documents are 
evidence of this- but he is not confident of the Church's reception ofhis work. 
It perhaps stands more as an unwitting indictment of the Vatican than of 
Gutierrez and his colleagues, but the Vatican's response to liberation theology 
has not been noted for its warmth. 40 It was particularly suspicious of what it 
saw as hints ofPelagianism, and, more importantly, of liberation theology's use 
of Marxist analysis. 
4.3.1 Gutierrez as Marxist? 
4.3.1.1 Gutierrez as Too Marxist 
With its demand for solidarity with the poor and oppressed, and its recognition 
that doing nothing supports the status quo, it is difficult to disagree with A 
Theology of Liberation. However, the Marxist and socialist tenor of a lot of 
Gutierrez's comments has led to questions being asked of how much of his 
Biblical thought is influenced by Marx, and how much Marxist thought is 
influenced by Biblical considerations. 'The first statement on liberation 
theology issued by Rome states that certain theologians, and one can only 
presume that Gutierrez is among them, are naive about the limitations of social 
analysis, particularly the Marxist variety. ' 41 There has, therefore, been 
considerable criticism of Liberation Theology from the Roman Catholic Church 
over this Marxist issue -particularly and especially from the two instructions on 
Liberation Theology issued by the 'Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of 
40 The responses have, however, become more measured, not to say more accepting of the 
validity of liberation theology over time. The 'Ten Observations on the Theology of Gustavo 
Gutierrez' (reprinted in Hennelly, A Documentary History, 348-50) seems hysterical when 
compared with the 'Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation' (reprinted in ibid., 
461-97). How much of this change is due to the fact that, as Alistair Kee puts it, because of 
'its support among the Latin American hierarchy, there was no alternative but to adopt the 
Vatican fall-back position of incorporation' (Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology 
(London: SCM Press, 1990), 200), and how much to recognition of the good in liberation 
theology- we shall probably never know. What is certain is that all the Vatican's documents 
on liberation theology have criticisms to make. 
41 Cadorette, From the Heart of the People, 83. Cadorette writes his next 34 pages to show 
that the Vatican instruction is wide of the mark. Robert McAfee Brown also writes in defence 
of Gutierrez ('Spirituality and Liberation: The Case for Gustavo Gutierrez', Worship 58 
(1984), 397). Brown correctly asserts that Gutierrez merely accepts 'certain interpretative 
themes ofMarx' (ibid, 398), and defends him against the Vatican's accusations. 
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the Faith', led by Cardinal Ratzinger,42 in 1984 and 1986. The main objection 
that the first Vatican Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of 
Liberation makes is against 'certain forms of liberation theology which use, in 
an insufficiently critical manner, concepts borrowed from various currents of 
Marxist thought. '43 The Vatican Instruction is concerned that 'ideological 
principles [of Marxism] come prior to the study of social reality and are 
presupposed in it' and that one cannot take just one part of Marxism- the 
analysis- without accepting the whole (atheistic) ideology.44 
This criticism misses the point. Criticism derived from liberation theology's 
use of Marxism could be a convenient handle for conservatives in the Roman 
Catholic Church and elsewhere to hang their antagonism. However, to defend 
the Vatican position, Marxism must properly be seen as a failed ideology.45 
And for all Gutierrez's defence of 'utopia' (and its distinction from 'ideology'), 
Marxist socialism - of a Latin American or any other variety - has not yet led 
to the creation of any 'New Humanity.' All this, however, is to over-simplifY 
Gutierrez's position. The class struggle that Gutierrez calls for, as we have 
already seen, cannot be identified with class warfare.46 Gutierrez does not 
assume that the bourgeoisie, or any other class, will be destroyed, nor (as noted 
above) does he assume that people can improve themselves without God's 
42 Though closer to home for Gutierrez, Cardinal Alfonso L6pez Trujillo, a past president of 
the general Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM) is also a prominent critic, 
saying that 'the liberation theology movement promotes Marxist revolution, not true 
Christian liberation' (McGovern, Liberation Theology and Its Critics, 49). 
43 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 'Instruction on Certain Aspects of the 
"Theology of Liberation"', in Hennelly, A Documentary History, 394. The second 
instruction, 'Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation' (in ibid, 461-97), is a more 
balanced document, but points to the reality that, after such liberating events as the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, 'the progress achieved is far from fulfilling the 
original ambitions' (ibid., 464), and would still wish to put Gutierrez's third level of 
liberation (from sin) first (see ibid., 476-7). Social sin is still secondary, and Marxism is 
mentioned only implicitly in a warning against the imposition of 'an imported ideology' 
(ibid, 486). 
44 Ibid, 402, and see Rosino Gibellini, The Liberation Theology Debate (London: SCM Press 
Ltd., 1987), 44. 
45 It probably does not help that a Polish Pope who has experienced Marxist-Leninism at first 
hand now leads the Church. This does not mean that John Paul II is necessarily antagonistic 
towards liberation theology (see the discussion in McGovern, 14-19). The Pope's concern is 
to avoid a situation where a 'collectivist socialism [that] only takes power from a wealthy 
capitalist elite and transfers it to a new bureaucratic elite' (ibid., 181, referring to Laborem 
Exerens). 
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grace acting in them. The debate over the use of Marxism47 merely serves to 
emphasise how differently Marxism (like capitalism) is perceived in Latin 
America compared with the first world. 48 
It may be that a Marxist analysis 'of the structures of oppression in the Third 
World'49 is appropriate. The danger is, on the one side, in not accepting that 
there may be other analyses, and, on the other, of throwing out the baby of 
liberation praxis and its preferential option for the poor with the Marxist 
bathwater. Gutierrez, at least according to Cadorette, will incorporate ideas, 
even ones derived from Marxism, into his theology, but those ideas that do not 
'advance the cause of liberation ... are left out. ' 50 
4.3.1.2 Gutierrez as Not Marxist Enough 
There is another side to this debate, exemplified by Alistair Kee, which takes 
the line that Gutierrez, and all other liberation theologians, are not Marxist 
enough. This is because they do not take into account Marx's critique of 
religion. 51 Kee argues that Marxist social analysis began with his (Marx's) 
46 See A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 157-9. 
47 Juan Luis Segundo, for one, denies that Marxism belongs 'to the "people" of Latin 
America' (Theology and the Church (London: Geoffiey Chapman, 1985), 139), but states 
that the Church has 'a considerable popular movement within its own walls' (ibid., 141), 
which 'does not stem from any kind of social analysis' (ibid., 142, emphasis original). 
However, he recognizes that the mixture of Marxist analysis with popular faith 'led the 
faithful ... to recognize class enemies' (ibid., 144). Marxist analysis may or may not be 
necessary, but he rightly believes conscientization is. 
48 See McGovem, xix. Also Jose P. Miranda tells us that 'in both Marx and the Bible the 
possibility of ... definitive liberation is absolutely the basis of all the thinking' (Marx and the 
Bible (London: SCM Press, 1977), 254). Alistair Kee regards Miranda as a theologian who is 
committed to Marx's philosophy (Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology, 202-3). 
However, as J. Emette Weir rightly points out, Miranda's work is heavily skewed in favour of 
exegesis and theology over socio-economic analysis ('The Bible and Marx', Scottish Journal 
of Theology 35 (1982), 340). Although his demonising of capitalism denies any positive 
influence it may have, Miranda clearly feels he has biblical warrant to parallel Marx with 
Biblical themes. 
49 Denys Turner, 'Marxism, Liberation Theology and the Way of Negation', in Rowland 
(ed.), Cambridge Companion, 202. 
5
° Cadorette, 98. 
51 Though Juan Luis Segundo asserts that this critique is not consistent. Sometimes religion 
must be suppressed before the revolution, sometimes it will be suppressed 'precisely by the 
establishment of socialist society ... ' (Signs of the Times (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1993 ), 14-15). 
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analysis of religion. Religion, as any Marxist will know, was found to be 
wanting as it was a 'reversal of reality'. 52 
However, as Kee himself notes, liberation theology represents a religion, a 
Christianity, that has committed itself to the poor and is therefore 'no longer 
susceptible to Marx's criticism that religion is reconciliation with injustice and 
an ideological legitimation of the structures of oppression. ' 53 Further, as I have 
noted, Gutierrez critiques 'apolitical' religion as one that supports the status 
quo. Similarly, Gutierrez opposes an individualist religion that promotes a 
highly 'other-worldly' eschatology (this anti-individualism can also be seen in 
Gutierrez's emphasis on the social aspects of sin). These points can be taken, at 
least implicitly, as a critique of a religion that is a 'reversal of reality' - but 
(against Kee) if the religion has changed, then the criticism must either fall, or 
change to match the new conditions. 
Without defining it, it seems that Kee wants a very different liberation 
theology. This liberation theology would accept capitalism, or at least, to be 
more consistent with Marx, 54 it would accept having to go through capitalism 
to get to socialism. A similar process is required for religion: religion must 
accept that the mystery of the 'religious essence of the human' is not to be 
found in the supernatural but as an 'experience [which] is both subjective and a 
response to the objective. ' 55 Whether or not religious experience is correct to 
see itself in this way remains to be seen but, ultimately, Kee fails to show how, 
by being more ontologically Marxist, the liberation theologians can do any 
better at serving the poor they seek to liberate. It is by this standard, not by 
their adherence to Marx, that the 'failure' of liberation theology is to be 
measured. 56 
52 Kee, Marx and the Failure of Liberation Theology, 169, and elsewhere. 
53 Ibid., 175. 
54 See ibid., 271. 
55 Ibid., 282. 
56 Cf D.P. Davies, review in Modern Churchman, 32 (1992), 57. 
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It seems that Kee, in seeking to critique liberation theology, has failed to 
exercise any critique of Marx. 57 There is no answer to Marx's own atheism 
(other than it was personal to Marx), the secular 'Pelagianism' in Marxism is 
unaddressed, and no answer is given to the Marxist violent rise of the 
proletariat necessarily meaning the fall (or death) of the bourgeoisie. 58 
Therefore Kee's critique and assumption of the failure of liberation theology is 
itself extremely questionable. 
4.3.2 Violence 
Alongside the Marxist theme, there is the suggestion that Gutierrez espouses 
violence. This is incorrect. Gutierrez is aware of the violence in society around 
him, and he distinguishes between three types of violence: institutional 
violence, and repressive violence, which both come from the state or its agents, 
and counter-violence. This is 'the violence that the masses resort to when all 
other options to achieve justice and liberation ... have been exhausted. ' 59 This 
is not advocacy of violence, but a recognition that it exists, and that this third 
type of violence requires understanding, and not condemnation, when the 
state's violence remains unchallenged and uncondemned - especially by the 
church. He also accepts that when people become involved in seeking their 
liberation, 'and thus assuming a political task', they will find that their 
involvement 'turns out to be ... more conflictual than it appeared in the first 
stages of political involvement. ' 60 Whether this conflict leads to the violence of 
martyrdom will depend on the reaction of the authorities to the drive for 
liberation, but it is (in the Latin American situation) a constant threat. 
Paul Germond tells us that the Medellin Conference was realistic: 'violence 
may be regarded as theologically legitimate -but it is more desirable to attain 
justice by ... non-violent strategies ... '. This does not lead to a 'blind baptism 
of violence' but a painful recognition that, because institutional and repressive 
57 Cf. anonymous review in Expository Times, I 01 (1990), 353-4. 
58 Even if it argued that, theoretically, a Marxist overthrow of the ruling classes could happen 
peacefully, in practice, all Marxist inspired revolutions have involved violence and death. 
59 Anne Hieber, 'Peace Profile: Gustavo Gutierrez', Peace Review, 13 (200 1 ), 298. 
60 The Power of the Poor in History, 46. 
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violence 'are so entrenched that revolutionary violence must be part of the 
struggle to destroy such structures, if liberation and justice are to be 
achieved.' 61 This is far short of an advocacy ofviolence, and contains, as far as 
I can see, parallels with the Western recognition of the legitimate use of force 
given in the Just War theory.62 
4.3.3 Making History Come Out Right 
The Marxist issue remains a point of controversy, but the creation of a 'New 
Humanity' raises other questions. The very idealism which seems to think that a 
New Humanity can be created by any utopia or liberation this side of the 
Second Coming appears suspect. James Nickoloff's assertion that Gutierrez is 
referring to a new humanity that is 'not dissimilar, nor indeed, unrelated to 
shifts which have already occurred in Western history' ,63 is open to 
considerable doubt: the nature ofhumanity has seemed constant since the Fall-
selfish and sinful- and has not changed whatever the political situation.64 And 
Gutierrez is aware of this when he points out that humanity (including Western 
humanity) is still looking for liberation from exterior and interior pressures, on 
a social and a psychological plane (20). This clearly goes beyond any shift that 
has already occurred in the West. 
The idea of a 'New Humanity' opens up two inter-related criticisms. Firstly, 
does Gutierrez (in spite of what has been said above) advocate Pelagianism; 
and secondly, how easy is liberation (whether it is of a Pelagian variety or not)? 
61 Paul A. Germond, 'Liberation Theology: Theology in the Service of Justice', in Charles 
Villa-Vicencio (ed.) Theology and Violence: The South African Debate (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1988), 229-30. Jose Miranda goes so fur as to include capitalism as part of 
institutional violence: 'capitalism as a system does not permit existing resources to be 
directed to the satisfaction of needs ... Capitalism has seized the resources of humanity, and 
physically kills millions of human beings day by day with hunger, or leaves them lifelong 
mental defectives' (Communism in the Bible (London: SCM Press, 1982), 74). This 
somewhat radical approach does leave me wondering where revolutionary violence should be 
directed, and how full liberation could be achieved, given capitalism's global reach. 
62 For parallels between Gutierrez and Augustine- from whom a Just War Theory is derived 
-and their recognition ofthe use of violence in society, see Henry Higuera, 'Gutierrez v. the 
Vatican', This World25 (1989), 59-72. 
63 James B. Nickoloff, 'Church of the Poor: The Ecclesiology of Gustavo Gutierrez', 
Theological Studies, 54 (1993), 519, emphasis original. 
64 This is not to say that societies cannot change, or that some societies are not better than 
others. 
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4.3.3.1 The Charge of Pelagianism 
To take the first point first: Gutierrez states that one level of liberation 'does 
not occur without the others' ( 13 7) and the third level of liberation, 'liberation 
from sin and entrance into communion with God and with all persons' (137), is 
a necessary part of liberation. As far as Gutierrez is concerned ' [a] change of 
social structures can help to bring about this personal change [of heart] but 
does not automatically bring it about.'65 However, he also states that '[t]o 
know God is to work for justice. There is no other path to reach God' (156). It 
could be inferred from this that if humanity works hard enough, a perfectly just 
society would be created which would bring, in a somewhat Pelagian manner, 
the Kingdom of God on earth.66 
The Vatican in particular charges liberation theology with the tendency to 
substitute 'a figure of Jesus who is a kind of symbol who sums up in himselfthe 
requirements of the struggle of the oppressed' for '[f]aith in the incarnate 
word, dead and risen for all'. 67 In other words, Gutierrez has fallen into 'the 
trap of Pelagianism. ' 68 However as I have noted above, Gutierrez does not 
leave liberation at this second stage - the third stage is fundamental. 
While Gutierrez is consistently careful to point to the distinction between 
working for a just society on earth and the Kingdom of God, his desire to try to 
'make history come out right'69 leads him, in A Theology of Liberation, to 
appear to blur the distinction between earthly and heavenly justice. However 
Gutierrez defends his position in The Truth Shall Make You Free. After several 
references to A Theology of Liberation, he states bluntly that '[t]he faith does 
not permit a reduction of the kingdom to any historical embodiment, however 
human and just we think it to be. 70 In other words, he wishes to emphasise the 
65 Gustavo Gutierrez, The Truth Shall Make You Free: Confrontations, 133. 
66 The idea of temporal progress is discussed further below, see 4.4.3. 
67 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 'Instruction on Certain Aspects of the 
"Theology of Liberation"', in Hennelly, A Documentary History, 408. 
68 Ibid., 118. 
69 To use Stanley Hauerwas's phrase. 
70 Gutierrez, The Truth Shall Make You Free, 146. This book was written as a response to the 
major criticisms brought against him and against liberation theology, by the Vatican (and 
others). 
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link between 'the Christian message and human liberation' without making 
them identical. 
4.3.3.2 An Easy Liberation? 
As for the second criticism, the ease of liberation, we need to see that today, in 
spite of many governmental changes (some supported by the church); there are 
still countless numbers of poor people in Latin America. However, A Theology 
of Liberation makes no actual mention of an automatic or easy liberation - if 
liberation were either, there would be no need to write of a class struggle. Nor 
would there be any need to refer to martyrdom: 
we must pay a high price for being an authentic church of the poor. I 
am referring not to the cost entailed in the manner of life and action 
proper to the church, but to that inflicted by the hostile reactions that 
the church meets in its work. In present day Latin America this means 
frequent attacks on the church and its representatives ... [including] 
assassination. ( xliii) 
The above quotation comes from the 1988 introduction to A Theology of 
Liberation, it seems that Gutierrez is (possibly in the light of experience) 
withdrawing from any idea that liberation might be easy, but he maintains his 
positive outlook on history. This is an outlook that may not be borne out by 
events. In sum, we can say that, for Gutierrez, faith is a pre-requisite of 
liberation. However, we are left to wonder how his theology copes when 
history does not seem to be on his side? 
4.3.4 When History Turns Out Wrong 
While the charge of Pelagianism may be easy for Gutierrez and his supporters 
to refute, he does have to struggle with Theodicy - how can we worship a 
good God when, for the poor of Latin America, the world continues to be evil? 
This is problematic especially when we consider Gutierrez's progressivist view 
ofhistory. If we refer to Gutierrez's book On Job, we can see a clarification, if 
not a development, in Gutierrez's thinking. In this book, subtitled God-Talk 
and the Suffering of the Innocent, Gutierrez tells us that the nature of the gift 
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of God's love is not one that operates 'in a world of cause and effect' .71 Using 
a new translation of Job 42:6,72 Gutierrez tells us that Job did not repent as 
God has not accused him of any injustice, but that Job is saying "I repudiate 
and abandon ... dust and ashes".73 For Gutierrez, 'in his final reply what Job is 
expressing is not contrition but a renunciation of his lamentation and dejected 
outlook.'74 In other words, and to release Job (and liberation theology) from 
any idea that God must be tied to retributive justice - even in its positive form 
that those who work for justice must see justice brought about for them and 
others- Job has to be 'delivered from the envy that paralyses reality and tries 
to put limits to the divine goodness ... '75 
It should, however, be evident that in rejecting the theology of 
retribution Job has not been freed from the necessity of practicing 
justice, but only from the temptation of imprisoning God in a narrow 
conception of justice. He has been delivered, at least in principle, from 
the most subtle form of idolatry, a danger that has been mentioned at 
various points in the Book of Job. God is now seen by Job as 
completely free, untrammelled by the narrow theological categories in 
which Job had been trying to enclose God's dealings with humankind.76 
Gutierrez recognises the challenge that he and others face in having to do 
theology while facing 'a cruel present and a dark tunnel with no apparent 
end. ' 77 So, what to do when, in spite of all our efforts, history does not work 
out right is not to abandon our search for justice, but to continue, even in the 
midst of our own innocent suffering, to care about the oppression of others, 
and recognize that we have no power to force God to act. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
We may dismiss the charges of Pelagianism and the advocacy of violence 
against Gutierrez relatively easily. The charge of Marxism requires a more 
71 Gustavo Gutierrez, On Job: God-Talk and the Suffering of the Innocent (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1987), 87. 
72 Proposed by Dale Patrick, and endorsed by N.C. Habet (see ibid., n. 14 and 15, 126). 
73 Ibid., 86. This translation is completely defensible in Hebrew idiom (conversation with Dr. 
R.W.L. Moberly, 07/08/01). 
74 Ibid., 87, emphasis original. 
75 Ibid., 91. 
76 Ibid. According to Waiter Moberly, the interpretation Gutierrez puts on the new translation 
of Job 42:6 'is as likely as any' (conversation with Dr. R.W.L. Moberly, 07/08/01). 
77 Ibid., 102. 
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refined approach: Gutierrez is no Marxist, but he does use Marxist analysis, 
and (given that the options before him are either capitalism or socialism) 78 he 
rightly favours a socialist approach as tending to a more egalitarian distribution 
of wealth. For those who choose to be suspicious of any form of Marxist or 
socialist nuance in Liberation Theology, Liberation Theology can then be 
viewed with disfavour: but this negative attitude can only be sustained if the 
radical nature ofthe Bible is also deliberately ignored. 
In the sense that it promotes revolutionary behaviour, Marxism is a 
revolutionary force - in a similar way Liberation Theology seeks to be 
revolutionary. But the revolution it promotes is a very different one from, say, 
the French Revolution. As I have noted, Gutierrez's class struggle is not the 
same as class warfare. There is no sense that the triumph ofthe oppressed (or 
proletariat) requires the demise of the bourgeoisie. It is perhaps worth noting 
that the integration of Aristotle's thinking into Christianity by Aquinas was not 
universally welcomed at the time - perhaps the same might occur with Marxist 
analysis in Liberation Theology.79 
Whether Marxist analysis is used or not, the continuing suffering of the poor is 
clearly a problem: for Gutierrez, the church must continue to seek liberation for 
the poor, even if at present, it can only seek to share the poor's suffering. 
Working for a just society does not require God to bring it about, but the poor 
will see and note where God stands if the church will stand with them. 
However, if Gutierrez does wish to work for a just society, questions of how 
he expects God to act, and when, are inevitably raised: it is to these questions 
that I now turn. 
78 For Gutierrez, and other liberation theologians, capitalism 'evokes foreign domination, 
exploitation of workers, unbridled greed for profit and concentration of wealth and power in 
the hands of the elite' (Peter C. Phan, 'Peacemaking in Latin American Liberation 
Theology', Theology Digest 42 ( 1995), 226). 
79 Although he is very circumspect in his use of what may be seen as Marxist terminology 
(see for example the Encyclical letter, Centesimus Annus, 41, where he discusses 'alienation' 
(www.vatican.va/holy father/john paul ii/encyclicalsldocwnentslhf jp-ii enc 01051991 
centesimus-annus en.html (06/12/2002))), Pope John Paul 11 does appear to have 
incorporated liberation theology into his thought; see Pope John Paul II, 'Excerpts from "On 
Social Concern" (Sol/icitudo Rei Socialis)' , in Hennelly, A Documentary History, 521-8. 
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4.4 Gutierrez's Eschatology 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Gutierrez clearly does not regard his fellow Christians as mere pilgrims looking 
for a new city at some point and time in the future, he wants action now to 
bring about the growth of the kingdom on earth, a kingdom that brings justice 
for the poor, allows them to 'irrupt' into history, and which challenges the 
current social and political establishments and their representatives wherever 
they may be found (including in the church). This approach raises questions of 
what sort of eschatology Gutierrez expounds, so, as I did in chapters two and 
three regarding Augustine (and his interpreters), I will now consider 
Gutierrez's eschatology. 
4.4.2 'Up There' and 'Down Here' 
This eschatological dimension appears in the early stages of A Theology of 
Liberation. 
[T]he rediscovery of the eschatological dimension in theology has also 
led us to consider the central role of historical praxis. Indeed if human 
history is above all else an opening to the future, then it is a task, a 
political occupation, through which we orient and open ourselves to the 
gift which gives history its transcendent meaning: the full and definite 
encounter with the Lord and with other humans ... (8, emphasis 
original). 
We can see already that Gutierrez is interested in a dialectical approach to 
eschatology- and one that emphasises the 'now' over the 'not yet'. He quotes 
Edward Schillebeeckx: "The hermeneutics of the Kingdom of God ... consists 
especially m making the world a better place ... " (10-11). For Gutierrez, 
'salvation IS already here' and 'the prophetic perspective (in which the 
Kingdom takes on the present life, transforming it) is vindicated before the 
sapiential outlook (which stresses the life beyond)' (85, emphasis added). 
When he examines the history of the people of God and God's covenant with 
his people, Gutierrez is concerned to show that '[t]he eschatological horizon is 
present in the heart of the Exodus' (89), and (against what can be seen as an 
Augustinian approach), 
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building the temporal city is not simply a stage of "humanization" or 
"pre-evangelization" as was held in theology until a few years ago. 
Rather it is to become part of a saving process which embraces the 
whole ofhumanity and all human history (91). 
Gutierrez explicitly criticises establishment Christianity, with its emphasis on an 
other-worldly eschatology, in The Power of the Poor in History: 
Of course its (this transitory world's] unreality did not prevent those 
who claimed to live only for the world ''up there" from solidly installing 
themselves in the world "down here." Such installation was necessary, 
it would seem, as the platform from which to proclaim to others that 
they ought not to become attached to anything ephemeral and 
corruptible. 
Eternal life was seen exclusively as a future life and not as present in an 
active and creative form within our concrete historical involvement as 
well. It was a contracted, partialized view of human existence, the 
product of a gospel carefully reduced to suitably narrow, myopic 
dimensions. 80 
In A Theology of Liberation, Gutierrez takes his lead from the work of 
Gerhard Von Rad in order to emphasise the 'as well' of eschatology. Gutierrez 
views the Old Testament prophets as orientating present actions of God toward 
the future, but based on his past initiatives on behalf of his people (93-94). 
Gutierrez concludes that there is both a present and future aspect to the 
'eschatological perspective'. 'The self-communication of God points to the 
future, and at the same time this Promise and Good News reveal humanity to 
itself and widen the perspective of its historical commitment here and now' 
(95). 
4.4.3 The Kingdom of God and Temporal Progress ... 81 
It is with this understanding that Gutierrez regards temporal progress and 
growth of the Kingdom of God as related - though he is careful to follow the 
Vatican 11 line and state that they are not to be equated with one another ('the 
growth of the Kingdom goes beyond temporal progress' (99)). However, ifwe 
refuse to get involved with the poor, with the oppressed, if we refuse make 
these our neighbour, then we have abstained from serving, and this 'is to refuse 
80 The Power of the Poor, 39, emphasis original. 
81 et: 4.3.3.1, above. 
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to love: to fail to act for another is as culpable as expressly refusing to do it' 
(113). Thus our actions in the temporal world, our desire to see temporal 
progress is tied in with the growth of the Kingdom of God. It is interesting to 
note that these actions, as Gutierrez realises in his introduction to the second 
edition of A Theology of Liberation, written in 1988, do not have to be 
expressly or overtly political: 
I have learned much in recent years ... The struggles of those who reject 
racism and machismo . . . as well as of those who oppose the 
marginalization of the elderly, children, and other "unimportant" 
persons in our society, have made me see, for example, the importance 
of "being with" that some may regard as having little political 
effectiveness (xxx). 
However, our 'commitment to the creation of a just society and, ultimately, to 
a new humanity, presupposes confidence in the future' (121). Here, 
eschatology and politics meet. In chapter 11 (121-140) of A Theology of 
Liberation, entitled 'Eschatology and Politics', Gutierrez discusses this very 
issue. With his 'this-worldly' aspect to eschatology and relationship between 
temporal progress and the growth of the Kingdom of God, it is inevitable that 
there would also be a relationship between eschatology and politics. Earlier, 
Gutierrez has given us a broad and narrow definition of'politics'. 
The construction - from its economic bases - of the "polis," of a 
society in which people can live in solidarity, is a dimension which 
encompasses and severely conditions all human activity ... Only within 
this broad meaning of the political sphere can we situate the more 
precise notion of "politics," as an orientation to power ... The concrete 
forms taken on by this quest for and exercise of political power are 
varied. But they are all based on the profound aspiration of a 
humankind that wants to take hold ofthe reins of its own life and be the 
artisan of its own destiny. (30-1 )82 
It is under this definition that Gutierrez is prepared to have 'confidence in the 
future' and to say of his Latin American situation that the 'thrust toward the 
future occurs above all when one participates in the building up of a just 
society .. .' (122, emphasis original). Eschatological hope is defined as 
accepting the future 'as a gift ... accepted in the negation of injustice .. .' 
82 Note it is only in the broader dimension that Gutierrez says that '[n]othing lies outside the 
political sphere ... ' (30). Faith is not being reduced to politics- and especially not to politics 
as 'orientation to power'. 
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(125).83 It is this eschatological hope that leads actions of faith and charity in 
the present, and which also (here Gutierrez follows J.B. Metz) leads to 'the 
"eschatological proviso" ... whose role is to stress the "provisional" character of 
"every historically real status of society"' ( 128). 84 
Gutierrez then turns, in chapter 11 of A Theology of Liberation, to examine 
Jesus' own approach to politics. He concludes that Jesus was neither an icon, 
nor a zealot, but that he did confront the groups in power. For Jesus, the 
attitude towards the poor 'determines the validity of all religious behaviour; it 
is above all for them that the Son of Man has come' (132). 
For [Oscar] Cullmann ... the key to the behavior of Jesus in political 
matters is ... "eschatological radicalism," which is based on the hope of 
an impending advent of the Kingdom. Hence it follows that "for Jesus, 
all the realities of this world were necessarily relativized and that his 
allegiance, therefore had to lie beyond the alternatives of 'existing 
order' or 'revolution."' (133, emphasis original). 
Gutierrez, however, does not agree with Cullmann's "consequent eschatology" 
that expects such an imminent arrival of the Kingdom, and therefore that 
structural reform, for Jesus, is unnecessary. For Gutierrez, Jesus 'by freeing us 
from sin ... attacks the roots of an unjust order' (134), therefore, '[t]he political 
is grafted into the eternal' (135), as 'to preach the universal love ofthe Father 
is inevitably to go against all injustice, privilege, oppression, or narrow 
nationalism' (135). 
4.4.4 ... or the Lack of Progress 
Of course, the above opens the question of what is to be done if history does 
not improve, in spite of Christian action: but, for Gutierrez, this is where the 
solidarity with the poor - and a continuing eschatological hope- enters into 
the equation. In The Power of the Poor in History, Gutierrez is explicit: 
Building the earthly city actually immerses human beings in the 
salvation process that touches all humanity. Every obstacle that 
83 Here we can see, in embryo, Gutierrez's position outlined in On Job discussed in 4.3.4 
above. 
84 Gutierrez criticises Metz's new political theology, and states, fairly obviously, that it does 
not translate directly to the Latin American situation, but finds it a useful 'jumping off point' 
for his own approach. 
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degrades or alienates the work of men and women in building a humane 
society is an obstacle to the work of salvation ... 
The prophets proclaim a reign of peace. But peace presupposes the 
establishment of justice ... The conquest of poverty and abolition of 
exploitation are signs of the Messiah's arrival and presence ... To work 
for a just world where there is no servitude, oppression, or alienation is 
to work for the advent of the Messiah. 85 
This working for a just world has to be undertaken without, as we have seen in 
the examination of On Job, 86 demanding that God must act- or that he must 
act in a particular way. For Gutierrez, Christian solidarity with the poor is to be 
prepared to go as far as entering into their suffering, it is to be prepared to 
suffer with the poor to the point of death: martyrdom, while not to be sought, 
is, like conflict, a painful reality for those who seek to stand alongside the 
oppressed. 87 Indeed the years since A Theology of Liberation was first written 
has seen much blood spilled and many martyrs (of whom Archbishop Oscar 
Romero is perhaps the best known example) have fallen. It can be said that the 
situation of the poor has not changed all that much, but this does not mean that 
liberation theology has failed, nor that Christians should no longer stand with 
the oppressed. As Gutierrez tells us, this suffering, this martyrdom, acts as a 
profound witness to the poor: 
They see in the surrender of these lives a profound and radical 
testimony of faith; they observe that in a continent where the powerful 
spread death in order to protect their privileges, such a testimony to 
God often brings the murder of the witness; and they draw nourishment 
from the hope that sustains these lives and these deaths. According to 
the very earliest Christian tradition the blood of martyrs gives life to the 
ecclesial community, the assembly of the disciples of Jesus Christ. This 
is what is happening today in Latin America. Fidelity unto death is a 
wellspring of life. It signals a new demanding, and fruitful course in the 
following of Jesus.88 
Due to this suffering both of the poor and those who speak out on their behalf, 
Gutierrez cannot be accused of promoting 'an easy optimism' in his theology, 
nor in his eschatology. However he does see change taking place, and 'despite 
85 The Power of the Poor, 32. 
86 See 4.3.4 above. 
87 See Gustavo Gutierrez, We Drink from Our Own Wells (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1984), 117 and n. 8, 167. 
88 Ibid., 23. 
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- or thanks to - the immense price that is being paid, the present situation is 
nourishing new life, revealing new paths to be followed, and providing reason 
for profound joy. ' 89 
4.4.5 Conclusion 
Liberation theology works to create a just society on earth. Therefore it 
espouses a progressivist eschatology, where 'secular history [functions] as part 
ofthe coming ofthe kingdom ofGod'90 - the kingdom of God is to be sought 
'down here' as well as 'up tqere'. This searching for, and demands for, change 
in society so that the kingdom of God can be brought closer must continue 
despite all the hardship and persecution afflicted on those who have solidarity 
with the poor (and on the poor themselves) by those who feel their privileged 
place in society is under threat. A church prepared to suffer, to act in solidarity 
with the poor, offers those poor a powerful witness of the God who Gutierrez 
sees as having a preferential option for the poor. 
4.5 The Church and Civil Society 
4.5.1lntroduction: The Political Power of the Poor 
In The Power of the Poor in History, following a paragraph discussing the 
parable of the Good Samaritan, Gutierrez discusses the awareness that 
Christians are developing of the nature of the class structure and the injustice 
inherent in that structure. This in turn requires 'a new understanding of 
politics.' Gutierrez continues by telling us that for a lot of Christians this means 
'taking a revolutionary, socialist option, and thus assuming a political task, in a 
global perspective, that turns out to be more scientific and more conflictual 
than it appeared in the first stages of political involvement.'91 Gutierrez 
critiques the idea that only an elite has the charism of political leadership, or 
that it a distinct, spare time, activity. For him '[p]olitics is the global condition 
... of human accomplishment.' 
89 Ibid., 25. 
90 Robert C. Doyle, Eschatology and the Shape of Christian Belief (Carlisle: Paternoster 
Press, 1999), 274. 
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All human reality, then, has a political dimension ... For it is within the 
context of the political that the human being rises up as a free and 
responsible being, as a truly human being, having a relationship with 
nature and with other human beings, as someone who takes up the reins 
ofhis or her destiny, and goes out and transforms history.92 
From this we can see in it that Gutierrez moves us from a consideration of the 
global nature of politics to a consideration of the power of a single person -
though working with others- to transform history.93 As I shall discuss further 
below, the poor are educated or 'conscientized' into understanding that not 
only are they oppressed, but that history has moved on from the days (prior to 
the French and Russian revolutions) when political decisions were in 'the hands 
of an elite who were "destined" to rule' (30). And if this is so, then the poor 
have the means within their grasp to change their situation. For Gutierrez, 
The praxis of liberation, therefore, inasmuch as it starts out from an 
authentic solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, is ultimately a 
praxis of love - real love, effective and concrete, for real, concrete 
human beings. It is a praxis of love ofneighbour, and oflove for Christ 
in the neighbor, for Christ identifies himself with the least of these 
human beings, our brothers and sisters. Any attempt to separate love 
for God and love for neighbor gives rise to attitudes that impoverish 
both. 94 
Gutierrez is interested in the personal, but not in individualism.95 Freedom for 
the person is freedom in a society of 'new structures', not freedom for the 
individual to do as he or she wills without regard for the other.96 For although 
'structures always depend on concrete persons, and the latter must be involved 
if we want real change ... ', any (new) society must have justice and freedom at 
its core. 
That is why I wrote: "These personal aspects - considered not as 
excessively privatized, but rather as encompassing all human dimensions 
- are also under consideration in the contemporary debate concerning 
91 The Power of the Poor, 46. 
92 Ibid., 47 (and see A Theology of Liberation, 30-31, quoted at 4.4.3). 
93 Though Gutierrez does not say how that transformation is to be achieved .. 
94 Jbid, 50. 
95 For Gutierrez, life is social, it 'implies communion' (Gustavo Gutierrez, The God of Life 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1991 ), 12). 
96 Elsewhere Gutierrez refers to Bonhoeffer's writing in defining freedom: "In the language 
of the Bible ... freedom is not something man has for himself but something he has for others 
... Being free means 'being free for the other' ... " (A Theology of Liberation, Revised 
Edition, 24, quoting Creation and Fall, Temptation.) 
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greater participation of all in political activity ... " The requirement is a 
. 1 h kn . 97 uruversa one t at ows no exceptions. 
Gutierrez sees this requirement, and the interplay between faith and political 
commitment, in the writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. 'The intense degree of 
Bonhoeffer's political commitment during the last ten years of his life only 
served to sharpen his concern for the proclamation of the Christian message. ' 98 
Gutierrez approves of Bonhoeffer's ideas - even if he had failed to carry 'his 
intuition to its mature theological implications' - of doing theology 'from 
beneath', for Gutierrez, 
[Bonhoeffer] had moved toward a theological outlook whose point of 
departure is in a faith lived by exploited classes, condemned ethnic 
groups, and marginalized cultures. The heretofore "absent from history" 
are making the free gift of the Father's love their own today, creating 
new social relationships of a communion of brothers and sisters. This is 
the point of departure for what we call ''theology from the underside of 
history. "99 
This free gift and the new social relationships can be viewed as the basis of the 
poor's political power - a power that the church, with its preferential option 
for the poor, should seek to give them. 
4.5.2 The Preferential Option ... for All 
The phrase 'a preferential option for the poor' has become something of a 
cliche since Gutierrez and his liberation theologian colleagues introduced it to 
the world. As I have noted above, Gutierrez spends some time in defending this 
option for the poor as one that leads to an expression of God's universal love 
for all. In his 1988 Introduction to the second edition of his A Theology of 
Liberation, he betrays some defensiveness towards his position. 
The very word "preference" denies all exclusiveness and seeks rather to 
call attention to those who are first - though not the only ones - with 
whom we should be in solidarity. In the interests of truth and personal 
honesty I want to say that from the very beginning of liberation 
theology, as many writings show, I insisted that the great challenge was 
to maintain both the universality of God's love and God's predilection 
for those on the lowest rung of the ladder of history. To focus 
97 The Truth Shall Make You Free, 133, quoting A Theology of Liberation First Edition, 51. 
98 The Power of the Poor, 228. (Bonhoeffer is the subject of chapter 6.) 
99 Ibid, 233. 
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exclusively on the one or the other is to mutilate the Christian message. 
Therefore every attempt at such an exclusive emphasis must be rejected 
(xxv-xxvi). 100 
This preferential option for the poor situated within God's agapeic love also 
explains Gutierrez's concerns for class struggle: 
[Although] class struggle is meant to fight against the oppressors' 
power and blindness . . . Class struggle calls the oppressors to 
conversion. But it does not and may not threaten them with hatred or 
death without contradicting its own principles and purpose. 101 
However, on reading A Theology of Liberation, we can see that Gutierrez is 
keenly aware of the Biblical texts that condemn those who by their unjust 
actions, cause poverty. 'They are not merely allusions to situations; the finger is 
pointed at those who are to blame' (167). Gutierrez then gives three principal 
reasons why poverty is given such a 'vigorous repudiation': firstly it 
'contradicts the very meaning of the Mosaic religion'; secondly, it goes 
'against the mandate of Genesis' (167-8, emphasis original), 
And fmally, humankind not only has been made in the image and 
likeness of God; it is also the sacrament of God ... The other reasons 
for the Biblical rejection of poverty have their roots here: to oppress the 
poor is to offend God; to know God is to work justice among human 
beings. We meet God in our encounter with other persons; what is done 
for others is done for the Lord (168, emphasis original). 
For all Gutierrez's passion about justice, some of his readers might be 
uncomfortable with this approach. However, it is clear that Gutierrez has a 
Biblical mandate for his line of attack - a mandate, moreover, that comes from 
both Testaments (see 167). We have already seen that Gutierrez does not 
regard Matthew as "spiritualising" the Lukan Beatitudes102 -and certainly not 
in a manner which allows anyone to shirk their responsibility for their 
neighbour. Gutierrez is very aware - after all, he lives and works among the 
poor of Peru - that poor people are also sinful, 103 but he believes that the 
society he lives in is fundamentally oppressive and, to paraphrase Marx, that 
the point is not to interpret that sinful society, but to change it. This of course 
10
° Cf. On Job, 94 and The God of Life, 115-17. 
101 Cadorette, From the Heart, Ill, emphasis added. 
102 See 4.2.2.4 above. 
103 See We Drink from our Own Wells, 125. 
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raises (Augustinian) questions about whether any new society would be any 
less sinful than the one that preceded it. 104 However Gutierrez, arguing in 
favour of a socialist approach, quotes a group of Santiago priests with 
approval: 
We do not believe persons will automatically become less selfish, but 
we do maintain that where a socio-economic foundation for equality 
has been established, it is more possible to work realistically toward 
human solidarity than it is in a society torn asunder by inequality ... In 
other words, today the gospel of Christ implies (and is incarnated in) 
multiple efforts to obtainjustice (66). 105 
In his desire for a radical liberation of the poor, what Gutierrez (for all he is 
aware of it) takes less cognisance of, is their 'partial penetration' 106 by the 
ideology of the oppressors. Many of the poor decide to accommodate 
themselves to the status quo. As Curt Cadorette points out, Gutierrez's writing 
often seems to make the rich and poor 'two antagonistic, irreconcilable social 
groups' 107 whereas the reality is more complex. Gutierrez, as Cadorette points 
out, fails to deal with the middle classes and how they mediate the dominant, 
capitalist structure to the poor. 108 And there are, of course, those few poor 
people who 'make it' in the capitalist society, even if for most it is a struggle to 
survive. The ultimate paradox is that any struggle to overcome the system has 
to exist alongside the accommodations made by the very same poor people 
with that system as they seek to provide daily necessities for their families. 
104 Gutierrez is aware 'that a social transformation, no matter how radical it may be, does not 
automatically achieve the suppression of all evils' (24), but he appears to assume that some 
evils would be suppressed. The unaddressed danger is that if one evil is suppressed another 
may rise to take its place. 
105 We should note, however, that there is less emphasis on a specifically socialist approach 
in Gutierrez's later writings, but the desire for justice remains. 
106 This phrase is taken up by Paulo Freire (see chapter 5). Partial penetration of the poor 
occurs when the poor are so oppressed (or so used to the situation) in which they find 
themselves that they cannot conceive of any way of improving or changing their situation -
they often feel that they 'deserve' their poverty. This can be expressed in opposition by the 
poor to any attempts to conscientize, or help them to help themselves. 
107 Cadorette, From the Heart, 57. Although Pixley and Boff state that, in Latin America 
'some 15 percent might be called "middle class'" (Pixley and Boff, The Bible, the Church 
and the Poor, l ), they generally take the same approach to rich and poor. 
108 Ibid., 57-8. Nor does he (or other liberation theologians) explain how a society is to get to 
socialism without (as Marx says we must) first going through a capitalist stage. 
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4.5.3 Base lEccllesian Commwurnities 
Whatever the 'partial penetration' of the poor by the society in which they live, 
Gutierrez clearly believes that the key for the ordinary Christian in society, 
whether rich or poor is to be liberated from oppression and sin. 109 One way for 
this to start to happen is in the Base Ecclesial Communities. These new 
communities have become a major means of proclaiming the gospel to and by 
the poor. Gutierrez refers to them as 'a major source of vitality within the 
larger Christian community and have brought the gospel closer to the poor and 
the poor closer to the gospel - and not only the poor but, through them, all 
who are touched by the church's action, including those outside its boundaries' 
( xli). He states in The Power of the Poor in History that ' [ f]aith has liberating 
potential, but it must be developed ... '. 110 
The potential of a liberating faith, and the capacity for revolution, are 
intimately bound up together in the concrete life of this poor and 
oppressed people. Hence it is impossible to cultivate the one without 
the other as well, and this is what many find so unsettling. The 
development of the people's political awareness and its Christian 
awareness go hand in hand. The life and work of many of Latin 
America's new basic Christian communities have been strongly marked 
by the experience of this intimate link between faith and revolution. 111 
Both 'religious' and political reductionism is rejected, though Gutierrez accepts 
that 'the development of the political dimension and the faith dimension will 
not always be in step' as the process, and the reality on which it is based, is 
complex. 112 
4.5.4 Conclusion 
Gutierrez, although he is clearly against any form of individualism, believes that 
an individual 'in relationship with ... other human beings' can 'transform 
history'. While I have already shown that Gutierrez recognises that changing 
history is not as easy as some of his writing may suggest, he clearly expects 
himself, his church and others to work in solidarity with the poor, not least in 
109 Gutierrez's critics in the Vatican would also believe this, but they would regard freedom 
from sin as a first level of liberation, whereas Gutierrez puts liberation from sin at the third 
level. 
110 The Power of the Poor, 97. 
Ill Ibid., 98. 
132 
the Base Ecclesial Communities. This expectation is based on the command to 
love our neighbour. The poverty that the neighbour lives under is to be 
denounced, 113 and the poor themselves must be empowered to be agents of 
their own liberation. For Gutierrez, the church is called to stand in solidarity 
with the poor so that they can not only become aware of their oppression (be 
'conscientized'), but also take action in order to remove that oppression. Thus 
we turn to our final topic of educating the poor. 
41.6 Educating the Poor for Pollitican Involvement 
4.6.1 introduction 
The "pedagogy ofthe oppressed", as Gutierrez recognises (57), is the work of 
Paulo Freire. However, as Freire is the subject of the next chapter, I shall 
confine myself in this section to a few comments based on Gutierrez's work, as 
an introduction to the idea of how the poor should be "conscientized"114 and 
thereby make some effort at overcoming their oppression. Part of that 
conscientization must involve overcoming the 'partial penetration' of the poor 
by the dominant culture (as discussed above). Therefore, the process of 
conscientization can be described as a means of making the poor aware oftheir 
oppressive situation, and the realisation that they have the means to do 
something about creating a better, freer society. Gutierrez recognises that: 
The participation of the oppressed presupposes an awareness on their 
part of their unjust situation. "Justice, and therefore peace," say the 
Latin American bishops, "conquer by means of a dynamic action of 
awakening (concientizacion) and organisation of the popular sectors 
which are capable of pressing public officials who are often impotent in 
their social projects without popular support." 
... Consequently, the Church feels compelled to address itself directly to 
the oppressed - instead of appealing to the oppressors - calling on them 
to assume control of their destiny, committing itself to support their 
demands, giving them an opportunity to express those demands, and 
even articulating them itsel£ .. (67-8). 
112 Ibid., 98-9. 
113 See 4.2.2.4 above. 
114 Although he did not invent the word, Paulo Freire makes considerable use of it and the 
concept it embodies- see the next chapter. 
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There is no mention here of how the poor are to be 'conscientized', but 
Gutierrez is aware that this process is necessary - and that it is a process. In his 
discussion of the Biblical Exodus, he tells us that '[a] gradual pedagogy of 
successes and failures would be necessary for the Jewish people to become 
aware of the roots of their oppression, to struggle against it, and to perceive 
the profound sense ofthe liberation to which they were called' (88). However, 
this requires both struggle with, and an education of, the poor for a better life. 
4.6.2 Solidarity or Identity? 
From the above we can see that Gutierrez regards the Gospel itself as having 'a 
conscienticizing function,' or, in other words, a pedagogical function, but that 
this will depend on it being announced by someone (or some people) operating 
'from within a commitment to liberation' and within an 'effective solidarity' 
with the oppressed. This shows a distinction from his expressed support for the 
(Freirian) idea that only the poor can do the announcing and denouncing of the 
liberating utopia. It also raises questions as to how far the 'solidarity' with the 
poor should go, as the implication of the quoted passage above is that the 
Gospel is announced to the poor, even if it is only the poor who, as Gutierrez 
believes, can liberate themselves. 
Poverty is an act of love and liberation. It has redemptive value. If the 
ultimate cause of human exploitation and alienation is selfishness, the 
deepest reason for voluntary poverty is love of neighbor ... as Ricoeur 
says, you cannot really be with the poor unless you are struggling 
against poverty. Because of this solidarity - which manifests itself in 
specific action, a style of life, a break with one's social class - one can 
also help the poor and exploited to become aware of their exploitation 
and seek liberation from it. Christian poverty, an expression of love, is 
solidarity with the poor and is a protest against poverty (172, emphasis 
original). 
There is a parallel passage in We Drink from Our Own Wells which is also 
worth quoting as it emphasises the nature of the solidarity Gutierrez seeks with 
the poor. 
The solidarity is not with "the poor" in the abstract, but with human 
beings of flesh and bone. Without love and affection, without - why not 
say it?- tenderness, there can be no true gesture of solidarity. Where 
these are lacking there is an impersonality and coldness (however well 
intentioned and accompanied by a desire for justice) that the flesh and 
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blood poor will not fail to perceive. True love exists only among equals 
115 
In the same work, Gutierrez goes on to recognise that real identity with the 
poor will not occur in this life. 'The will to live in the world of the poor can 
therefore only follow an asymptotic curve ... [that] can, however, never reach 
the point ofreal identification with the life ofthe poor'. 116 
The above reveals a certain dichotomy in Gutierrez's thought, and one that he 
has yet to solve. It also raises questions of how far he is unintentionally 
influenced by elitism. The solidarity with the poor still carries a certain 
awareness of difference from the poor - a sort of being with the poor without 
being of the poor - Gutierrez himself, having been able to choose his vocation 
is part of the 'not poor'. He may be seeking to lead the poor by showing them 
what he believes liberation to mean, but he is not intrinsically one of them. The 
very fact that he can choose to live among them, whereas the poor themselves 
do have that choice, shows his difference from the poor. The question then 
arises as to how this difference would be perceived by the poor, especially as 
they become more conscientized, more aware of their need for them to take 
action themselves to further their liberation - when would be the moment for 
them to drop their teacher and become the agents of their own liberation? 
It is not evident from Gutierrez's writings, but Cadorette tells us that Gutierrez 
spends a great deal oftirne in leadership training: 
Among the poor are people [called "organic intellectuals"] with 
charisms of self-awareness, integrity, and a will to political change ... 
Gutierrez and the members of his team have learned from experience 
that without such people the processes of conscientization and social 
change will invariably flounder. For this reason they devote a great deal 
of their time in the pueblos jovenes to leadership training, which 
includes both socio-political analysis and theological education. 
The challenge for the "organic intellectual" and the conscienticized [sic] 
poor is to tap the power of their culture and belief in such a way that 
115 We Drink From Our Own Wells, I 04. 
116 lbid, 126. 
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they point to "the urgency of a revolutionary process" and stimulate 
appropriate socio-political action on its behalf 117 
The problem, as I see it (and one which will be further explored in the next 
chapter), is how much the pedagogue inputs, or influences, the outcome ofthe 
training. It may be that the students will come to reject the ideas put to them, 
and come up with their own, but the teacher's ideas will have- at the very least 
- influenced the discussions. A further question to ask is this: when does the 
pedagogue yield to the "organic intellectual"? One supposes that a good 
teacher should know when to allow his or her pupils to continue on their own, 
but defining the moment when one who has solidarity with the poor should 
yield place to the poor themselves is not a question that Gutierrez addresses, 
though he does demonstrate the need to find the right people within the 
masses: 
Nothing can replace a serious, scientific knowledge of the nature ofthe 
exploitation that the popular masses are suffering. It is equally urgent 
that we be able to differentiate between various strata and groups 
within the popular masses - that we come to recognise which are more 
advanced and which are more backward, both in terms of their basic 
relationship to the productive process, and in terms of their potential for 
mobilization ... 118 
Presumably it is the more advanced members of the popular masses who would 
become the "organic intellectuals". Though we are told that '[t]hey are 
committed to the cause ... not as a revolutionary elite, but as persons of and 
for the poor', 119 it does seem that there is a certain amount of elitism in 
Gutierrez's thought: there is the pedagogue, the "organic intellectual" and the 
more backward popular masses. This elitism, as I have shown, works against 
Gutierrez's statements that only the poor can liberate themselves. Gutierrez's 
'hierarchy' can be viewed as an unconscious echo of the Leninist vanguard: and 
like Lenin's vanguard, there is a danger that the pedagogue and organic 
intellectual 'classes' could become self-perpetuating - which would leave the 
poor simply having changed one set of masters for another. 120 This is clearly 
117 Cadorette, From the Heart, 49. 
118 The Power of the Poor, 97. 
119 Cadorette, From the Heart, 49. 
12
° For a discussion on Lenin's vanguard, see Sheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision, 
(London: George Alien & Unwin, 1961), 421. 
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not Gutierrez's intention; any hierarchy cannot be described as a 'status' 
hierarchy, but merely the practical result of trying to conscientize the poor and 
exist in solidarity with them. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, for 
anyone who is not ofthe poor, exercising solidarity with the poor, especially if 
it is supposed to involve committing 'class suicide', is a very difficult 
exercise. 121 
All the above notwithstanding, what cannot be denied, however, is that 
Gutierrez is committed to a church of the poor, where ideally all the poor 
would be conscientized and there would be no difference between the 
pedagogue and the "organic intellectual." Liberation theology, and the Base 
Ecclesial Communities have led to a revitalisation of the church in the poor 
communities, and to demands from the poor to be treated as human beings, and 
this in turn has led to persecution and martyrdom for many as the privileged 
power brokers (including some ofthe ecclesial hierarchy) react against this new 
phenomenon. These demands, in spite of opposition, have been made by many 
other liberation theologians. One who also follows Freirean lines is Juan Luis 
p~ Segundo. --
4.6.3 Juan Luis Segundo 
Segundo clearly re-iterates the Freirean critique of imposed literacy training-
where the program is imposed from outside and where no account is taken of 
illiterate pupils' own intelligence. 123 He then goes on (where Freire, writing as a 
humanist, does not) to say that '[a]n evangelization committed to man's 
liberation is deeply tied up with the new form of literacy-training: i.e., one 
121 Apart from tracing liberation theology's descent from the Catholic Action movement in 
Latin America, Milagros Peiia, notes that the intellectuals have 'an integral role in social 
movements by articulating and elaborating broader sentiments that other may find appealing' 
('Liberation theology in Peru: An Analysis of the Role oflntellectuals in Social Movements', 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 33 (1994), 43). Peiia concludes that '[w]hen 
intellectuals are in positions where they can use their social location within the larger society 
to their advantage, they further enhance their movement's mobilizing potential' (ibid, 44). 
This is clearly a role not given to the popular masses. 
122 Segundo was publishing papers on liberation theology before Gutierrez. See his, 'The 
Future of Christianity in Latin America' (1962), reprinted in Hennelly, A Documentary 
History, 29-37. 
123 See Juan Luis Segundo, Our Idea of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1974), 172-4. 
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incorporated within a process of consciousness-raising.' 124 Both the education 
and the evangelisation are seen as part of one process, and, as far as Segundo is 
concerned, the church should involve itself with conscientization- despite the 
political implications. 
The political implications, as I have shown, have caused opposition, not least 
from the Vatican. In his response to the (first) Vatican Instruction, Segundo 
mounts a strong defence of conscientization and the Base Ecclesial 
Communities where 'the people practice for themselves an analysis of their 
own praxis.' 125 Segundo is clear that the people are not manipulated (this was 
one of the Vatican's concerns)- but this does raise the question of how far he 
thinks that Liberation Theology, and the education or conscientization it 
engenders, is from the people or from the intellectuals. 
Alfred Hennelly tells us that '[e]ither it is asserted that the "base communities 
are liberation theology put into practice" or "liberation theology has emerged 
from reflection on the experience of the base communities".' 126 Segundo 
himself talks of two theologies of liberation, the first coming from the 
university students, the middle classes 'who received the first features of this 
liberation theology as a joyful conversion and a new commitment.' 127 
Unfortunately, this first theology of liberation met obstacles: it became evident 
that 'common people had neither understood nor welcomed anything from the 
first theology of liberation ... ' 128 It seems that the intellectuals had tried to 
think for the people, and not with them. 'It appeared then that if theologians 
were still to be the "organic intellectuals" of the common people ... they were 
obliged to learn how oppressed people lived their faith.' 129 This indicates that 
124 Ibid, 174-5. 
125 Segundo, Theology and the Church, 144. 
126 Alfred Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 1989), 28. 
127 Segundo, 'Two Theologies ofLiberation', in Hennelly, A Documentary History, 357. 
128 Ibid., 359. 
129 Ibid., 360. 
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this 'second line' of liberation theology is trying to be more of, and with, the 
people. But for Segundo, like Gutierrez, there is an intellectual struggle and a 
certain critical distance required. The 'intellectual cannot totally renounce the 
exercise of a certain criticism' and the theologian has to be immersed in popular 
culture, 'but not with closed eyes.' 130 
In the end, Segundo remains unsure about how compatible these two lines of 
theology are, but Hennelly is more sanguine. He regards the two lines as in a 
'profound dialectical relationship ... resulting in a symbiosis that stimulates 
constant growth and maturation in both partners in the dialectic.' 131 It is to be 
hoped that both partners will move towards liberation together, but whatever 
else there must be, there needs to be a radical conversion to the poor: 
Christ's reconciliation constitutes a call for the concrete reconciliation 
of all those on one side of the dividing line of the Beatitudes . . . the 
poor, the hungry, the exploited, and the persecuted, in order that the 
radical conflict of the gospel with the opposite categories may be a 
universal, mighty call for the conversion of persons and peoples. 132 
4.6.4 Conclusion 
I have shown here that both Gutierrez and Segundo believe that the poor 
should be 'conscientized'; they should be made aware of their oppression and 
be given the tools to form 'an articulate agenda for social action' under the 
guidance of their own "organic intellectuals." This is not to say that either 
theologian recommends a specific political program - indeed, Gutierrez 
carefully avoids advocating specific political policies, and states that this is 
beyond the church's remit - but the search for justice 'from below' must 
continue as long as oppression lasts. Gutierrez believes that the poor deserve 
the right, and the education, to be able to think and act for themselves in 
society. 
130 Ibid., 363. 
131 Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 28. 
132 Segundo, Signs of the Times, 52. 
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4. 7 Conclusion 
It cannot be denied that Liberation Theology has had a lasting and deep impact. 
Liberation theology has spread across cultural, denominational and even 
religious barriers. Talk of the 'preferential option for the poor' has become 
theologically commonplace. Indeed the danger for Liberation Theology is not 
perhaps so much the Vatican's policy of placing conservative bishops into 
positions of authority in the Latin American Church (and whatever that might 
mean for the Base Ecclesial Communities), but the danger of domesticity. 
The universal adoption of the 'preferential option for the poor' can mean that it 
becomes a mere knee-jerk phrase which does little for the liberation of the very 
poor it was supposed to assist. Or, what I fear may be happening especially in 
the West, the language of liberation theology can be eo-opted and emptied of 
its content. 133 This may be an attempt to answer Gutierrez' s emphasis on the 
social nature of sin (though he never states that sin is wholly social- 'sin is a 
personal and social intrahistorical reality' (185, emphasis added)), it allows a 
Western, individualist approach to the gospel to continue in essence unimpeded 
and unthreatening to the establishment. Both of these reactions can be seen as 
an attempt by those in power (within or outside the church) to ask for change 
without that change affecting fundamentally those in power. As Gutierrez 
states: 
One manifestation of our break with injustice and exploitation, which 
the present economic and social structures foist upon the vast majority 
of our people under the guise of law, should come from the bishops. 
They must turn to the oppressed, declaring their solidarity with them 
and their desire to join with them in their struggle. This is what they 
must do [even if it means persecution from those in power] instead of 
what they have done in the past, when they turned to those in power 
and called for necessary reforms while implying that their own position 
need not be affected by such change. 134 
Liberation Theology seeks to challenge the establishment, and expects church 
leaders to be a part of that challenge. However, under this leadership, the poor 
are to be given the power to think for themselves, to recognise their oppression 
133 See Hennelly, Liberation Theologies, 6. 
134 The Power of the Poor, 29. 
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and to demand change. These demands for change echo the prophetic demands 
for justice that emanate from the Old and New Testaments. The gospel, under 
Liberation Theology, has been radicalised and Gutierrez's theology looks 
forward to a situation when 'the poor themselves become its [the gospel's] 
messengers.' 
That is when we shall see the preaching of the gospel become a 
stumbling block and a scandal. For then we shall have a gospel that is 
no longer "presentable" in society. It will not sound nice and it will not 
smell good. The Lord ... will speak to us then, and only at the sound of 
his voice will we recognise him as our liberator. 135 
This new way of doing theology has brought surprising results, as well as 
considerable pain for many: martyrdom continues to be a Latin American 
reality. Liberation theology, however, still seeks to conscientize the poor, and, 
in order to examine this process of education- with its political ramifications -
that I now turn to the pedagogue who has influenced Gutierrez: Paulo Freire. 
135 Ibid, 22. 
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Chapter 5 
PAULO FREIRE AND THE BASE ECCLESIAL COMMUNITIES 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall show that Paulo Freire's work has been influential on 
liberation theologians (Gutierrez and Segundo in particular), and more 
generally on the Base Ecclesial Communities discussed briefly in the last 
chapter. I shall discuss the role of the Base Ecclesial Communities m more 
detail here, focusing on their general educational- or 'conscientizing'- role. 1 
Like liberation theology itself, Paulo Freire's work faces its biggest danger in 
domesticisation, or conversion into one 'method' among many. Freire was 
exiled from Brazil following the 1964 military coup because of his literacy 
work among the poor,2 work in which he aimed to raise the awareness of the 
poor to their oppression and to give them the tools to act on their knowledge. 
Indeed, in teaching the poor to read and write, he had already given them one 
tool- literacy was a requirement for enfranchisement. 3 
For Freire, the key to his work is conscientization:4 it is only by this process of 
moving the learner towards his (or her)5 own 'critical consciousness' that real 
education takes place. Freire is not interested in what he calls 'banking 
education' or 'domestication', where the students are treated as mere objects 
to be filled with requisite facts, and thereby conditioned to be content with 
1 
'Education' and 'conscientization' are not exact synonyms, but Freire and liberation 
theologians insist that conscientisation is a necessary part of education, especially of education 
for political involvement, which is the focus of this thesis. 'Education' can be used to 
domesticate people, as well as to liberate, conscientize, them. In other words, one can educate 
without conscientizing, but you cannot conscentize someone without educating them. 
2 Later, he was also declared persona non grata by the Pinochet government in Chile. See 
Raff Carmen, 'Paulo Freire 1921-1997 - a Philosophy of Hope, a Life of Practice', 
Development in Practice 8 (1998), 65. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Freire, concerned that the term 'conscientization' had been 'eo-opted by mainstream adult 
education programs aiming to preserve the status quo', stopped using the word in 1972, but 
the concept remained a key part of his thought. See Daniel Schugurensky, 'The Legacy of 
Paulo Freire: A Critical Review of his Contributions', Convergence- Toronto: Tribute to 
Paulo Freire, 31 (1998), 27, n.7. 
5 Freire has been criticised for the sexism apparent in his early works. Such criticism was 
accepted, and evidence of more inclusive language can be found in Freire's later works (see 
5.3.7 below). 
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their allotted place in society - a place allotted to them by the dominant class. 
Freire's conscientizing approach, of course, requires a different attitude from 
the teacher: on the one hand the teacher is to be a learner in dialogue with his 
or her students- an authoritarian approach is not one Freire would approve of, 
as it denies the students the status of 'subjects' -but on the other, the teacher 
does have an authority, and is expected to lead the class towards their critical 
consciousness. In Freire's later works,6 the authority of the teacher has come 
more to the fore, perhaps to counter the impression given in the early work, 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, that the teacher was to be just a fellow learner 
with the students. 'The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but 
one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in their turn 
while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process 
in which all grow.'7 Freire has, however, never denied a teacher's 
responsibility, but redefined it to counter an establishment education that 
reinforced the status quo. 
It is at this point that opposition to Freire's methods becomes understandable: 
it is the establishment that sets up and maintains any education that exists. To 
have, therefore, someone advocating a (revolutionary) educational process that 
encourages people to challenge the establishment, is not something that any 
establishment will willingly entertain. As Freire notes, even when the 
dominant classes are constrained to allow some education for the dominated 
poor, they do not want the oppressed to think. 8 What would be even worse, 
from the establishment point of view, is that Freire clearly expects the 
oppressed to think along revolutionary lines, with the encouragement of their 
revolutionary leaders.9 Given also Freire's reading of (and influence by) 
Marx, 10 it is unsurprising that the military governments of Latin America 
6 See, for example, Miles Horton and Paulo Freire, We Make the Road by Walking 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 186-9, where the 'difference between having 
authority and authoritarianism' is discussed. 
7 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), 53. 
8 Ibid., 102. 
9 See ibid., 102-3. In later works, Freire makes fewer assumptions that conscientization would 
automatically lead to revolutionary thought or action. 
1
° Freire had also appropriated other Marxist thinkers in his thought, including Western 
Marxists such as Gramsci and Althusser. For a list of the people and the schools of thought 
evidenced in Freire's writings see Daniel Schugurensky, 'The Legacy ofPaulo Freire', 19-20. 
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wanted nothing to do with him, and much preferred the 'culture of silence' 
that the dominant impose on the dominated. 
Freire's exile did not mean that Latin America lost Freirean thought entirely. 
The Base Ecclesial Communities carried on with his thought. For a time in 
Brazil, they were the only means of opposition to the military junta that 
governed that country. 11 How much influence Freire had on these base 
communities is possibly debatable, but to suggest- even irnplicitly12 -that he 
had no influence, given the way in which these communities functioned 
especially in the period from 1968 (when military rule was at its most harsh) 13 
is untenable. 14 This is not to say that base communities did not exist prior to 
Freire, nor that, without him, they would not have existed at all; but it is to say 
that they would not have existed in the same way, nor as such a challenge to 
the military government. As Andrew Dawson demonstrates, the forerunners of 
the Base Ecclesial Communities were set up by the Catholic hierarchy as a 
response to a shortage of priests, and as a means of propagating Catholic 
doctrine in the face of 'the challenges of rapid demographic shift [due to rapid 
urbanisation], Protestant growth and a perceived communist threat ... '. 15 
Catechists were trained to read and repeat the Church's official line in written 
material, and were only utilised in the absence of a priest. They were not 
meant to interpret or advocate any action, nor were they meant to question the 
official line taken by the ecclesial authorities. 16 Although there were inevitably 
tensions between the communities and the hierarchy that created them, these 
For a discussion of Freire's Latin American pedagogical-political roots, see Edgar Gonzalez 
Gaudiano and Alicia de Alba, 'Freire- Present and Future Possibilities', in Peter L. McLaren 
and Colin Lankshear (eds.), Politics of Liberation: Paths from Freire (London: Routledge, 
1994 ), 124-7. 
11 Freire makes this point in Paulo Freire and Antonio Faundez, Learning to Question: A 
Pedagogy of Liberation (Geneva: WCC Publications, 1989), 65-6. 
12 An drew Dawson manages to write an entire chapter on 'The origins and character of the 
base ecclesial community: a Brazilian perspective' without mentioning Freire, but as I shall 
show, Freirean influence is not so easily omitted. See Dawson in Christopher Rowland (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Liberation Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 109-28. 
13 Ibid., 115. 
14 See 5.7 and 5.8 below. 
15 Ibid., 111. 
16 Who were still, at that time, advocating an 'Augustinian' approach to obedience to one's 
elders and betters, and were part of the establishment. Further, part of the reason for setting up 
such limited lay participation was to counter, as I have noted, a 'perceived communist threat'. 
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'Base Ecclesial Communities' were nowhere near the liberating organisations 
they became once the oppressive military government stamped down on all 
opposition to its rule. 
Against Dawson, Peter McLaren credits Freire with 'designing the literacy 
methods for "base communities" organized worldwide by priests and lay 
workers responsive to the initiatives of Liberation Theology'. 17 He, therefore, 
can be said to have, at the very least, played a part in the progress of base 
communities in moving the oppressed towards a critical consciousness. In 
order to examine the influence of Freire on base ecclesial communities, I will 
first examine Freire's pedagogical methods, and then look at some of the 
criticisms his work has encountered. I will also examine Freire's work in 
terms of the three themes I am following in this thesis: Freire's eschatology, 
his view on how the church should relate to civil society, and (as something of 
a recapitulation) his ideas on educating the individual Christian for political 
involvement. The latter two themes will also encompass his influence on the 
formation and running of the base ecclesial communities. (As I noted in the 
previous chapter, recent, more democratic, developments in Latin America, 
combined with the Vatican's approach in placing conservative bishops in 
vacant sees in the continent have meant that base communities became less 
politically active, but as there are now other channels open for legitimate 
protest, this might have been expected without any Vatican action or 
approval). I will then conclude with a few thoughts on Freire's contribution to 
education in the Christian context. 
5.2 Freire's Pedagogical Method 
Freire tells us that he always wanted to teach, but he cannot have foreseen how 
far his ideas would have taken him. His ideas have spread even further (though 
often without the revolutionary fervour that made them, and Freire himself, so 
many enemies and detractors). 18 Freire's work has, above all, concentrated on 
17 Peter McLaren, 'Paulo Freire and the Academy: A Challenge from the U.S. Left', Cultural 
Critique, 33 (1996), 156. 
18 
'Freirean programs in this country [the United States] have "raised consciousness," but 
seldom directly influenced social change.' Tom Heaney, 'Issues in Freirean Pedagogy' from 
http://nlu.nl.edu/ace/Resources!Documents/Freirelssues.html (03/12/2002) 4. Also 'too many 
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literacy programmes for adults, and developed on the theme of 
'conscientization' -this word, upon which so much of Freire's work is based 
is notoriously difficult to define. Freire himself spends much time in defining 
it, not least in an effort to refute easy or partial definitions that others may 
wish to place upon such a 'great mouthful of a word' .19 Conscientization is 
more than consciousness-raising, more than the 'apprehension of reality' 
meant by the French 'prise de conscience'20 - it includes these, but goes 
further: 'there is no conscientization without historical commitment. '21 That 
commitment involves action to 'transform the concrete situation where I find 
myself oppressed.' 
Obviously, I can't transform it in my head: that would be to fall into 
the philosophical error of thinking that awareness "creates" reality, I 
would be decreeing that I am free by my mind. And yet, the structures 
would continue the same as ever ... 22 
Freire is clearly no 'ivory tower' academic, and he realises that 
conscientization is 'a painful birth' and that lots of people, both of the 
oppressed and ofthe oppressor classes, recoil from it. However, Freire tells us 
(in one of his rare explicitly Christian comments) that it is our Christian 
calling: 'our position ... [is] the position of a church that must not forget it is 
called by its origins to die shivering in the cold. ' 23 
5.2.1 The Process of Education 
This utopian denunciation and announcement, Freire calls 'heroism in love'. 
In his early, defining work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972), he calls 
Christians (and others / 4 to a process of education. 
Indeed . . . men know themselves to be unfinished; they are aware of 
their incompleteness. In this incompleteness and this awareness lie the 
Freirean programs [in the U.S.] have become little more then low-budget versions of the 
senior institutions upon which they have come to depend ... ' (ibid.). 
19 Paulo Freire, 'Conscientizing as a Way of Liberating', in Alfred T. Hennelly (ed.), 
Liberation Theology: A Documentary History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1990), 5-13. 
20 lbid, 7. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 lbid 13 
24 For' the most part, Freire does not write explicitly as a Christian. There are however, 
sections in his work, such as 'My Faith and Hope' in Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Heart 
(New York: Continuum, 2000), I 01-7, where he discusses his Christian faith. He criticises the 
traditional Catholic Church and supports liberation theology: see The Politics of Education 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985), 121-40, and 5.4.2 below. 
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very roots of education as an exclusively human manifestation. The 
unfinished character of men and the transformational character of 
reality necessitate that education be an ongoing activity.25 
Freire sees this defining educational activity as revolutionary activity. The 
education he advocates he calls a 'problem-posing' education. It is an 
education that seeks not to fill students with pre-digested bits of knowledge 
(what Freire calls 'banking' education), but to get both teachers and students 
to ask questions of the reality in which they find themselves. This sort of 
education - one that positively encourages people firstly to ask 'why?', then to 
critique their situation, and thirdly to seek to change that situation - is one, 
Freire insists, that only a genuinely revolutionary government could or would 
tolerate.26 
In spite of the foregoing, Freire's method was not to gather a group of poor 
people together and teach them how to be revolutionaries. His job was to teach 
them how to read and write. The problem was that he was successful in both 
doing the job and in the methods employed in doing that job. In a sense (and 
in a sense only) any 'revolutionary' action on the part of the people was 
incidental. For Freire did not see directing the form of action that the 
conscientized people undertake as part of his remit. But how does a literacy 
programme conscientize the poor? 
In order to read the word, Freire believes, one has to read the world. To use an 
example given in Cultural Action for Freedom, the sentence 'Eva saw the 
grape'27 makes no sense to the poor - being taught to read such sentences 
becomes a meaningless exercise divorced from their reality. On the other 
hand, words such as 'favela' ['slum'], do make sense as it represents 'the same 
social, economic, and cultural reality of the vast numbers of slum dwellers in 
those [Brazil and other] countries. ' 28 So it is words such as this that allow the 
poor to read both the word and the world.29 It is once the poor can read the 
25 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 57. 
26 See ibid., 58-9. 
27 Paulo Freire, Cultural Action for Freedom (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972), 24. 
28 Ibid., 38-9. 
29 For a detailed account of how Freire teaches the poor how to read using 'generative words' 
(words generated from the poor's own context), see ibid., 85-8. See also Paulo Freire, 
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word and the world that they begin to reject the image of themselves that has 
been imposed on them by their oppressors. 
5.2.2 The Assumptions of Conscientization 
The process, begun by a literacy program, of conscientizing the poor, begins 
with an assumption on the part of the educator: that the poor person is indeed 
an illiterate 'oppressed within the system' .30 This is opposed to the 
assumptions of other literacy programs whose authors 
. . . do not recognize in the poor classes the ability to know and even 
create the texts which would express their own thought-language at the 
level of their perception of the world. The authors repeat with the texts 
what they do with the words, i.e., they introduce them into the learners' 
consciousness as if it were empty space - once more, the 'digestive' 
['banking'] concept ofknowledge. 31 
The effect of this lack of recognition is that the students are domesticated; that 
is, they are prepared 'for a life of political alienation in society' / 2 rather than 
empowered. Given the above dichotomy (that either the teacher assumes that 
his or her students are to be filled with the required knowledge so that the 
students become 'good' passive members of society, or the teacher assumes 
that the students are to be conscientized - to recognise how the status quo 
treats them, and not to be content within that system) then it is unsurprising 
that Freire assumes that education is politics. Neutrality is not an option, the 
educator must ask him or herself, 
What kind of politics am I doing in the classroom? That is, In favor of 
whom am I being a teacher? . . . Of course, the teacher who asks in 
favor of whom I am educating and against whom, must also be 
teaching in favor of something and against something . . . After that 
moment, the educator has to make his or her choice, to go farther into 
opposition politics and pedagogy.33 
Education: The Practice of Freedom (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 
1974), especially 49-58 and 82-4. 
30 Ibid., 29. 
31 Ibid., 26. 
32 lra Shor, 'Education is Politics: Paulo Freire's Critical Pedagogy', in Peter McLaren and 
Peter Leonard (eds.), Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter (London: Routledge, 1993), 25. 
33 Ira Shor and Paulo Freire, A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming 
Education (Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey, 1987), 46. Freire makes a similar point in 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of Freedom: Ethics, Democracy, and Civic Courage (Lanham, Md: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 73. 
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These questions and choices are not usually in the forefront of an educator's 
mind (and, presumably, an educator is free to choose not to go into opposition 
politics). Indeed, Freire found that the 'banking,' or 'domesticating,' system is 
so universally adopted that the biggest difficulty he faced in his adult literacy 
programs was training the teams of coordinators. 
Teaching the purely technical aspect of the procedure is not difficult; 
the difficulty lies rather in the creation of a new attitude - that of 
dialogue, so absent in our own upbringing and education. The 
coordinators must be converted to dialogue in order to carry out 
education rather than domestication ... The period of instruction must 
be followed by dialogical supervision, to avoid the temptation of anti-
dialogue on the part ofthe coordinators. 34 
Freire's methods face criticism, often from those it is intended to help, because 
they have 'internalised' their oppression so effectively that the poor assume 
that they are totally ignorant/5 and (in a school situation) if a teacher asks the 
students 'to eo-develop the class with her or him, the students often doubt that 
this is 'real' education. ' 36 The students are so indoctrinated with how 
education ought to be done to them, that they find it difficult to visualise how 
a different approach to their schooling could be appropriate. Under this new 
cooperative system, the teacher has (as Freire admits in Learning to Question) 
a difficult balancing act to complete. 
I have never said that not having a truth to impose implies that you 
don't have anything to propose, no ideas to put forward ... Educators 
cannot refrain from putting forward ideas, nor can they refrain either 
from engaging in discussion with their students on the ideas they have 
put forward. Basically, this has to do with the near mystery of the 
praxis of educators who live out their democratic insights: the/ must 
affirm themselves without thereby disaffirming their students ... 3 
What Freire goes on to say provides the link between his work with students in 
school, and his adult literacy work. He states, 
the demands I make of myself of living out my democratic principles 
in my relations with the students with whom I am working, I also look 
for in revolutionary leaders in their political-pedagogical relations with 
the working classes, the popular masses. 
34 Paulo Freire, Education: The Practice of Freedom, 52. 
35 Freire discusses this 'self-depreciation' in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 38-9. 
36 Ira Shor, 'Education is Politics', 29. 
37 Freire and Faundez, Learning to Question, 34. 
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I do not believe that education is something done for students or to 
them. I do not believe either ... that revolutionary change is something 
done for the popular masses but with them. 38 
5.2.3 Progressive Education 
If people, in other words, are to be conscientized, they have to have their own 
consciousness raised, and not a pseudo-consciousness that merely reflects how 
the educator thinks the popular masses ought to react to their situation. Here 
we move into a difficulty of Freirean education: the many requirements of an 
educator. In his fourth letter to those who dare teach/9 Freire lists the 
following 'indispensable qualities' that progressive teachers need to develop 
in order to carry out their work. He lists humility, which is the understanding 
that '[n]o one knows it all; no one is ignorant of everything.' Then there is 
courage, tolerance, decisiveness, security, 'the tension between patience and 
impatience' and the joy of living. The tension between patience and 
impatience as one quality is intriguing, but Freire insists that 
Neither patience nor impatience alone is what is called for. Patience 
alone may bring the educator to a position of resignation, of 
permissiveness that denies the educator's democratic dream ... 
Conversely, impatience alone may lead the educator to blind activism, 
to action for its own sake ... Isolated patience tends to hinder the 
attainment of objectives central to the educator's practice, making it 
soft and ineffectual. Untempered impatience threatens the success of 
one's practice, which becomes lost in the arrogance of judging oneself 
the owner of history. Patience alone consumes itself in mere prattle; 
impatience alone consumes itself in irresponsible activism. 40 
Apart from this tension between patience and impatience, there is a further, 
more basic, tension on the progressive educator. On the one hand there has to 
be a (political) assumption on the part of the educator about the people he or 
she is educating, but on the other, these same people have to be free to make 
their own choices without dependence on the educator. This seems to require 
an almost impossible juggling act on the part of the educator - who is required 
to conscientize the students without directing the action that those students 
38 Ibid. 
39 For the following, see Paulo Freire, Teachers as Cultural Workers: Letters to Those Who 
Dare Teach (Oxford: Westview Press, 1988), 39-46. 
40 Ibid., 44, emphasis original. 
150 
should take once they are conscientized (except as one member of the 
conscientized group).41 
Underlying Freire's definition of education as politics is a critique of 
domination and a commitment to challenge inequality and justice. 
From a democratic point of view, Freire sees society controlled by an 
elite which imposes its culture and values as the standard. In schooling, 
this imposed standard is transferred by required syllabuses, mandated 
textbooks, tracking, and standardized exams... After years in passive 
classrooms, students do not see themselves as people who can 
transform society.42 
It would be difficult to find a more accurate, and more succinct, summary of 
Freire's politico-pedagogical approach. Students trained at school to be 
passive in class tend to remain passive as oppressed adults. As Freire has said 
- in response to Faundez's assertion that only by asking questions and taking 
risks (including the risk of making mistakes) that education becomes creative 
and stimulating - '[a]ny educational practice based on standardization ... on 
routine . . . is bureaucratising and thus anti-democratic. '43 If people do not 
believe that they can make a difference, it is difficult to see how they could be 
persuaded to take part in the democratic process. This does not mean that 
people will necessarily become revolutionary once they have been 
conscientized. Freire's own expectations of the effects of conscientization 
were much reduced by the time he was appointed Secretary of Education in 
Sao Paulo in 1988 (Freire had returned from exile in 1980): 'I am struggling to 
make at least a minimum contribution in the radical line of the pedagogy of 
liberation. '44 There is no mention of continual revolution here, as in Freire's 
early work, but the list of his achievements while in office is still impressive 
for a city the size, and with the problems, ofSao Paulo.45 
41 This difficult balancing act will be further discussed at 5.3.8 below. 
42 Shor, 'Education is Politics', 28. 
43 Freire and Faundez, Learning to Question, 41. 
44 Car Ios Alberto Torres and Paulo Freire, 'Twenty Years after Pedagogy of the Oppressed', 
in McLaren and Lankshear (eds.), Politics of Liberation, l06. 
45 See ibid., 102. Also see Tim Sieber, 'Pedagogy, Power, and the City: Paulo Freire as Urban 
School Superintendent', in Paulo Freire ( ed. ), Mentoring the Mentor: A Critical Dialogue with 
Paulo Freire (New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 273-82. For Freire's own account ofhis work see 
Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the City (New York: Continuum, 1993), where, interestingly, he 
talks of opposition to his work~ without naming where that opposition comes from, or why he 
was opposed. 
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5.3 Criticisms ofFreire's Work 
5.3.1 Introduction 
A writer as prolific as Freire, and one who has faced opposition to the extent 
of being exiled, has obviously generated considerable criticism (as well as 
support). In this section I will examine some of those criticisms and evaluate 
how pertinent they are. It is clear that some criticisms may be valid for 
Freire's early work, but need modifying (at the very least) if his later work is 
taken into account. Freire himself was open to criticism, and tried to modify 
his stance if he felt such criticism was valid.46 This does not mean that 
criticism ceased, nor that some criticisms did not retain their credibility. As I 
shall show, his dualistic thinking still leads to difficulties, as does his 
(apparent) lack ofresults. 
5.3.2 The Limits of The Revolution 
In a clear, and welcome, change from his early work, in a discussion about his 
role as Secretary for Education, Freire argues paradoxically that 'the strength 
of education lies precisely in its limitations. ' 47 It is because of these limitations 
that he feels he is efficient in his job: as he cannot do everything, he can be 
efficient at what he can do. This idea of 'limitation' (which does not appear in 
Freire's early work) not only points towards the limitations of his early 
subjectivist thinking,48 but also more generally, of his revolutionary, 
dialectical thinking. For Freire, a person is either oppressed or oppressor, 
one's educational methods are either 'banking' methods, or they are 
democratic, liberationary methods. This duality denies the complexity of 
humanity and of the situation: often people can (in different situations) be both 
oppressor and oppressed. 49 
46 For a clear example of this openness, see bell hooks, 'bell hooks Speaking about Paulo 
Freire- the Man, his Work', in McLaren and Leonard, Pau/o Freire: A Critical Encounter, 
146-54. 
47 Torres and Freire, 'Twenty Years after Pedagogy of the Oppressed', 106. 
48 In later works, Freire realised that 'a more critical understanding of oppressive situations ... 
does not yet liberate the oppressed'( Schugurensky, 'The Legacy ofPaulo Freire', 20). 
49 On this point see especially Peter Mayo, 'Gramsci, Freire, and Radical Adult Education: A 
Few "Blind Spots'", Humanity and Society 18 (1994), 92. 
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The revolutionary language and approach especially evident in Freire's early 
work has rightly generated criticism on two counts. Firstly, Freire's positive 
and uncritical endorsement of revolutionaries such as Guevara, Castro and 
Mao makes no mention of the negative, non-dialogical aspects of their 
revolutions. In defence of Freire, it must be noted that the negative side of 
these revolutions was less evident in the 1960s.50 Secondly, Freire tended 
(especially in his early work) to write in a revolutionary manner, that is he 
writes as if he expects educators to work against an established government, 
but for most of his life he worked with governments - these governments were 
radical or revolutionary governments, but none-the-less Freire tended to be, in 
action, radical and willing to work within the system, rather than the 
revolutionary and rejecting of the system as a whole. However, his later work, 
such as A Pedagogy for Liberation, Freire still gives the impression that social 
movements can exist 'outside' the system: 51 he does not seem to realise that, 
in spite of his experience, if a government is against an organisation, it is very 
difficult for that organisation to operate. 52 
5.3.3 Black and White, or Shades of Grey 
Freire's work, as noted above, tends to present 'a dualistic view of reality 
through pairs of opposites in which one is the preferred option ... '. 53 Freire's 
dualistic thinking has led some of his followers 'to advocate a monolithic 
rejection of banking education ... '. 54 Educational methods, however 
'democratic' in theory, will often contain at least an element of 'banking' 
information as long as there is one person, or group of people, in a leadership, 
teaching, or coordinating role.55 The guidance (to put it no stronger) ofthese 
leaders will point the rest of the group in a particular direction, even if it is in a 
liberating direction. It is in defining the point at which 'direction' becomes 
50 Also, as I noted in chapter 4 above, in the first world we tend to be much more critical of 
communist and other revolutionary socialist approaches than is the case in Latin America. 
51 See Shor and Freire, A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues on Transforming Education, 
38-9. 
52 For a discussion on the 'taming' of Freirean organisations in the U.S., see Tom Heaney, 
'Issues in Freirean Pedagogy', 4-5. 
53 Schugurensky, 'The Legacy ofPaulo Freire', 24. 
54 Ibid., 25. 
55 In both Pedagogy of the Oppressed and Cultural Action for Freedom, Freire makes 
numerous references to the oppressed's relationship with the revolutionary leadership. In this 
aspect he is not as democratic, or anti-elitist, as he might like to think he is. 
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'directives' that is difficult for those following Freire, as it appears to be for 
Freire himself. On the other hand, as Freire himself recognised, some form of 
direction is required: 
[If an educator] washes his or her hands and says in effect: "Since I 
respect students and I am not directive, and since they are individuals 
deserving respect, they should determine their own direction." This 
educator does not deny the directive nature of education that is 
independent of his own subjectivity. He simply denies himself the 
pedagogical, political, and epistemological task of assuming the role of 
a subject of that directive practice. He refuses to convince his learners 
of what he thinks is just. This educator, then, ends up helping the 
power structure. 56 
What we are left with, then, is an educator, who must not be authoritarian, 
who should never 'transform learners' presences into shadows of the 
educator's presence.' But neither should the opposite situation occur. 'The 
educator' according to Freire, 'has to stimulate learners to live a critically 
conscious presence in the pedagogical and historical process. ' 57 This balance 
cannot be easy to achieve, and although Freire did try to address the issue, he 
clearly failed to come up with a satisfactory solution. Indeed, he seems to 
deliberately leave us to work out how this balance is to be achieved as he 
notoriously refused to write any 'how-to' books. 
5.3.4 How to 'Do' Freire 
This gap in Freire's (large) output of books is controversial. Freire himself 
consistently argued that his ideas were to be adapted and critically reapplied to 
the new context in which the teacher found him or herself. Daniel 
Schugurensky refers to this when he recalls the comment of an adult educator 
saying that she did not want Freire to give her a recipe, but "to help me cook 
dinner."58 There is the appendix at the end of Education: The Practice of 
Freedom, which follows the chapter on 'Education and Conscientiza9ao' 
56 Paulo Freire and Donaldo Macedo, Literacy: Reading the Word and the World (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 139. 
57 Ibid, 140. 
58 Quoted in Schugurensky, 'The Legacy of Paulo Freire', 25. In his note (28, n. 27) 
Schugurensky points out that 'popular education groups inspired by Freire' provide plenty of 
material; but this does not answer the criticism that Freire himself did not provide it. 
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where Freire goes through the phases ofhis literacy approach,59 but this work 
clearly applies to a Latin American context. One can understand the frustration 
of educators who do not have a manual at their fingertips, but I suspect that 
Freire would say they are victims of banking education who would wish to 
pour the contents ofthe manual into their students heads and expect them to be 
conscientized at the end of the process - rather than having been conscientized 
by a dialogue set up with the students. Freire always refused to allow his 
'substantive ideas' to be reduced to 'a mere technique', especially in areas 
(geographically or intellectually) where he himself does not feel proficient. 
Therefore, in not being familiar, let us say, with the New York City 
context ... it would be preposterous of me to provide what many North 
Americans often so anxiously ask for, recipes in terms of techniques 
and tactics for action. The only thing that I could offer is to work with 
North American educators so as to enable them to understand more 
deeply what it means to struggle against sexism [for example] as a 
substantive object of knowledge. Hence North American educators 
who dare to be progressive educators . . . have the responsibility of 
analysing both the possibility and limitations of actions within their 
own context so as to not sacrifice the force that gave rise to the 
struggle against sexism, racism, and other isms in the first place.60 
In itself, Freire's point is valid. However, as he seems not to have solved the 
tension between 'possibility and limitations' in his own context, anyone 
following Freire is still left wondering how far a dialogue can go, and how far 
conscientization can go, given that Freire regards it (especially in his early 
work) as a revolutionary process. In A Pedagogy for Liberation Freire is 
insistent that educators could work within the system, the schools, that they 
find themselves: 'but even there it is necessary to be critical inside the 
system. '61 In the same book, Freire tells us that he works both in schools and 
59 See Freire, Education: The Practice of Freedom, 49-52. The Appendix (61-84) gives the ten 
situations and seventeen 'generative words' used by Freire in Rio state, Brazil. 
60 Paulo Freire, 'A Response', in Freire (ed.) Mentoring the Mentor, 326-7. 
61 Shor and Freire, A Pedagogy for Liberation, 39. However, Henry Giroux points to the 
danger of just using the 'language of critique.' 'By viewing schools as primarily reproductive 
sites, they [radical educators] have not been able to develop a theory of schooling that offers a 
viable possibility for counterhegemonic struggle and ideological contestation' (Henry A. 
Giroux, 'Schooling as a Form of Cultural Politics' in Henry A Giroux and Peter L. McLaren 
(eds.) Critical Pedagogy, The State, and Cultural Struggle (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), 130). Giroux argues that the key is a new (dialectical) meaning for 
authority: 'For radical educators and other working in oppositional social movements, the 
dominant meaning of authority must be redefined to include the concepts of freedom, equality, 
and democracy. Furthermore, the more specific concept of emancipatory authority needs to be 
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'with the social, popular movements in the periphery ofthe cities'.62 However, 
whether he has worked within, or outside formal schools - he has always 
worked with, or at the invitation of, governments and duly elected 
authorities.63 This work has not always been as successful as might have been 
hoped: when Freire went to Guinea-Bissau to help an (admittedly 
revolutionary) government with its literacy program, the outcome was not an 
unqualified success, as the literacy was taught in the colonizers' Portuguese 
tongue, and not Creole, or other indigenous languages. Pedagogy in Progress: 
The Letters to Guinea-Bissau clearly 'talks up' the success of the mission -
the tying in of education and production, the notebooks the students produced, 
the political awareness of the leaders in Guinea-Bissau - but Freire did not 
then publish a letter he wrote to Mario Cabral in which he questioned the use 
ofthe Portuguese language in the program. 
Nevertheless, what our practice is demonstrating is that learning the 
Portuguese language obviously works ... in cases in which Portuguese 
is found not to be totally foreign to the social practice of those 
becoming literate ... But this is not the situation in the rural centres of 
the country, where one fmds the oppressed majority of the national 
population ... In truth, the Portuguese language is not the language of 
the People ofGuinea-Bissau.64 
This letter was published as an Appendix in Literacy: Reading the Word and 
the World, four years after Pedagogy in Progress appeared. It seems obvious 
that, had it been published with Pedagogy in Progress, it might have lessened 
the criticism Freire faced that he was not interested in native languages. 
Unfortunately this criticism still exists, and has validity, as there is no 
evidence that Freire engaged with the native languages in Brazil. 65 
seen as the central category around which to construct a rationale for defining teachers as 
transformative intellectuals and teacher work as a form of intellectual practice related to the 
issues, problems, concerns, and experiences that link classroom life to the daily concerns of 
the wider community and society' (ibid., 137-8). It remains to be seen how this sort of 
authority could be effective in today's classrooms. 
62 Shor and Freire, A Pedagogy for Liberation, 38. 
63 Even in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, his revolution has to be seen as more theoretical than 
one he has lived out in practice. This is in spite of Freire's exile from Brazil and Chile by 
reactionary regimes. 
64 Paulo Freire, 'Letter to Mario Cabral', in Freire and Macedo, Literacy, 162. 
65 See, for example, Mayo, 'A Few 'Blind Spots", 87. 
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The reason given for continuing the Guinea-Bissau program in Portuguese is 
that there was a lack of materials in Creole (this was not least due to the fact 
that Creole was not a written language).66 This did not (or did not any longer) 
impress Freire. His solution would be for the learners to produce the material 
they needed themselves. For him, literacy must begin with the people's mother 
tongue. Literacy in other languages can follow later, as those languages 
become important to the people. In Guinea-Bissau, once people were 
proficient in reading and writing Creole, then they could have been introduced 
to Portuguese, the language of the elite. This, of course, would have taken 
longer, but Freire wished to start where the people were, rather than where the 
government wished they were: it seems he was over-ruled, with disastrous 
results.67 
5.3.5 Judgement by Results 
This is one basic criticism of Freire that is still made: the lack of results.68 The 
poor, one might say, are still with us. This is true in Brazil where he lived, 
worked, and, towards the end of his life, held political power. It is also true in 
other countries, from the United States to Guinea-Bissau, where he worked or 
had influence. The fact that the oppressor mentality needs to be opposed (not 
least by the church) does not deny the fact that its grip on power, and over the 
life of others, is tenacious. One author tells us that Freire had to admit that he 
had not come across a single case of the oppressed overcoming their 
oppression.69 However, in Freire's defence, we must note that 
66 Carlos Alberto Torres, 'From the Pedagogy of the Oppressed to A Luta Continua', in 
McLaren and Leonard (eds.), Paulo Freire: A Critical Encounter, 132. 
67 Freire returns to this theme in a dialogue with Donaldo Macedo, where he argues that 
Creole is a valid language, and points to the dangers of elitism if education is solely done (in 
this case) in Portuguese (see The Politics of Education, 184-6). 
68 
'[O]fthe 26,000 students involved in literacy training [in Guinea-Bissau] practically none 
became functionally literate' (Carlos Alberto Torres, 'From the Pedagogy of the Oppressed to 
A Luta Continua', 133). Reasons for this include the undeveloped state of Guinea-Bissau 
materially and politically, reliance on a 'colonial bureaucracy' that had not supported the 
current government in its struggle for power, and (most importantly for Freire) the language 
question (see ibid., 133-5). 
69 See G. MacGoin quoted in John Lockhart, After Freire: A Continuing Pedagogy? The 
William Temple Foundation Occasional Paper 26 (Manchester: William Temple Foundation, 
1997), 30. 
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Part of the force of Freire's critique was also his denunciation of 
undemocratic and authoritarian regimes ... 70 So it is important to note 
that Freire's own participation in politics in recent years has led him to 
pursue, in effect, radical social-democratic, rather than revolutionary 
goals.71 
Social democracy, as opposed to revolution, is prepared to accept incremental 
improvements in society. In facing the question towards the end of his life, of 
how he could retain his hope with all the problems remaining in Brazil, Freire 
states 
Only the improvement of democracy, which implies overcoming social 
injustice, can demonstrate how worthwhile all the hope we put into the 
fight was ... We now need to consolidate democracy, shore up its 
institutions, ensure a return to development, and ensure economic 
balance, with which we may face the social problems that afflict us.72 
The enormity of the task still to be accomplished should not blind us to how 
far Freire's Brazil had come. Further, the enormity of the task of the peasantry 
in 'overcoming their oppression' must not blind us to the work that Freire has 
done in setting them on the road to overcoming that oppression. 
It also does not deny the fact that, in the 1960s, he was capable of teaching 
illiterates to read and write in a matter of days. If the revolution has not 
happened, it does not mean that Freire's methods and life has to be regarded as 
a complete failure: consciousness has been raised, and if Freirean educational 
organisations have been 'tamed' in the United States/3 it was at least because 
the authorities felt that these organisations required taming. Freire himself did 
not expect the revolution to be completed: if liberation is achieved on one 
level, the hope born of that struggle, 'will continue to have meaning when, and 
only when, it can in its own turn give birth to new struggles on other levels.' 74 
In sum, we must note that although there have been no dramatic results of 
Freire's life and work, there have been results: the people in the Base Ecclesial 
70 It is important to recall that, when I critiqued Augustine's political 'quietism', there was no 
democratic alternative to authoritarian regimes then in existence. 
71 John Lockhart, After Freire: A Continuing Pedagogy?, 30. 
72 Pedagogy of the Heart, 107. 
73 As noted above. 
74 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of Hope (New York: Continuum, 1998), 198. 
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Communities of Brazil and elsewhere, 75 have had their consciousness raised, 
which meant that '[t]hey came to realise more clearly that they were persons, 
that they ought to have a role in society, that they could make decisions, and 
that they had a right to make their presence felt.' 76 This in itself is no small 
step on the road to freedom from oppression. 
5.3.6 There is No Neutrality 
It should be clear from the above that Freire does not claim 'ideological 
neutrality'. His work is with radical governments and organizations of the 
political left; and, like the liberation theologians, he favours a socialist against 
a capitalist approach, and communitarian ideas against individualist ones in 
order to break 'the culture of silence.' 
Freire's idea of a culture of silence has been criticised: James Blackburn 
argues that the powerless may express 'power' in terms of 'sabotage, non-
cooperation, and the secret observance of a distinct culture and identity.' 77 
Such 'power' does not strike me as being very powerful or effective as it 
usually only succeeds in bringing the wrath of the dominant down on the 
(already) dominated. The power of the poor is really only power to sabotage/8 
or to drop out, 79 which, in the end - as both Ira Shor and Michelle Fine 
demonstrate - only leads to a perpetuation of the oppressed state. In the first 
case, the 'students see their future already in their present, a life of squalor, 
disregard, going nowhere' so they find no motivation for cooperating with an 
75 For Freire's influence on Base Ecclesial Communities, see 5.7 and 5.8 below. 
76 Ranulfo Peloso da Silva, 'Personal Experiences', in Sergio Torres and John Eagleson (eds.), 
The Challenge of Basic Christian Communities (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1981 ), 215. For 
Freire's own description of the peasants' response to conscientization see, for example, 
Cultural Action for Freedom, 43-6. 
77 James Blackburn, 'Understanding Paulo Freire: Reflections on the Origins, Concepts, and 
Possible Pitfalls of his Educational Approach', Community Development Journal, 35 (2000), 
10. 
78 For a discussion of this 'power' in U.S. schools, see Freire and Shor, A Pedagogy for 
Liberation, 123-9. 
79 For a discussion on this (again in a U.S. context), see Michelle Fine, 'Silencing and 
Nurturing Voice in an Improbable Context: Urban Adolescents in Public School', in Giroux 
and McLaren (eds.), Critical Pedagogy, the State, and Cultural Struggle, 152-73. Fine points 
out that this 'power' merely reinforces, for another generation, the lack of opportunity for the 
poor ofthe community. 
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alienating system. 80 In the second case, the students, Fine argues, are reacting 
to an imposed culture of silence, but even those who fled the school system 
'with resistance, energy, and vision' were 'silenced, withdrawn, and depressed 
by age twenty-two. ' 81 
Blackburn's second point, that the Freirean educator possesses 'the secret 
formula of a power to which they must be initiated'82 and 'that this formula ... 
is universally applicable and unquestionably justifiable . . . regardless of the 
cultural or religious context of the population that is perceived to be 
oppressed' 83 is also questionable in the light of Freire's refusal to produce 
'how to' manuals for his work, 84 and his concern to educate the educators in 
dialogical education. The fact that his ideas have been rnisapplied85 does not 
mean that the ideas themselves are flawed. If people are to break out of their 
'magical' or 'fatalist' approach to life and faith, then some form of 
conscientization (appropriate to that situation) must be taught. However, as I 
shall discuss below, to assume that people will blindly accept everything from 
the conscientizing educator grossly underestimates their intelligence. 
Blackburn' s insistence on the power of the poor is symptomatic of those who 
want to praise the poor while keeping separate from them. An example of this 
attitude can be found in Donaldo Macedo's article in Mentoring the Mentor. 
He tells us of a colleague who addressed a conference along the lines that 
community people don't need to go to college because, since they 
know so much more than do members of the university community, 
there is little that the university can teach them. While making such 
public statements, this colleague was busily moving from the inner city 
to an affiuent suburb, making sure that her children attend better 
schools. 86 
8° Freire and Shor, A Pedagogy for Liberation, 128. The better off students are still alienated, 
but 'playing by the rules in an elite school can pay off in your future' (ibid.). 
81 Fine, 'Silencing and Nurturing Voice', 169. 
82 Blackburn, 'Understanding Paulo Freire', I 0, quoting M. Rahnema. 
83 Blackburn, 'Understanding Paulo Freire', 10. 
84 See above. 
85 Blackburn supplies us with two examples ofthis; see 'Understanding Paulo Freire', 11-12. 
86 Donaldo Macedo, 'An Anti-Method Pedagogy: A Freirean Perspective', in Freire (ed.), 
Mentoring the Mentor, 6. 
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This 'false generosity of paternalism' ensures that any power the oppressed 
holds is of a completely inferior league to the power and 'cultural capital' of 
the better educated. It seems that Blackburn is guilty of the same sort of 
paternalism, and, as such, his criticisms must be dismissed. 
5.3. 7 The Complexity of Life and Oppression 
Another aspect of Freire's work that grates somewhat, and has not received 
comment, is that he talks of opposition and persecution while ignoring the fact 
that, although he was exiled, others were not given the option of flight. Freire 
tells us that we must expect a violent reaction from the dominant classes, and 
there will be some who leave and some who stay. 87 At this point, Freire should 
have been more careful before making clear his support for those who stay. 
These people have to face persecution up to and including martyrdom for 
standing up for their beliefs. This is not to downplay the shock and trauma for 
Freire of being forced into exile, but it did become a learning experience for 
him,88 and he was able to go back home: something (obviously) denied the 
many who were killed. By denying those who leave an acceptance of 'the 
dramatic tension between past and future, death and life ... between saying the 
word and mutilating silence ... ', 89 he clearly forgets that he himself left Brazil 
in 1964 (whether willingly or not), but yet, in his life and work, clearly still 
accepted this 'dramatic tension'. It is, I fear, another case of Freire's dualistic 
thinking running away with him, and he forgets that there are complexities 
that need to be explored even in his own life. 
Other criticisms of Freire's work include his lack of 'sustained discussion on 
gender, race, and sexuality issues. ' 90 Although there is comment on these 
aspects of social difference in Freire's work, I must agree that he does not go 
into these aspects in depth. Further, I too wince, with Mayo, at Freire's 
comment that "I, too, am a woman",91 but it is, I think, too much to ask of one 
87 The Politics of Education, 128. 
88 See Learning to Question, 4-26. Also see The Politics of Education, 180-2. 
89 The Politics of Education, 128-9. 
90 Mayo, 'A Few 'Blind Spots", 87. 
91 Quoted in ibid, 88. For a discussion of Freire's sexist language, see especially bell hooks, 
'bell hooks Speaking about Paulo Freire- the Man, his Work', 146-54. Michelle Fine is even 
more forgiving: 'I excuse you "the man," asswning you know and share my concerns for the 
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person (however prolific a writer) to attend in depth to all aspects of 
oppression that exist in the world. Here it will suffice to note that Freire was 
aware of these issues, and strove to see how they could be overcome92 -
though his solution involved the rather drastic measure of 'class suicide' by 
any and all oppressors. 
5.3.~ Cllass Suicide 
The 'class suicide' of the oppressors93 (which may or may not include 
educators) has, needless to say, yet to occur in any society. Peter Mayo makes 
the point well that 'so many factors' need to be rejected 
like one's habitus (values, norms, taste for culture, 'master patterns' of 
thinking and speaking, relationship to language and culture, etc.), one's 
educational background, the nature of one's everyday work ... possibly 
even one's acquired coherent and systematic view of the world ... that 
can distinguish the adult educator from the working class participant 
with whom he or she is working.94 
This gap between educator and 'educatee' is one that is extremely difficult to 
close. Peter Leonard, in his work at the Department of Applied Social Studies 
in the University of Warwick (the Warwick School), sought to overcome 'the 
student-teacher contradiction', but was faced with 'considerable instability and 
tension.' The idea that student input was valued so highly led one year to no 
curriculum being written before the start of the year. This led to such 
'intolerable anxiety and strain on both students and teachers' that the 
experiment was abandoned.95 Even as the Warwick School tried to achieve 
some balance, it faced 'the dangers of charisma, the certainty, the dominance 
of ideas over practice, the compelling belief system' that Freire (and Grarnsci) 
symbols and meanings of language and exclusions' (Michelle Fine, 'A Letter to Paulo', in 
Freire ( ed.) Mentoring the Mentor, 91 ). 
92 Freire did 'not accept that he should be criticised with hindsight ... '. This would assume 
that he would not, or could not, change, and his later works avoid sexist language as he 
'evidently becomes more aware of the criticisms raised by feminists' (John Lockhart, After 
Freire: A Continuing Pedagogy?, 28). 
93 See Freire, Pedagogy in Process: The Letters to Guinea-Bissau (New York: Continuum, 
1983), 78ff., where Freire comments approvingly on Amilcar Cabral's call for the 'class 
suicide' of middle class people who need 'to integrate' themselves 'with the reality of his 
country, with his people ... '. 
94 Peter Mayo, 'A Few 'Blind Spots", 90. 
95 Peter Leonard, 'Critical Pedagogy and State Welfare', in McLaren and Leonard (eds.), 
Pau/o Freire: A Critical Encounter, 164. 
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presented.96 Leonard has to admit that they 'faced, but never fully escaped 
from, the dangers inherent in traditional bourgeois intellectual activity -
elitism, the cult of the expert, the belief in the superiority of mental over 
manual labour. ' 97 
There are, according to James Blackburn, only one group of educators who 
have managed, or who manage better than most, to 'shed ingrained attitudes of 
'anti-dialogue' which may have become automatic.' These are 'the 
progressive Christian groups', especially liberation theologians, who 
By virtue of their spiritual vocation to 'merge with the people' - as 
Christ himself is purported to have done98 - in an act of humility and 
sacrifice, Jesuit priests (among others) - even those armed with Phd's 
[sic] - seem to have a rare ability to engage in the kind of dialogue 
Freire writes about. Others may find it far more difficult to shed their 
self-image as intellectual superiors. 99 
On the other hand, and inevitably, those who use the Bible, or who approach 
conscientization from a Christian angle, are criticised for their indoctrination 
of the people by those who are less sympathetic to faith or 'other-worldly' 
schemes of thought. (Christianity is, after all, in Leonard's phrase, a 
'compelling belief system'.) The problem is, according to Blackburn, that 'any 
pre-determined vision of liberation introduced from the outside is ultimately 
paternalistic, since it presupposes that the oppressed are incapable of 
determining their own endogenously produced vision of liberation.' 100 
However, what needs to be remembered is that in Latin America, where Freire 
was born and where Liberation Theology first took root, most ofthe oppressed 
(and, incidentally, most oppressors) call themselves Christian. Gustavo 
Gutierrez informs us that 
The situation of oppression does not eliminate the people's character as 
believers. The possibilities of a liberative faith are bound up with their 
revolutionary capacity, and vice-versa ... Hence one cannot try to 
develop one of these capabilities without taking the other into account. 
96 Ibid., 166. 
97 Ibid. 
98 By 'merging', I assume Blackburn means that Christ became a part of suffering humanity. 
Christ certainly did not sacrifice his identity by merging with the people. Nor do I expect that 
the Jesuits feel they are sacrificing their identity as they 'merge with the people'. 
99 Blackburn, 'Understanding Paulo Freire', 8. 
100 Ibid., 12. 
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Herein lies the real meeting ground between organizations of the 
common people and Christian communities ofthe common people. 101 
Carlos Mesters, in partial answer to the ideas of 'indoctrination', also makes 
the pertinent point that the people 'are far smarter than you would think' and 
are capable of 'discovering things in the Bible that other readers don't find.' 102 
In other words, once people start to be conscientized, they start to develop 
their own opinions along with their own critical faculties. Also, the fact that 
these opinions may not necessarily coincide with those of the educator is not 
something to be concerned about in a situation of dialogue. 
5.3.9 Conclusion 
The criticisms of Freire range over a wide area, and some are more pertinent 
than others. Those that still need answering relate to the practical application 
of a Freirean system - especially as Freire shifted his ground from a 
revolutionary to a more radical democratic approach. Also, he never solved 
the dilemma about how much he was inside, and how much outside, the 
'system.' However, Freire has given us an approach to education and 
liberation that has led to people gaining a feeling of worth, and wanting a 
place in society, 103 which in itself is a positive result of his life's work - a life 
spent within (though critical of) the Catholic church. As such, he would have 
had no problem with Gutierrez's comments or Mesters observations (cited 
above). His own faith, as I have said, was not overtly displayed, but there are 
occasion when he does make explicitly Christian comments, or when he 
comments on the Catholic Church as he saw it: it is to some of these 
comments that we now turn. 
5.4 Freire's Christian Belief 
Throughout his life, though there was a time when he 'fled the church on 
seeing that the village priest served the rich but abandoned the poor of the 
101 Gustavo Gutierrez, 'The Irruption of the Poor in Latin America and the Christian 
Communities of the Common People', in Torres and Eagleson (eds.), The Challenge of Basic 
Christian Communities, 114. 
102 Carlos Mesters, 'The Use of the Bible in Christian Communities of the Common People' in 
ibid., 207. 
103 See 5.3.5 above, especially da Silva's coments. 
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Gospel', 104 Freire was happy to claim that he had been influenced by both 
Christ and Marx. 105 Even in 1990, he saw no problem in the 'contradictory' 
nature of his position: 'my "meetings" with Marx never suggested to me to 
stop "meeting" Christ.' 106 
When Freire wrote Pedagogy of the Oppressed in exile in the 1960s, he was 
'certain that Christians and Marxists, though they may disagree with me in 
part or in whole, will continue reading to the end.' 107 He admits his work is 
radical, and contains numerous references to guerrillas and revolutionary 
leaders, including 'another loving man: Carnilo Torres, "the guerrilla 
priest."' 108 He is, on the other hand, clearly against the sort of faith that 
encourages a fatalistic acceptance of one's (miserable) lot. In discussing how 
the mind-set ofthe oppressor is 'housed' within the dominated peasant, Freire 
says that the peasants become 'fearful of freedom', 
They resort ... to magical explanations or a false view of God, to 
whom they fatalistically transfer the responsibility for their oppressed 
state. It is extremely unlikely that these self-mistrustful, downtrodden, 
hopeless people will seek their own liberation - an act of rebellion 
which they will view as a disobedient violation ofthe will of God ... 109 
It will be clear from this that Freire is on the side of the liberation theologians 
(and with their critical use of Marxism) when it comes to the religious 
situation in Latin America. As I have noted in the previous chapter, and above, 
the Latin American people's faith cannot be separated from their liberation, so 
it must be radicalised and the 'false view of God' corrected. 
5.4.1 Freire's Christian Marxism 
As I have noted above, scholars have discerned many influences on Freire's 
work. Freire's genius was 'to combine their ideas into an original 
formulation.' 110 This can allow for scholars (outside of direct, acknowledged 
104 Adriana Puiggr6s, 'Paulo Freire and the "Pedagogy of Hope"', Media Development 4 
(1997), 24. 
105 See for example, Horton and Freire, We Make the Road by Walking, 245-7. 
106 lbid 246 
107 Ped;gogy. of the Oppressed, 17. 
108 Ibid., 138. 
109 lbid.,l32. 
110 Schugurensky, 'The Legacy of Paulo Freire', 20. 
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quotes m his work), to discern different influences as predominant: Henry 
Giroux tells us, for example, that Freire's 'commitment to Marxism has not 
been displaced but is tempered by his commitment to the critical traditions of 
liberation theology, Freudianism, existentialism, radical humanism, and the 
more open Marxism of Antonio Grarnsci and Amilcar Cabral.' 111 This 
statement obviously privileges Marxism over other influences. Peter Roberts, 
in a somewhat skewed article (in that it discusses Freire's moral philosophy 
without once mentioning his Catholicism), tells us that 'Freire is thoroughly 
Marxist' when he presents liberation as something taking place 'in the 
transformative action of human beings on the world, within specific historical 
and social circumstances.' 112 While this line of thought may be Marxist, it can 
also be seen as a Christian liberation where people are called (in specific 
contexts) to 'defend the cause of the fatherless' 113 and to seek justice. 114 
If Freire had been an orthodox Marxist, we would expect him to reject religion 
as being opposed to the emancipatory interests of the oppressed, but instead 
we find him speaking highly of the Base Ecclesial Communities (BECs). In 
his discussion of BECs (and other social movements, 'some of them linked 
with the church and some not') in Learning to Question, Freire goes so far as 
to state that '[i]t is my opinion today that either the revolutionary parties will 
work more closely with [all] these movements and so prove their authenticity 
within them ... or they will be lost.' 115 
This ignoring of Freire's Catholicism (which even occurred in tribute articles 
after his death) 116 could be symptomatic of what Stanley Hauerwas calls 'the 
sheer prejudice of many secular thinkers ... [that] any reflection informed by 
111 Henry A. Giroux, 'Radical Pedagogy and Prophetic Thought: Remembering Paulo Freire', 
Rethinking Marxism 9 (1996/97), 80. 
112 Peter Roberts, 'Knowledge, Dialogue, and Humanization: The Moral Philosophy of Paulo 
Freire', Journal of Educational Thought 32 ( 1998), 1 08. 
113 lsaiah 1:17. 
114 Peter Roberts, 'Knowledge, Dialogue, and Humanization: The Moral Philosophy ofPaulo 
Freire', 108. 
115 Freire and Faundez, Learning to Question, 66. 
116 See, for example, Moacir Gadotti, 'Paulo Freire: dreaming of a world of equality and 
justice', Media Development 44 ( 1997), 26-9. 
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religious claims cannot possibly be serious.' 117 However, Hauerwas also notes 
'the lack of attention [given] to the inability of Christian theologians to find a 
sufficient medium to articulate their own best insights for those who do not 
share their convictions.' 118 This inability may well be increased for those (like 
Freire) who do not call themselves theologians. Indeed Freire tells us that 'I do 
not feel very comfortable speaking about my faith', 119 but he does none the 
less speak about it, and Christ's influence on his work. 
Therefore, this privileging of his Marxism, given Freire's life-long (although 
critical) commitment to the Catholic Church, is clearly open to question. As 
John Elias tells us, Freire does 'appeal to an existentialist or Marxist view of 
human nature' in order to correct 'a distorted Christian notion of humans and 
their relationship to God', 120 but this does not imply that Freire has abandoned 
his Catholic faith or its influence over his work. He was thankful that many 
Christians were 'vigorously reacting' against the attitude that it is God's will 
for the oppressed to suffer. 'But as a child, I knew many priests who went out 
to the peasants saying: "Be patient. This is God's will. And anyway, it will 
earn heaven for you."' Freire continues: 
How could we make God responsible for this calamity? As if Absolute 
Love could abandon man to constant victimization and total 
destitution. That would be a God such as Marx described. 121 
Freire goes on to reiterate the point that this sort of faith only assists the 
oppressor. 122 'Whenever men make God responsible for intolerable situations, 
for oppression, then the dominating structures help to popularise that myth.' 123 
It is Freire's Christianity that leads him to espouse conscientization, and 
117 Stan1ey Hauerwas, Against the Nations (Minneapo1is: Winston Press, 1985), 26. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Pedagogyofthe Heart, 104. 
120 John L. E1ias, Paulo Freire: Pedagogue of Liberation (Ma1abar, Fla.: Krieger, 1994), 51. 
111 Paulo Freire, 'Conscientizing as a Way of Liberating', in Hennelly (ed.), Liberation 
Theology: A Documentary History, 11. 
122 Freire makes a similar point from a different perspective in Learning to Question: 'These 
considerations remind me of what Marx and Engels say in The Holy Family: "The class which 
rules a society materially also rules spiritually'" (Freire and Faundez, Learning to Question, 
74). 
123 Paulo Freire, 'Conscientizing as a Way of Liberating', in Hennelly (ed.), Liberation 
Theology: A Documentary History, 11. 
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'conscientization shows us that God wants us to act' 124 and to work with the 
oppressed. 
Conscientization . . . involves an excruciating moment . . . in those who 
begin to conscientize themselves, the moment they start to be reborn. 
Because conscientization demands an Easter. That is, it demands that 
we die to be reborn again. Christians must live their Easter, and that 
too is a utopia ... That is why Christianity is, for me, such a marvellous 
doctrine. People have accused me of being a communist, but no 
communist could say what I have just said. 125 
Freire might not be a communist, but he is certainly utopian. His utopia, 
however, takes very little account of the darker side of human nature. 126 It 
often seems that as soon as people are released from oppression, they -
contrary to all history - will not oppress others. This is idealistic, and not what 
traditional Catholicism teaches. Freire does seek to look briefly at the 
complexity of the oppressed who are also oppressors in his response to 
Mentoring the Mentor, but it seems that all is needed is more teaching so that 
the oppressed oppressor becomes less incomplete, and engage in 'the search 
for coherence.' 127 It seems that his dualistic thinking (referred to above) is 
intact. 
His Marxist influences also allow him to approach the possibility of violent 
revolution with more equanimity that we might expect from a traditional 
Catholic. CM Guevara is one example ofthe revolutionaries cited by Freire: 128 
Guevara did not create dichotomies between the methods, content and 
objectives of his projects. In spite of the risks to his and companions' 
lives, he justified guerrilla warfare as an introduction to freedom, as a 
call to life to those who are the living dead. Like Camilo T orres, he 
became a guerrilla not out of desperation, but because, as a lover of 
men, he dreamt of a new man being born in the experience of 
liberation. In this sense, Guevara incarnated the authentic revolutionary 
utopia as did few others. 129 
Even here, as he praises a socialist revolutionary, Freire uses religious 
language. It seems that Freire 'is essentially a Christian thinker who has 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 12-13. 
126 See Elias, Paulo Freire: Pedagogue of Liberation, 56-9. 
127 Paulo Freire, 'A Response', in Freire (ed.), Mentoring the Mentor, 312. 
128 Especially in Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and Cultural Action for Freedom. 
129 Cultural Action for Freedom, 75. 
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assimilated Marxist ideas' 130 rather than the other way round. As with his 
Christianity, Freire is critical in his approach 131 - particularly of 'the 
mechanistic Marxists' who assumed that 'education had no role to play before 
society is radically transformed.' 132 However, his assimilation of Marxist ideas 
has led to questions, not least from certain Christian quarters, over his utopian 
view ofhuman nature, and how perfectible that nature might be. 
5.4.2 Freire's Critical Catholicism 
Freire tells us, in his chapter on 'Education, Liberation and the Church' in the 
Politics of Education, that, like all other organisations, the church cannot 
regard itself as neutral. Members (and leaders) of the church cannot wash their 
hands of the conflict between oppressed and oppressor, lest they side 
themselves with the oppressor. 'The illusion that suggests it is possible, by 
means of sermons, humanitarian works, and the encouragement of 
otherworldly values, to change men's consciousness and thereby transform the 
world exists only in those we term nai've ... '. 133 The nai've must go through an 
apprenticeship of 'their own Easter' during which 
they die as elitists so as to be resurrected on the side of the oppressed 
... Such a process implies a renunciation of myths that are dear to 
them: the myth of their superiority, of their purity of soul, of their 
virtues, their wisdom, the myth that they save the poor, the myth of the 
neutrality of the church, of theology, education, science, technology, 
the myth of their own impartiality ... 
They will also discover to what extent their idealism had confused any 
number of concepts - for example, "conscientization" ... - when they 
tried to offer magic remedies for healing the hearts of mankind without 
changing the social structures, or, equally idealistic, when they claimed 
that conscientization was a similarly magic means of reconciling the 
irreconcilable. 134 
130 Elias, Paulo Freire: Pedagogue of Liberation, 42. 
131 However, the statement that 'Freire ... does not accept the economic determination that 
Marx espoused' (Eiias, 43) exaggerates the point. 'What Freire did not accept ... is the overly 
optimistic readings ofMarx by orthodox Marxists' (Peter Mayo, 'Paulo Freire: Pedagogue of 
Liberation' (Review Article), Convergence, 29 (1996), 64). Also see The Politics of 
Education, 178-9. 
132 Freire, Teachers as Cultural Workers, 67. Also, on the same topic, see Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, I 04-8. 
133 Freire, The Politics of Education, 122. 
134 Ibid., 122-3. 
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Freire parallels this sort of idealism with the moralistic position Reinhold 
Niebuhr condemned 'whether it be found in the religious or the secular 
domain.' 135 He, Freire, speaks out (here and elsewhere) equally strongly 
against the sort of church and churchmen who choose to condemn those who 
speak out for the oppressed. By refusing the church its prophetic role, these 
leaders deny it the hope of building a more just world. However, other 
Christians are seeking to work alongside the oppressed in 'A Theology of 
Liberation'. 'Their experience teaches them that being Christian doesn't 
necessarily imply being reactionary, just as being revolutionary doesn't always 
imply being demonic.' 136 This road, however, is not an easy one to travel, as 
the oppressors (both within and outside the church) will react violently. This 
violence will be directed at the liberated oppressed, but will sometimes include 
the 'committed intellectuals'. 
When this happens, many will retreat, keep quiet, or adjust to the 
situation; others will react by taking on new commitments. A basic 
difference between those who leave and those who stay is that the 
latter accept, as an integral part of existence, the dramatic tension 
between past and future, death and life . . . between saying the word 
and mutilating silence, between hope and despair, being and nonbeing. 
It is an illusion to think that human beings can escape this dramatic 
tension. 137 
The amount of risk we are called on to take will depend on our situation, but 
Freire is clear that there is risk in life: '[a] reign of undisturbed peace is 
unthinkable in history.' 138 So any form of conservative church (whether it calls 
itself 'traditional' or 'modernising') 139 is condemned for having too much in 
the world that it has to sit still. It cannot challenge the status quo, as it is too 
much a part ofthat status quo. 
Freire then turns to the prophetic church, one that 'accepts becoming, in order 
to be.' 140 Although it is a new reality in Latin America, Freire regards this 
135 Referred to in ibid., 124. 
136 Ibid., 128. Freire points out elsewhere (ibid, 141, n. 11) that 'Dom Helder Ciimara, the 
prophetic archbishop of Olinda and Recife (Brazil), is today [ 1985] considered one of these 
terrible demons.' 
137 Ibid., 128-9. 
138 Ibid., 129. 
139 This term, for Freire, refers to a church that adapts to a modern, industrial culture without 
affecting the status quo. 
140 Ibid., 137, emphasis original. 
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church as the original. 141 Against the individualism of the modernising church, 
this church challenges the social structures that keep the oppressed in their 
place. In a seeming paradox, we are told that '[t]he prophetic church is no 
home for the oppressed, alienating them further by empty denunciations.' 142 
They must be encouraged to move on in their own 'Exodus' towards a new 
promised land, 'forever dying and forever being reborn.' 143 
This dying, this martyrdom, faced by people and clerics alike would be all the 
more painful when those carrying out the oppression claimed to be acting in 
defence of Christianity. The traditional church described by Freire in The 
Politics of Education, even in the guise of a 'modernizing church', will not 
welcome a prophetic, liberating church, as the prophetic church threatens the 
traditional church in its relationship and accommodation with those in 
power.I44 
What we see here is a very clear enunciation of what Liberation Theology is 
about (and something of the opposition that liberation theologians have faced). 
Freire, as I have noted, is unafraid to use Christian metaphors in his writing, 145 
and it is clear (from his highly favourable critique of James Cone's A Black 
Theology of Liberation if nowhere else) 146 that Freire expects theology and 
politics to be closely intertwined. 
5.5 Freire as Liberation Theologian 
Paulo Freire makes no claim to be a theologian, 147 but Alfred Hennelly, in his 
book Theology for a Liberating Church, insists that ' [ w ]e must ... confer on 
141 Freire is consistent here, in an essay published in 1972, he states that the prophetic church 
is 'as old as Christianity without being traditionalist' (Paulo Freire, 'The Educational Role of 
the Churches in Latin America', LADOC (Washington D.C.), 3.14 (1972), 11). 
142 Ibid., 139. 
143 Ibid. 
144 For a discussion on persecution and internal conflict within the church, see Ronaldo 
Mufioz. 'Ecclesio1ogy in Latin America' in Torres and Eagleson (eds.), The Challenge of 
Basic Christian Communities, 155-6. Also see Jon Sobrino, 'The Witness of the Church in 
Latin America', in ibid., 170-80, where he discusses different types of persecution and 
martyrdom. 
145 For example, he points up Che Guevara's emphasis on communion with the people- see 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 138-9. 
146 In Freire, The Politics of Education, 145-8. 
147 See Paulo Freire, 'Letter to a Theology Student', Catholic Mind, 70 (1972), 8. 
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Freire belated recogmtion as one of the outstanding compafieros m the 
worldwide fraternity of theologians of liberation.' 148 This is due to his 
influence on various liberation theologians. Hennelly tells us that examples 
could be cited of Freire's relationship with other liberation theologians, but 
Hennelly (and John Elias) 149 concentrate on the work of Gustavo Gutierrez 
and Juan Luis Segundo. Hennelly also looks at how Freire's methods of 
conscientization can be paralleled with the stages of liberation, and how 
Freire's culture circles (though, interestingly, Hennelly never uses the term) 
can be paralleled with Base Ecclesial Communities. 150 
Freire's influence can be traced in the documents which came out of the 
Medellin conference of Latin American Bishops in 1968. Conscientization, in 
the form of the 'educational activity of the [Roman Catholic] Church' is seen 
as 'absolutely essential' so that Christians can 'consider their participation in 
the political life of the nation as a matter of conscience ... '. 151 Further, the 
work of conscientization 'and social education ought to be integrated into 
Joint Pastoral Action at various levels.' 152 Freire's work and thought is evident 
in the Bishops' recognition of the need for conscientization 'and action 
flowing from it' that 'permeate[ s] all sixteen Medellin documents from 
beginning to end.' 153 
The Christians' 'participation in the political life of the nation' is, from 
Freire's and Medellin's perspective, to be in the form of seeking liberation. 
Gustavo Gutierrez acknowledges the debt to Freire when he defines 
conscientization, the liberating work of 'a true cultural revolution': 
From this point of view, one of the most creative and fruitful efforts 
implemented in Latin America is the experimental work of Paulo 
148 Alfred Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church: The New Praxis of Freedom 
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1989), 80. 
149 See Elias, Paulo Freire: Pedagogue of Liberation, especially 145-8. 
150 I shall discuss the relationship between Freire's ideas and Base Ecclesial Communities 
below in 5.7.and 5.8. 
151 Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops, The Church in the Present-Day 
Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the Council: Jl Conclusions (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1973), 62 ("Peace,"# 18), quoted in Hennelly, Theology for a 
Liberating Church, 72. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 73. 
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Freire, who has sought to establish a "pedagogy of the oppressed." By 
means of an unalienating and liberating "cultural action," which links 
theory with praxis, the oppressed perceive - and modifY - their 
relationship with the world and with other persons. Thus they make the 
transfer from a "nai've awareness" - which does not deal with 
problems, gives too much value to the past, tends to accept mythical 
explanations, and tends toward debate - to a "critical awareness" -
which delves into problems, is open to new ideas, replaces magical 
explanations with real causes, and tends to dialogue. 154 
Hennelly tells us that 'Gutierrez also utilizes key concepts of Freire at pivotal 
points in his theology, for instance, in his description of the "new man," that 
is, ''the kind of man who critically analyses the present, controls his destiny, 
and is orientated toward the future"' .155 Also, Gutierrez exploits the Freirean 
dialectic of denunciation-annunciation' in his 'conceptualization of utopia and 
its relationship to political action.' 156 This dialectic is further utilized when 
Gutierrez wishes to critique (like Freire) a desire to claim 'neutrality': '[a]ny 
claim to non-involvement in politics ... is nothing but a subterfuge to keep 
things as they are.' 157 
5.5.1 Levels of Liberation 
In the last chapter, I discussed Gutierrez's three levels of liberation and how 
they related to one another. In the order Gutierrez put them, we have first, 
'economic, social, and political liberation; [second] liberation which leads to 
the creation of a new humanity in a new society of solidarity; and [third] 
liberation from sin and entrance into communion with God and with all 
persons.' 158 I will now show how closely this corresponds to Freire's ideas of 
conscientization. Gutierrez's first level of liberation 'expresses the aspirations 
of oppressed peoples and social classes, emphasizing the conflictual aspect of 
the economic, social, and political processes which puts them at odds with 
154 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 57. For Freire's own 
description of the transfer from naive to critical consciousness (and the dangers ofwhat may 
happen if people do not make the transfer), see Education: The Practice of Freedom, 18-20. 
155 Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 73, quoting Gutierrez A Theology of 
Liberation First Edition, 214. 
156 Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 73. See Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation 
Revised Edition, 135-9. 
157 Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 151. 
158 Ibid., 137. 
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wealthy nations and oppressive classes.' 159 With its emphasis in favour of the 
oppressed, and the non-neutral nature of its approach, I can only agree with 
Hennelly when he says this is a very 'succinct recapitulation of the socio-
political thought ofFreire ... '. 160 
The next level of liberation occurs when humanity assumes 'conscious 
responsibility for its own destiny.' This destiny encompasses 'the desired 
social changes' with an expression of freedom that 'leads to the creation of a 
new humankind and a qualitatively different society.' 161 Freire, too, is 
interested in a new humanity, responsible for themselves and their new 
society. For example, in Learning to Question, Freire clearly agrees with 
Antonio Faundez when the latter states that it is a matter 'of changing society 
from the base so as to build a new society in which power and the struggle for 
power manifest themselves in a different way.' 162 This new way means that 
power, including political power, 'will belong to all' .163 To us, this may seen 
somewhat idealistic, and place too much faith in the beneficial and all-
encompassing involvement of 'democracy', but Faundez and Freire's 
sentiments clearly chime in with Gutierrez. 
This leaves us with the third level of liberation, the liberation from sin, 
which is the ultimate root of all disruption of friendship and of all 
injustice and oppression. Christ makes humankind truly free, that is to 
say, he enables us to live in communion with him; and this is the basis 
for all human fellowship. 164 
Here we must turn to Freire's remarks about theology, as most of his work 
(when he writes as a humanist, rather than specifically as a Catholic Christian) 
tends to omit the transcendent. 
The issue around liberation and its practice is not fighting against the 
religiousness of the popular classes ... but rather over-coming with it, 
the vision of God at the service of the strong for a God on the side of 
those with whom justice, truth, and love should be ... 
159 Ibid., 24. 
160 Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 79. 
161 Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 24-5. 
162 Faundez and Freire, Learning to Question, 64. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 25. 
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This way, submission-faith toward a destiny that would reflect God's 
will makes way for a spurring faith of loving rebelliousness. In this 
process, there is an understanding of the body - for those who have 
evolved in their faith - as the dwelling of sin turns into an intelligence 
ofthe body as the temple ofGod. 165 
So, Freire clearly looks to a Christ who 'makes humankind truly free', but he 
gives no indication of how far individual sin in the oppressed (it is difficult to 
see how he could regard the oppressor as free from sin) could contribute to the 
disruption of friendship. Clearly the oppressed are more sinned against than 
sinning in this context (and I have discussed the criticisms of liberation 
theology with regard to individual and corporate sin in the previous chapter). I 
must note here, however, that Freire's only real indication of the stubborn 
nature of sin in marring human relations, and contributing to oppression in all 
its forms, is in his realisation that humanity is called always to be more human 
-we never, it seems, actually arrive. 166 
5.5.2 Juan Luis Segundo 
Parallels between Freire and other liberation theologians exist apart from 
Gutierrez, such as Juan Luis Segundo, who adapts Freire's theory of literacy 
training to evangelisation: 
To put it in other words: it is not possible to give the gospel as it really 
is, that is, as a liberative interpretation of history, without making man 
a subject of that history rather than an object of it. Without this 
[Freireian] process of consciousness-raising, the task of evangelising 
and catechising runs the risk of being a cultural invasion ... 
An evangelization committed to man's liberation is deeply tied up with 
the new form of literacy-training: i.e. one incorporated within a process 
of consciousness-raising. 167 
Segundo also makes the point that the way to avoid an "aseptic", unreal, 
spiritual, evangelization, is to keep the 'intimate and necessary connection 
between evangelization and political conscientization ... '. 168 He further 
emphasises the sacramental nature of Freire's work (I have noted above, that 
165 Freire, Pedagogy of the Heart, 103. 
166 On the 'unfinishedness' of human beings, see, for example, Freire, Pedagogy of Freedom, 
52. 
167 Juan Luis Segundo, Our Idea of God (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1974), 174-5 (cf 
Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 73-4). 
168 Ibid., 174. 
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Freire believes that revolutionary leaders - after the manner of Guevara -
should be in communion with the people). Segundo regards the sacraments 'as 
a "communitarian pedagogy of liberation'". Just as the sacrament presents the 
Christian with their problematic situation as it is and invites their responses; 'it 
should also show divine revelation to be an element capable of helping them 
to face up to this challenge.' But the Christians' response, just like those 
undergoing a Freirean literacy program, is also in two parts: the intellectual 
and the practical. 169 
Thus again, we have a critique (along with Gutierrez) of a politically 'neutral' 
church. A church that sets out to conscientize as its evangelises, cannot do 
anything other than educate its lay people for political involvement - with, it 
must be said, the whole-hearted support of Paulo Freire. This is, of course, a 
return to our third theme, but before I discuss that in more detail, I will now 
turn (briefly) to Freire's concepts of eschatology, and his ideas on the relation 
of the church to civil society (with particular reference to the Base Ecclesial 
Communities). 
5.6 Freire's Eschatology 
As Freire does not call himself a theologian, we cannot expect him to have a 
developed theology of the eschaton, but we can discern something of his ideas 
from his writings. He is keen to see a new humanity, but it is one that is very 
much achievable down here on earth. 170 This may be, at least in part, a 
reaction against the sort of preaching he heard as a child where suffering and 
oppression were God's will, only to be relieved in heaven. 171 However, it does 
mean, as Elias tells us, 'that Freire's radical person, who develops through the 
process of conscientization, will be able to act rationally and in a 
nonoppressive manner.' 
Undoubtedly this is a prerogative of utopian thinkers who proclaim the 
coming of the new man and woman. It is no doubt the rhetoric of the 
preacher who proclaims the coming of the Kingdom. But it is rather a 
narrow base, not only for criticism of society and its institutions, but 
169 See Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 74, and Elias, 146-7. 
170 See 5.4.1 above, and the discussion ofFreire's utopianism. 
171 See Freire, 'Conscientizing as a Way of Liberating', in Hennelly ( ed. ), A Documentary 
History, 11. 
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also for a program of social and political revolution. The dark side of 
humans will not be eliminated when the present oppressed are 
released. 172 
Freire is nothing if not passionate as he proclaims his 'utopian theology of 
hope': 
The utopian posture of the denouncing, announcing, historically 
committed Christians who are convinced that the historical vocation of 
humankind is not to adapt, not to bend to pressures, not to spend 90 
percent of their time making concessions in order to salvage what we 
call the historical vocation of the church. We humans have an 
unbelievable historical vocation, and we cannot jeopardize it for any 
one fact, nor can we compromise it for any single, isolated problem, 
because the church has the whole world. 173 
In the same work, he makes clear that salvation is largely about what is to be 
done by us in this world. 
We work out our salvation in communion. Each one of us must set out 
in quest of his salvation, we must do it ourselves. I don't mean that 
God hasn't saved us by the divine presence in history: I'm talking now 
on the human level. 174 
For Freire, the human vocation is to become more human. This is to be 
achieved by a continuing conscientization. The early Freire may well have 
possessed 'the same faith in human perfectibility' which is 'clearly identical to 
the vision of transcendent society propounded by utopian socialists' .175 But, 
later on, and certainly when he wrote Pedagogy of the Heart (published in the 
year of his death), he was less sure of perfectibility, talking of the permanent 
'struggle for hope' in the face of 'daily bank robberies, witness killings, 
massacres ... '. 176 His struggle is for a society that 'is less evil and more 
humane.' 177 Freire's hope and struggle rest in his 'inconclusion', the lack of 
completeness of perfection: 
It is necessary to accept the inconclusion that one becomes aware of ... 
Critical acceptance of my inconclusion necessarily immerses me in 
permanent search. What makes me hopeful is not so much the certainty 
172 Elias, 56. 
173 Freire, 'Conscientizing as a Way of Liberating', in Hennelly ( ed. ), A Documentary History, 
8. 
174 Ibid., 12. 
175 Elias, 57. 
176 Freire, Pedagogy of the Heart, 105-6. 
177 Ibid., I 04, emphasis added. 
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of the find, but my movement in search. It is not possible to search 
. h h 178 w1t out ope ... 
This is less dogmatic than the revolutionary character of Freire's early work, 
but none-the-less, he clearly expects progress in this life. In other words, the 
Kingdom now is emphasised over the heavenly 'not yet' aspects of the 
Kingdom. 
5. 7 The Relation of the Church to Civil Society 
As it should be clear from the above, Freire has clear views on the relation of 
any individual to civil society. Although that individual was to work with 
others in a communitarian fashion, he or she was an individual: 
I cannot of course deny the singularity and uniqueness but that does 
not make my existence, in itself, isolated from other existences, a 
model of absolute meaning. On the contrary, it is in intersubjectivity, 
mediated by objectivity, that my existence makes sense. "I exist" does 
not come before "we exist," but is fulfilled in it. 179 
He spent his life trying to ensure that the oppressed broke out ofthe 'culture of 
silence' and took their place in society in order to change it. Freire was also 
alive to the idea that the overcoming of the culture of silence would involve 
struggle and conflict, but he accepted that as a part of life - indeed if 
Christians did not accept their part in the struggle, he regarded them as less 
than Christian. 
Those who don't make their Easter [conscientize themselves], in the 
sense of dying in order to be reborn, are not real Christians ... 
Each of us has to give witness, and conscientization is a summons to 
do that: to be new each day. 180 
For those Christians who do 'make their Easter', who work with the oppressed 
and are, therefore, part of the prophetic church, the educational role of that 
church 'must be totally different from that of other churches ... '. 
Education must be an instrument of transforming action, a political 
praxis at the service of permanent human liberation. This . . . does not 
happen only in the consciousness of people, but presupposes a radical 
178 Ibid., 106, emphasis original. 
179 The Politics of Education, 129, and see Freire and Shor, A Pedagogy for Liberation, 109: 'I 
don't believe in self-liberation. Liberation is a social act.' 
180 
'Conscientization as a Way ofLiberating', in Hennelly (ed.), A Documentary History, 13. 
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change of structures, m which process consciousness will itself be 
transformed. 181 
Freire's recipe for Christian education is therefore much the same as his ideas 
for all education. He expects education to happen through communication, 
dialogue as both 'educator-educatee' and 'educatee-educator' search for truth 
together. 182 This concept of dialogue moves away from the idea of one 
knowledgeable teacher imparting wisdom to the ignorant masses, and, 
similarly, in the Base Ecclesial Communities (BECs), there are 'coordinators', 
or 'animators', but never 'leaders' .183 There are, therefore, clear parallels 
between Freire's 'culture circles', and the way in which the BECs are set 
up. 184 Both aim to educate and to conscientize the people. Neither have leaders 
- or perhaps it is better to say that neither is supposed to have leaders in the 
traditional sense. I have already noted that Freire's biggest problem was to 
educate his educators away from their old systems of banking education, and 
Hennelly tells us that a key element of the coordinators' weekly meetings was 
'the distribution and discussion of a typed or Xeroxed ... two-page summary 
... of topics for the next meeting.' 185 While this may 'represent an impressive 
building of lay leadership at the grassroots level', 186 it also shows that the 
church has felt that the BECs need a considerable input from higher up the 
organizational chain of command187 - the sort of direction that Freire (in his 
more theoretical moments) would wish to question. 
Consistently, when he discusses BECs, Freire is positive about them -
especially in their role in politicising the priests and the people in the wake of 
the military coup in Brazil that forced him into exile. Indeed, he credits the 
181 The Politics of Education, 140. 
182 On this topic, see Paulo Freire, 'Extension or Communication', in Education: The Practice 
of Freedom, especially 147-8. 
183 See Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 86. 
184 On culture circles (and their use in Freire's literacy program), see Education: the Practice 
of Freedom, 42-58. On the organisation of BECs, see Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating 
Church, 82-6. 
185 Hennelly, Theology for a Liberating Church, 86. 
186 Ibid. 
187 This may also reflect the tension within Liberation Theology that encourages lay 
participation particularly in BECs, but also insists that BECs are part of, rather than separate 
from, the institutional (and hierarchical) church. 
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military dictatorship with creating the conditions for BECs to emerge from the 
silence imposed on the people. As people met together 
in the intimacy of the church ... [they] ended up by spreading and 
bringing into being the basic church communities. When popular 
groups assume the role of subjects in studying the Gospels, when they 
no longer simply read, then they inevitably study them from the 
standpoint of the oppressed and no longer from that of the 
oppressors. 188 
Freire goes on to comment on the importance of social groups, whether they 
are attached to the church or not, but he does credit the BECs with a political 
activism that was necessary at a time when most political activity had been 
closed down by the government. 189 
Although the political situation in Brazil may have been the catalyst for the 
BECs to emerge as forums for political opposition to the government, as I 
have noted above, the base communities were originally set up as clergy began 
to identifY what was called a 'pastoral crisis', and so lay catechists were 
trained to disseminate the Church's teaching. This had led to the continued lay 
involvement with BECs, but, as Dominique Barbe points out, 'Church base 
communities nearly always have at their beginnings a priest or a sister.' 190 She 
comments on the task of lay leadership, but points out, in a clear echo of 
Freire that 'the poor have got into the habit of self-depreciation.' 
That is why each base community is founded through a gentle and 
gradual pedagogy, which teaches the humble ... to give worth to what 
they have to say as they express themselves to each other. 191 
Clearly what is being expressed here is an identification with the people on the 
part of (this) pastoral agent, which is Freire's first requirement on the part of 
any person seeking to assist in the conscientization of the poor. He also insists 
that the poor are conscientized in community, which is what the BECs 
provide. The similarity in approaches between Freire's politico-pedagogy and 
188 Freire and Faundez, Learning to Question, 66. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Dominique Barbe, 'Church Base Communities', in Curt Cadorette et al. (eds.), Liberation 
Theology: An Introductory Reader (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992), 183. See also 
Margaret Hebblethwaite, Base Communities: An Introduction (London: Geoffiey Chapman, 
1993), who points up the lay participation, and indeed leadership, in BECs, but also has to 
state that 'without the participation or approval of priests and sisters, and the pastoral strategy 
of favourable bishops, base communities would barely have got off the ground' (ibid., 117). 
191 Ibid., 185, emphasis original. 
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the work of the BECs, is so striking that, in spite of the fact that Freire did not 
acknowledge his influence on BECs, it is impossible to believe that the 
connection does not exist. 192 
For Freire it is clear that the church has to be educative. It has to work not just 
on behalf of, but also with the oppressed. Pious platitudes and acceptance of 
the status quo are not acceptable. Whatever the actual clerical involvement in 
the BECs, there is no suggestion that Freire would expect clerical leadership 
(indeed as noted above, he would not expect any leadership in the traditional 
sense). The laity therefore needs to be involved, to 'make their Easter' as all 
members of the church are conscientized. Within the BECs the task (again 
according to Barbe in an echo of Freire) is to restore a voice to the people, and 
then for the people to act. For Barbe, '[a] group does not become a community 
until the day it decides to act together ... '. 193 Again, like Freire, the parallel 
with Exodus is drawn: 'the exodus of action is always necessary.' 194 For 
Barbe, however, the BEC is primarily a religious community. Political action 
and involvement is but a consequence of the community's life together, 
'however inevitable.' 195 Freire would, I suspect, accept the inevitability of 
political action, but deem it a result of conscientization, as a part of the whole 
pedagogical approach, and not to be separated off. However, he would not be 
worried that the conscientization was taking place in a religious context: 
From the prophetic point of view, it makes little difference in what 
specific area education happens; it will always be an effort to clarifY 
the concrete context in which the teacher-students and student-teachers 
are educated and are united by their presence in action. 196 
5.8 Educating the Christian for Political Involvement 
We now turn to the crux of the matter: how does Freire see the Christian being 
educated for political action? This section is going to be something of a recap 
of previous sections as it should be obvious that Freire's whole project was 
192 See Elias, 147. The others Elias refers to who have made the connection include Hennelly: 
see Theology for a Liberating Church, 81-94. Also see Margaret Hebblethwaite, Base 
Communities, 178 for a list ofthe ideas that have 'come in [to BECs] ... via the influence of 
Freire's thought.' 
193 Dominique Barbe, 'Church Base Communities', 187. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid., 190. 
196 The Politics of Education, 140. 
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about an education that he hoped would lead to political action. If the 
oppressed were not moved to act, then they were still trapped in the culture of 
silence imposed on them by the oppressor. For Freire, as much as Barbe might 
like to call the political act a consequence coming behind the religious nature 
of the group, political action is vital. 'Education will always be ... a mode of 
action meant to change things, a political program for the permanent liberation 
of man.' 197 He expects this action to change structures radically, a process that 
'hopefully' will transform peoples' minds. 
The church must therefore educate for that action. If the church becomes (or 
remains) fearful of the change that political action will bring, it 'badly loses its 
way.' As a consequence, '[i]t can no longer test itself, either through the 
denunciation of the unjust world, or the annunciation of a more just world to 
be built by the historical-social praxis of the oppressed.' 198 
In the utopian denunciation-annunciation cycle, the church itself stands as a 
witness in terms of how it educates its congregation and how it stands as an 
example on the side of the oppressed. These two aspects of witness are not 
necessarily distinct. Given that the BECs have (at least to begin with) clerical 
input, 199 then this becomes one example of how the church stands on the side 
of the oppressed. This stance will provoke a reaction, and therefore a test for 
the church: will its leaders, its 'committed intellectuals ... retreat, keep quiet, 
or adjust to the situation', or will they 'react by taking on new 
commitments'i0° Freire expects many to belong to the former camp, but 
praises those in the latter.201 
How much change the conscientized members of the BECs can expect to be 
able to bring about is open to question. Barbe's example of BEC action is the 
197 Paulo Freire, 'The Educational Role of the Churches in Latin America', 14. Freire does not 
expect a change of heart to lead to the changing of the world, but that a change in structures 
'may (but may not, too!) lead to a change of hearts' (ibid., I). 
198 The Politics of Education, 127. 
199 See above. 
200 The Politics of Education, 128. 
201 Ibid., 128-9. 
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building of a house for a widow against official persecution.202 Barbe notes 
that 
At the end of five or six years, certain ones discover that creating a 
civilization of love is not at all easy. Structures must be thought about. 
The spontaneous mutual assistance of the bairro [sic] is no longer 
adequate. 203 
Full conscientization is, it seems, necessarily a long-term project. This is not 
the impression gained from reading Freire's works, especially the early books. 
Where Freire modifies his approach in his later works, it is to downplay his 
revolutionary expectations; but he remains convinced of 'the fundamental 
importance of my faith for overcoming an oppressive reality and for building a 
less ugly society, one that is less evil and more humane. ' 204 There is no 
mention here of the 'new man or woman' free of oppression and able to live in 
non-oppressive love and peace with all. 
While, realistically, those involved in setting up the BECs do not seem to 
expect to create a new man or woman, I have already noted that it is 'the 
progressive Christian groups ... who seem to have had most success in using 
the Freirean approach ... '. 205 The BECs 'can represent the starting point for a 
politics in which commitment and practice seek to serve the common good 
and social justice. ' 206 Leonardo Boff, like Barbe, separates politics out into a 
field 'with its own relative autonomy.' However 
Faith is not set aside. Instead it acquires its true dimensions as a 
spiritual mystique, a source of inspiration, and a signpost pointing 
toward liberation. That liberation transcends history, but it can be seen 
and anticipated in history through a process of liberation that generates 
less inequitable forms of social coexistence within society.207 
The transcendent element is brought back in with a clarity that is missing from 
Freire's own writings: the Kingdom is both now and not yet. 208 This view of 
the BEC allows, even insists, that political action is taken to create a more just, 
202 Barbe, 187-8. 
203 Ibid., 189-90. 
204 Pedagogy of the Heart, I 04. 
205 Blackburn, 'Understanding Paulo Freire', 8. 
206 Leonardo Boff, 'Theological Characteristics of a Grassroots Church', in Torres and 
Eagleson (eds.), The Challenge of Basic Christian Communities, 138. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Seeibid., 143. 
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more humane society; but equally it does not exercise any sort of naive belief 
that this new society would be perfect. The BEC 'learns to discover God in its 
own life, struggles, and happenings' ,209 and approaches life with 'a new kind 
ofholiness' not confined to the ascetic. It is the holiness ofthe militant. 
Rather than concentrating on the fight against one's own passions, 
which remains a permanent struggle, one fights politically against the 
creation and use of exploitative mechanisms of accumulation; and one 
fights for the establishment of more well balanced, communitarian 
relationships. The new virtues find expression in class solidarity, 
participation in community decisions, mutual aid, criticism of abuses 
of power, endurance of slander and persecution for the sake of justice 
fiO 
For BotT, the BECs point both to 'a greater fidelity to the liberating 
wellsprings of the gospel message, and also fidelity to the transcendent destiny 
of the earth with all its anxieties and yeamings. ' 21 1 Freire might have worried 
about the transcendence of the earth's destiny, but the work of the BECs for 
greater justice for all, especially for the oppressed, can only have continued to 
meet with his approval. 
5.9 Conclusion 
I have shown that Freire's work has had considerable influence on Liberation 
Theology from Medellin onwards. His ideas and methods of conscientization 
have been appropriated by liberation theologians, especially Gutierrez and 
Segundo, as a way of liberating the poor. Freire himself, while not wearing his 
religious heart on his sleeve, identified himself clearly with the liberating wing 
of the Catholic Church. He denied that he was a communist, though he felt 
able to borrow ideas from Marx and his followers and use those ideas in his 
own work - work whose contribution is not so much valuable for thinking 
entirely new thoughts, but which was able to synthesise others' thought in a 
new way: the way of conscientizar;iio. Freire, like the liberation theologians, is 
clearly on the side of the poor. His work is utopian, idealistic, and somewhat 
dualistic - and as such has been rightly criticised for ignoring the complexities 
of life. Freire's practice, certainly once he had left Latin America in the early 
209 Ibid., 138. 
210 Ibid., 142. 
211 Ibid., 143. 
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1970s for a post in Geneva with the World Council of Churches, was radical 
democratic rather than revolutionary, thus denying the tenor of his early work, 
especially Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Having said that, the radical nature of 
freeing the poor from their 'culture of silence' has generated both considerable 
praise and opposition. Freire foresaw that this opposition would occur, and 
expected Christians to face it alongside the poor. Love of neighbour, 
especially the poor and oppressed neighbour, can be said to be at the heart of 
Freirean pedagogy, and as such, this pedagogy exercises considerable hold 
over liberation theologians. 
Freire's pedagogy was developed in the context of the Third World, but has 
been appropriated by various educators in the First World. Often these 
educators (such as Ira Shor, Michelle Fine, and Donaldo Macedo) are working 
in deprived areas oftheir countries.212 Others (Peter Leonard and the Warwick 
School) faced considerable difficulty in translating Freire's methods into a 
genuinely First World University context. As I have noted above, Freire 
himself expected his ideas to be adapted to new contexts, not copied 
wholesale. This is also true of those who wish to use Freire's ideas m a 
Christian context. It is the liberation theologians who have had the best 
success in identifying with the oppressed in Latin America (and elsewhere), 
but there is also a realism creeping into their work213 that is not seen in 
Freire's utopian dream. That is, for most people, the shades of grey in real life 
have to be taken into account, and incremental improvements - of the sort 
Freire looked for in his later work (and as Secretary of Education in Sao 
Paulo) - may be the order of the day. On the other hand, a utopian, prophetic 
denunciation-annunciation may be the best way forward in certain stark 
situations such as Brazil in the 1960s, or the Germany of the 1930s. It is to the 
Nazi Germany ofDietrich Bonhoeffer that we now turn. 
212 Freire himself defined 'Third World' so flexibly that it could include a lot of inner city (and 
other) areas in the First World. 
213 For example, see Dominique Barbe's article cited above. 
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Chapter 6 
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND ANTI-GOVERNMENT CONSPIRACY: 
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER'S RADICAL PATRIOTISM 
6.1 Introduction 
'Bonhoeffer's life is a necessary key to understanding his theology.' 1 His life 
was lived, and his theology formed in the cauldron of the collapse of the 
Weimar republic, the rise and implementation of Nazism, and the horrors of 
the Second World War. Against the idea that there are distinct, discontinuous 
phases in Bonhoeffer's thought, Clifford Green, Ernst Feil and James 
Burtness2 argue for a continuity of thought in Bonhoeffer's theology. This is 
not to say that there is no development in his thought, but the idea that 
Bonhoeffer's theology suffered from the radical breaks and changes in 
direction - specifically that his 'prison theology' was radically different from 
what had occurred before -that were discerned by the 1960s 'death of God' 
movement and others is now discredited.3 
Accepting the above, this chapter will concentrate on the Finkenwalde 
writings (Discipleship and Life Together) and also the later works, Ethics and 
Letters and Papers from Prison. This is because by this time (1935 on) the 
Hitler regime was in place, the Church Struggle had commenced and 
Bonhoeffer, by force of circumstances, was playing a prominent role in that 
struggle. He later joined the anti-Hitler conspiracy, which also caught up, and 
1 F. Burton Nelson, 'The Life of Dietrich Bonhoetfer', in John W. de Gruchy (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 22. For similar sentiments, see John W. de Gruchy, 'The Reception of Bonhoeffer's 
Theology', ibid., 97, and Clitford J. Green, Bonhoejfer: A Theology of Sociality (Grand 
Rapids, Mi.: Eerdmans, revised edition 1999), 3: 'a deep, personal concern is at work along 
with the theological, philosophical, exegetical, ecclesiastical, and political factors which 
informed his thinking.' 
2 See Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality; Ernst Feil, The Theology of 
Dietrich Bonhoejfer (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1985); and James Burtness, Shaping the 
Future: The Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). 
3 See the discussion in John W. de Gruchy, 'The Reception of Bonhoeffer's Theology', 93-
109: de Gruchy argues for a middle way between continuity and discontinuity (see especially 
ibid., I 00). Further the similarities, differences and dependence of Bonhoetfer's theology on 
Kart Barth is much discussed, though beyond the scope of this thesis. For a detailed 
discussion, see Andreas Pangritz, Karl Earth in the Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Grand 
Rapids, Mi.: Eerdmans, 2000). 
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in 1945 killed, his brother Klaus and brothers-in-law Hans von Dohnanyi and 
Ri.idiger Schleicher.4 Bonhoeffer's task, as he saw it, was to rescue his church 
from its struggle for its own survival, to, as it were, rescue Luther from the 
Lutherans, and to teach its people (by example as well as word) how to live as 
disciples of Jesus Christ, who, '[w]henever Christ calls us, his call leads us to 
death.' 5 
This chapter will first look at Bonhoeffer's life and work, placing it in its 
(anti-) Nazi context. I shall then look at the Lutheran doctrine of the Two 
Kingdoms and how Bonhoeffer re-worked that doctrine to overcome any idea 
of the separation of life into two spheres. I shall then, with specific reference 
to the use made of Bonhoeffer in South Africa, examine whether Bonhoeffer 
can be thought to have renounced privilege (and thereby have become more 
egalitarian in his outlook). Then, as with the previous chapters, I shall examine 
Bonhoeffer's eschatology (to examine how his thought affected his outlook on 
his 'present-day' reality); his ideas on the relation of the church to civil 
society; and his ideas on the education of the individual Christian for political 
involvement. 
6.2 Bonhoeffer's Life and Work: an Overview 
In one section, I am not going to attempt to look at the whole ofBonhoeffer's 
life, but I shall seek to set his life (and work) in its context ofthis thesis and its 
focus on the education of Christians for political involvement. This will mean 
a brief examination of Bonhoeffer's own home life, the visit to the United 
States of America in 1930-31, his leadership of the Finkenwalde seminary and 
the collective pastorates, and his involvement in the resistance against Hitler. 
4 It has been argued that these family connections, rather than theology, influenced 
Bonhoeffer's decision to join the conspiracy - that there was discontinuity between his 
thought and his actions (see Kenneth Morris, 'Bonhoeffer's Critique of Totalitarianism', 
Journal of Church and State 26 (1984), 255-6). However, John A. Moses argues convincingly 
against this idea ('Dietrich Bonhoeffer as Conspirator Against the Hitler Regime: The 
Motivation of a German Protestant Revolutionary', War and Society 17 (1999), 25-40). For a 
discussion of the links between the Bonhoeffer family and his theology, see Renate Bethge 
'Bonhoeffer's Family and Its Significance for His Theology' in Larry Rasmussen, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer- His Significance for North Americans (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 14-
30; for a more critical discussion of family influences on Bonhoeffer (including his fiancee's 
wish for him to be more open), see Frits de Lange, Waiting for the Word (Grand Rapids, Mi.: 
Eerdmans, 2000), 39-62. 
5 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2001), 87. 
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6.2.1 Childhood Influences 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer was born, along with his twin sister, in 1906 to an upper 
middle class family.6 It was, inevitably, a privileged upbringing, though much 
was expected of Dietrich and all his brothers and sisters. 7 Though not without 
its tragedy - Dietrich's older brother Waiter, called up to fight in the First 
World War, died of his wounds on 28th April 1918 (27-28)- this privileged 
situation would trouble Dietrich in later years. He felt isolated from the less 
fortunate, and less able to understand them (19-20). This tension eventually 
led him to write about 'the view from below' in his 1943 paper 'After Ten 
Years', 8 but he was never able to deny the legacy of generations of privilege, 
nor his authoritarian conservatism. 
6.2.2 America 
Although he was aware of the political situation in Germany, Bonhoeffer 
'gave no thought to becoming politically active' until he reached America 
(127). Yet, by 1932, 'Bonhoeffer was ashamed of his "disinterest," calling it 
"at this time essentially frivolous"' (128). Although he was appalled by the 
'unbearably thin and disappointingly shallow' theology,9 'Bonhoeffer was 
impressed by ... the selflessness with which Union Theological Seminary 
students, among others, shared the life of the unemployed' (163). He also 
attended several lecture series, including on 'Church and Community' and 
'Ethical Interpretations.' The latter required him to 'analyze articles in 
newspapers and periodicals, forming objective opinions on foreign or 
domestic political questions' (163). 
6 Eberhard Bethge, in his definitive biography ofDietrich Bonhoeffer, devotes eleven pages to 
his ancestors showing Bonhoeffer's upper class and aristocratic connections. See Eberhard 
Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: A Biography Revised Edition (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 
2000), 3-13. For the remainder of this section, page numbers in brackets in the text refer to 
this book. 
7 
'Karl Bonhoeffer held high expectations for each child of the family, almost as if it were 
their inherent duty to fulfil the potential they had been given' (Nelson, 'The Life ofDietrich 
Bonhoeffer', 24). 
8 Reprinted in Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (London: SCM Press, 
enlarged edition 1971 ), 17. Hereinafter referred to as LPP. 
9 Nelson, 'The Life of Dietrich Bonhoeffer', 28. 
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Bonhoeffer also formed some lasting friendships whilst at Union Seminary. A 
pivotal one was with the French pacifist, Jean Lasserre. 
Lasserre confronted him with an acceptance of Jesus' peace 
commandment that he had never encountered before. Not that 
Bonhoeffer immediately became a convinced pacifist - in fact he never 
did so - but after meeting Lasserre the question of the concrete reply to 
the biblical injunction of peace and of the concrete steps to be taken 
against warlike impulses never left him again. (153) 
This encounter led both men to insist that the one body of Christ meant that 
there could be no nationalism, nor could Christians be part of any 
discrimination on the grounds ofrace or class (see 154). 
The element of race, and the need to combat racism, was present in another of 
Bonhoeffer's pivotal relationships from Union Seminary, that with Albert F. 
(Frank) Fisher. It was their joint work in Harlem that opened Bonhoeffer's 
eyes to the situation facing black Americans in their own country. 10 A third 
friendship was with Paul Lehmann who 'helped Bonhoeffer deepen his 
appreciation for the church to become involved in civil rights and the cause of 
economic justice.' 11 
6.2.3 'fhe Church Struggle 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see the threat that Hitler and Nazism 
posed to civilisation and the church, but, as Joseph Harvard puts it: 
In 1934, Hitler appeared to some as a paragon of virtue and a political 
messiah. Hitler stood for honesty, industry, love of family and country. 
He restored law and order, ended unemployment, and stood against 
communism along with building the Volkswagen and Autobahn. 12 
However, Bonhoeffer was involved with the church's resistance to Nazism 
from the start. This resistance centred on the Aryan legislation of 7t1J. April 
1933 - which banned those of Jewish blood from holding any political, civil or 
church office - rather than any enabling acts that underpinned Hitler's 
dictatorship, 13 but Bonhoeffer saw that the question of church membership for 
10 See Nelson, 'The Life ofDietrich Bonhoeffer', 29. 
11 Quoted in ibid. 
12 Joseph S. Harvard, 'The Continuing Cost of Discipleship', Journal for Preachers, 7:4 
(1984),3. 
13 Though it was under such acts that Bonhoeffer was executed in 1945. 
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Christians of Jewish descent was for the church, not the state, to decide. 
Bonhoeffer was always clear that the church should not accept the Aryan 
clauses for itself 'By August 1933 Bonhoeffer had concluded beyond all 
doubt that there could be no question of belonging to a church that excluded 
the Jews' (273). 
6.2.4 Finkenwalde 
Bonhoeffer was invited to direct one of the semmar1es set up by the 
Confessing Church, and he took up this appointment in 1935. His experiment 
in communal living ('Bonhoeffer had reflected about communal life for four 
years; now he could put his ideas into practice' ( 419)) continued until the 
Gestapo forcibly closed the seminary down in 1937. Bonhoeffer's leadership 
was by example, in the work rate he set, his insistence on time away from that 
work, and in practical service. 14 There was only one rule: the ordinands were 
'never to speak about another ordinand in that person's absence or to tell that 
person about it when such a thing did happen' ( 428). It seems that the students 
'learned almost as much from the failure to observe this simple rule, and from 
renewed resolution to keep it, as they did from the sermons and exegeses' 
(428). It was not just the lifestyle that gave rise to rumours; 15 Bonhoeffer's 
concern for peace (raised by Lasserre and his work in the ecumenical 
movement) was still prominent: 
When in May 1935 his students heard the news that Hitler was 
reintroducing conscription, many of them rejoiced at this opportunity 
to prove that service in the Confessing Church did not signify any lack 
of patriotism. They were taken aback when he calmll suggested that 
the pacifist position should be considered seriously ... 1 
It was, however, the lectures on discipleship that were at 'the heart of 
everything' (441). I shall discuss the themes of discipleship below; here I will 
merely note that Bonhoeffer expected his students to live out the themes he 
expounded in his lectures. The practical experience of the 'House of Brethren' 
14 Following a lack of response to the kitchen's request for help with the washing up, 
'Bonhoeffer rose from the table, disappeared into the kitchen, and refused to let in the others 
who hurried to follow him' (429). 
15 It was thought that Bonhoeffer had introduced 'Catholic practices' (433). These included 
verbal confession to one another (465-6). 
16 Keith Clements, 'Ecumenical Witness for Peace', in de Gruchy (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 157. 
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that Bonhoeffer set up - and which lasted only two years before the Gestapo 
intervened- was recorded in Life Together. In this book, Bonhoeffer revealed 
that it was possible to have 'a living Protestant community' (469). 
'Finkenwalde offered an alternative with its new forms of service, for 
Bonhoeffer always drew a sharp distinction between the office of the pastor as 
preacher - an office that could not be relinquished - and the office of the 
parish minister, which should not be preserved at all costs' ( 4 70). 
As it transpired, not even the idea of training pastors m residential 
accommodation could be 'preserved at all costs' after 1937. Another way had 
to be found: and so the 'collective pastorates' were born. These lasted until 
March 1940, when 'strict military conscription brought all the ordinands ofthe 
Confessing church into the army' (589). In that time, Bonhoeffer managed, in 
spite of all the difficulties, to train five more groups of ordinands, each group 
split between two pastorates, for the Confessing Church. 
6.2.5 Conspirator 
Bonhoeffer's decision to return to Germany on 201h June 1939, especially after 
so many (including Reinhold Niebuhr) had worked so hard to find him 
employment in America, was multi-faceted, but Bethge's thesis is that 
ultimately, '[i]t was simply his readiness to recognize that he was and would 
have to remain a German, fully accepting of guilt and responsibility' (654). 
Part of the reason for his decision to go abroad, was his concern that 'he would 
be drawn more deeply into the conspiracy against Hitler' (636) if he stayed. 
This is, of course what happened after Bonhoeffer returned to Germany. Now 
' [ c ]onvinced that 'true patriotism' called for a concerted attempt to remove 
Hitler and his entourage from national leadership, Bonhoeffer became a 
civilian member of the Abwehr until his arrest on 9 April1943.' 17 
As an agent of the Abwehr, Bonhoeffer was able to travel outside the Reich. 
Officially he was gathering information for the German war effort. In practice, 
17 Nelson, 'The Life ofDietrich Bonhoeffer', 40. 
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he was engaged in smuggling Jews, or those of Jewish descent, out of the 
Reich. 18 However, theology was not forgotten. He worked, when he could, on 
his Ethics. 
The themes of Christ and reality, concreteness, the natural, the 
penultimate and the ultimate, the four mandates, deputyship, 
responsibility, state and church and 'telling the truth' all profoundly 
reflect the endeavour by Bonhoeffer 'to address the great moral 
dilemmas posed by the war and the need to resist a blatantly evil 
government' .19 
Bonhoeffer's life as a double agent came to an abrupt halt with his arrest in 
1943, but even in prison he contrived to continue writing - much of what 
survives has now appeared in Letters and Papers from Prison - but any hopes 
of release were dashed with the failure of the plot on 20 July 1944 and his 
transfer to the Gestapo prison on Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse in October 1944. 
Although Bonhoe:ffer's only direct involvement with the conspiracy was a trip 
to Sweden in 1942, his fate was sealed. He was summarily tried and executed 
at Flossenbiirg, one month before the end ofthe war?0 
6.3 Bonhoeffer and the Two Kingdoms 
On the face of it, Bonhoeffer has little to say about educating Christians 
(especially ordinary Christians) for political involvement. His privileged 
background, and his autocratic conservatism militate against the idea that he 
should advocate giving power to the congregation? 1 Even his 'theology from 
below' does not necessarily mean that everyone can be educated into free 
responsibility:22 in Letters and Papers from Prison, he still regards the 
18 It was this that led to Bonhoeffer's arrest. His connection with the plot to overthrow Hitler 
was not discovered until after the fuilure of the plot on 20 July 1944. 
19 Ibid, 40-1, quoting Kelly and Nelson, A Testament to Freedom. 
20 The description ofBonhoeffer's death as 'martydom' is open to interpretation, as he is seen 
by some as dying for a political, not a Christian, cause: see Bethge, Biography, 931, and John 
de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Eerdmans, 1984), 16. 
21 See Bethge, Biography, 445-6. 
22 See discussion at 6.5 below. This is not to say that Bonhoeffer equates ordinary Christians 
with the peasantry, but that he clearly differentiates between those who carry responsibility 
and authority, and those who do not. John de Gruchy quotes Ruth Zerner describing 
Bonhoeffer as 'a theological de Tocqueville - perceptive, prophetic, aristocratic in 
temperament, suspicious of the masses, and sensitive to the realities of his time and place.' See 
John W. de Gruchy, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Transition to Democracy in the German 
Democratic Republic and South Africa', Modern Theology 12 ( 1996), 34 7, emphasis added. In 
spite of this, de Gruchy, in this article, wants Bonhoeffer to be more of a democrat than I 
believe he was: Bonhoeffer's experience of democracy in the Weimar Republic was not 
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peasant's 'sin of strength' as 'the breaking of the order of life'. 23 Also, 
Bonhoeffer's question, 'are we still any use?' 24 is directed, not at people in 
general, but at the elites. He clearly expects obedience to authority: part of his 
defence while being interrogated by the Nazis, was to point to his orthodox 
exegesis of Romans 13 in Discipleship?5 He might expect change after the 
war,26 but his concern appears to have more to do with finding the correct role 
for the elites, rather than abolishing them. 
On the other hand, Bonhoeffer has written about 'doing theology from below'. 
This is a theology 'from the perspective of the outcast, the suspects, the 
maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed, the reviled - in short, from the 
perspective of those who suffer. ' 27 He also wrote favourably in his Ethics 
about the Enlightenment's refusal to sanction privilege, and its support for 'the 
equal dignity of men before the ethical. ' 28 However, Bonhoeffer then goes on 
to insist that 'the ethical calls for clear relationships in terms of superiority and 
inferiority' ,29 there has to be a clear order, which for Christians is found in the 
commandments of God, which, in turn, 'embraces the whole of life. ' 30 It 
appears therefore, that Bonhoeffer is nowhere near advocating equality in civil 
society. 
6.3.1 lLutber and the Two Kingdoms 
Bonhoeffer's idea that God's commandments embrace life in its entirety 
challenges the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms. Although the two 
kingdoms doctrine accepts that God is in control of both kingdoms, the church 
comes under his right hand, and the state his left. Therefore, what a person 
may be expected, or allowed, to do as an office holder in the secular realm 
conducive to its support from one with such an aristocratic background as Bonhoeffer - even 
if his elitism was one that 'recognised its responsibility for the establishment of a just order 
... ' (ibid., 362). 
23 LPP, 345. Also, cf. Green, A Theology ofSociality, 276. 
24 ln his essay 'After Ten Years', LPP, 16-17. 
25 LPP, 60. See Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 200 I), 
240ff. 
26 See 'Thoughts on the Day ofthe Baptism ofDietrich Wilhelm Riidiger Bethge', LPP, 295. 
27 LPP, 11. 
28 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Simon and Schuster/Touchstone, 1995), 269. Cf. 
Green, A Theology ofSociality, 323. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 272. 
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may not be the same as what that person may do in the spiritual realm. Martin 
Luther, according to W. Cargill Thompson, saw 'nothing incompatible' with 
one person having to live as a Christian privately, but to carry out duties as a 
public person 'which might appear to be contrary to the precepts of the 
Sermon on the Mount.' 31 This is because, for Luther, 'God has ordained the 
two governments, the spiritual [government] which fashions true Christians 
and just persons through the holy Spirit under Christ, and the secular [weltlich] 
government which holds the Unchristian and wicked in check and forces them 
to keep the peace outwardly and be still, like it or not. ' 32 
As Luther expects there to be very few 'true Christians' in any society, there is 
all the more reason for a coercive secular government. For Luther, the secular 
government must be obeyed, even by the true Christian - 'because a true 
Christian ... lives for and serves his neighbour and not himself ... ' .33 Luther's 
doctrine of non-resistance, rather than total obedience,34 is founded on 
Romans 13 (and 1 Peter 2:13).35 Therefore, even if a prince overreaches 
himself and tries to compel belief, then Luther (like Augustine) commands 
passive resistance only. 'If he [the prince] then takes away your goods and 
punishes you for your disobedience, then blessed are you, and you should 
thank God for counting you worthy to suffer for the sake of his Word. ' 36 
Indeed, in the light of the Peasants' Revolt, Luther's line on obedience to 
secular authority stretched so far as to allow that 'a rebel might be slain by 
anyone, a tyrant by no one. ' 37 
Luther's experience forced him to move away from his earlier, more idealistic 
positions, and accept more and more secular interference in Church affairs. 38 
31 W.D.J. Cargill Thompson, The Political Thought of Martin Luther (Sussex: The Harvester 
Press, 1984), 61. 
32 
'On Secular Authority', in Harro Hopfl, Luther and Calvin: On Secular Authority 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10-11. 'Weltlich', Hopfl notes, can also be 
translated as either 'worldly' or 'temporal', see ibid., xxxviii. 
33 Ibid., 13. 
34 See Cargill Thompson, The Political Thought of Martin Luther, 98. 
35 See, for example, 'On Secular Authority', 13 and 27. 
36 lbid, 29. 
37 Wolin, Politics and Vision, 162. 
38 This was inevitable in the light of his opposition to papal or other ecclesial authority, thus 
leaving the secular authority the only one with any coercive power. See Quentin Skinner, The 
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This, Cargill Thompson argues, 'helped to prepare the way for the subsequent 
development of the Lutheran territorial church system in Germany' 39 - a 
system that Bonhoeffer inherited. 
6.3.2 Bonhoeffer's Adaptation of the Two Kingdoms Doctrine 
Whatever Luther may have intended by his idea of the two kingdoms, by the 
early part of the twentieth century, religion had been confined to the private 
sphere, separate from the world where 'one either saw radical flight from the 
world as one's way to God, or one lived in this world, radically open to it but 
independent of all relations to God. ' 40 According to Emst Fell, Bonhoeffer 
regarded overcoming religion 'as something which either separates or 
identifies faith and the world' as the 'chief task' for theologians of his 
generation. In other words, he wished to overcome the misappropriation of the 
two kingdoms doctrine that had allowed the conflict 'between a Christian and 
a bourgeois-secular vocation' to be resolved.41 For Bonhoeffer the conflict 
must remain: this can be seen in his ideas of 'free responsibility' ,42 and his 
awareness of the 'better righteousness' that Jesus expects of his disciples.43 
Bonhoeffer's writings have different emphases in terms of God's 'Yes' and 
his 'No' to the world. In terms ofthe Finkenwalde and Prison writings, we can 
see an emphasis on God's 'No' in Discipleship and, to a lesser extent, Life 
Together, and more of an emphasis on God's 'Yes' in Ethics and Letters and 
Papers from Prison. Bonhoeffer's earlier works contain a more positive 
outlook on the world, 44 but the subtlety of thought, and the awareness of 
conflict can be seen in, for example, Creation and Fall, where Bonhoeffer 
writes of the curse and the promise associated with Genesis 3. 
That humankind must live in the fallen world . . . that is the curse. That 
humankind is allowed to live in this world and that it will not be 
deprived of the word of God ... that is the promise. 45 
Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2: The Age of Reformation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), 12ff. 
39 Cargill Thompson, The Political Thought of Martin Luther, 174. 
40 Emst Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 10 I. 
41 Discipleship, 50. 
42 See Ethics, 220-58. 
43 Discipleship, 116-17. 
44 For a discussion ofthis, see Feil, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 107-25. 
45 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1997), 132, 
emphasis original. 
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For Bonhoeffer, the curse and promise associated with the world applies 
everywhere, including the monastery. Retreat from the world is not a valid 
option. Luther had to re-enter the world, 'not because the world itself was 
good and holy, but because even the monastery was nothing else but the 
world.'46 
6.3.2.1 The Two Kingdoms and Finkenwalde 
Therefore the church-community is not to be seen as some sort of shelter or 
escape from the world. Bonhoeffer was clear, even as he wrote about the 
Finkenwalde community, that 
The Christian cannot simply take for granted the privilege of living 
among other Christians. Jesus Christ lived in the midst of his enemies 
... So Christians, too, belong not in the seclusion of a cloistered life 
but in the midst of enemies.47 
If Christians are able to gather together, it is by God's grace, and 'merely a 
gracious anticipation of the end time. '48 Life Together was written shortly after 
Discipleship and so still bears the hallmarks ofBonhoeffer's 'No' to the world 
-but even so, Bonhoeffer clearly expects Christ's followers to live, work and 
witness in the world. Bonhoeffer re-iterates the theme of curse and promise: 
'God's people must live in distant lands among the unbelievers [the curse], but 
they will be the seed of the kingdom of God in all the world [the promise]. '49 
Therefore the role of the Christian community is to fit the Christian for living 
outside that community: 
Every day brings the Christian many hours of being alone in an 
unchristian environment. These are times of testing. This is the proving 
ground of a genuine time of meditation and genuine Christian 
community. Has the community served to make individuals free, 
strong, and mature, or has it made them insecure and dependent? Has it 
taken them by the hand for a while so that they would learn again to 
walk by themselves, or has it made them anxious and unsure? This is 
one of the toughest and most serious questions that can be put to any 
form of everyday Christian life in community ... 50 
46 Discipleship, 48. 
47 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together I Prayerbook of the Bible (Minneapolis: Augsburg 
Fortress, 1996), 27. 
48 Ibid., 28. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 91-2. 
196 
In the Christian community, service is service to and for others in listening, 
active helpfulness and bearing with one another51 before there can be any 
'service of the Word of God'.52 This is because Bonhoeffer expects his 
seminarians to live the Word, before they can teach it. Life Together is clearly 
about how Bonhoeffer saw the Confessing Church community at 
Finkenwalde, but this does not mean that its concerns do not have application 
outside that Christian community. The German editors of Life Together put the 
point well when they ask '[h]ow could one overlook the fact that the basic 
concern of Life Together was found again in the words about "prayer and 
action for justice on behalf of the people" ... '.53 What Life Together does 
show us is Bonhoeffer's concern that those who seek to be involved in 'prayer 
and action for justice on behalf of the people' are well grounded in the 
Christian faith that leads them to undertake such prayer and action. In Life 
Together, Bonhoeffer does not comment on the doctrine of the two kingdoms 
explicitly, but his implicit treatment clearly emphasises the rule of God over 
all, as opposed to the differences between the two kingdoms. 
I have already noted Bonhoeffer's emphasis on God's 'No' to the world in 
Discipleship. Part of the reason given for writing the book is so that 
Bonhoeffer can work out his answer to the troubling questions: 
What could the call to follow Jesus mean today for the worker, the 
businessman, the farmer, or the soldier? Could it bring an intolerable 
dilemma into the existence of persons in the world who are Christian? 
54 
Given this concern, Bonhoeffer's negative description of the world can be 
seen as surprising only if we expect those with secular vocations to be able to 
carry them out in the world without struggle. It is better to view Bonhoeffer's 
negativity about the world as a warning against the cheap grace that so aligns 
the secular world with God's kingdom of the left hand that, far from being 
intolerable, the dilemma ceases to exist. It is this misappropriation of the 
51 See ibid., 98-100. 
52 Ibid., I 03. 
53 Ibid., 125, editors' Afterward to the German Edition, quoting LPP. 
54 Discipleship, 39. 
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doctrine of the two kingdoms that Bonhoeffer repudiates. 55 If grace was not to 
become cheap grace, then discipleship was a constant, daily requirement. 
Without this emphasis on discipleship, '[t]he justification of the sinner in the 
world became the justification of sin and the world. ' 56 
It was in America that Jean Lasserre challenged him about 'the biblical 
injunction of peace'. Also Lasserre confronted Bonhoeffer 
with the question of the relationship between God's word and those 
who uphold it as individuals and citizens of the contemporary world. 
This soon led Bonhoeffer to a new understanding of the Sermon on the 
Mount. 57 
In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer's treatment of the Sermon on the Mount centres 
on 'Jesus' call and promise. ' 58 This call can only lead to the cross; the faith-
community can only be 'the community ofthe Crucified' (109). 
Things cannot go any other way than that the world unleashes its fury 
in word, violence, and defamation at those meek strangers ... In their 
poverty and suffering, this group of Jesus' followers gives too strong a 
witness to the injustice of the world. That is fatal. While Jesus calls, 
"blessed, blessed," the world shrieks, "Away with them!" Yes, away! 
But where will they go? Into the kingdom of heaven. Rejoice and be 
glad, for your reward is great in heaven (109-10). 
Bonhoeffer notes that these people while worthy of heaven, are (and here he 
uses Nazi terminology) 'obviously at the same time ... unworthy of living 
... '.
59 These same people are to be salt and light - they are to be a visible 
community that preserves the earth (110-14). Invisibility is not an option. 
However, Bonhoeffer defines the good works seen in the light of Christ as 
'poverty, being strangers, meekness, peacemaking, and finally being 
55 Green tells us that by giving the gospel and church a political role, Bonhoeffer transcends 
the 'traditional 'two realms' doctrine'. However, 'Church and secular existence' are not so 
autonomous under Luther's doctrine as Green seems to think. Conversely, Green is right to 
argue that Bonhoeffer goes beyond the limited right of resistance that Luther gave Christians 
in the sixteenth century (A Theology ofSocia/ity, 290). 
56 Ibid., 50. 
57 Bethge, Biography, 154. Lasserre, therefore, 'provided the initial impulse for ... 
Discipleship' (Ibid., 153). 
58 Discipleship, 102, n. 2. In the same footnote, Bonhoeffer attacks any contrast between 
Matthew and Luke. 'Matthew is not interested in spiritualising the original Beatitude (Luke's 
form), nor is Luke interested in politicising any original Beatitudes (Matthew's form) referring 
only to "state of mind."' For the remainder of this section, page numbers in brackets refer to 
Discipleship. 
59 Ibid., 110- and see editors' n. 51 on the same page. 
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persecuted and rejected, and in all of them the one work: bearing the cross of 
Jesus Christ' (114). 
This work also included concern for the well-being of all in the church-
community and beyond. In the context of when Bonhoeffer was writing - the 
Nazi mistreatment and murder of the Jews- the fact that Bonhoeffer tells us 
the disciples' concern and care for others is not confined to the church-
community, is significant, even while no specific action is advocated.60 On 
similar lines, Bonhoeffer's statement that '[f]or Christians, there is no such 
thing as absolute earthly allegiance' ,61 and his clear statements warning 
against 'loyalty oaths', sounded a lot more 'political' than his words may 
appear now.62 Equally, Bonhoeffer's insistence that Jesus 'demands undivided 
obedience' threatened Lutherans who referred to obedience to the State when 
in office, as opposed to in their private capacity, to justifY their participation in 
Nazi-inspired evil acts.63 In spite- or perhaps because- of all this, the Sermon 
on the Mount section of Discipleship still reads as a paper addressed to those 
who can and do expect persecution simply for being Christians, for focussing 
solely on Jesus, and becoming separated from the people around them.64 
However, the disciples cannot judge the other person; that other person can 
only be viewed as one 'to whom Jesus comes' (170). Enemies must be prayed 
for. If the sin is to be condemned, the sinner is not. On the other hand, they 
cannot force the forgiving Word on an unwilling world (173). Like Luther, 
Bonhoeffer does not expect a large number of true Christians: 
The call [of Jesus] separates a small group, those who follow, from the 
great mass of the people. The disciples are few and will always be only 
a few. (175) 
60 See ibid., 121-2, especially editors' n. 85. Also see the German editors' 'Afterward' in ibid., 
304: 'During the Third Reich readers knew that a real engagement with the thoughts of 
Discipleship would necessarily entail practical consequences for their own lives.' 
61 Ibid., 130. The German Christians required pastors to swear a loyalty oath to Hitler from 
August 1934, ibid, n. 112. 
62 Kenneth Morris makes a similar point. 'Bonhoeffer's Critique ofTotalitarianism', 267-8. 
63 See Discipleship, 135 and editors' n. 124. 
64 See, for example, ibid., 169. 
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Even here there is separation: confession alone65 does not save people. They 
must be doers of the word as well; inaction is not an option if disciples want to 
be part of the faith-community (179-82). The 'doing' is the call to serve even 
the weakest and despised 'brothers or sisters- be they Jew or Greek, slave or 
free ... ' (257). This service, presumably, Bonhoeffer felt could be enacted in 
any walk of life (237-40). 
The education of the Christian for political action seen here consists in taking 
the Sermon on the Mount seriously, and, vitally, seeking to serve any and 
every member ofthe community- and not just the church community. 
6.3.2.2 The Two Kingdoms and Ethics 
Bonhoe:ffer's approach to the doctrine of the two kingdoms, the idea that 
Christ is Lord over all, but in different ways, can be discerned in Ethics 
primarily in his treatment of the ultimate and the penultimate - or 'The Last 
Things and the Things Before the Last' .66 Ethics, as Feil notes, moves away 
from the negative view of the world:67 even though the present world is 
'doomed to destruction', it 'must be taken seriously. ' 68 Bonhoeffer rejects two 
approaches to the world: that of radicalism - which 'sees only the ultimate' 
and 'Christ is the destroyer and enemy of everything penultimate, and 
everything penultimate is enmity towards Christ'69 - and compromise, where 
the penultimate 'is not threatened or imperilled by the ultimate' (127). For 
Bonhoeffer, 'the Christian life means neither a destruction nor a sanctioning of 
the penultimate' (132). 
What is this penultimate? It is everything that precedes the ultimate, 
everything that precedes the justification of the sinner by grace alone, 
65 Even in a time when confession was an important means of differentiating between the 
Confessing and Reich Churches- see ibid., 178, n. 234. 
66 This is not the first time Bonhoeffer had looked at this topic. See Jan Ligus, 'Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer: Ultimate, Penultimate and Their Impact' in Guy Carter et al. (eds.), Bonhoeffer's 
Ethics: Old Europe and New Frontiers (Kampen, The Netherlands: Kok Pharos, 1991 ), 59-60. 
Ligus also observes that 'the first chapter of The Cost of Discipleship also deals with the 
relation ofthe ultimate to the penultimate' (ibid., 59, and see LPP, 157 where Bonhoeffer says 
'I just hinted at this, but did not follow it up ... '. Chapter 1 of Discipleship concerns cheap and 
costly grace, discussed above.) 
67 Feil, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 139ff., and see also Ligus, op. cit., 60. Bonhoeffer himself is now 
becoming more involved 'politically', i.e. in the conspiracy against Hitler. 
68 Feil, 139. 
69 Ethics, 126-7. For the rest of this section, page numbers in brackets refer to this work. 
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everything which is to be regarded as leading up to the last thing when 
the last thing has been found. It is at the same time everything which 
follows the ultimate and yet again precedes it ... ( 133) 
Therefore the relationship between the ultimate and the penultimate can be 
seen as complex, but Bonhoeffer is clear on two points: 'it is the ultimate 
which determines the penultimate', and it is ' [ f]or the sake of the ultimate the 
penultimate must be preserved' ( 13 3). 
In Ethics, therefore, Bonhoeffer has nothing similar to the Lutheran idea of the 
separation of the two kingdorns;70 here the interrelation (but not 
interdependence) of the two kingdoms is shown. The question for us is what 
action should we take in the world in preparation for the ultimate? 
The hungry man needs bread and the homeless man needs a roof; the 
undisciplined need order and the slave needs freedom. To allow the 
hungry man to remain hungry would be blasphemy against God and 
one's neighbour, for what is nearest God is precisely the need of one's 
neighbour . . . If the hungry man does not attain to faith, then the guilt 
falls on those who refused him bread. To provide the hungry man with 
bread is to prepare the way for the coming of grace. ( 136) 
Bonhoeffer is careful to say that these actions are not the same as the coming 
of grace, but for those who do these things 'for the sake of the ultimate' 
. . . this penultimate does bear a relation to the ultimate. It is a 
penultimate. The coming of grace is the ultimate. (137, emphasis 
original) 
The penultimate is spoken of and done to prepare the way, 'so that the word of 
God, the ultimate, grace, can come to them' (137). Even here, however, there 
is no clear link between action and the ultimate; it is not the case that 'values 
must be set in order' before people can become Christians. Bonhoeffer points 
to the paradox that 'precisely at times when the world has seemed to be 
relatively in order that the estrangement from the faith has been especially 
deep-seated and alarming.' He continues: 
The preparation of the way for Christ cannot, therefore, be simply a 
matter of the establishment of certain desirable and expedient 
conditions; it simply cannot be the realization of a programme of social 
reform. It is quite certain that the preparation of the way is a matter of 
70 This separation, as noted above, had lead to 'cheap grace', and was not what Luther 
intended. 
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concrete interventions in the visible world . . . yet everything depends 
on this activity being a spiritual reality, precisely because ultimately it 
is not indeed a question of the reform of earthly conditions, but it is a 
question ofthe coming of Christ. (137) 
However, even though we are all still sinners, because of the 'approaching 
ultimate', the penultimate must still 'be respected and validated' (139). 
Christian life involves living in the world, however aware we might be of the 
fallen nature of that world. Bonhoeffer makes his position clear in his 'Outline 
for a Book': 
The church is the church only when it exists for others ... The church 
must share in the secular problems of ordinary human life, not 
dominating, but helping and serving. It must tell men of every calling 
what it means to live in Christ, to exist for others ... It must not under-
estimate the importance of human example . . . it is not abstract 
argument, but example, that gives its word emphasis and power.71 
It is clear from this that Bonhoeffer has not become blind to the world's 
failings, but just very aware of how Christians are to live in the world, even if 
they are not to be of it- this latter point being the emphasis of Discipleship.72 
Indeed, as Feil correctly argues, in Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison, 
Bonhoeffer 'postulates faithfulness to the earth for the sake of Jesus Christ 
directly in the knowledge of the destruction of the earth.' 73 Or, in Bonhoeffer' s 
own words: 'It may be that the day of judgment will dawn tomorrow; in that 
case, we shall gladly stop working for a better future. But not before.' 74 In the 
Ethics we are told that: 
God loves man. God loves the world. It is not an ideal man that He 
loves, but man as he is; not an ideal world, but the real world. 75 
71 LPP 382-3 
72 And, why he was able to 'stand by what I wrote', even if he could see the dangers of the 
book from the vantage point of his Tegel theology. See ibid, 369. 
73 Feil, 139. This eschatological perspective is also noted by L. Gregory Jones. See 'The Cost 
of Forgiveness: Grace, Christian Community and the Politics of Worldly Discipleship', in 
Wayne Whitson Floyd and Charles Marsh (eds.), Theology and the Practice of Responsibility 
(Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity Press International, 1994), 159. Jones continues: 'In particular 
social and political circumstances, Christians must discern whether, and to what extent, it is 
possible to proclaim the ultimate word offorgiveness rather than live in the penultimate realm 
of preparing the way - perhaps in silence.' It seems to me that Bonhoeffer expects the 
penultimate to occur whether or not the ultimate can be proclaimed, but Jones is right to say 
that, in the penultimate realm, 'Christians are called to acts of repentance which, for example, 
"resist injustice"' (ibid.). 
74 LPP, 15-16. 
75 Ethics, 73 (cf Feil, 141). 
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This attitude, while still aware that Christians should not be of the world - the 
pages following the above quotation from Ethics show that Bonhoeffer is very 
much aware of the evil of the world, and that Christians should have a 
different attitude76 -he concludes that '[i]t is only through God's being made 
man that it is possible to know the real man and not to despise him. ' 77 
6.3.3 Conclusion 
Bonhoeffer clearly reacted against his Lutheran inheritance in terms of the 
separation of the two kingdoms and argued trenchantly against 'thinking in 
terms of two spheres'. 78 He insisted on Christ's lordship over all, including the 
fallen world. 79 Therefore, 'there is no real possibility of being a Christian 
outside the reality of the world and that there is no real worldly existence 
outside the reality of Jesus Christ. ' 80 Bonhoeffer argued for costly, rather than 
cheap, grace, and for the respect of the penultimate for the sake of the 
ultimate. Christians must therefore be involved in society as Christians, as 
disciples. There will be a cost to this (emphasised in Discipleship), but the 
church is only the church not when it concentrates solely on God's kingdom of 
the right hand, but when it 'exists for others.' This means that the church must 
recognise its political responsibility. As with much else, Bonhoeffer's thought 
developed over time. In the next section, I shall look at how his thought 
developed from 1933 (the Jewish question) through to his ideas on free 
responsibility and how disciples can operate under an 'ethic of resistance' 
when the church itself is in danger of acting inauthentically. 
6.4 The Church's Political Responsibility 
6.4.1 Responsibility for the Jews 
From the moment Hitler came to power, Bonhoeffer was involved with the 
church's resistance to Nazism. As noted above, this resistance centred on the 
Aryan legislation of 7t1t April 1933, but in his essay 'The Church and the 
Jewish Question', unlike his later work, Bonhoeffer still followed the 
76 See Ethics, 73-6. 
77 Ibid., 76. 
78 Ibid., 198. 
79 As such, it has been argued that he had a 'weak' eschatology, see 6.6 below. 
80 Ibid. 
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traditional Lutheran line and carefully differentiated between what the church 
could, and what it could not, tell the state to do. 
Without doubt, the Church of the Reformation has no right to address 
the state directly in its specifically political actions . . . Without doubt 
the Jewish question is one of the historical problems which our state 
must deal with, and without doubt the state is justified in adopting new 
methods here. 81 
But, Bonhoeffer continues with what he feels the church can, and should be 
able to, do: 
there are three possible ways in which the church can act towards the 
state: in the first place ... it can ask the state whether its actions are 
legitimate . . . Secondly, it can aid the victims of state action ... even if 
they do not belong to the Christian community ... The third possibility 
is not just to bandage the victims under the wheel, but to put a spoke in 
the wheel itself ... 82 
Whether or not the objections are theological, and whether or not Bonhoeffer 
advocates the 'third possibility' at this time, he is crystal clear on whether the 
church should accept the Aryan clauses for itself: 
It is ... the task of Christian preaching to say: here is the church, where 
Jew and German stand together under the Word of God ... No one who 
feels unable to tolerate church fellowship with Christians of Jewish 
race can be prevented from separating himself from this church 
fellowship. But it must then be made clear to him with the utmost 
seriousness that he is thus loo sing himself from the place on which the 
church of Christ stands ... 83 
As he wrote this, Bonhoeffer was prepared to leave open the question of 
whether this separation would be a 'tolerable schism', but '[b]y August 1933 
Bonhoeffer had concluded beyond all doubt that there could be no question of 
belonging to a church that excluded the Jews. ' 84 The church's political 
responsibility was limited here to questioning the state about the legitimacy of 
its action, and, as far as Jewish members of the church went: 'aiding the 
victims of state action'. Green tells us that 'Bonhoeffer is referring to, but not 
81 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, No Rusty Swords (London: Collins, 1965), 222-3. 
82 Ibid., 225. 
83 lbid., 229. 
84 Bethge, Biography, 273. For the background on the Bonhoeffer family's approach to the 
Jews, and to Hitler's 'inevitable' approach to the Jewish question, see Edwin H. Robertson, 'A 
Study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Jews', in Bonhoeffer's Ethics: Old Europe and New 
Frontiers, 121-30. 
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yet advocating, the possibility that the church may have to demand the 
dissolution of a government which has forfeited its legitimacy. ' 85 
Bonhoeffer's attitude to the Jews has faced criticism. For Kenneth Barnes, 
Bonhoeffer's time in Britain from October 1933 to April 1935 suggests 'an 
uncertainty and ambivalence ... about the church and the Jewish question',86 -
ignoring the fact that Bonhoeffer (as noted above) had settled his position by 
August 193 3. A more balanced approach comes from Ruth Zerner who notes 
Bonhoeffer's Lutheran heritage, and his willingness to repeat attitudes of 
'condescension, if not contempt, towards Jews' ,87 but also his focus on 
'restraining popular attitudes . . . towards the Jews. ' 88 She also points to 
Bonhoeffer's later statements including: 'Only he who cries out for the Jews 
may sing Gregorian chant'; and 'An expulsion of the Jews from the West must 
necessarily bring with it the expulsion of Christ. For Jesus Christ was a Jew'. 89 
We may conclude that, for all his initial failings, there was progression m 
Bonhoeffer's thought. So, to read all ofBonhoeffer's life (and future work) in 
the light of the 1933 essay on 'The Church and the Jewish Question', with all 
the apparent ambiguities that Barnes finds in that document, is as dangerous as 
reading Bonhoeffer's entire life and work backwards from his martyrdom.90 
Bonhoeffer's attitude to the Jews, it must be remembered, was considerably 
more liberal than a lot of people in Germany (including Martin Niemoller)91 at 
the time. He had to fight an often lonely battle, even as his own thought 
progressed and he worked through the three options of church action and 
involvement laid out in his 1933 essay. Bonhoeffer had to think through (and 
react against) an unquestioning obedience to the state that was engendered by 
85 Green, A Theology of Sociality, 232. 
86 Kenneth C. Barnes, 'Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hitler's Persecution ofthe Jews', in Robert P. 
Ericksen and Susannah Heschel (eds.), Betrayal: German Churches and the Holocaust 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1999), 120. 
87 Ruth Zerner, 'Church, State and the "Jewish Question"', in de Gruchy (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 195. Also see Robertson 'A Study ofDietrich Bonhoeffer 
and the Jews', 129 for a discussion on Bonhoeffer's 'indefensible' repetition of the 'medieval 
teaching of the 'curse' upon the Jews ... '. 
88 Zemer, 'Church, State and the "Jewish Question'", 195. 
89 Quoted in ibid., 197. 
90 A danger noted by de Gruchy in 'The Reception ofBonhoeffer's Theology', 97. 
91 Ibid., 195. 
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his upbringing, his culture and his Lutheran religion. The fact that Bonhoeffer 
went so far in his thinking should be commended; it is wrong to expect (as 
Barnes does) a fully articulated opposition to the state as early as 1933. The 
calls for political action on the part of the church were generally ignored, but 
had they been heeded, and had other church leaders joined Bonhoeffer 'while 
there was time to prevent genocide', then there may have been a chance for 
effective resistance to Hitler before tyrannicide became the only option. 92 
6.4.2 .Responsibility for Peace 
It was Hitler's antipathy towards the Jews that renewed Bonhoeffer's demands 
for political action on the part ofthe church, but his concerns were wider than 
that. His ecumenical work, which officially began at the 1931 conference in 
Cambridge, brought him into contact with many (including the English Bishop 
George Bell) who were fighting for peace. This concern about the 
international situation, and primarily with regard to peace, was all the more 
surprising from a Lutheran - who was expected to 'see that Christianity 
involved giving Caesar his due and that bearing arms for the Fatherland when 
required was a natural and Christian duty' 93 - and a German where there was, 
even among protestant circles, 'widespread opposition to anything savouring 
of 'internationalism".94 However, Bonhoeffer was not a typical German 
Lutheran, and he was still challenged by Lasserre's demand to receive Jesus' 
teachings on the Sermon on the Mount not 'as ideals for an ideal world', but as 
a concrete command to non-violence.95 In 1932, at the ecumenical conference 
at Gland, Switzerland, Bonhoeffer challenged the churches to re-examine 'a 
world whose idol has become the word 'security' -a world without sacrifice, 
full of mistrust and suspicion, because past fears are still with it ... ' 96 and to 
stand for a peace in which 'righteousness and truth are preserved. ' 97 His 
concern remained much the same at the conference in Fano, where his call was 
92 See Michael Westrnorland-White et. al., 'Disciples of the Incarnation', Sojourners 23, 1994, 
30. 
93 Keith Clements, 'Ecumenical Witness for Peace', in de Gruchy (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 155. 
94 Ibid, 157. 
95 Ibid, 155. 
96 No Rusty Swords, 186-7. 
97 Ibid., 188. 
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for a peace that 'must be dared.' 98 As Geffiey Kelly notes, '[t]he churches 
were, however, timid and lacking in the will to commit themselves to such a 
risky cause.'99 This led to Bonhoeffer's complaint that the churches spent too 
much time looking after their own perceived interests and survival under 
Nazism to engage in resistance - and action on the part of those whom the 
regime victimised. 100 
6.4.3 Responsibility before Christ 
So, how were Christians to behave, especially as the church (even the 
Confessing Church) failed to live up to the promises of the Barmen 
declaration?101 From 1935 to 1940 (when the Gestapo closed down the 
collective pastorates), as I have noted, Bonhoeffer was engaged in training 
candidates for ministry in the Confessing Church. Discipleship is Bonhoeffer's 
key to Christian behaviour at this time. This discipleship, this radical living for 
'Christ in community', can be seen as forming an 'ethic of resistance' .102 I 
have noted above that Discipleship was seen as more political when it was 
written than it might be seen today. This is due to the context and culture of its 
time: the editors' of Discipleship make the point with clarity: 
Bonhoeffer's Confessing Church [was] in open hostility to the regnant 
Nazi ideology ... Beatings, arrests, police terror, and rampant injustice 
were commonplace in the years in which the Nazi government 
reinforced its grip on every aspect of life in Germany. It was not lost 
on Bonhoeffer that these developments and the sluggish reaction of 
many church leaders were in sharp contrast to those daring, even 
shocking sayings of Jesus, the Beatitudes. 103 
98 Ibid., 291. 
99 Geffiey Kelly, 'Bonhoeffer and Romero: Prophets of Justice for the Oppressed', in 
Theology and the Practice of Responsibility, 96. 
100 See LPP, 300 ('Our church ... is incapable of taking the word of reconciliation and 
redemption to mankind and the world'), and 381 ('No taking risks for others'), and c£ Kelly, 
op. cit., 96. 
101 In its day, the Barmen declaration was politically radical 'because in that situation it 
created a freedom zone "in the midst of a system of terror"' (de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South 
Africa, (Grand Rapids, Mi.: Eerdmans, 1984), 33). For a copy of the full text of the Barmen 
declaration (in English), see ibid., 145-50. Bonhoeffer was not at the synod that drew up the 
declaration, drafted by Karl Barth, but he 'was relieved by this justification of his views' 
(Bethge, Biography, 371). 
102 Green, A Theology ofSociality, 307. Green notes that Bonhoeffer criticises ethical postures 
that may have served previous generations well, because they are insufficient for the present 
task, and therefore it is responsible action that 'is in fact at the center ofBonhoeffer's ethic of 
resistance' (ibid., 305-7). 
103 Editors' 'Introduction' to the English Edition of Discipleship, 2-3. 
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In turn it is Bonhoeffer's treatment of those Beatitudes, especially his ideas on 
not resisting evil, forgiveness, or loving one's enemies, that has caused some 
to see Discipleship 'as too otherworldly and impractical in how Christians had 
to deal with an enemy such as Nazism ... '. 104 Bonhoeffer's editors would have 
none of this. For them, Bonhoeffer's 'countercultural perspective' in 
Discipleship 'was not a flight from the world, but a struggle to establish a 
critical church presence in the world.' 105 
This 'countercultural perspective' can be seen in Discipleship when the 
Christian is to 'expect nothing from the world but everything from Christ and 
his coming realm.' 106 In this light any revolution against current social order is 
forbidden. 107 However, Ernst Feil tells us not to regard Bonhoeffer's different 
overall approach in Discipleship - compared with Ethics and Letters and 
Papers from Prison and with his earlier, more positive view of the world- as 
discontinuity, but to see the call of discipleship as a call that 'leads out of the 
world and only thereby truly into the world.' 108 This is to over-simplifY. 
Bonhoeffer's goal in writing Discipleship was to bring those who 'have to 
admit sadly that we have made it too difficult for them to get to know Jesus' 109 
into true discipleship. The idea is that these people, too, can be blessed along 
with those 'who already stand at the end of the path on which we wish to 
embark' and who 'in the knowledge of such [costly] grace, can live in the 
world without losing themselves in it.' 110 Discipleship was written to counter 
'cheap grace' where 
the world is in principle justified by [cheap] grace. I can thus remain as 
before in my bourgeois-secular existence . . . The conflict between a 
Christian and a bourgeois-secular vocation is resolved. Christian life 
consists of my living in the world and like the world, my not being any 
different from it ... 111 
104 Ibid., 14. 
105 Ibid., 16. 
106 Discipleship, 239. This sentiment strikes an Augustinian note (the sojoumer idea is 
especially clear in ibid., 250-2). 
107 Ibid., 238-9. 
108 Fei1, 138. 
109 Discipleship, 37. 
110 Ibid., 55 ( c£ Feil, 138). 
Ill Ibid., 50-1. 
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Given the difference between 'cheap' and 'costly' grace, it is unsurprising that 
this book contains mostly Bonhoeffer's 'No' to the world. However, this 'No' 
to the world also contains the radical 'Yes' to Christ that Bonhoeffer wished to 
emphasise against the prevailing culture of accommodation to Nazism. This 
radical 'Yes' to Christ does not diminish in Bonhoeffer's theology. As he 
becomes more deeply involved in the conspiracy, he still defines the Christian 
life as 'prayer and righteous action'. 112 How he conceived 'righteous action' 
and what it consisted of may have changed over the period from Discipleship 
to Letters and Papers from Prison, but the two sides of faith and action (or 
obedience) in the world are still extant. As a good Lutheran, Bonhoeffer insists 
on the ontological priority of faith, but he is equally clear that this does not 
follow chronologically. 113 Bonhoeffer regards the first step as one of 
obedience that leads to faith. It is a step that is taken in the 'iustitia civilis', 
that is in the sphere of civil rather than faith or spiritual justice, 'within which 
people are free' to obey Christ's call or not. 114 
This gtves both people and churches responsibilities in the civil realm. 
Bonhoeffer discusses these explicitly in his Ethics. 115 Even though he knew 
that the Confessing Church had failed to hold the Nazi government to account, 
he clearly felt that the church still had responsibilities towards the state. 116 
These responsibilities were laid on the church in order to answer 'the claim of 
government on the church'. 117 These responsibilities consisted mainly of 
'call[ing] sin by its name and ... warn[ing] men against sin ... ' .118 The question 
remains as to who was to express the concerns and criticisms that the church 
had of the state. Does Bonhoeffer expect the people who should have seen 'the 
need for free and responsible action' to be ordinary people, or the elites, the 
church leaders, only? It is to this question that I now turn. 
112 LPP, 300. 
113 Discipleship, 63-4. 
114 Discipleship, 64, and see editors' footnote 19 on the same page. 
115 Ethics, 344-6. 
116 These compare with the responsibilities Luther held that the church had toward the state 
(see 6.3.1 above). 
117 Ethics, 345. The government's claim on the church consists in keeping and, if called upon, 
to restore, 'the rightful order within which the spiritual office can be rightfully discharged and 
both government and Church can perform their own several tasks' (ibid., 344). 
118 Ibid., 345. 
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6.5 A Privileged Liberator? 
F. Burton Nelson tells us that 'Bonhoeffer's own biography depicts a journey 
from privilege to deprivation, from afiluence to subsistence, from comfort to 
suffering, from upper class elitism to the lower dregs of society behind 
bars.' 119 Whether Bonhoeffer would ever have identified himself as part of the 
'lower dregs of society' is moot, 120 but Bonhoeffer's empathy with the 
disadvantaged, including the Harlem blacks he met while at Union Seminary, 
the disadvantaged children he organised Youth clubs for when he was a pastor 
in Berlin, the Jews in anti-Semitic Germany, and finally his fellow inmates at 
T egel prison (and the other places he was incarcerated) is well documented. 121 
Nelson's pertinent question is whether it is at all possible 'for middle and 
upper class, afiluent, comfortable Christians . . . to hear the Bible from 
below'?122 This question seems particularly valid in the light of the Confessing 
Church's failure to stand with the oppressed ofNazi Germany. All Bonhoeffer 
could do was hope that, one day, 'men will once more be called so to utter the 
word of God that the world will be changed and renewed by it.' 123 
At Finkenwalde, Bonhoeffer was involved with those who were training to be 
pastors, and therefore leaders in the Confessing Church. What we cannot 
discern in Life Together and Discipleship is the sort of political action (outside 
and apart from prayer) Bonhoeffer would expect from the ordinary member of 
the congregation. Bonhoeffer has been seen as a sympathetic character by 
liberation theologians, 124 but he also has an elitist side. In Ethics, Bonhoeffer 
119 F. Burton Nelson, 'Christian Faith and Public Policy: The View from Below', Covenant 
Quarterly 40 (1982), 31. 
120 
'[Bonhoeffer demonstrates] an ability to concentrate on intellectual projects of [his] 
choosing and even continue much of [his] pre-prison life-style, including the cultivation of 
[his] sensitive esthetic [sic] tastes.' Larry Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 45. 
121 As one example, even at Schonberg, Bonhoeffer 'did a great deal to keep some of the 
weaker brethren from depression and anxiety.' Letter from H. Falconer to S. Leibholz 
( 1.1 0.1945), quoted in Bethge, 924. 
122 Nelson, 'Christian Faith and Public Policy', 32. 
123 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 'Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism of Dietrich Wilhelm Rudiger 
Bethge', in LPP, 300. 
124 G. Clark Chapman Jr. charts several parallels with, and criticisms of, Bonhoeffer by 
liberation theologians, including the parallel between praxis, 'the continuing reciprocity of 
action and reflection' and Bonhoeffer's portrayal of discipleship ('Bonhoeffer: Resource for 
Liberation Theology', Union Seminary Quarterly Review 36 (1981), 231). Chapman also 
criticises Bonhoeffer for his lack of awareness of the class conflict, but this, just like the 
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discusses the French Revolution and its inheritance, he is clear that there are 
(or ought to be) 'strong and mentally superior personalities' over and above 
the masses, and is concerned that 'the increasing acceptance of mass standards 
will . . . level down mental achievements to such an extent that technology 
itself will cease to develop and will therefore cease to exist.' 125 Later on in the 
same book, Bonhoeffer asserts that 'it is granted to only very few men ... to 
experience the hazard of responsible action.' 126 However, Bonhoeffer is not 
content to leave it there. He is critical of a society that crushes those, outside 
of the great and the good, who 'venture to act on their free responsibility', 
with 'the machinery of the social order'. 127 He also, in the light of this 
'machinery', seeks to redefine free responsibility: 
every life can experience this situation [of free responsibility] in its 
most characteristic form, that is to say, in the encounter with other 
people. Even when free responsibility is more or less excluded from a 
man's vocational and public life, he nevertheless always stands in a 
responsible relation to other men; these relations extend from his 
family to his workmates. The fulfilment of genuine responsibility at 
this point affords the only sound possibility of extendin§ the sphere of 
responsibility once more into vocational and public life. 12 
In this and the following paragraph, one can detect signs of the conservative 
aristocrat129 ('The apprentice has a duty of obedience towards his master, but 
at the same time he has also a free responsibility for his work, for his 
achievement and, therefore, also for his master'), 130 but Bonhoeffer has clearly 
opened the door towards ordinary people becoming more involved with action 
for others. As with his theology from below, these moves are only tentative, 
and have not been fully. worked through - there is tension here between the 
author of Discipleship who did not wish to see any upset of the social order, 
criticisms of his sexism (see H. Russel Botman, 'Is Bonhoeffer Still of Any Use in South 
Africa?', in John W. de Gruchy (ed.) Bonhoeffer for a New Day (Grand Rapids, Mi.: 
Eerdmans, 1997), 367-8.) is criticism out of time. There was enough conflict in the 1930s and 
1940s, for anyone to cope with, without demanding that Bonhoeffer be aware - before the 
world around him - of other conflicts. 
125 Ethics, 102. 
126 Ibid., 246-7. 
127 Ibid., 247. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Kenneth Morris calls it 'rank elitism' ('Bonhoeffer's Critique ofTotalitarianism', 266). 
130 Ethics, 248. 
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and the desire to see all humanity capable of exercising a free responsibility 
that accepts the 'tension between obedience and freedom.' 131 
In his discussion of the place of responsibility, Bonhoeffer reacts against 'two 
disastrous misunderstandings' 132 of the call of the grace of Christ on a 
person's life. The first is the secular Protestant one that confuses the call to 
earthly duties and institutions for the whole of Christ's call on a person's 
life. 133 The second is the monastic one that attempts 'to firld a place which is 
not the world and at which this call [of Christ] can, therefore, be answered 
more :fitly .' 134 God's "no", as well as his ''yes", 'is addressed to the who le 
world, including the monastery ... '. 135 For Bonhoeffer, although he talks about 
recognising a "limited field of accomplishments" that may be a person's lot, 
he insists that its boundary is broken both by Christ 'from above', 'but also in 
an outward direction.' 136 In theory this can apply to everyone, and Bonhoeffer 
argues that 'there can be no petty and pedantic restricting of one's interests to 
one's professional duties in the narrowest sense.' However Bonhoeffer's 
example is of a physician (like his father?) who may be called to take 'public 
action against some measure which constitutes a threat to medical science ... '. 
It would have been interesting to see how Bonhoeffer saw boundary breaking 
responsibility working for the apprentice (or the schoolboy, student, or 
industrial employee) whom he regarded as in a relationship of free 
responsibility, even while they held a duty of obedience to their respective 
masters. 137 Professionals, such as church pastors, are encouraged to go beyond 
the "Lutheran" idea of the limitation of responsibility and care for the 
neighbour who is farthest away from them, 138 even to the extent of breaking 
God's own law 'solely in order that the authority of life, truth and property 
131 Ibid, 249. Though, interestingly, in Discipleship Bonhoeffer also writes: 'The rights of a 
man with a university education and the privileges of social standing are no longer valid for 
anyone who has become a messenger of Jesus ... Let it become clear that with all the riches 
you have, you covet nothing for yourselves ... ' (Discipleship, 189). 
132 Ethics, 251. 
133 Ibid., 251-2. This objection is reminiscent of Bonhoeffer's attack on 'cheap grace' in 
Discipleship. 
134 Ethics, 252. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid., 253. 
137 See ibid., 247-8. 
138 Ibid., 255-7. 
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may be restored.' 139 This means that acceptance of guilt is also a part of free 
responsibility, but, yet again, it is the professional classes who seem called to 
exercise this sort offree responsibility. 
How far Bonhoeffer, had he survived the Second World War, would have 
moved towards a liberationist position is a matter for conjecture, but he was 
clearly beginning, but only beginning, to think beyond the bounds of his 
upbringing but he still regards positively the 'urban middle-class culture' that 
both he and his godson had been born into. 140 This is in spite of the concerns 
expressed to his sister about his privileged situation, 141 though we cannot tell 
whether he would have agreed with John de Gruchy that privilege is 'too 
much at the cost of others', and 'has become a form of self-imposed bondage 
from which we need to be liberated for our own sakes as well as those of 
others.' 142 Writing from a South African perspective - in which whiteness was 
a birthright to privilege - de Gruchy points to a Bonhoeffer 
whose theology and life experience enabled him to so transcend the 
limitations of his ecclesiastical and social heritage that he himself 
became free for others and is therefore able to help us discover that 
freedom in Christ for ourselves. He does so as one who in his time and 
place forsook the privileges of his birth, education, and class for the 
sake of Christ and the "least of his brethren" - the Jews of Nazi 
Germany. 143 
Bonhoeffer certainly called for, and was active on behalf of the Jews of Nazi 
Germany, but whether he forsook the privileges that were his birthright, is 
open to debate. 144 Certainly he was prepared to go his own way in following 
Christ when even the Confessing Church wanted to compromise with Nazism, 
139 Ibid., 257. 
140 LPP, 294. For an excellent description on how Bonhoeffer was 'personally tom' on the 
issue of a social ethic going beyond the constraints ofhis privileged upbringing, see Chapman, 
'Bonhoeffer: Resource for Liberation Theology', 227. 
141 Bethge, Biography, 19-20. See 6.2.1 above. 
142 de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa, 68. 
143 Ibid., 75. 
144 As Keith Clements points out, the 'we' Bonhoeffer refers to, who learned to see things 
'from the perspective of ... those who suffer', are still 'the consciously privileged, the strong.' 
Keith Clements, 'Community in the Ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer' Studies in Christian 
Ethics, 10 (1997), 30. However, we must also note that Bonhoeffer's life of costly discipleship 
'was lived on a sharp learning curve, as he sought to see things from the perspective of others 
... ' (John de Gruchy, 'Bonhoeffer, Apartheid, and Beyond: The Reception of Bonhoeffer in 
South Africa', in de Gruchy ( ed.) Bonhoeffer for a New Day, 360). 
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but he never denied that the good things in life were also gifts of God. 145 On 
the other hand, Clifford Green's observation that Bonhoeffer "remained fairly 
conservative in his social attitudes and largely limited by the perspectives of 
his own class ... " 146 goes too far in the opposite direction. Bonhoeffer 
certainly sees the goodness of his middle class situation even in prison: 
The urban middle-class culture embodied in the home ofyour mother's 
parents has led to pride in public service, intellectual achievement and 
leadership, and a deep-rooted sense of duty towards a great heritage 
and cultural tradition. This will give you, even before you are aware of 
it, a way of thinking and acting which you can never lose without 
being untrue to yourself 147 
Bonhoeffer was never interested in being untrue to himself, and would have 
seen no reason to deny his upbringing, even in prison. On the other hand that 
upbringing meant 'pride in public service', which in itself means consideration 
of others, even 'the least of the brethren.' 148 Bonhoeffer's own 'liberation' in 
1932 had more to do with his unease about using his theological gifts for his 
own ends: his awareness of 'the clear contradiction between his vocational 
profession to be a servant of Christ, and his actual, conscious use of his 
vocation to serve his own ambition.' 149 The Bible, especially the Sermon on 
the Mount, had a big part to play in this liberation - as had his American 
experiences, including his friendship and work with Albert Fisher and Jean 
Lasserre. Certainly, this 'conversion' 150 put him on the road that, through 
discipleship and as a (very critical) servant of the church, led to his 
involvement with the conspiracy against Hitler. He was not the only member 
of his family to be involved in that conspiracy, and it can be argued that family 
145 See Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 124; cf. LPP, 341-2 (the letter is from 30 June 1944, 
not 27 June, as Rasmussen claims). 
146 Quoted in Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 124. 
147 Bonhoeffer, 'Thoughts on the Day of the Baptism ofDietrich With elm Riidiger Bethge', in 
LPP, 294-5. 
148 This does not mean that he is (or was) a liberal democrat. Therefore I cannot agree with H. 
Russet Botman's attempt to locate Bonhoeffer as a theologian of the democratic Weimar 
republic (H. Russet Botman, 'Who is "Jesus Christ as Community" for Us Today?', The 
Journal of Theology for Southern Africa, 97 (1997), 30-38). Botman wants Bonhoeffer to be a 
democrat, and not the authoritarian conservative he was. (Indeed, it was his authoritarianism 
that he used to oppose totalitarianism - see Kenneth Morris, 'Bonhoeffer Critique of 
Totalitarianism', 255-72.) 
149 Green, A Theology ofSociality, 147. 
150 Though we must be clear that Bonhoeffer never described it as such. Bethge, Biography, 
174. 
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influence meant he was more involved than he might otherwise have been, but 
his family certainly supported him in his actions. 151 
Therefore when de Gruchy tells us, correctly, that a step of obedience is 
required for personal liberation - and that this "outward liberation" precedes 
the "inner liberation"- and '[l]ike Peter or the rich young ruler in the gospels, 
or like Bonhoeffer himself, white South Africans [amongst others] need to be 
set free from that which prevents them from hearing the good news - they 
need to be externally liberated from clinging to those things that are contrary 
to the gospel', 152 this does not have to mean the 'class suicide' that Paulo 
Freire (for example) talks about. 
As we have just seen, however, Bonhoeffer's 'stumbling block' was his own 
ambition. That this ambition came (at least in large part) from his family's 
expectations and upbringing, as Green recounts, 153 is undoubted, but 
Bonhoeffer did not abandon his upbringing entirely when he sought to 
abandon his worldly ambition - as his thoughts on the day of the baptism of 
his great nephew show. 154 It was not privilege per se that Bonhoeffer felt he 
had to repudiate, 155 nor was it his theology which he had written because of 
that ambition, but the ambition itself that needed to be repudiated - indeed 
much of his early theology is now seen as containing the themes that would be 
explored in greater depth later in Bonhoeffer's life. 156 
However, de Gruchy is following Bonhoeffer when he reports the critique of 
both a distorted communalism - 'when ethnicity becomes ideological and 
nationalist it ends up denying the freedom and liberty of others and then, in 
151 Bonhoetfer's father wrote after the war about the loss of 'two sons and two sons-in-law 
through the Gestapo'. 'But since we all agreed about the necessity of action ... we are sad, but 
also proud of their straight and narrow attitude.' Quoted in Bethge, Biography, 933, emphasis 
added. (See also discussion at 6.1 above.) 
152 de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa, 77. 
153 Green, A Theology ofSociality, 143-6. 
154 Quoted above. We must note, however, that Bonhoetfer is prepared to criticise his class, 
often for its unwillingness to exercise its responsibility. See, for example, Ethics, 75; 254, and 
LPP, 5. 
155 He continued to make use of his parents' homes in Berlin and in the country, though, in the 
latter case especially, it was not just for his own use. 
156 See 6.1 above. 
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turn, devours the liberties of its own group' 157 - and individualism - 'which ... 
means that every person exists for himself or herself and not for others, and 
this is equally destructive of society.' 158 What de Gruchy reminds us of, is the 
fact that most liberation movements target their action 'against the liberal 
culture of the West' .159 
A theology of liberation for the privileged is thus about the freeing of 
sociality from nationalism in which individuals become cogs in the 
state machine, but also about the liberation of the privileged from 
irresponsible individualism for the sake of social existence and 
responsibility. 160 
All this of course has implications for the church, which too must be liberated 
from its propensity to be a 'mirror image of broken community'. It took until 
1944 for Bonhoeffer to be freed from 'the bondage of Constantinianism' and 
to contemplate a church truly free ofthe state apparatus. 161 However, whether 
a church is established or not, to be truly free, it must derive its freedom 'not 
from a state constitution but from its obedience to Jesus Christ.' 162 Of course, 
such a church may well need to spend its time opposing privilege and suffer 
for its stand, but this would be no surprise to Bonhoeffer. His 'view from 
below', 'where personal suffering is a more effective key ... for exploring the 
world in thought and action than personal good fortune' also contains a 
warning that 'we must do justice to life in all its dimensions from a higher 
satisfaction, whose foundation is beyond any talk of 'from below' or 'from 
above'.' 163 The view from below is, it seems, a staging post along the way. 
However, what is needed, is a confession of guilt even, and perhaps especially, 
on the part of those who struggle for justice. 164 As Bonhoeffer confessed his 
guilt and moved into the 'responsible action' of smuggling Jews out of the 
Reich and the conspiracy against Hitler, so de Gruchy says white South 
157 de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa, 79. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid., emphasis original. 
160 Ibid., 79-80. 
161 As shown by his 'Outline for a Book', LPP, 382-3; et~ John de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and 
South Africa, 81-2. 
162 de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa, 82. 
163 LPP, 17; cf. de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa, 83, though de Gruchy does not quote 
the warning. 
164 See Ethics, 110-16, especially 113-16 where Bonhoeffer pens a confession on the part of 
the Church for 'her timidity, her evasiveness, her dangerous concessions.' (Ibid., 113). 
216 
Africans need to move 'beyond guilt' and start 'taking concrete steps to 
participate in its [society's] transformation into a responsible society.' 165 Such 
responsible steps are what Bonhoe:ffer sought to take in his involvement with 
the resistance movement. 
As such involvement was ethically ambiguous, and cost Bonhoeffer his 
Christian reputation, so other ambiguous situations may be looked at in the 
light of his theology. The Seventh International Bonhoeffer Congress took 
place in Cape Town in 1996, when the 'morally ambiguous' and 'ethically 
problematic' actions of the anti-apartheid movement, as well as the actions of 
the apartheid state security system were open to investigation by the 
Commission on Truth and Reconciliation. 166 De Gruchy, in his own paper at 
the congress, looks specifically at the new situation in South Africa, but covers 
familiar ground: the identity, the solidarity, or -to use Bonhoeffer's word -
the deputyship alongside the victims of state oppression, 167 the need to 
acknowledge our own guilt, 168 but his final section looks forward to the new 
situation. South Africa may not become 'religionless' but it is certainly multi-
faith. So what is required was righteous action in the world, and a church 
(under the disciplina arcani) that was 'a disciplined life of reflection on the 
Word and prayer for the world.' 169 It is only this model of spirituality that can 
serve in a 'postmodem world of multi-faith and multi-cultural societies such 
as South Africa.' 170 However, de Gruchy ends with questions rather than 
answers: these questions ask what role the elites - to whom the question "Are 
we still of any use?" was asked- have today. 'And does Bonhoeffer still have 
something to say ... to the new generation of women and men who must take 
responsibility for the future?' 171 It is to the question of the future, and 
Bonhoeffer's attitude to it, that I now turn. 
165 de Gruchy, Bonhoeffer and South Africa, 86. 
166 See John W. de Gruchy, "Are We Still of Any Use?", in de Gruchy (ed.) Bonhoeffer for a 
New Day, 2. 
167 See John W. de Gruchy, 'The Reception ofBonhoeffer in South Africa', in ibid., 359-61. 
168 Ibid., 361-3. 
169 Ibid., 365. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
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6.6 Bonhoeffer's Eschatology 
The attitude to the future, as I have indicated in my study of Augustine and 
Gutierrez, can be seen in the attitude to eschatology: the last things. 
Bonhoeffer's theology, however, majors in ecclesiology (particularly in his 
early work) and Christology (more to the fore from Act and Being onwards, to 
the extent that 'it is eminently justifiable to regard christology as the guiding 
principle of Bonhoeffer's theology'). 172 This does not mean that Bonhoeffer 
gives no thought to eschatology, but that his eschatology- like other aspects 
of his theology - must be seen in relation to his christology. For example, in 
Letters and Papers from Prison, Bonhoeffer asserts that, against 'other 
oriental religions', the redemptions referred to in both the Old and New 
Testaments, 'are historical, i.e. on this side of death ... '. For Bonhoeffer 
The difference between the Christian hope of resurrection and the 
mythological hope is that the former sends a man back to his life on 
earth in a wholly new way ... The Christian ... has no last line of 
escape available from earthly tasks and difficulties into the eternal, but, 
like Christ himself . . . he must drink the earthly cup to the dregs ... 
This world must not be prematurely written off; in this the Old and 
New Testaments are at one. Redemption myths arise from human 
boundary-experiences, but Christ takes hold of a man at the centre of 
his life. 173 
This means that, even while one is conscious of 'the constant knowledge of 
death and resurrection', one lives 'completely in this world' .174 Or, to use the 
parallels noted above, in living in the penultimate, we point to the ultimate. 175 
'In so doing we throw ourselves completely into the arms of God, taking 
seriously, not our own sufferings, but those of God in the world- watching 
with Christ in Gethsemane.' 176 
Feil asserts that in the Ethics and Letters and Papers from Prison, 
'Bonhoeffer's understanding of the world changed in such a way that the 
world was said to be preserved for the sake of the church; now the church was 
said to be there for the world.' 177 Following his discussion of the divine 
172 Feil, 95. For much of what follows, see ibid., 99-159. 
173 LPP, 336-7 (cf. Feil, 94). 
174 LPP, 369. 
175 See 6.3.2.2 above. 
176 Ibid., 370. 
177 Feil, 138. 
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mandates in Ethics, Bonhoeffer tells us that 'the will of God is nothing other 
than the becoming real of the reality of Christ with us and in our world.' 178 
Further on, we are also told that '[t]he will of God is already fulfilled by God 
Himself, by His reconciliation of the world with Himself in Christ.' 179 
Bonhoeffer's eschatology has been described as weak. 180 Larry Rasmussen 
refers to his lack of an 'apocalyptic eschatology'. These are essentially the 
same criticism. An apocalyptic eschatology includes 'the announcement of 
impending reversals of fortune ... ' and 'in this ending of the present age, the 
proleptic community struggles to structure itself by the coming order of God, 
and show the beginnings of new Israel and new creation.' 181 In contrast, 
Bonhoeffer's legacy reduced eschatological justification from a 'new-
community power which relativizes all other authorities and pioneers new 
social realities' to a 'rescue in the face of recurring failure' .182 Rasmussen 
does point to the apocalyptic elements of Bonhoeffer's eschatology, 183 but 
there is no way of avoiding the fact that Bonhoeffer only came to anything 
approaching an apocalyptic eschatology hesitantly, and late. 184 This side of his 
theology may militate against the idea of the church-community being a 
'community of radical critique' that saw itself a having 'a vital public task ... 
as an eschatological community ... to communicate a purging judgment, both 
in the public square and in the sanctuary.' 185 However, Bonhoeffer clearly 
expected the church to hold a 'watchman's brief: 'If the Church did not do 
this [warn men against sin], she would be incurring part of the guilt for the 
blood ofthe wicked (Ezek. 3.17ff.).' 186 In Nazi Germany, ifnowhere else, this 
warning against sin could only be seen as a 'radical critique.' 
178 Ethics, 209, emphasis added. 
179 lbid. 
18
° Chapman, 'Bonhoeffer: Resource for Liberation Theology', 238. 
181 Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 77. 
182 Ibid., 78. 
183 For example, in ibid., he points to Ethics, 187-8 and 186-7 
184 Jan Ligus, tells us that '[i]n his Ethics, his [Bonhoeffer's] re-evaluation is evident, and he 
perceives the Christian life as life with Christ in this world. It is the penultimate directed 
towards the ultimate, i.e. an eschatological perspective' ('Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Ultimate, 
Penultimate and Their Impact', 68). 
185 Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 86. 
186 Ethics, 345. 
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For Bonhoeffer, therefore, we must conclude that he (certainly at the end of 
his life, if not before) had come to an eschatological position that required 
involvement with the world, a desire to see a better world, because God in 
Christ loved that (real) world. Whether he would expect the church-
community, or merely its leaders, to engage in permanent radical critique 'in 
the public square' is open to question. I will therefore now look at how 
Bonhoeffer regarded the relationship between the church and the society it 
serves. 
6. 7 The Relationship of the Church to Civil Society 
That there is a relationship between the Christian and civil society, is clear 
from Bonhoeffer's decision to return to Germany in 1939. Bonhoeffer was 
involved, as a German in German society, as so had to be with 'his' people at 
this time of conflict, or he would not feel able to take part in any 
reconstruction after the conflict - assuming he would survive. 187 
The first point to note here is that, although Bonhoeffer made his decision 
alone, he did not regard his decision as an individualist one. He is coming 
home to share the fate of his country and community. Emst Feil points out 
that, as early as Act and Being, 'Bonhoeffer eliminated ... every form of 
individualism or subjectivism, for revelation always encounters the person and 
creates community at the same time.' 188 On the other hand, while standing 
against individualism, Bonhoeffer does see people as individuals. People 
'became single individuals for his [Jesus'] sake' .189 
Christ intends to make the human being lonely. As individuals they 
should see nothing except him who called him . . . [This is because 
Christ] stands not only between me and God, he also stands between 
me and other people and things. 190 
187 See Bethge, Biography, 655 quoting Bonhoeffer's letter to Reinhold Niebuhr. Also see 
Dorothee Soelle, 'Church: They Had Everything in Common', Theology Today 42, 1983, 217-
19. 
188 Feil, 12. 
189 Discipleship, 99. 
190 Discipleship, 92 and 93-4. 
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But we are not left as lonely individuals; Jesus also is the basis of a new 
community. 'He stands in the centre between the other person and me.' 191 So 
the lonely individual is given 'the promise of new community'. 192 
Bonhoeffer is clear that ' [ e ]very one enters discipleship alone, but no one 
remains alone in discipleship.' 193 This interplay between the individual and the 
(church-)community is present in Discipleship (quoted above) and in Life 
Together. The latter book makes two stark statements: 'Whoever cannot be 
alone should beware of community', and ' [ w ]hoever cannot stand being in 
community should beware of being alone.' 194 The first statement is because 
'[y ]ou cannot avoid yourself, for it is precisely God who has singled you out.' 
The second because '[y]ou are called into the community of faith; the call was 
not meant for you alone.' 195 
As I have noted above, Bonhoeffer's critique of thinking in two spheres 
allowed 'no place to which the Christian can withdraw from the world ... ', 196 
not even the monastery. The church, and the people within it as the church-
community, are to be involved with the world, even if its involvement is 
reduced to warning people against sin. 197 However, it may well be that the 
church faces the choice between the three possible ways of acting towards the 
state: asking the state 'whether its actions are legitimate', or aiding 'the 
victims of state action', or, most dramatically, putting 'a spoke in the wheel' 
191 Discipleship, 98. 
192 Ibid. There is much discussion in secondary literature of the interplay between individual 
and community. See, for example: Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology ofSociality, and 
'Human Sociality and Christian Community', in de Gruchy (ed.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 113-33; also see A.I. McFadyen, 'The Call to Discipleship', Scottish 
Journal of Theology 43 (1990), 461-83; and Jay C. Rochelle, 'Bonhoeffer: Community, 
Authority and Spirituality', Journal of Current Theology and Mission 21 (1994), 117-22 
(especially 122). 
193 Discipleship, 99. 
194 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together I Prayerbook of the Bible, 82, emphasis original. 
195 Ibid. It must be noted that Life Together is seen to have a 'wider application to laity', and 
its themes are not just confined to (trainee) pastors (Ruth Zemer, 'Bonhoeffer on Discipleship 
and Community' in Lutheran Forum 30 (1996), 36). Against this, we must also note that 
Bonhoeffer himself was writing to and for trainee pastors. 
196 Ethics, 198, and see 6.3.2.2 above. 
197 See Ethics, 345, quoted in 6.4.3 above. 
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of state action. 198 The question remains, how the church's involvement should 
be taught correctly to Christians as they seek to follow 'the man for others.' 
6.8 Educating the Christian for Political Involvement 
From what has been said above, it should be clear that Bonhoeffer has no 
programme for educating even the middle-class Christian for political 
involvement. He expects recognition of free responsibility, which in turn 
recognises God's "yes", as well as his "no" to the world. This will lead to an 
openness toward taking action in the world outside one's immediate 
professional duties. Bonhoeffer's own education towards political involvement 
began in America in 1931 - where he found 'that the denominations of 
America are not to be understood primarily from their theology, but from their 
practical work in the community and their public effectiveness' 199 - and 
continued for the rest of his life. 
Interestingly, there are very few references to education in Letters and Papers 
from Prison.200 Even in Ethics, Bonhoeffer mentions education only rarely. 
Here it is regarded as a parental responsibility within the mandate of marriage: 
the children are to be educated 'to be obedient to Jesus Christ. ' 201 They must 
also educate their children aware of 'the differences in their responsibilities' 
when it comes to telling the truth. For Bonhoeffer, with his experiences of 
interrogation, "telling the truth" is no simple matter that does 'depend on 
moral character', but is 'something which must be learnt. '202 
198 No Rusty Swords, 222-3, quoted at 6.4.1 above. 
199 Ibid., 114. 
200 One of the most pertinent references is to Bonhoeffer's own education: 'I am still 
discovering right up to this moment, that it is only by living completely in this world that one 
learns to have faith ... ' (LPP, 369). John de Gruchy points out that Bonhoeffer thought that it 
requires 'good taste', and therefore a good education, to be responsible: or, more specifically, 
his fiancee's and his niece's literary 'bad taste' 'simply did not equip a person to become 
responsible.' (See John de Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation: Theological 
Aesthetics in the Struggle for Justice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 I), 136-
68: quotations from 144.) Against this, we must note that such an education alone did not 
move Bonhoeffer into 'responsibility'; it took his trip to America, and the weak theology of 
the Union Seminary to do that. 
201 Ethics, 207, and see ibid, 339. Bonhoeffer used 'divine mandates' to overcome the misuse 
of 'orders of creation' which he felt had led to cheap grace and the ideas that a Christian 
should obey secular authority, even if that meant condoning evil (see 6.4.3 above). For further 
discussion of the mandates see Ethics, 204-10, 339-41. 
202 Ibid., 359. 'One of the reasons that truth telling must be learned is that sin has distorted the 
whole moral order' (Burtness, Shaping the Future, 142). 
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The state, however, has 'a right to educate for goodness, i.e., for outward 
justice or righteousness. ' 203 The justice considered here follows from 'the 
second table [of the Ten Commandments]' and 'cannot be in conflict with 
Jesus Christ.' While Bonhoeffer insists that he does not require Christian 
action as such, he does insist on 'action which does not exclude Christ.' This 
in turn can only come about through the preaching of the Church. 204 
This leaves us to consider the role of the Christian in political society. 
Following a discussion of the political responsibility of the church (which, in 
extremis, is reduced to 'establishing and maintaining, at least among her own 
members, the order of outward justice which is no longer to be found in the 
polis, for by so doing she serves government in her own way.'),205 Bonhoeffer 
turns to the individual Christian: 
Is there a political responsibility on the part of individual Christians? 
Certainly the individual Christian cannot be made responsible for the 
action of the government, and he must not make himself responsible 
for it; but because of his faith and his charity he is responsible for his 
own calling and for the sphere of his personal life, however large or 
however small it may be. If this responsibility is fulfilled in faith, it is 
effectual for the whole of the polis. According to Holy Scripture, there 
is no right to revolution; but there is a responsibility of every 
individual for preserving the purity of his office and mission in the 
polis. In this way, in the true sense, every individual serves 
government with his responsibility. No one, not even government 
itself, can deprive him of this responsibility or forbid him to discharge 
it, for it is an integral part of his life in sanctification, and it arises from 
obedience to the Lord of both Church and government.206 
How should this responsible life be lived? Bonhoeffer's path, according to 
Larry Rasmussen, is to 
rule out extremes as the normal and normative patterns and procedures 
for the use of power. But they are not ruled out as exceptional 
instances of Christian action brought on by hard necessity ... 207 
203 Ethics, 335. 
204 See Ethics, 336. Pagan governments have to rely on the 'providential congruity between 
the contents of the second table and the inherent law of historical life itself (ibid.). 
205 Ethics, 345. 
206 Ethics, 345-6. 
207 Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 140, quoting from Ethics, 'The Structure of the 
Responsible Life', 220ff. 
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Bonhoeffer's time is so abnormal that he can 'write of the guilt of his church, 
his nation and his class.' It follows from this complicity that 'not to plot 
Hitler's overthrow but instead attempt to save some measure of moral 
innocence amidst such guilt by not supporting tyrannicide only compounds the 
guilt. ,2os 
There is another tension here. Bonhoeffer experienced the 'the failure of the 
Confessing Church and the ecumenical church forcefully and successfully to 
oppose Nazism, in the one instance; and the location of the most responsible 
anti-Nazi action among the people of the military/political resistance, in the 
other. ' 209 This meant that Bonhoeffer had to develop his theology to account 
for the resisters' nonreligious "participation in the sufferings of God in the life 
of the world",210 while most people appeared willingly to become complicit in 
the evils of Nazism. This folly, 'a bewitching complicity with evil and its 
party slogans' ,211 is produced 'in a large part of mankind' as a result of 'any 
violent display of power'.212 Bonhoeffer is convinced that this folly cannot be 
overcome by instmction, 'but only by an act of liberation' 213 - this again 
points away from an idea of a Christian political education, but towards an 
authoritarian idea of leadership responsibility. This is not to say that he allows 
anyone (member of the elite or not) to feel contempt for any member of 
humanity,214 but the question is whether those in power 'expect more from 
people's folly than from their wisdom and independence ofmind.'215 
In spite of such realism, or even pessimism, Robin Lovin states Bonhoeffer's 
'advice is for us, too, when ordinary mles of morality fail us'. 
On these occasions, the Christian acts, not out of self-interest, but to 
protect those who otherwise would suffer . . . What characterises 
responsible action is "deputyship," standing in on behalf of those who 
are powerless to act for themselves and using what power we have for 
their protection. Responsibility can have dramatic consequences in the 
208 Ibid., 141. 
209 Rasmussen, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 118. 
210 Ibid., 119, quoting Ethics. 
211 Chapman, Bonhoeffer: Resource for Liberation Theology, 233. 
212 LPP, 8. 
213 Ibid., 9. 
214 Ibid., 9-10. 
215 Ibid., 9. 
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central events of history, but it is rare enough in any circumstances, 
and when it is exercised on the smaller scale of city politics, business 
decisions, family choices, and congregational meetings, it upsets the 
predictable patterns of self-interested behavior and creates unexpected 
opportunities to introduce new forms of cooperation. In these ways, 
too, those who "live by responding to the word of God which IS 
addressed to us in Jesus Christ" take history into their hands.216 
This still, however, leaves the question of how Bonhoeffer would educate 
ordinary Christians for such responsible action, especially if their family 
background had not prepared them to place that action higher than 'personal 
integrity or the sanctity of an oath'.217 De Lange points to Bonhoeffer's high 
expectations of all Christians and church-communities, and asks whether these 
expectations are attainable for 'ordinary people as they are?' 218 Geoffrey 
Kelly, on the other hand, wonders whether the church, and its 'bourgeois 
parishioners' could cope with 'Bonhoeffer's dream of a renewed, Christ-
orientated church' ,219 and asks, pertinently, how churches today could 'relate 
Christian faith with concrete action to achieve peace and justice ... ?' and, very 
appropriately for those following Bonhoeffer's life and work, 'how can 
Christians condition themselves to endure persecution for the cause of justice 
(Matthew 5:10)?'220 
What is clear therefore, is that Bonhoeffer believes that educating Christians to 
be Christians wherever they are, will, or at least should, lead to responsible 
action in the sphere of his or her own life 'however large or however small it 
may be.' He also believes that the responsible action, undertaken to achieve 
peace and justice, could involve opposition, persecution and hurniliation.221 
216 Robin W. Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices: The Social Ethics of Earth, Brunner, 
and Bonhoejfer (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 147. 
217 Ibid., 148. 
218 De Lange, Waiting for the Word, 143. 
219 Geffrey B. Kelly, 'Prayer and Action for Justice: Bonhoeffer's Spirituality' in de Gruchy, 
The Cambridge Companion to Dietrich Bonhoejfer, 250. Christian Gremmels notes how easy 
it is for a church to talk of being for others without being with them. 'There is a very subtle 
possibility in the concept of the "church for others," as it is often used nowadays, that actually 
it is used to keep others away' ('Bonhoeffer, The Churches, and Jewish-Christian Relations', 
in Theology and the Practice of Responsibility, 299). 
220 Ibid., 252. 
221 See, for example, LPP, 7; and Discipleship, I 08-10. 
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6.9 Conclusion 
Bonhoeffer's life and work involves a considerable amount of education: his 
own. He moves from the unbelieving, ambitious theologian (who nevertheless 
talks of Christ existing in community), to an ecumenical, believing pastor and 
seminary leader who calls for a peace that 'must be dared' and 'is the opposite 
of security' ,222 but who believes in the authority of the state/23 to the 
conspirator and martyr for whom 'being Christian today will be limited to two 
things: prayer and righteous action among men. '224 This, as I have noted, 
involves both a development in his thinking, and tension between his 
privileged upbringing and his wish to 'do theology from below'. There is 
enough in Bonhoeffer's writings for liberation theologians to point to his 
empathy with the oppressed, but Bonhoeffer is no social democrat, and those 
with privilege and power are expected to use it responsibly, rather than hand it 
over to the masses: noblesse oblige, rather than 'power to the people.' 
222 No Rusty Swords, 291. 
223 Discipleship, 240ff. 
224 LPP, 300. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, I have tried to discern how the church should educate ordinary 
Christians for political involvement. My underlying concern has been 
practical: that is, I wish to think through what kind of education for political 
involvement would be appropriate for Christians in today's world. In order to 
do this, I have needed to step back to look at foundational theological theory 
in this area. In turn, this necessitated that I examine the thought of different 
theologians who had influenced thinking on Christian involvement in politics. 
The first theologian, Augustine of Hippo, was chosen for his significance for 
the entire Western tradition of thinking about Christianity and politics. The 
second, Gustavo Gutierrez, was chosen because of the apparently profound 
differences between him and Augustinian political thought. Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer was chosen as the third theologian because he can be seen as a 
mediating figure between the other two, as it can be seen that Bonhoeffer both 
has an Augustinian inheritance (mediated through his Lutheranism) and has 
influenced Liberation Theology; as well as having many other significant 
contributions in his own right. 
However, from these three theologians, it cannot be shown that there is, or has 
been, a political, or even prepolitical education for the Christian congregation. 
For Augustine and Bonhoeffer, I have shown there is no explicit political 
education, but all my conversation partners have expected some form of action 
to follow Christian commitment, 1 as all of them have expected love for the 
neighbour to express itself in practical ways (even if the action was not 
explicitly political).2 However, what I have discerned, and shall elucidate 
below, draws on Nicholas Lash's work to produce a form of 'summary 
1 Gutierrez (chapter 4 above) clearly advocates a process that leads to action on the part of 
ordinary people. Both Bonhoeffer and Augustine's expectation tends toward action by those in 
authority and/or power. 
2 This includes Augustine; see Confessiones, XIII, xvii (21) and chapter 3 above. 
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grammar'3 that all churches, and therefore all congregations, should consider 
in terms of their relationship, both political and social, with civil society. 
Before I do this, I shall for the sake of clarity, bring out the emphases from the 
previous chapters that help us towards these conclusions. 
7.2 Christian Political Involvement: Three Approaches 
7.2.1 Augustine 
In this thesis, as noted above, I first looked at the Augustinian approach. I use 
the word 'the' with caution, as so many people have used Augustine to back 
up their own views or to reflect the situation they are in, 4 that defining one 
Augustinian approach is practically impossible. For example, as discussed in 
chapter 2 above, his works were used as ammunition in both sides of the 
medieval dispute between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor.5 In the 
twentieth century, Neville Figgis wrote of Augustine's 'nostalgia for the 
infinite', which reflected the post First World War nostalgia for a better place; 
during the cold war in the 1960s, Herbert Deane wrote of Augustine as a 
bulwark against anarchy advocating obedience to the authorities in all 
circumstances; in the 1970s Robert Markus promoted the idea that Augustine 
would favour a more 'secular' approach to the political realm, only to fmd that 
this approach was rejected by John Milbank in the 1990s as post-modem 
thinking grew up as a reaction against cold, non-spiritual rationality. It 
remains to be seen what new directions Augustine will take in the twenty-first 
century.6 
However, as I showed in chapter 2, the current dominant view of Augustine's 
political thought, exemplified by Herbert Deane, is that Augustine was a 
political quietist. He therefore expected his congregation to follow and obey 
their political masters, even if those masters were tyrants or pagans or both. 
Nevertheless, while Augustine certainly advocated obedience, it does not 
3 See Nicholas Lash, 'Considering the Trinity', Modern Theology 2 (I 986), 183-96, and 
discussion below. 
4 
'Interpretations swing with the reigning theories, always ensuring that he [Augustine] is not 
left in opposition.' O'Donovan, 'Augustine and Politics ... by John von Heyking', 135. 
5 See 2.4.2 above. 
6 As discussed in chapter 2, von Heyking's work, which was published in 2001, is an 
unsatisfactory following ofMarkus, and advocates an unsustainable 'politics as nature' line. 
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follow that he is politically quietist. He and his fellow bishops were active in 
appealing to the Imperial court to try to alleviate injustice. Augustine also 
played a full part in seeking to help the poor and needy of Hippo. Along with 
his conviction of the fallenness of humanity, his eschatology was too 
otherworldly, however, to expect too much of this world in terms of a better 
life. This in turn raises questions over what advice, if any, he would have for 
his congregation about political involvement. 
My principal conversation partner m looking at Augustine's ideas on 
educating people for political involvement was Peter Bathory. Specifically, I 
examined Bathory's theory that Augustine had a prepolitical paideia for his 
congregation, which allowed them, if not active involvement, then at least the 
ability to recognise a good leader when they saw one, and to follow him. As I 
showed in chapter 3, I cannot agree with Bathory's thesis as it stands. That is 
not to say his ideas are not (as Duncan Forrester puts it) 'a corrective' to 
Deane's thesis of passive compliance, but if Augustine did have a prepolitical 
paideia, then it was merely incidental to his Christian paideia. Of course, if 
you come from the right class, and are commanded into office, you are to 
serve 'the peace ofBabylon'. 
This peace, of course, is nowhere near as good as the peace of the city of God, 
but it is the best we can hope for in this life. Lower orders, like everyone else, 
are to regard themselves as pilgrim members of the city of God; but, unlike 
their leaders in the church or in civil society, they are unlikely to affect the 
world around them. However, Eugene TeSelle is correct to point out that the 
'distancing from the world and its values' is 'Augustinian only as a first step, a 
clarification of one's primary values and commitments.'7 For all that 
Augustine advocated obedience to the authorities, he did note the difference 
between 'better and worse in the temporal sphere' 8 and sought to do all he 
could to improve the lot ofthe poor and disadvantaged in his church.9 
7 TsSelle, Living in Two Cities, 61. And see 2.5.2.2 above. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Van der Meer (Augustine the Bishop, 138) quotes Sermo 61, where Augustine asks his 
congregation for money so that he could pass it on to some poor men 'who have not received 
overmuch from you.' 
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In short, action by - as opposed to on behalf of - ordinary people is not 
advocated. On the other hand, leaders are, of course, expected to do what little 
they can to mitigate the effects of injustice, though even they must recognise 
that there will always be injustice this side of the second coming. So, political 
involvement is for the political classes only, even if it will not achieve much; 
the rest of us are to obey our betters unless and until they order us 'to do what 
is impious and wicked' 10 whereupon we are to accept lawful punishment up to 
and including death for failing to carry out those orders. For Augustine, it is 
the martyrs who are to be the example for his congregation in terms of how 
they are to live in their civil society. 
7.2.2 Liberation Theology: Gutierrez and Freire 
In Latin America, martyrdom is still very much a part of Christian witness. 
Therefore, in conversation with Gustavo Gutierrez and Paulo Freire, my next 
theological approach is that of Latin American liberation theology. As far as 
liberationists are concerned, all theology is political, the only question is 
whether you act and speak in favour of the oppressive status quo or not. It is 
axiomatic to say that liberationists are not in favour of the status quo. They 
seek to serve the oppressed, to conscientize them, and to promote the 
Kingdom of God here on earth. For liberation theologians there is a strong 
structural element to sin, and structures (as well as people) need reforming. 
One cannot preach the kingdom of God 'exclusively as a future life' 11 and 
proclaim that people, the poor especially, must merely put up with the blatant 
injustices of life in this transitory, unreal, world because such is part of God's 
plan. Therefore, the structures that need challenging often include 
ecclesiastical ones. It is unsurprising that liberation theology has faced 
challenges from both ecclesiastical and secular power sources that prefer 
'peace' to a revolutionary justice. 
Gustavo Gutierrez writes about three stages of liberation: first 'economic, 
social, and political liberation; [second] liberation which leads to the creation 
10 DCD, V.17. 
11 Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History, 39. 
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of a new humanity in a new society of solidarity; and [third] liberation from 
sin and entrance into communion with God and all persons.' 12 This has a 
certain utopian and socialist flavour to it. The Marxist and dialectical flavour 
to Liberation Theology has of course been one of the bones of contention 
between Liberationists and the Vatican. As I discussed in chapters four and 
five, the Marxism is somewhat muted and need not detain us, but the 
dialectical approach to life, seen especially in the division of humanity into 
'oppressor' and oppressed' is a more pertinent criticism of both Freire's 
conscientization process and of Liberation Theology generally as it 
oversimplifies the complexity of life and the social situations in which people 
find themselves. This criticism should not blind us to the positive aspects of 
conscientization, and Liberation Theology's correct emphasis on the 
preferential option for the poor. It should also not blind us to the considerable 
opposition and persecution that liberation theologians (and Freire himself) 
faced in promoting their ideas and working those ideas out with the poor and 
oppressed, especially as they sought to challenge society as to the causes of 
poverty. 13 
Conscientization of the poor takes place in the Base Ecclesial Communities 
(BECs), which generally follow the pedagogical approach pioneered by Paulo 
Freire. The poor are encouraged to ask questions of their situation, to critique 
that situation, and then to work out how they can change that situation. What 
is sought is community, and for that to occur, what is required is that people 
act together. 14 While a BEC is seen primarily as a religious community (and 
indeed often has a priest or religious sister at its head), political action and 
involvement is but an inevitable consequence of the community's life 
together. 15 
12 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 137. As I noted in 4.2.2.3 
above, these stages are not to be viewed as distinct, and the progression through them is 
viewed as ontological rather than chronological. 
13 
'Once causes are determined, then there is talk of"social injustice," and the privileged begin 
to resist.' Ibid., xxiv. 
14 Dominique Barbe, 'Church Base Communites', 187. 
15 Ibid., 190. This was seen especially in Brazil during the military dictatorship that sought to 
stifle all political opposition: the BECs stood as the only group who could give expression to 
popular feeling. 
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Another difficulty comes from the idea that liberation, while not being seen as 
the same as salvation, is seen as 'a salvific work.l 6 and therefore raises 
questions about what is to be said about God if the attempts to overcome 
oppression fail. Although Gutierrez does address this question in his book On 
Job, the impression is still one that liberation theology expects improvements 
in justice and peace for the poor in this life. 17 Another question that remains 
unaddressed, is how the oppressed are to be changed in their human nature so 
that they do not in their turn become oppressors once they have successfully 
liberated themselves. 
There are also difficulties, gtven liberation theology's avowed anti-elitist 
approach, over the allied notions of leadership and authority. Gutierrez talks of 
a coming alongside the poor, Freire calls for a 'class suicide' on the part ofthe 
bourgeoisie. This is, to put it mildly, difficult as class suicide involves the 
rejection of so many factors, like one's: 
values, norms, taste for culture ... relationship to language and culture 
... one's educational background, the nature of one's everyday work 
18 
This gap between bourgeois educator and oppressed 'educatee' can therefore 
be extremely difficult to close. In fact, Gutierrez spends considerable time 
working with those identified as 'organic intellectuals' - there are, as Curt 
Cadorette notes, good reasons for this, 19 but it is interesting that, even m 
liberation theology (a theology that seeks liberation for all) there is a hierarchy 
of education for liberation: the pedagogue, the organic intellectual, the rest of 
the poor. 20 This internal conflict between the expressed anti-elitism and the 
practical realities of organisation can also be discerned in Freire's struggles in 
describing the distinction between authoritarianism and authority: just because 
a teacher is not interested in 'banking' education, this does not mean that they 
16 Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, I 04. 
17 In On Job, 90-2, Gutierrez makes it clear that, while God is just, his justice cannot be 
trapped within human ideas on the nature and the timing of justice. 
18 Peter Mayo, 'A Few 'Blind Spots", 90. 
19 See discussion in 4.6.3 above. 
20 As I showed in 4.6.3 above, this hierarchy is a practical outworking of Freire's and 
Gutierrez's practice, rather than a 'status' hierarchy- but it exists, none the less. 
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have no authority and cannot promote their ideas. Conscientization therefore is 
a subtler, and possibly a more 'top-down', process than it first appears.21 
I have also noted that the rhetoric of liberationism has been toned down over 
time. The revolutionary Freire, the one who calls for 'class suicide', of the 
1960s and 70s, becomes the radical democratic Secretary of Education of Sao 
Paulo in the 1990s- where he hopes to help build 'a less ugly society, one that 
is less evil and more humane. '22 Gutierrez similarly tones down his rhetoric. In 
the first edition of A Theology of Liberation, he insists that class struggle, as 
'combating the oppressive class' in a struggle for justice and human dignity, is 
totally in accord with Christian love; but in the second edition of A Theology 
of Liberation, Gutierrez merely states that: 
The universality of Christian love is . . . not incompatible with a 
preferential option for the poorest and most oppressed ... 23 
Therefore Gutierrez does not, especially latterly, see liberation as the rise of 
the proletariat and the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. Nor does he see a simple 
linear progression from one stage of liberation to the next. He expects, and has 
experience of, the struggle, and indeed failure, involved in liberation (as noted 
above). In his discussion of 'Liberation and Salvation' in A Theology of 
Liberation, he tells us that '[a] gradual pedagogy of successes and failures 
would be necessary for the Jewish people to become aware of the roots oftheir 
oppression, to struggle against it, and to perceive the profound sense of the 
liberation to which they were called. '24 In this context, the Exodus, along with 
the rest of Biblical history, is seen as a political act requiring political action 
on the part of his people.25 How far conscientization has got in educating the 
poor for that political action is still a matter open to debate. However, the fact 
that liberation theology has spawned the BECs with all the political and social 
21 Even if the idea of conscientization is to give the poor a voice, this idea has to be passed 
onto the poor from the pedagogue, and often against the poor's initial wishes - see 5.2.2 
above. 
22 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Heart, 104. In contrast, his early seminal work, A Pedagogy 
of Liberation, published in 1971, is distinctly revolutionary in tone and speaks highly of 
revolutionaries such as Che Guevara. 
23 A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 160, and see 4.2.2.3 above. 
24 Ibid., 88. 
25 Ibid., 89-91. As I noted above in 4.2.2.2, Biblical history is not seen solely as political, but 
this is part of what God's work is about. 
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implications, means that there is, as far as this theology is concerned, a role for 
educating ordinary Christians for political and social involvement. 26 
7.2.3 Bonhoeffer 
My third conversation partner was Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer's 
theological background emphasised obedience to the civil authority, but he 
took part in a conspiracy against that authority; he was born into wealth and 
privilege but sought towards the end of his life to do theology ':from below'; 
and he has a foot, as it were, in the Augustinian camp (traced through his 
Lutheranism), but he has influenced liberation theology. With his privileged, 
and somewhat elitist background, 27 and as one who had witnessed the failure 
of the Weimar Republic, Bonhoeffer cannot be described as a democrat. His 
development of the idea of free responsibility and especially his theology :from 
below has appealed to liberation theologians, but Bonhoeffer regarded :free 
responsible action as something 'granted to only very few men' .28 While 
Bonhoeffer may have empathised with the people :from the lower classes with 
whom he came into contact over his lifetime, there is no evidence that he 
sought to educate the ordinary parishioner for the sort of political action and 
involvement he was prepared to hazard for himself 
Therefore, for all his involvement against the Hitler regime, and his influence 
on liberation theology, it is difficult to see any form of 'conscientization' of 
the poor in Dietrich Bonhoeffer's writings. As the director of Finkenwalde 
seminary, he clearly had ideas about educating pastors for their role in the 
church and society: Discipleship and Life Together are the two books that 
arose directly out of that experience - and appear at first glance to say very 
little about a pastor's (much less one of his congregants)29 political role. 
26 However broadly this may be construed - Gutierrez states in the introduction to the revised 
edition of A Theology of Liberation, xxx, that '[t]he struggles of those who reject racism and 
machismo ... as well as of those who oppose the marginalization of the elderly, children, and 
other ''unimportant" persons in our society, have made me see, for example, the importance of 
gestures and ways of "being with" that some may regard as having little political 
effectiveness.' 
27 See 6.2.1 above. 
28 Ethics, 246. 
29 Although Life Together arose out of the Finkenwalde experience, its message has been 
applied to Christian communities more generally (see Zemer, 'Bonhoeffer on Discipleship and 
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Discipleship in particular says more about living by the Sermon on the Mount 
than in the 'real world.' However, for Bonhoeffer, as we have seen,30 living by 
the Sermon on the Mount is precisely what Christian living in the real world is 
all about. 
In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer tells us that Christians can 'expect nothing from 
the world but everything from Christ and his coming realm. ' 31 This firm 'No' 
to the world, this 'No' therefore to accommodation to Nazism, also contains 
the radical 'Yes' to Christ. This gives both people and churches 
responsibilities in the civil realm. 32 Bonhoeffer discusses these explicitly in his 
Ethics. 33 In spite of the Confessing Church's failure to hold the Nazi 
government to account, Bonhoeffer clearly felt that the church had 
responsibilities towards the state - responsibilities that consisted mainly of 
'call[ing] sin by its name and ... warn[ing] men against sin ... '. 34 
There is a clear tension in Bonhoe:ffer between the conservative son of a 
privileged family, and the man who, at the end of his life, sought to 'do 
theology from below ... from the perspective ofthose who suffer.' 35 However, 
he remains convinced that the good things in life are gifts of God, to be used 
and enjoyed; and was part of a conspiracy that sought to restore a proper 
authoritarian government to the German people (as opposed to Hitler's 
totalitarian regime)36 - not a democratic government. For the ordinary person, 
action is constrained, and there is still 
Community', 36). Although '[t]he experiment in community undertaken at Finkenwalde was 
"a mission entrusted to the church" ... ' (Editor's Introduction to Life Together, 23, quoting 
Bonhoeffer's preface: see ibid., 25.), Bonhoeffer himself points out that 'Christian[s] cannot 
simply take for granted the privilege of living among other Christians.' (Ibid., 27.), and his 
book is clearly mainly addressed to, and based on the experience of, the student pastors who 
attended Finkenwalde. 
30 See 6.3.2.1 above. 
31 Discipleship, 239. 
32 As I have shown in 6.4.3 above .. 
33 Ethics, 344-6. 
34 Ibid., 345. 
35 LPP, 17. 
36 For definitions of, and the distinction between, 'authoritarian' and 'totalitarian' see Kenneth 
Morris, 'Bonhoeffer's Critique ofTotalitarianism', 255-72. 
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According to Holy Scripture ... no right to revolution; but there is a 
responsibility of every individual for preserving the purity of his office 
and mission in the polis.31 
However much his own class and his church failed to act in time against 
Hitler, Bonhoeffer still looks to these interests for the restoration of ordinary 
life. 
As I have discussed above, we are not told how Bonhoeffer would educate the 
individual Christian so that they could recognise their free responsibility and 
act on it. 38 In spite of this, Mark Thiessen Nation asserts that Bonhoeffer's 
preoccupation 'was how to shape a Christian people that would embody 
discipleship seriously enough that an Adolf Hitler could not have his way with 
them. ' 39 This may well be a legitimate development from Bonhoeffer's 
concerns, but, for me, Bonhoeffer's authoritarian conservatism is too much in 
evidence even in his later works to allow this idea of a Christian people -
rather than a Christian leadership - embodying the sort of discipleship and 
righteous action that Bonhoeffer required. 40 Bonhoeffer may have dreamt of 
such a church, but this still leaves the concerns I noted in chapter six above 
that Bonhoeffer's high expectations may be unattainable for 'ordinary people 
as they are',41 or whether the church's 'bourgeois parishioners' could cope 
with 'Bonhoeffer's dream of a renewed, Christ-orientated church' .42 In other 
words, even if Bonhoeffer had overcome his conservatism to wish to 'shape a 
Christian people' in the mould of the costly discipleship he advocated, we are 
still left with the question of how he would educate his parishioners for the 
righteous action, or the political involvement, such discipleship would require. 
37 Ethics, 345-6. 
38 There is only one paragraph in Ethics, 345-6. 
39 Mark Thiessen Nation, 'Discipleship in a World Full of Nazis: Dietrich Bonhoeffer's 
Polyphonic Pacifism as Social Ethics', in Stanley Hauerwas et al. (eds.), The Wisdom of the 
Cross: Essays in Honour ofJohn Howard Yoder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 275. 
40 This is not to say that, had he survived the war, he would not have moved to such a position, 
but I do not see such a move in Bonhoeffer based on the writings we have. 
41 De Lange, Waiting for the Word, 143. 
42 Geoffrey B. Kelly, 'Prayer and Action for Justice: Bonhoeffer's Spirituality', 250. 
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7.3 A Christian Political Education? 
Clearly, we have not produced a formula for educating Christians for political 
involvement. What we cannot do is adopt Augustine, or Gutierrez or 
Bonhoeffer's approach wholesale. However, what we can do, I suggest, is 
discern a 'summary grammar' encompassing three distinct, though related, 
tensions that, if ignored, move the church and its congregations towards error. 
The first tension is eschatological: that is how far we should emphasise the 
'now' or the 'not yet' nature of God's kingdom. The second tension is 
worldly: the church is in the world, but not of it. The standards and practices 
of the church should be radically different from the world's, but yet hoping to 
influence the world for its good. The third tension is the social action tension: 
that is the tension that lies between prophetic denunciation and annunciation 
and the practical (and often pragmatic) approach to the incremental steps 
required to move towards a better kind of justice. If the church is solely 
prophetic in its proclamation - in the sense of being too insistent on how 
things ought to be - then its own members (much less those who are not 
Christian) will become apathetic as they will fail to see how they appropriately 
serve the cause of justice, or witness to God's kingdom positively. On the 
other hand, if the church becomes too pragmatic - devoting all its time to the 
incremental, but achievable steps in improving justice in some part of the 
world, then the prophetic vision will wither, and the difference between the 
church and voluntary social service organisations will be difficult to see. 
Nicholas Lash develops the idea of a 'summary grammar' as a limit against 
which to test our thought and action and to correct 'our propensities towards 
idolatry' .43 He proposes that 'the doctrine of the Trinity may be considered as 
the "summary grammar" of the way of Christian discipleship construed in 
terms of ... "the intrinsic dialectics of experienced life"' .44 This is because if 
we stop with the idea of God as Spirit, 'we would be pantheists' - which is 
idolatrous as we would then have identified the nature of God with the quest 
for the good.45 However, life is not all good, so we may absolutise our limited 
43 Nicholas Lash, 'Considering the Trinity', 194. 
44 Ibid., 192. 
45 Ibid., 193. 
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action or understanding and find ourselves approaching God as 
incomprehensible, utterly transcendent, and worship him in silence. This too, 
according to Lash, is idolatry if we stop here as 'we would (at best) be 
agnostics', because we would have totally identified a nature of God 'which 
proscribes all mention of him. '46 So we continue with an interrupted silence 
and the 'memory of a Word once spoken'. 'But, ifwe stopped there, we would 
be in danger of ascribing absolute significance to the past as past ... '.47 For 
Lash, the pattern needs to be broken again with the knowledge that it is 'in 
new possibilities, not ancient meanings, that acquaintance with God is to be 
found. ' 48 This leads us back full circle, to the doctrine of the Spirit. 
For Lash therefore, each doctrine (ofFather, Son or Holy Spirit) by itseifleads 
to idolatry, but taken together, the doctrine ofthe Trinity 'is a doctrine of God, 
because its purpose and function, as 'summary grammar' of the pedagogy of 
salvation, is to enable us appropriately not only to work and think ... but also 
to worship. ' 49 
In my view there is a connection in kind between Lash's summary grammar 
for the 'pedagogy of salvation' and my summary grammar of tensions for 
educating Christians for political involvement. Just as I have not deduced a 
specific programme for educating Christians for political involvement, Lash 
points to a doctrine of the Trinity that points to 'God the unknown' .50 Also, 
just as each ofLash's grammatical elements leads to another ifwe are to avoid 
idolatry, each of my tensions leads to the next: how the 'now' and 'not yet' 
nature of God's kingdom is to be expressed will lead to a consideration ofhow 
Christians are to live their lives in but not of the world. This tension in turn 
provokes thoughts of how the balance is to be struck in the prophetic or 
practical nature of Christian pronouncement and action. The prophetic and 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., emphasis original. 
48 Ibid., 193-4. 
49 Ibid., 194, emphasis original. My basic difference from Lash is that the 'propensity for 
idolatry' for Lash, occurs when one part of his summary grammar is emphasised to the 
exclusion of the other two, for me, the error occurs when one side of a tension is emphasised 
to the exclusion of the other. 
50 Lash, 'Considering the Trinity', 194. 
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practical tension returns us to consideration of the now and not yet nature of 
God's kingdom. In order to expound these tensions, I shall first elucidate them 
in summary form, and then look at each tension, and the errors that could 
follow from them, in turn. 
7.4 The Tensions of Church and Politics 
The three tensions identified above, along with the idolatries follow from 
emphasising one side ofthe tension over the other, are as follows: 
1) God's kingdom is both 'now' and 'not yet'. If the latter IS over-
emphasised, the church is dangerously close to ignoring the belief that 
God's kingdom of justice and love has arrived, and is active on earth. 
Totally ignoring the 'now' aspect of God's kingdom easily leads to the 
claim that nothing can be done to save the world, therefore salvation 
has nothing to do with the present condition of the world and political 
involvement is irrelevant. The suffering the world inflicts must be 
home with patience and placidity. If the other side of this dialectic -
the 'not yet' nature of God's kingdom here on earth- is ignored, then 
the church runs the danger of equating liberation with salvation, and 
assuming that humanity can indeed save itself. 
2) The church is in the world but not of it. Over-emphasise the former, 
and the church will face the expectation of baptising the status quo, to 
be part of the world and its established order, structures and 
organisation. (This may be a particular danger for established churches 
that owe their position, to a greater or lesser extent, to the good will of 
the state and its legislative process). If the idea that the churches are 
not of the world is over-emphasised, then the temptation will be to 
retreat into a ghetto mentality and live as a church against the world 
with nothing to say to it. 
3) The church is prophetic and embodied. Over-emphasis on the former 
will lead to paralysis as the prophetic tends to mere denunciation of the 
world as it is, which will deter people from attempting to make a 
difference, and they will therefore tend to sit back and wait for the 
parousia. Over-emphasise the latter, and the prophetic vision is lost as 
differences between the church and the world will be eroded - all 
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persons of good will can see that the world is not as just or as peaceful 
a place as it might be, and can be persuaded to take action if they can 
see that the scope and target of that action is achievable. 
This is not to say that one side of a tension can never be emphasised over the 
other. The danger of idolatry comes when over-emphasis means that the other 
side of the tension is eroded or lost. It may be true that 'where there is no 
vision, the people perish' ,51 but they are equally likely to perish if no practical 
steps are taken to realise the vision laid before them. Any political paideia, 
whether it is for churches, church leaders, or 'ordinary' Christians must show 
that these tensions not only exist, but that Christians (above all people) must 
live with these tensions as they exercise their free responsibility in seeking to 
work out 'how the coming generation is to live. ' 52 I shall now expand on the 
above summary, and show in more detail how each tension follows from the 
work of the three theologians discussed above. 
7.4.1 The Kingdom: Now and Not Yet 
This tension clearly follows from my consideration of the eschatology of my 
conversation partners. If we look at Augustine's views, we can see that he 
clearly emphasises the 'not yet' side of the eschatological argument: 'the 
peace of Babylon' is all we can expect in this life, and he does not expect 
much in the way of improvement in earthly justice - indeed he finds 
'progress' 'inherently ambiguous'.53 Augustine's view is that there has never, 
after the Fall, been a truly just state here on earth, 54 nor does he regard a 
Christian state as 'feasible or necessary' .55 If we stopped here, however, we 
would be ignoring Augustine's relative judgements about different societies, 
and fall into the heresy of saying that salvation has absolutely nothing to do 
with, and gives us no responsibility for, the present, political situation. 
51 Proverbs 29.18 (Authorized Version). 
52 Bonhoeffer, LPP, 7. 
53 O'Donovan, 'Western Political Thought', 146; and see 2.3.4 above. 
54 See DCD, XIX.2l. 
55 Deane, 137. 
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In other words, the eschatological division of people into the two cities is 
Augustinian as 'a first step' only.56 In chapter 2 above, I have pointed to 
Augustine's own involvement, with others, in civil society and his attempts 
through the African church councils to improve the justice of society/7 and 
arguments for leniency in the application of the law58 - laws that he 
nonetheless supports in their attempts to secure the peace of Babylon. For 
Augustine, the facts that members of the city of God are pilgrims while on 
earth59 and that they 'are never bona fide members of the earthly city'60 does 
not remove the requirement to care for our neighbour.61 However, it does 
mean that it is extremely difficult to imagine where Augustine would or could 
advocate any form of civil disobedience, short of martyrdom, in order to 
promote greater justice in society.62 
For Gutierrez, while he never advocates violence, he regards civil 
disobedience - including the 'counter-violence' of the oppressed63 - as 
understandable, and he certainly looks to the church, and its Base Ecclesial 
Communities, to be involved politically in conscientizing the poor. His 
eschatology, as discussed in chapter 4 above, emphasises the 'now' side of the 
kingdom of God, one that regards 'making the world a better place' as part of 
the 'hermeneutics of the kingdom of God'.64 In A Theology of Liberation, 
Gutierrez makes his position clear: 'The absolute value of salvation - far from 
devaluing the world - gives it its authentic meaning and its own autonomy, 
because salvation is already latently here. ' 65 He is clearly against any idea that 
eternal life can be 'seen exclusively as a future life' .66 On the contrary, for 
Gutierrez, Christian actions in the temporal world and the desire to see 
temporal progress are connected with the growth of the kingdom of God here 
56 TeSelle, Living in Two Cities, 61. 
57 See 2.3.7 above, and Dodaro, 'Augustine's Political Activism', 11. 
58 See especially Epp. 152-5 to and from Macedonius. 
59 See DCD, XV, I. 
60 O'Donovan, 'Western Political Thought', 141. 
61 See Confessions, XIII, xvii (20). 
62 See 2.3.6 above and Dodaro, 'Between the Two Cities', 3. 
63 See 4.3.2 above and Hieber, 'Peace Profile: Gustavo Gutierrez', 298. 
64 Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, Revised Edition, 10-11 (quoting Edward 
Schillebeeckx); and see 4.4 above. 
65 Ibid., 85. 
66 Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History, 39. 
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on earth. This leads to an eschatological hope defined as accepting the future 
'as a gift ... accepted in the negation of injustice ... '.67 This leads to the very 
positive statement that 'the claim that "the victory which has conquered death 
is our faith" will be lived, inescapably, at the very heart of history to its 
fulfillment in the definitive encounter with God. ' 68 
The danger with this progressivist eschatology is that the idea of secular 
history functioning 'as part of the coming of the kingdom of God',69 is 
subverted to becoming the idea that secular history is the coming of the 
kingdom of God. This is one of the accusations made against Gutierrez by the 
Vatican's Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine ofthe Faith in March 1983. 
As an excuse for eliminating every "dualism", the author [Gutierrez] 
proposes a dialectical relationship between liberation-salvation and 
liberation-politics ... Although he does not admit it, he falls into a 
temporal messianism and reduces the growth of the kingdom to the 
increase of justice (what kind of justice?) in society. 70 
This is an incorrect reading of Gutierrez71 - he looks to a future 'definitive 
encounter with God', and is insistent that the increase of justice is a part, but 
not the whole of liberation72 - but it is the potential idolatry of a liberationist 
approach to eschatology: a reduction of salvation to liberation in this world. 
This idolatry is, however, rendered implausible by the stubborn sinfulness of 
human nature and all the other limits of life in this world. 73 Therefore it needs 
to be balanced by the 'not yet' nature of eschatology. But recognising this 
tension opens the question of how Christians are to live in this world. 
Even as Christ's disciples seek to mitigate the world's injustices, they must be 
aware that the world will always have injustices that need mitigating: and that 
there will always be those who will oppose what the disciples of Christ seek to 
67 Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, 125. 
68 lbid, 140. 
69 See Doyle, Eschatology and the Shape of Christian Belief, 274, emphasis added. 
70 Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 'Ten Observations on the Theology of 
Gustavo Gutierrez', in Hennelly, Liberation Theology: A Documentary History, 349. 
71 See Hennelly's introduction to ibid., 348. 
72 I have discussed the shortcomings of Liberation Theology in 4.3 above. Gutierrez, 
particularly in his later works, is careful to note the 'spiritual' aspects ofliberation as well as 
its temporal aspects. 
73 Cf. Lash, 'Considering the Trinity', 193. 
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do. So we can see that, in so far as it represents the kingdom of God and not 
the earthly kingdom, the church's stance should be appositional; but in so far 
as it is called to love its worldly neighbour- the kingdom is also 'now' -the 
church must be involved with that neighbour, and any attempt to improve the 
justice in and of the world, must be commended. This has brought us to the 
consideration of the second tension, how the church is to be in the world, but 
not ofit. 
7.4.2 In the World But Not Oflt 
Following from the previous tension, therefore, but yet distinct from it, the 
tension of being in the world, but not of it, follows not just from the now and 
not yet nature of God's kingdom, but also from the knowledge that the world 
is both loved by God and under his judgment. 
Augustine tells us very clearly that, as far as the world is not the kingdom of 
God, it comes under God's judgment; but if we look, for example to 
Bonhoeffer's later works (especially Ethics and Letters and Papers from 
Prison), we can see that the world is also loved by God. Indeed, Bonhoeffer 
goes so far as to reverse his original position and states that, instead of God 
keeping the world in being for the sake of the church, the church continues to 
exist for the sake of the world. 74 Withdrawal from the world is not an option. 
This can clearly be seen from my study of all three theological approaches, 
and I have already noted in this conclusion that Augustine, who is most clear 
about the world's final 'end', never advocated a hermetically sealed church 
separated from the world. However, I have also noted how Augustine's 'other 
worldly' eschatology severely limited any expectation of improving the justice 
and peace in this world. The world, it seemed to Augustine was irredeemable 
in itself, and only the Catholic Church pointed the way for humanity to find its 
true 'end' in God. As Neville Figgis points out, if Augustine did not say that 
'extra ecclesiam nulla sal us', he certainly believes in the principle. 75 
74 See 6.4 above, and Feil, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 138. 
75 Figgis, Political Aspects, 72. 
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Therefore, if we are to follow Augustine's lead, we must more closely define 
this tension as one that advocates involvement in the world, but which does 
not expect overmuch from that involvement, as the world will never 
correspond to the kingdom of God. Put this way, it sounds somewhat 
pessimistic, and one can easily see how people could refuse to get involved on 
the grounds that not much will change anyway - thereby being not in and not 
of the world. Some readings of Discipleship and Life Together have assumed 
that Bonhoeffer takes this separatist line as he expects Christians to face 
persecution simply for being Christians and being separate from the world 
around them.76 As I have noted in chapter 6 above,77 these readings ignore the 
context in which Bonhoeffer was writing. To take one example, Bonhoeffer 
was reminding Christians that Jesus 'demands undivided obedience' in the 
context of Hitler's demand for a loyalty oath to him as Fiihrer.78 So, although 
Bonhoeffer's Finkenwalde writings might appear to be separatist tomes, they 
cannot be considered as such when the Nazi German context is taken into 
account. Indeed, Bonhoeffer deplored the attempts to retreat from the world, 
and pointed out that these attempts lead to a situation where one is not in the 
world, but still of it. It was for this reason that Luther had to leave the 
monastery: 'Luther had to leave the monastery and reenter the world, not 
because the world was good and holy, but because even the monastery was 
nothing else but the world.' 79 
In Discipleship, Bonhoeffer's 'No' to the world was a radical 'Yes' to Christ. 
This 'Yes' to Christ is also a 'Yes' to involvement with and for the other for 
whom Christ also died. Bonhoeffer points to the Sermon on the Mount and 
tells us that we are (only) blessed if we seek God's kingdom of peace and 
justice here on earth as well as in heaven.80 However, he also points to the 
beatitude that tells us we are blessed when, not if, we are persecuted for 
righteousness sake. 81 This is the most difficult lesson of all. It is all too easy, 
76 For example, see Discipleship, 169; and see the discussions in 6.3.2.1 and 6.4.3 above. 
77 See 6.3 .2.1. 
78 See Discipleship, 135, and editors' note 112 in ibid., 130. 
79 Discipleship, 48, and see chapter 6 above, 6.3.2 
80 
'It is important that Jesus calls his disciples blessed ... when they suffer for a just cause.' 
Ibid., 109. 
81 Ibid., 109-10. 
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as Bonhoeffer found, for the church- in its concern to be 'in' the world- to 
bless the bourgeois mentality and proceed with cheap grace and a distortion of 
what Luther (and Augustine) said about obedience to secular authority - in 
other words, to succumb to what Bonhoeffer called the 'secular Protestant' 
rnisunderstanding82 ofthe call of God's grace on a person's life and reduce the 
tension between the church and the world to nothing, and being, as I have 
noted, both in and of the world. 
If the over-emphasis on being 'in' the world leads to the 'secular Protestant' 
misunderstanding of what the call of God's grace is about; then an 
overemphasis on being 'not of the world leads to a misunderstanding in 
another direction. This ts what Bonhoeffer calls the 'monastic' 
misunderstanding of the call of God's grace on a person's life: this is where a 
person fails to appreciate that Jesus' call involves struggle against the world, 
while in it, but 'attempts to find a place which is not the world and at which 
this [misunderstood] call can, therefore, be answered more fitly. ' 83 Bonhoeffer 
insists that this attempt to be neither of nor in the world fails to take either 
God's "yes" or his "no" to the world seriously. 84 
Thus, as far as the church is a representative of the kingdom of God, it must be 
aware of God's "no", and not be of the world. However, because it is also 
aware of God's "yes", it must be in the world, and obedient to its structures as 
far as possible - given that the church's ultimate loyalty is to God and to the 
proclamation of His kingdom. This prophetic proclamation is the subject of 
the third tension. 
7.4.3 The Prophetic and the Embodied Church 
Given that the world is both loved and yet to be judged, the church must work 
out how it is going to live alongside the world without being a part of it: how 
it is to 'make use of the peace of Babylon' without making such imperfect 
peace its own goal. Following on from Peter Bathory, this temptation is one 
82 See 6.5 above, and Ethics, 251. 
83 See 6.5 above, and Ethics, 252. 
84 Ibid. See also 6.5 above. 
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that occurs most often when things are going well: this brings the prophetic 
task to the fore, which seeks 'to re-establish contact between ongoing social 
and political affairs and the founding principles that had given social 
substance to those affairs. ' 85 Bonhoeffer also points out that it is dangerous to 
assume that success and prosperity (setting the values of the world in order) 
will produce more people of faith. 'This is refuted by the evidence of the New 
Testament and of Church history; indeed it has perhaps been precisely at times 
when the world has seemed to be relatively in order that the estrangement 
from the faith has been especially deep-seated and alarming. ' 86 Even the 
Puebla documents note that Base Ecclesial Communities should do more to be 
ecclesial communities. 
But not enough attention has been paid to the training of leaders in 
faith education and Christian directors of intermediate organisms in 
neighbourhoods, the world of work, and the rural areas. Perhaps that is 
why not a few members of certain communities, and even entire 
communities, have been drawn to purely lay institutions or have been 
turned into ideological radicals, and are now in the process of losing 
any authentic feel for the church. 87 
Perhaps this lack of training is the reason why people have transferred their 
allegiance to lay institutions. However, there is another possibility. Perhaps 
some people had just got fed up with a church that still seemed too 
comfortable with the rich and powerful in the land. Given that most people in 
Latin America are at least nominally Roman Catholic, the church could still be 
tempted by that 'success' and become comfortable with the world around it, 
and be further tempted towards the easy life of cheap grace. 
Therefore the church must continually point to God's kingdom- to how things 
ought to be- and how they will be come the eschaton;88 but it must also work 
for that impossibility. The first part of this, I shall refer to as the prophetic call 
of the church, the second as its embodied role. The 'impossible' vision is none 
85 Bathory, 151; and see 3.6.4 above. 
86 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 137. 
87 
'Puebla Final Document, "Base-Level Ecclesial Communities (CEBs), the Parish, and the 
Local Church"', quoted in Hennelly, Liberation Theology: A Documentary History, 249. 
88 I have discussed Bonhoeffer lack of a radical critique and apocalyptic eschatology in 6.4 
above, but he certainly believed in the church's 'watchman's brief. The radical critique in 
more in evidence in Gutierrez and Freire; and we have also seen this critique in Augustine, but 
his emphasis that things will never be truly just in this life militated against the hope of radical 
improvements in society. 
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the less real, and can be worked for in practical steps (however small and 
incremental). It is, to follow Gutierrez, much better to do something to 
improve the justice in the world, than to do nothing, as this denotes acceptance 
of the status quo. It is axiomatic to state that the status quo is never perfectly 
just, so there is always something that can be done to improve the justice in 
the world. However, Bonhoeffer, as I have noted above,89 would point to the 
unpopularity of such a fight on the part of the weak. This resistance on the part 
of the powerful is also a continuing feature in Liberation theology. Augustine, 
while never seeking to oppose civil authority, was none the less a part of a 
violent society, and continually pointed to the martyrs as his example of 
passive resistance to any idolatrous demands that civil society might seek to 
impose on Christians. 90 
These two roles- the prophetic and the embodied- must be kept in tension: to 
over-emphasise the prophetic call to achieve the kingdom of God will either 
lead to apathy on recognition that this is humanly impossible, or enthusiastic 
calls for revolution which tend to lead to more destruction and hardly witness 
to the kingdom of God. Bonhoeffer, perhaps surprisingly, makes this latter 
point in Discipleship. 
Would a revolution which simply overturned the ex1stmg order of 
society not obscure the awareness of God's new ordering of all things 
through Jesus Christ, and the establishment of his church-community? 
Moreover, would every such attempt not actually hinder and delay the 
abolition ofthe entire world order and the dawning of God's realmt1 
If revolution is excluded, then an over-emphasis on the prophetic call, an 
emphasis on how the world does not come up to God's standards, will tend to 
reduce prophecy to mere denunciation, and obscure the denunciation-
annunciation dialectic that Gutierrez and Freire point to.92 Mere denunciation 
will lead to a church separated from the rest of society, with nothing positive 
to say - and therefore it runs the huge risk of its message being totally ignored. 
89 See 6.3.2.1. 
90 Augustine did not accept that anything less than idolatrous demands should be resisted. 
91 Discipleship, 238-9. 
92 See Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, 136: 'The denunciation [of the existing order] is to 
a large extent made with regard to the annunciation.' Also: 'According to Freire, between the 
denunciation and annunciation is the time for building, the historical praxis' (ibid.). See 5.5 
above. 
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On the other hand, to over-emphasise the incremental approach to improving 
justice would tend to eliminate any differences between church and civil 
society - you do not need to be a Christian to see that there are injustices in 
society. Nor do you need to be Christian in order to witness against injustice. 
Without the Christian prophetic denunciation-annunciation dialectic, the 
embodied aspect of the church's work can degenerate into the merely 
pragmatic where power, allies or action will be sought for its own sake -
where 'the peace of Babylon' starts to be seen as an end in itself rather than 
something to be used by the pilgrim members ofthe city of God. 
In its living with the tension between the prophetic and the embodied, the 
church must be both patient and impatient in the same way that Freire 
expected his educator to experience the tension between patience and 
impatience in conscientization. Freire noted that, 
Patience alone may bring the educator to a position of resignation, of 
permissiveness that denies the educator's democratic dream ... 
Conversely, impatience alone may lead the educator to blind activism, 
to action for its own sake . . . Patience alone consumes itself in mere 
prattle; impatience alone consumes itself in irresponsible activism. 93 
If the church is too patient, it will become resigned and apathetic, and will 
never aspire to bring the world closer to the kingdom of God. If it is too 
impatient, it runs the risk of constant and unconsidered action against 'the 
existing order of society' ,94 with all the attendant ills that could bring- a lack 
of foresight that cannot be said to witness to the kingdom of God. Both being 
too patient and impatient show a church that is forgetting the 'now' side of the 
presence of the kingdom of God. The tension between the prophetic and the 
practical may never be solved, and in this tension, we see the need also to look 
to the now and the not yet nature of the kingdom of God. 
93 Freire, Letters to Those Who Dare Teach, 44. See 5.2.3 above. 
94 They may be occasions when 'the existing order' has to be overturned - such as in Central 
Europe when the Iron Curtain came down in 1989. However, I suggest that the Christians 
involved in this overturning of society had a clear idea of what the new order should look like 
(even if they have since been disappointed). On the other hand, Bonhoeffer's warning is 
clearly pertinent for the situation that came about in former Yugoslavia. 
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7.4.4 Conclusion 
What I have discussed above is three inter-related tensions arising from my 
study of three theologians of differing times and places. Although inter-
related, the tensions are distinct. The first, as I noted above, arises from 
eschatological considerations ofthe nature ofthe kingdom of God. The second 
tension arises from asking what the correct attitude of the church should be to 
the world; and the third tension comes from asking what response the church 
should make to that world. However, each tension relates to the others in 
building a more complete picture of how Christians should live and act in this 
world. 
7.5 The Role ofthe 'Ordinary Christian' 
All the above has concentrated on the church, not on Christian individuals. 
None of my conversation partners have shown any individualist tendencies. 
While they have accepted that Christians are individuals, and are called as 
individuals, they have all been equally insistent that these Christian 
individuals are called to live and work in community. Bonhoeffer is especially 
clear in this point,95 but also Augustine insists that life is social,96 even if it is 
not naturally political. Liberation theology is also insistent on the idea of Base 
Ecclesial Communities: people are not conscientized in isolation. As far as the 
individual is concerned, we may assume from this that each person has a role 
in community. Although, as I have made clear, Augustine and Bonhoeffer do 
little to examine that role, I think it is legitimate to assume that a role exists. 
This is not just because 'to do nothing for fear that one person can do so little 
is the greater sin', but also because there is the underlying expectation that 
Christians will love their neighbours and seek to do their best for their 
neighbour.97 Also doing nothing, as noted above m my discussion of 
Gutierrez, shows support for an unjust status quo. 
95 See Life Together, 82; and Discipleship, 99; and 6.5 above. 
96 DCD XIX 5 
97 
'[A] :nan should harm no one, and, second, that he should do good to all, so far as he can.' 
DCD, XIX, 14. 
249 
However, we must also be aware of the potential cost of standing up for 
justice and peace: Augustine survived an assassination attempt. 98 Gutierrez 
lives and Freire lived in a world where politico-religious assassination was and 
is not uncommon,99 and Bonhoeffer died as one of Hitler's last victims in 
April 1945. What all these people have shown is leadership by example. 
Standing up for the poor, seeking mercy for the criminal, defending the Jews, 
all cost my conversation partners in some form or another. Martyrdom, or 
simple witness, may not change things (in the short term at least, it may even 
make things worse), but it shows the poor and oppressed on which side God is 
standing. The Biblical 'preferential option for the poor' is referred to so often 
that it has become commonplace, but it is still as valid as when liberation 
theologians introduced the concept to the world. 100 
This is the unenviable responsibility laid on those who would lead the church. 
They are to lead by example. In the end, as for Bonhoeffer, Christianity is 
often reduced to 'prayer and righteous action' .101 No education for Christian 
political involvement will work unless the disciples see Christians politically 
involved as Christians. This will not always be easy or uncontroversial: 
Bonhoeffer's motivation within the conspiracy has been deeply questioned in 
Germany at least, where many people saw him as a political conspirator, not 
as martyr, especially in the years immediately after the second World War. 
Also Paulo Freire often made so little of his Christian commitment that 
obituary articles could completely miss his Christian faith and motivation, 102 
but the point is that Christian disciples should be able to see the Christian 
motivation of these people. 
This emphasis on the persecution that Christians can face in their demands for 
justice on behalf of the poor has led to a change in terminology. Instead of 
98 Even if it was in what we might now term a religious quarrel, there were 'nationalist' ideas 
behind Donatism. 
99 Archbishop Oscar Romero is simply the most famous of many. 
100 This is, however, without denying God's love for everyone. See 4.5.2 above. 
101 LPP, 300, emphasis added. 
102 This is in spite ofhis Catholicism and his work for the Office of Education ofthe World 
Council of Churches in Geneva- see Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 11. For further discussion 
on this point, see 5.4.1 above. 
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referring to 'ordinary' Christians, I have now referred to 'disciples'. Although 
Gutierrez may live in a society that is nominally, at least, Roman Catholic, 
both Augustine and Bonhoeffer expect that there will only ever be a few 
disciples, 103 and that these may not necessarily be found in church (conversely 
those in church may not necessarily be disciples). 104 However, while they may 
be few in number, these are the people who are prepared to count the cost and 
walk the narrow path. These are the people whom the church should be 
seeking to educate: it may be that these people are more likely to be the 
'organic intellectuals' of any community. 105 
It may be fine to say that all disciples should be educated to know about, and 
to do 'prayer and righteous action', for them to have examples to follow in 
terms of Christian leadership, and to be aware of the possible cost involved; 
but what that righteous action should be in their situation cannot be prescribed, 
except that it should seek to serve the cause of justice in the world. 106 The 
tension between the embodied and the prophetic will not disappear: the 
Biblical emphasis on the prophetic clearly points towards both the failure of 
the Israelite community to live up to the demands of the covenant and the 
hostile environment in which those who followed God had to live- but there 
is very little Biblical prescription of how to 'do justice, and to love kindness, 
and to walk humbly with your God' .107 Just as the Old Testament community 
did, we have to seek our own ways of 'doing justice', in our situation, guided 
by those who have gone before, but aware that their situation may not be the 
same as ours. 
103 See DCD, XVI, 21; XXI, 12 and Discipleship, 175. 
104 See 2.3.4 above and the discussion of van Oort's observations on whether the reprobate 
exist within the church but not the city of God. 
105 While I have no evidence for this assertion of equating organic intellectuals with disciples 
as defined here; it seems to me that it may be likely, as these people need to be concerned, in 
the Christian context of the BECs, for their brothers and sisters- thus fulfilling the demands 
of 'love your neighbour'. Also, as leaders in their communities, organic intellectuals will be 
more likely to face persecution, should it be visited on their communities. 
106 The question to Gutierrez, 'what kind of justice?' (see 7.4.1 above) is pertinent. Some 
questions of justice have no easy answer: where should the line be drawn between civil 
liberties and state control? Where is the justice, or lack thereof, in the use of genetic 
engineering to boost crop yield? The difficulty of these questions, and others, does not 
however, excuse Christians from serving the cause of justice. They merely show that life 
rarely furnishes easy answers, and points to the need for education and leadership. 
107 Micah 6.8. 
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7.6 A Contemporary Application 
While the church may object that it does not only concentrate on private moral 
issues (abortion, euthanasia and the like), but also examines more 'public' 
areas of debate; the general assumption clearly favours a privatised religion. 108 
It also appears that what Bonhoeffer called ' secular Protestantism' is alive and 
well in the twenty-first century.109 When church leaders do speak out on areas 
of public policy, all too often these views are merely noted at best within their 
churches. To take one recent example: the potential war with Iraq may have 
exercised the minds of Anglican bishops, but it does not seem to have 
exercised the mind of many congregations. If ordinary church members are 
concerned about the potential war with Iraq, they are more likely to get their 
information from the media, rather than their churches. Given the twin strands 
of Christian pacifism, and the Christian just war tradition, this is a lamentable 
state of affairs. 
To put it provocatively: what is wrong with seeking to remove a dictator who 
has killed his own people, violated every international agreement he has been 
prevailed upon to sign, rules by terror, and (as far as we know) has weapons of 
mass destruction he is quite prepared to use? If the choice is between a guilty 
dictator and the lives of countless innocent civilians, surely the less evil option 
in a fallen world is to go to war against that dictator? This does seem, after all, 
to be a not over-exaggerated summary of the arguments from a Prime Minister 
who is a self-confessed Christian. However, the bishops do not seem 
convinced. Neither, it must be said, are many other people. 110 In their October 
2002 submission to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, 
the bishops define their job, on the part of the national church, as raising 
108 
'The Church of England's established position guards, in practice, against wholesale 
privatisation but negative reactions to its official political interventions point to a popular 
assumption [within and outside the Church] that it has, at best, a limited political role.' 
(Medhurst and Moyser, Church and Politics, 356.) 
109 Given the number of people in Great Britain and Europe who do not go to church, but still 
feel ' a latent sense of belonging' (Grace Davie, Europe: The l!..x ceptional Case (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002), 6-8), there must be little sense for these people that 
following Christ means taking up a position against the world whilst still in it (see Ethics, 252 
and 6.5 above). 
11 0 Though in October 2002, The Telegraph reported that fifty-seven per cent of Church of 
England clergy would support a war against Iraq, against the bishops ' line. 
http://www. telegraph.co. uk/news/main. jhtml?xml=/news/2002/1 0/06/nbish06.xml ( 16/0 1/03). 
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'those moral and ethical questions, which the government needs to address 
before there is any recourse to war.' 111 The submission clearly relies on just 
war thinking, and makes the excellent point that a just peace needs to be 
sought as the result of any war - the removal of Saddam Hussein is not to be 
seen as an end in itsel£ 112 However, the submission also says that '[i]t is the 
privilege of individual Christians to campaign one way or another for or 
against military action ... '. 113 The bishops are giving individual Christians the 
responsibility to think through the issues involved with war, without giving 
them the means so to do. I, for one, have not heard a single sermon about the 
rights and wrongs of going to war with Iraq or any other state: nor have I 
heard of any discussion group where the issue can be debated in a Christian 
context. The education, the prepolitical education is clearly lacking. 
It seems obvious to me that if the bishops' concerns are to be taken seriously 
by congregations, then those congregations should already be aware of the 
criteria on which the bishops are basing their objections to war with Iraq. This 
means that they should have already been taught about such notions as 'just 
war', and what the outcomes of such a war should be. Even ifthe bishops, and 
their clergy are split on the specific issue on whether war with Iraq is 
justifiable in current circumstances, the criteria upon which the debate rests 
should surely be available to and within congregations. 
The bishops claim to have 'drawn on the resources of scripture, tradition and 
reason' 114 in voicing their objections to war with Iraq. So, if sermons are not 
deemed to be the appropriate place for imparting the information for such 
debate - and, as they are generally one way affairs, feedback is limited - then 
the small groups which meet during the week ought, at the very least, to be 
able to examine Scripture in the light of the events of the day, and not just in 
111 
'Evaluating the Threat of Military Action Against Iraq: A submission by the House of 
Bishops to the House of Conunons Foreign Affairs Select Conunittee 's ongoing inquiry into 
the War on Terrorism' http://ww\\ .cofe.anglican org/papers/Bishopssubmission.doc 
(16/01/03), paragraph 70. 
112 Ibid., 63 . The bishops do not view the United States as having a good record in helping to 
build alternative regimes in those countries where it has recently intervened militarily (ibid.). 
113 Ibid., 70. 
114 Ibid. 
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the light of a privatised faith. This approach obviously has similarities with the 
BECs discussed in chapters 4 and 5 above. In turn, the small group leaders 
would require training similar to that given to the 'organic intellectuals' m 
Latin America. The emphasis is still on Bible study, but its purpose is 
expanded: I have no wish to stop the church 'being church', and it is axiomatic 
that Christians should learn to be Christians within the body of the church, but 
what I contend is that they should also learn how to be Christians, to think 
'Christianly', outside the body of the church, outside what is seen as the 
traditional, privatised box within which religion is 'supposed' to operate. 
This expansion of thinking will not necessarily be popular. Of course it is 
possible that the small group leaders, if not the rest of their groups, may notice 
injustices in society, and, in the light of Scripture, start to object. However, 
this challenge to the world is a necessary part of the gospel. If we rule out 
political questions, we will continue to 'cut short the proclamation of God's 
saving power ... '. 115 Leaving out the political questions will make life more 
comfortable, but it will remain a life of cheap grace. If Christians challenge 
the world, the world will object. This means that Christian discipleship would 
become a more confrontational, risky and dynamic business, but it would 
cover the whole of life. In turn, this means that prepolitical education must 
also involve counting the cost, which is in itself a necessary part of Christian 
discipleship. 116 Costly discipleship, to which challenging the world will 
inevitably lead, involves rejection, suffering for a just cause, but brings the 
blessing of Jesus. 117 
Perhaps this is why the bishops speak in a vacuum: greater involvement brings 
greater cost. However, if the bishops do not wish to talk in a vacuum, if they 
hope to make politicians and the public think that they need to take account of 
a Christian approach to the issues of the day, they must begin, I would 
suggest, by educating their congregations prepolitically to relate their faith to 
115 Oliver O'Donovan, 'Political Theology, Tradition and Modernity', 241. 
116 Luke 14.25-33. 
117 See Discipleship, 108-10. 
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those same issues, so that more ordinary Christians are prepared to challenge 
worldly thinking- and to count the cost of so doing. 
7.7 A 'Summary Grammar' for Political Education 
What I have discerned is a 'grammar' - or a 'set of protocols against 
idolatry' 118 - against which we can measure the church's approach to political 
involvement; and therefore how Christians should be educated for political 
involvement. However, I do not have a curriculum, or anything like it. 
What I have noted is that, for Augustine and Bonhoeffer, Christian leaders 
have a responsibility to act in the interests of their churches and people in 
general to try to create situations of greater justice. But it seems that their 
congregations are expected to follow (mutely?) behind. For Gutierrez, the 
leadership responsibility is to conscientize the poor so that they can take action 
on their own behalf. 
One of the key questions to note is how Christians are, as Kelly puts it, to be 
educated to 'condition themselves to endure persecution for the cause of 
justice ... ?' 119 Not that we should look for martyrdom, 120 but that all 
Christians need to be aware that the responsibility to love our neighbour 
inevitably involves social and political involvement on behalf of our 
neighbour. 121 This involvement on behalf of our neighbour, the poor, the 
oppressed must be (here I follow Augustine) correctly motivated and always 
seeking to serve the cause of justice in civil society. Christians are, in all 
circumstances, called to be disciples first and foremost. In all else, therefore, 
there should be broad obedience, but occasionally, respectful disobedience -
not looking for trouble, but aware that, in Jesus' words: 'blessed are those who 
are persecuted for righteousness' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.' 122 
118 Lash, 187. 
119 Kelly, 'Prayer and Action for Justice', 252. 
120 As Gutierrez notes, such masochism is sinful (We Drink from Our Own Wells, 117 and n.8, 
167). 
121 This must be motivated by 'a real, concrete approach to human persons' and not through 
'fleshless charity' that is 'foreign to human love' (Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation, 114). 
122 Matthew 5.10 (cf. Kelly, 'Prayer and Action for Justice', 252). 
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